# Popular Leadership and Collective Behavior in the Late Roman Republic (ca. 80 - 50 B.C.)

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

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# Preface

The first century B.C. was a turbulent period in Roman history. It was a period of transformation and political conflict. It is also a very well documented period. All this has resulted in a continuous and large flow of publications. Is it then necessary to add yet another comprehensive study of the late Roman Republic?

In the city of Rome during the late Republic, crowds of citizens frequently acted under the leadership of members of the Roman upper class. Aspects thereof have been researched by modern historians in various monographs and articles. A systematic study of popular leadership and crowd behavior in the late Roman Republic and the interaction between these two phenomena, however, is still lacking.

The objective of this study is to analyze the relationship between popular leadership and collective behavior in the political process of the late Roman Republic. The focus will be on the period from circa 80 to 50 B.C., i.e. from the death of Sulla (78) until the beginning of the second civil war (49), which marked the end of the Republican polity. During the final 30 years of the Republic, the processes of change, which had been in operation for several centuries as a result of the continuous expansion of the Roman empire, reached their peak and had their repercussions on all aspects of Roman society. Furthermore, this is the best documented period of Roman history, especially because of the rich amount of contemporary sources. That is why this period is best suited for a detailed analysis of the problems which have been researched here. I will deal only with the events in the city of Rome, since it was the center of politics. Besides, there are very few data about comparable events elsewhere during the same period.

One might wonder whether the sources are representative. This book deals with conflicts, which means that they had news value already in the late Roman Republic. We may therefore assume that at least the successful and spectacular - violent as well as nonviolent - events will have been recorded and, considering the relatively large density of the sources, will have come down to us. Moreover, many of the contemporary sources are eyewitness reports by participating observers. Our data, therefore, should be considered representative, albeit not complete.

Another problem is the prejudice of the sources. Many data are derived from the writings of Cicero, which are known to be subjective. Nevertheless, the Ciceronian source material is valuable, because Cicero's political viewpoints are known to us and because he was a sharp and able observer. Furthermore, Chapter 6 especially addresses the problem of the biased literary tradition.

Throughout the book I will regularly refer to preceding and later periods of Roman history for a better understanding of the events between 80 and 50. Considering the subject of my research, I have opted for a sociological phrasing of the questions. The first section of the Introduction summarizes some important sociological theories for readers who are unfamiliar with the social sciences. I hope that the results of this book will offer social scientists and historians who deal with other periods additional reference material for their own research. Here and there, especially in the notes, I have indicated what direction such further comparative study could take. For this reading public, I have also included some general information on Roman history, especially in the second part of the Introduction.

This study has been arranged by topic, but a chronological survey of the events is offered in Appendix B. After the Introduction, the chapters will successively treat leadership, participation, mobilization, collective behavior, and the role of these factors in the political process. The last chapter offers an analysis of the treatment of popular leadership and collective behavior in the ancient sources. At the end of the book, five appendices have been included, which will be referred to regularly in this study, but which perhaps also may serve as reference material for future research.

Some technical information for the reading of this book: all dates are B.C., unless otherwise indicated or evidently belonging to later periods. For the classical authors reference is made to the editions in the *Loeb Classical Library*, whenever possible. The translations of classical authors are mostly after Loeb, with slight modifications.

This research was made possible in part thanks to financial assistance from the Netherlands organization for the Advancement of Pure Research, the Fulbright-Hays program, and the Nijmegen University Fund Foundation.

Many individuals have contributed to the realization of this project and have encouraged and counseled me in multifarious ways. Some of them I should like to mention by name. In Paris I have been much inspired by cooperation with Professor Claude Nicolet and his *élèves*, among whom I would like to mention Jean-Louis Ferrary, Jean-Marc Flambard, and Hélène Leclerc. At the University of Michigan I have experienced fruitful cooperation with Professors John H. D'Arms, John W. Eadie, and others - students and faculty - in the Departments of Classical Studies, History, and Sociology. I should also like to thank emeritus Professor G.J.D. Aalders H.Wzn. who has provided me with support and advice in the course of my research. I thank Professor H.F.M. Peeters for having introduced me to interdisciplinary history. Professor Bruce W. Frier most kindly went over the manuscript and corrected the translation. Among my colleagues in the Department of Classics in Nijmegen, I thank those who have put their expertise at my disposal. I would like to thank all, including those who have not been mentioned by name, for their support and

encouragement. I should like to finish with the familiar, yet not unnecessary phrase that no one, except myself, is to be held responsible for the views expressed in this book or any remaining errors. The book is dedicated to my parents, who have granted me the opportunity to pursue my interests, and who have never doubted a successful result.

Nijmegen, June 1987

# Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| Ao-x | Appendix A, *optimates,* no. x. |
| Ap-x | Appendix A, *populares,* no. x. |
| B-x | Appendix B, case no. x. |
| *ILLRP* | DEGRASSI, *Inscriptiones Latinae Liberae Rei Publicae.* |
| *LGRR* | GRUEN, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic.* |
| LINTOTT | LINTOTT, *Violence in Republican Rome* |
| MARTIN | MARTIN, *Die Popularen in der Geschichte der späten Republik.* |
| *MRR* | BROUGHTON, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic.* |
| *NMRS* | WISEMAN, *New Men in the Roman Senate.* |
| *OÉ* | NICOLET, *L'Ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine.* |
| *RE* | PAULY-WISSOWA, *Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft.* |
| *RPA* | MEIER, *Res publica amissa.* |
| *SWRP* | SHATZMAN, *Senatorial Wealth and Roman Politics.* |

Abbreviations of classical authors and their works are as much as possible according to the list of abbreviations in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary,* second edition.

# Introduction

*Theoretical Starting-Points*

An interdisciplinary approach to ancient history, in my opinion, can yield important results. The intention of such an approach is not to apply modern theories to antiquity or to test the validity of those theories against data from ancient history. If that would be the object of research, one might, for example, incur the following problem: how can ancient collective behavior be fitted into a modern sociological typology if such behavior is part of normal participation in political life? For modern theorists generally view collective behavior and social movement as something which occurs outside regular and accepted patterns. They take for granted that these phenomena take place in authoritarian political systems or representative democracies. The events in antiquity, however, are often instances of direct democracy, such as in classical Athens, or accepted civilian participation, which from a political point of view is comparable to parliamentary action or referenda.

Nevertheless, some general sociological notions and conceptions are useful in ancient history. The intention of an interdisciplinary approach is to ask new questions with regard to the ancient source material with the help of social science theories, to find a terminological framework in which the output of historical research can be mounted, and to use modern theories as a heuristic device, which means that the historian provides himself with opportunities for comparison. The discovery of analogies and equivalents with the modern era or with modern theories can be of use for a better understanding of Roman history, but especially the differences between antiquity and the present are of importance if one is to understand the singularity of Roman reality.[1]

An important component of modern sociology is formed by research of group behavior. Many theories have developed on the subject. For the historian who wishes to take advantage of these theories the problem of selection crops up.[2] I have selected a number of sociological theories whose general notions and conceptions have served as starting-points for the research on popular leadership and collective behavior in the late Roman Republic. These theories have a solid empirical and often also

[1] On the use and value of social science theories in historical research, see: V.E. BONNELL, The Uses of Theory, Concepts and Comparison in Historical Sociology, *CSSH* 22 (1980), pp. 156-173; H.F.M. PEETERS, *Historische gedragswetenschap. Theorieën, begrippen en methoden. Een bijdrage tot de studie van menselijk gedrag op de lange termijn*, Meppel 1978.

[2] On criteria of selection for social science theories in historical research, see: PEETERS, *op.cit.n.1*, Ch. 3.

historical basis. Moreover, they are broad theories which pretend to have a general validity. They do not approach the problem of collective behavior from a monocausal point of view, but include a variety of factors, such as cognitive, social, political, and economic. We will now look at how these theories view the origin, development, and outcome of collective behavior.[3]

TURNER and KILLIAN's theory of collective behavior is centered on the collectivity rather than on the individual. According to their theory, collective behavior refers to the action of a group composed of interacting individuals who constitute a unit. Interaction is determined by group norms. Collective behavior is contrasted with organizational and institutional behavior. The group members and leaders in collective behavior are not selected and identified by procedure and tradition but more or less spontaneously. Coordination and direction of collective behavior do not depend on established norms, pre-existing social organization, or primary-group integration. Collective behavior is a novelty, and, therefore, prior social organization is not involved in the development of collective behavior, but new forms of organization are established. Though important, organization is less responsible for the origin of collective behavior than spontaneity. Collective behavior is neither irrational nor emotional, but is guided by an "emergent norm" which basically is a deviation from the traditional societal norms.[4]

In TURNER and KILLIAN's view, structural breakdown, the psychological state of the participants, and the role of shared beliefs are important in collective behavior. Structural breakdown means breakdown of culture and organization, which may result from changes in the redistribution of power in society, disasters, mass migration, disturbances in the economic system, and interruptions in the élite circulation process. Conditions which facilitate communication and mobilization are conducive to collective behavior, such as physical environment, type of social control, cultural homogeneity, and the functioning of institutionalized mechanisms of adjustment. Unanticipated events, disruption of the social structure, and value conflicts can precipitate collective behavior.

Collective behavior is noninstitutionalized behavior and it occurs "when the established organization ceases to afford direction and supply channels for action".[5] In such a situation informal and unconventional channels of communication become important. The situation is ambiguous

[3] For a review of the most important theories on collective behavior and social movements, see: R.A. BERK, *Collective Behavior,* Dubuque 1976[2]; A. MORRIS, C. HERRING, *Theory and Research in Social Movements: A Critical Review,* CRSO Working Paper 307, Ann Arbor 1984; J.B. PERRY, M.D. PUGH, *Collective Behavior. Response to Social Stress,* St. Paul 1978; TARROW, *Struggling,* passim.

[4] For their definition of collective behavior: TURNER, et al., *Collective Behavior,* pp. 4-6.

[5] *Ibidem* 30.

and unstructured. There is a feeling of uncertainty and urgency in the crowd. Collective behavior starts when a norm is created.

The individuals in a crowd act in different ways and have different motives for participation. Yet there is an illusion of unanimity because the behavior of a part of the crowd is seen by both observers and participants as being the sentiment of the whole crowd. This is to be explained by the emergence of a norm, i.e. "a common understanding as to what sort of behavior is expected in the situation":

> "Such a shared understanding encourages behavior consistent with the norm, inhibits behavior contrary to it, and justifies restraining action against individuals who dissent. Since the norm is to some degree specific to the situation, differing in degree or in kind from the norms governing noncrowd situations, it is an emergent norm."[6]

The norm develops through a process of rumor, which "is the characteristic mode of communication in collective behavior". "Rumor must be understood as a form of group interaction that involves a network of communicators who engage in a collective decision-making process."[7] In crowds symbols have a significant function in communication, for they constitute the material and the product of rumor. Symbolic interaction is important in the development of collective behavior, the direction of the action, and the formulation of goals.

In a crowd in which the participants cooperate to achieve shared objectives, i.e. a solidaristic crowd, a division of labor develops between the leaders, the active nucleus, and the spectators. Leaders mainly act as keynoters, i.e. they present a positive suggestion in an ambivalent frame of reference. Other leaders may implement these suggestions. By introducing symbols, for instance symbols with a negative connotation, leaders are able to manipulate the crowd into certain actions. Participation is differentiated. A distinction can be made between an active nucleus and spectators, who are more passive.

Collective behavior is not static, but some crowds can become conventionalized. Its members assemble with the expectation that collective behavior will develop. Repetition leads to regularized behavior. Conventionalized collective behavior can serve as an outlet to maintain and strengthen the social order.

Finally, TURNER and KILLIAN distinguish between social movement and other types of collective behavior. They consider the social movement the most extensive, continuous, and well-organized form of collective behavior. Distinguishing features are sustained action, enduring group identity, and continuity in strategy and in leadership. Their definition of social movement is:

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[6] *Ibidem* 22.

[7] *Ibidem* 32 and 42.

"A social movement is a collectivity acting with some continuity to promote or resist a change in the society or group of which it is a part. As a collectivity a movement is a group with indefinite and shifting membership and with leadership whose position is determined more by the informal response of the members than by formal procedures for legitimizing authority".[8]

A reaction to the collective behavior approach is provided by resource mobilization theory, as set forth by MCCARTHY and ZALD.[9] It provides a theoretical framework for the study of social movements. In resource mobilization a social movement is defined as: "A set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society".[10] This broad definition reflects the opinion in this theory that there is no distinction between a social movement and other types of collective behavior. Collective action is always part of a social movement. Furthermore, there are no fundamental differences between collective behavior and institutionalized behavior.

Resource mobilization stresses the importance of the existing infrastructure and almost denies the relevance of existing grievances and discontent: "Grievances and discontent may be defined, created, and manipulated by issue entrepreneurs and organizations".[11] According to this theory, the emergence of collective action and its success depend on several factors: the availability of resources (outside support and especially money and labor), the pre-existing organization (especially structures of communication and solidarity), and the entrepreneurs and their organizations, who generate demands. Social control, too, is an important factor affecting the potential success of mobilization and outcome.

People participate in collective action to realize their interests, and motivation depends on a rational calculation of costs and benefits. For an examination of the outcome of collective action one should look at the rational choices which the participants have made. Resource mobilization also distinguishes between active participants (élite) and a bystander public (mass). The mass are those individuals and groups that control very limited resource pools, for instance only their own time and labor. The élite controls a larger resource pool. Another distinction can be whether or not these groups will benefit directly from the accomplishment of movement goals.

TILLY supports the resource mobilization approach but focuses on the political process which generates collective action.[12] Furthermore, his theory has a strong historical founding. Collective action results from a

[8] *Ibidem* 246. See also 11.

[9] MCCARTHY, et. al., *AJS*, passim.

[10] *Ibidem* 1217-1218.

[11] *Ibidem* 1215.

[12] TILLY, *Mobilization*, passim.

power struggle within the political process. Contenders produce collective action in their struggle for political power.

> "A contender is any group which, during some specific period, applies pooled resources to influence the government. Contenders include challengers and members of the polity. A member is any contender which has routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the government; a challenger is any other contender."[13]

In contentions for power, coalitions usually are made between members of the polity or between nonmembers, but also coalitions between members and nonmembers are possible.

Since TILLY sees collective action as a product of power struggle, he pays attention to collective violence, which he defines as "any observable interaction in the course of which persons or objects are seized or physically damaged in spite of resistance."[14]

According to TILLY, the analysis of collective action has five main components: interest, i.e., the gains and losses of the group; organization; mobilization, i.e., the process by which a group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action and proceeds from passivity to activity; opportunity, i.e., the chances to act provided by the environment; and collective action, i.e., people acting together in pursuit of common interests.[15] All these components interrelate and influence each other.

TILLY stresses the importance of the opportunity to act together, made up of repression and facilitation. The presence and extent of social control determine the materialization of collective action. From the point of view of the government, repression is more successful if it focuses on raising the costs of mobilization rather than on the costs of collective action. Furthermore, the opportunity to act is determined by the susceptibility of the government to the claims of the contender and by the threat of competing claims by other groups.

Several types of collective action are possible: competitive action claims resources which are also claimed by other groups; reactive action attempts to reassert established claims; proactive action attempts to realize new claims. Collective action in each society or community has a different repertoire. The repertoire is determined by prevailing standards of rights and justice, daily routine, internal organization, prior experience, and pattern of repression.

While reviewing the studies on collective behavior and social movements, TARROW rightfully points out the fact that the question of success and failure of these phenomena has received little attention and largely remains unanswered. TARROW attempts to assess the political

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[13] *Ibidem* 52.

[14] *Ibidem* 176.

[15] *Ibidem* 7.

achievements of social protest.[16] Policy innovation is the major expression of the social change demanded by protest movements.

Although adhering to a resource mobilization point of view, TARROW does distinguish between collective behavior, as in general crowd behavior and riots, and social movements. For social movements have some ideological content. He defines social protest movements as "groups possessing a purposive organization, whose leaders identify their goals with the preferences of an unmobilized constituency which they attempt to mobilize in direct action in relation to a target of influence in the political system."[17]

Finally, the outcome of social protest movements is influenced by the political opportunity structure, which is composed of openness and closure of political access, stability of political alignments, and allies and support groups.

Obviously, several approaches to and definitions of collective behavior are possible. We have to address the question, what is collective behavior? First, there seems to be a difference between collective behavior and collective action. The latter term is used by the adherents of resource mobilization, because they research individuals cooperating to achieve certain interests and goals, while others also research less target-orientated types of behavior by a collectivity. The difference, however, is not always very clear, and this is even more true when analyzing data from the late Roman Republic. For our purposes, therefore, I will use the following definition: collective behavior is every larger gathering of people in which some action or reaction of the crowd is discernible. This is a deliberately broad and rather vague definition in order to include as many cases as possible. Furthermore, since many types of collective behavior were interrelated and sometimes overlapped or merged into one another, I think it is necessary to research all types, and not to limit the research to, for example, only violent or only nonviolent cases.

Next, is there a difference between collective behavior and social movement? I agree with TURNER, KILLIAN, and TARROW that the two, albeit part of one phenomenon, should be distinguished, especially if we concentrate on the role of collective behavior in the political process. If we look at the ancient world, we can observe significant differences between, on the one hand, for example, the revolt of Spartacus in the 70s B.C., during which tens of thousands of slaves attempted to realize their freedom by sustained action under one leader, and, on the other, the recurrent violent clashes between circus factions in the hippodrome of Constantinople in late antiquity. At the end of Chapter 5 the question will be treated whether the relationship between popular leadership and collective behavior in the late Republic can be termed a social movement.

[16] TARROW, *op.cit.*, passim.

[17] *Ibidem* 7.

The theories are less explicit on leadership. Let us here keep matters simple: a popular leader is a person who in some way provides leadership to collective behavior.

*Rome in the Late Republic: The Preconditions for Collective Behavior* [18]

The political system of the Roman Republic was based on a city-state, which implied that there existed three levels of administration: executive officials (magistrates), an advisory council (the senate), and a legislative body (popular assembly, of which there were two actually functioning in Rome). To start with the magistrates, a classification from top to bottom during the late Republic looked as follows: consul (2 yearly; general administration, military command), praetor (8 yearly; organization of and introduction to jurisdiction, replacement of the consuls), aedile (4 yearly; public works, supervision of markets, organization of games), and quaestor (20 yearly; administration of the treasury). These magistracies belonged to the *cursus honorum,* the honorable career a Roman had to complete if he was to be counted among the most prominent citizens. Furthermore, the occupancy of these magistracies provided access to the senate.

Besides, there existed two other magistracies: tribune of the plebs (*tribunus plebis* ; 10 yearly; president of the *concilium plebis*) and censor. The office of the tribune of the plebs had been instituted in the early Republic to protect the rights of the people. Only plebeians were allowed to hold the office, and they could obstruct the decisions of all other magistrates and the popular assemblies by their right of veto. Every five years two censors were elected (ex-consuls), who granted public works to contractors and saw to it that the senate had a sufficient number of worthy members. The censors periodically (usually every five years) made a revision (*census*) of the number of citizens and their property.

Except for the censors, the Roman magistrates were subject to the system of annuity and collegiality. Annuity meant that a magistrate's tenure did not exceed one year and that as a rule he was not re-elected. Collegiality implied that each magistrate had at least one colleague in office and that fellow magistrates could veto each other's decisions. In that way one kept each other in check and no one could exercise the same power for too long. (In emergencies a dictator was nominated, who received absolute power during six months.) The magistrates, including

[18] Introductions to the various aspects of the late Roman Republic are provided by: K. CHRIST, *Krise und Untergang der römischen Republik,* Darmstadt 1979; NICOLET, *Rome,* passim, who also provides a most extensive bibliography; H.H. SCULLARD, *From the Gracchi to Nero,* London 1973.
For a survey of the history of the late Republic and its most important problems: BEARD, et. al., *Rome,* passim; L. DE BLOIS, De Romeinse Revolutie (133-27 v.C.), *Lampas* 11 (1978), pp. 109-127.

the tribunes of the plebs, always belonged to the top layer of Roman society. Magistrates did not receive a salary and in the execution of their office they often had to contribute from private means.[19]

The senate was the most powerful organ. Membership was for life and the senators all had administrative experience. Bills proposed to the assemblies were always accompanied by an advice from the senate. Foreign affairs and public finance were even administered entirely by the senate without intervention by the people. Though the people were officially sovereign, the senate was considered the true government. In practice, therefore, the Roman polity became an oligarchy.[20]

During the late Republic two types of popular assemblies were operative in Rome. Unlike Athens, which had a one man-one vote system, Rome knew the principle of the group vote.[21] The citizens cast their ballots within their group, and in the popular assemblies each group had one vote. An important change in the voting procedures occurred when at the end of the second century the oral vote was replaced by a written, secret ballot. This considerably lessened the control of the élite on the course of the voting in the assemblies.[22]

The *comitia centuriata* decided on war and peace and elected the highest magistrates - consuls, praetors, and censors. The centuriate assembly was divided into five property classes, which were subdivided into 193 centuries. The number of citizens in a century varied. The highest census class had 70 centuries, while the unpropertied citizens were packed into one century and therefore only had one vote in the centuriate assembly. The voting proportion, consequently, was heavily in favor of the propertied.[23] The result of the voting in the centuriate assembly to an important extent was determined by the so-called *centuria praerogativa.* The *centuria praerogativa* was assigned by lot, but was always one of the centuries from the highest property class. This voting unit was the first to vote and only after its vote was cast the other units could vote. Superstition had it that the gods expressed their will through the lot and that the vote of the *praerogativa* represented divine will. The vote of the *praerogativa* therefore was usually followed by the other units.[24]

The *comitia tributa* decided on most legislation, elected the lower magistrates and the tribunes of the plebs, and in jurisdiction could serve as

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[19] On the magistrates: NICOLET, *Rome,* Ch. XI.

[20] On the senate: NICOLET, *Rome,* Ch. X.

[21] On the principle of the group vote: NICOLET, *Métier,* pp. 292-294; STAVELEY, *Voting,* Ch. VII.

[22] On the secret ballot: NICOLET, *Métier,* 361-365; STAVELEY, *Voting,* 158-159; TAYLOR, *RVA,* p. 34 and n.2. The secret ballot was introduced successively by a series of *leges tabellariae* : in elections in 139 by the *lex Gabinia,* in trials in 137 by the *lex Cassia,* and in legislation in 130 by the *lex Papiria.*

[23] On the centuriate assembly: NICOLET, *Métier,* 297-304; STAVELEY, *Voting,* 123-129; TAYLOR, *RVA,* Ch. V.

[24] On the *centuria praerogativa* : NICOLET, *Métier,* 349-357; TAYLOR, *RVA,* 91.

court of appeal. The tribal assembly was divided into 35 tribes (*tribus*, residential districts) - 4 for the city and 31 for the countryside. The voting proportion in this assembly, therefore, was more representative of the citizenry. Additionally, there existed a distinction between the tribal assembly proper and the *concilium plebis*. The tribal assembly represented the entire Roman people and was presided by a consul or praetor and occasionally by a curule aedile. In the *concilium plebis* the small group of the patricians was absent and it was presided by a tribune of the plebs.[25] The differences, however, were minor and in this book we will not distinguish between the two.

Only voting was allowed in the assemblies. Political discussion took place in the *contiones*. These were unstructured public meetings which served for discussion on bills, elections, and jurisdiction. The meetings were called by a magistrate, and orations and debates were held in it.[26]

Roman society was highly stratified and divided into property classes.[27] The Roman upper stratum was composed of two groups - senators and *equites* - which basically belonged to one status group. Access to the senate was open to members of the equestrian order who had held a magistracy belonging to the *cursus honorum*, i.e. as from Sulla the quaestorship.[28] Among the senatorial élite there existed several categories, such as *nobiles* and *homines novi*. The *nobiles* formed the top élite, the actual oligarchical nucleus. The nobles were the members of the families which generally produced most of the higher magistrates and certainly most of the consuls. During the late Republic the great majority of the consuls were still members of the *nobilitas*.[29] A *homo novus* was either the first member of a family to enter the senate through an elective magistracy, or a person of senatorial ancestry who became the first praetor or consul of his family, or a member of a non-senatorial family who was the first of his family not only to enter the senate but also to reach the praetorship or the consulate.[30]

Social status and prestige of the senators were not hereditary. In order to remain a part of the senatorial élite and certainly to maintain one's membership of the nobility, the members of the Roman upper class constantly had to prove themselves: they constantly had to secure their

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[25] On the tribal assembly: NICOLET, *Métier*, 304-307; STAVELEY, *Voting*, 129-132; TAYLOR, *RVA*, Ch. IV.

[26] On the *contiones* : NICOLET, *Métier*, 386-391; TAYLOR, *RVA*, Ch. II.

[27] On social stratification in Rome, see: G. ALFÖLDY, *Römische Sozialgeschichte*, Wiesbaden 1984[3] (1975), pp. 45-57; BEARD, *op.cit.*, 41-47; NICOLET, *Rome*, 190-206.

[28] NICOLET, *Annales* 1977, p. 730. Another way, which did not occur in the period under discussion, was election to the senate by the censors, who were elected every five years to revise the composition of the senate.

[29] See *ibidem*, 732; P.A. BRUNT, *Nobilitas* and *Novitas*, *JRS* 72 (1982), pp. 1-17.

[30] VANDERBROECK,*Chiron*, passim. For a different view see DONDIN-PAYRE, *Historia*, passim.

election to the highest magistracies, to take up military commands, and to demonstrate their serviceability to the *res publica* in other ways. Membership of the élite, therefore, was inextricably bound up with politics. This resulted in permanent competition for the offices.[31] That was equally true of the patricians, the remaining small group of families from the early Republican aristocracy. Their status was the only hereditary status among the Roman élite, but in order to actually belong to the ruling class they, too, had to prove themselves in public service. All things considered, the Roman oligarchy was a combination of timocracy, meritocracy, and aristocracy.

Admittance to the equestrian order was gained by a minimum amount of property, by a career as a public servant (secretary, herald) of a magistrate, and especially through a career as an officer in the armed forces.[32] The minimum property qualification for *equites*, and therefore also for senators, was 400,000 HS (sesterces), which was about 800 times the annual income of a poor peasant family.[33]

The economic basis of the upper strata was formed by landed property. The productivity of the ancient economy and especially of agriculture was insufficient to bring about large economic growth or accumulation of capital. Wealth was produced by external factors, such as confiscation of property, exploitation of provinces, and booty from war. The members of the upper class also engaged in trade and granting of credits, but these activities remained subordinate to landed property. A separate group was formed by the *publicani* - mostly *equites*. The Roman state left a lot to private initiative; thus the execution of public works and the lucrative collection of taxes in the provinces were left to the publicans, who leased these tasks from the state.[34]

As far as the senatorial élite was concerned, work in service of the community was recompensed to such an extent that personal ambitions could be entirely realized through political and military accomplishments. At the same time, one had to take care that individuals in their necessity to

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[31] NICOLET, *Annales* 1977, 732-733. On the competitiveness of Roman political culture, see: HOPKINS, *Death*, pp. 107-116.

[32] NICOLET, *Annales* 1977, 738-739.

[33] After HOPKINS, *Conquerors*, pp. 39-40 and *Death*, 75.

[34] NICOLET, *Annales* 1977, 741-751. On the economic activities of the Roman upper class in agriculture and commerce, see: C. NICOLET, Économie, société et institutions au IIe siècle av. J.-C.: de la lex Claudia à l'ager exceptus, *Annales ESC* 35 (1980), pp 871-894. On the commercial activities of the élite: J.H D'ARMS, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome*, Cambridge 1981. On landed property of the senators in the late Republic and the revenues therefrom: *SWRP* pp 21-24 and 47-50. On revenues from proscriptions, provinces, and wars: *SWRP* 37-44, 53-63, and 63-67. Other types of income, but less important than the aforementioned, came from the rental of tenement blocks in Rome, inheritances and downes, corruption, and legal practice: *SWRP* 21-24, 47-53 and 67-73. On money lending: *SWRP* 75-83. On the *publicani*: E. BADIAN, *Publicans and Sinners Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republic*, Ithaca 1983[3] (1972); NICOLET, *Rome*, 260-269.

perform did not rise above their peers, in order to maintain the power of the oligarchy and the equality among the leading group.[35] The oligarchy ruled by means of inner solidarity, personal vertical ties with other social groups, wealth, and authority which was legitimized by collective morality, achievement, and religious sanction.[36]

At the bottom of society were the (male) free citizens, who had the right to vote and who participated in the popular assemblies. Among this group large differences could exist. On the countryside there were wealthy farmers, poor tenants, day laborers, and all kinds of gradations in between. In Rome there were artisans, shopkeepers, and day laborers. At the very bottom and without rights were the slaves. A special phenomenon of Roman society was that freed slaves were enfranchized. The relationship between members of the upper strata and the lower strata is mostly to be qualified as a patron-client relation. Vertical ties permeated all status groups and existed in multifarious forms.

Roman economy, politics, and society were fundamentally influenced by the expansion. After the victory against Hannibal in the second Punic war, Rome started a series of wars of conquest. During the last two centuries B.C., the Roman empire expanded constantly until it comprised the entire Mediterranean basin.[37]

The consequences of the expansion were manifold. The conquests were especially advantageous to the upper strata. Because of the many wars they could gain military prestige. The enormous capital in booty which the members of the élite accumulated was used for conspicious consumption in Rome, which enlarged their prestige, and for investment in land, which led to concentration of landed property. Furthermore, due to the conquests large numbers of cheap slaves were imported into Italy, who were employed on the estates of the rich, their agents, and the Italian gentry. The pressure of rich landed proprietors on the small-holders to give up their land increased. Large-scale landownership increased, and large and mid-size estates developed and began to produce for markets; the peasantry which lived on a subsistence economy decreased. Incidentally, this only applied to certain parts of Italy. The expulsion of peasants was facilitated because of the fact that many peasants as conscript soldiers were away for a long time on military campaigns. Through migration from the countryside and through the frequent practice of manumitting slaves the city of Rome grew, and at the same time the urban market expanded.[38]

Furthermore, the public revenues increased. The conquered territories were tributary to Rome, and from the provinces there came a continual

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[35] *RPA* p. xxvii.

[36] See *ibidem* 45-63.

[37] On Roman expansion and imperialism see, next to the works mentioned in n.18 above: E. BADIAN, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic*, Ithaca 1981[3] (1965).

[38] On the consequences of the expansion: HOPKINS, *Conquerors*, Ch. I.

flow of revenues in the form of money and also in the form of corn, with which the growing population of the city of Rome could be fed. Tradesmen, merchants, and tax farmers could enrich themselves in the new territories.

Because of the many wars a substantial part of the Roman citizens were constantly under arms. Due to the decline of small-holdership there was a decreasing number of recruits who met the minimum property qualification to serve in the army. At the end of the second century, the Roman armed forces were transformed into a volunteer army, which resulted in a professionalization of the armies. Poor citizens, mostly landless peasants, joined up for a living. The soldiers' income depended on the share in the booty they received from their general. Additionally, ex-soldiers depended on their general in order to retain a source of income after their time in the army. For that purpose, generals attempted to pass an agrarian law in the popular assembly in Rome, by which veterans received a plot of land. This was a source of political conflict, since other members of the élite were afraid that by means of an agrarian law a general could acquire a loyal clientele among veterans. The officers also became professionalized. They were more and more recruited from the Italian upper class, which, though having been enfranchized after 88, was integrated into the Roman oligarchy only with difficulty. The officers settled for the best career available to them. Moreover, the detachment of citizen and soldier plus a declining consensus with regard to the legitimacy of the government of the ruling oligarchy among the professionalized officer corps led to a shift in loyalty among the armed forces from state to commander. Sulla and Caesar, therefore, were able to perform a coup d'état with the help of the armed forces.[39]

In the late Republic, the Roman élite was subject to change. The expansion led to an increasing inequality among the oligarchy; some senators as a result of military campaigns became much richer and much more powerful than others. This undermined the most important pillar of the regime, for an oligarchical system was based on an élite balanced by persons whose influence and wealth were not too different and who kept each other in check. Differences and conflicts between individual members of the élite increased. The competition for the magistracies intensified, because a magistracy could imply participation in a lucrative military campaign or a profitable governorship of a province. The obsolete institutions offered insufficient career opportunities to young members of the élite. The growing problems within Roman society formed a breeding ground for political conflicts. The harmony with which the senatorial élite had governed Rome for centuries did not exist anymore.

Political conflicts were fought in different ways. One way was through political trials. The members of the Roman élite sued each other

[39] See DE BLOIS, *Army*, passim.

regularly, and political differences of opinion and feuds were frequently settled in court. Since much administration of justice was public, popular opinion played a part in this as well.[40] Another way was through the people.[41] Because of the problems which faced Roman society, the people, mostly under the leadership of an opposing politician, frequently found themselves in an antagonistic position towards the ruling élite. In that respect, one might possibly speak of social conflicts.[42]

With regard to collective behavior, there existed a number of conditions which were highly conducive to collective behavior. There were numerous occasions in which the people acted collectively or were assembled in great numbers: meetings, popular assemblies, elections, games, performances in the theater, and religious festivities.

Although patron-client relations were an important factor in the maintenance of power by the élite, there was fierce competition between the members of the élite for the most important offices. This competition increased during the late Republic. Further, a certain influence of the people was an accepted phenomenon. These two factors, competition and popular influence, resulted in the fact that certain types of interaction between élite and plebs were embedded in Roman political culture, which signified that politicians attempted to gain the favor of the people and that popularity enlarged the prestige of a politician.

The polity of the late Republic was still aimed at the administration of a city-state. Rome, however, by then ruled an empire. For the government of such a vast empire, the existing administrative system was inadequate and it led to multiple dysfunctions. The number of magistrates and the civil service were too small. In 50, for example, Rome and the provinces were administered by some 60 magistrates. This provided opportunities for private initiative without adequate state control. Acute problems, which were mainly caused by Rome's expansion, increasingly had to be solved by individuals with extraordinary powers, which then led to great power concentrations outside the state. The political structure of the city-state was expanded and stretched to its limits under pressure from the government of an empire. The late Republic was a period of political crisis, but a crisis without an alternative, because everyone wished to hold on to the existing polity and also because imperialism offered sheer unlimited opportunities to especially the upper strata for personal and material advancement. The alternative, the monarchy, only developed after a series of devastating civil wars.[43]

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[40] On the trials during the late Republic: *LGRR* Chs. VII-VIII and App. II.

[41] By "people" I usually mean the citizen population.

[42] For a survey of social conflicts in the late Republic, see: ALFÖLDY, *op.cit.n.27*, 68-84; BRUNT, *Conflicts*, Ch. 6.

[43] The concept "crisis without alternative" was coined by MEIER. On this and the trailing constitutional developments: *RPA* xliii-liii, 151-161, and Ch. 5.

Chapter 1

# Leadership

In this chapter I will discuss the persons who provided leadership to collective behavior. In the Roman Republic, just like in other periods, a division of labor existed. In Rome a three-level leadership structure can be discovered: top level, middle level, and low level leadership, or, as it will be called in this book, *(top) leadership, assistant leadership,* and *intermediate leadership.*[1] These types of leaders will be analyzed in the three sections of this chapter. The analysis will try to determine who these leaders were, what relationships they had with each other, and what their motives were to pursue popular politics. The role of leadership in collective behavior will be discussed in Chapter 3 on mobilization.

Top leadership included famous characters of the late Republic, such as Caesar and Pompey. Much has already been written on the life of these persons, on their political strategy, and on their actions. There is not much new I can add. In this chapter, therefore, the middle and low level leaders will be emphasized, the persons who have thus far received little attention in modern historiography. That is not to say that the major leaders were insignificant. But by stressing their subordinates it is possible to demonstrate on the one hand what their great power and influence on the history of the late Republic was (partly) founded on, and on the other hand how their actions were influenced by their subordinates. Before dealing with the various types of leaders, it is necessary to make some general remarks on the political situation of the élite in the late Republic.

In the elections the *nobiles* were greatly advantaged. They carried with them the prestige of descending from consular families. In view of the powerful position of their families they also were able to mobilize clients, friends, and financial means to support their election. In the late Republic the élite had become considerably more rigid. From 249 to 220 about half of the consuls had a father or a grandfather who had held the consulate; between 80 and 50 the number had risen to three out of four, as is shown by HOPKINS' research.[2] So the *nobilitas* claimed increasingly more consulates.

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[1] Possibly the Roman situation differed in this respect from later periods; RUDÉ thus distinguishes only two levels in the preindustrial crowd, "outside leaders" and "local captains": G. RUDÉ, *The Crowd in History. A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England 1730-1848,* New York 1964, pp. 237-258; idem, *Paris,* pp. 19-20. The same during the middle ages: FOURQUIN, *Soulèvements,* pp. 97-98 (intermediate leaders, vertically bound to the élite).

[2] *Death,* 56 table 2.2, column g, and 58 table 2.4, column g.

For *homines novi* it took a tremendous effort to compete with this. The new men also were barely accepted within the nobility. They were stigmatized by their social descent.[3] The ruling élite had become rigid; there was a lack of mobility. It was particularly difficult for new men to reach the top: the consulate and the *nobilitas*. But on the lower level of the upper strata the situation was less dramatic. Senators of lower rank often were descended from nonsenatorial families.[4] Owing to the fierceness and the high costs of political competition, and to a decreasing fertility in combination with a high mortality not every family could constantly produce successful candidates for office. Especially on the lower level this cleared the way for persons from outside to enter the senatorial élite.[5]

Next to them, there were persons who did belong to the senatorial élite, but who nevertheless fell outside the centers of power: scions of senatorial families who for a long time had not held any important political positions, members of impoverished families, persons whose careers were frustrated by factionalism, ambitious politicians without suffient family clientele. These persons were at a disadvantage and needed something extra against their competitors with a better starting position.[6]

In general the consensus concerning the oligarchical polity and its institutions was declining among the ruling élite in the late Republic.[7] Conformity to the traditional norms and values of the élite decreased. The Roman upper class was disintegrating, individualism increased. Personal *dignitas* became more important than the collective interests of the oligarchy and the *mos maiorum*.[8] Competition, especially at the top, grew fierce. A contributing factor was the opportunity of imperialism. A magistracy could lead to lucrative provincial or military commands, especially in the eastern Mediterranean. Senators who were able to reach the top magistracies and lucrative commands put their unsuccessful peers at a great distance as far as wealth and influence were concerned.[9]

All this becomes clear in the reforms which Cicero and Sallust, both *homines novi,* proposed with regard to the élite. Both thought changes necessary if the élite was to govern the state properly and unanimously. Cicero complained about corrupt senators who were only after their own

[3] *NMRS* pp. 100-107.

[4] *LGRR* 189-208; *NMRS* 153-169; NICOLET, *Annales* 1977, 734.

[5] HOPKINS, *Death,* Ch. 2, tries to prove on the basis of these arguments and statistical material that the Roman élite was much more open than has thus far been assumed. He rightfully emphasizes that there must have been many sons of senators who did not have a successful political career. HOPKINS' statements chiefly concern the rank and file of the élite. Between 80 and 50, as HOPKINS' own figures show (n.2), the *nobilitas* had a great advantage in obtaining the top magistracies.

[6] L. DE BLOIS, De Romeinse Revolutie (133-27 v.C.), *Lampas* 11 (1978), pp. 109-127, esp. 119 and 123; *NMRS* 106; *RPA* 154-156 and 297-299.

[7] See DE BLOIS, *Army,* 27-36.

[8] On individuation in the Roman upper class, see: HOPKINS, *Death,* 79-81 (and also 81-94 on secularism as a reinforcement of individualism).

[9] BEARD, *op.cit.,* 68-71.

interests.[10] He disdainfully commented on *piscinarii*, Roman nobles who merely concerned themselves with their fishponds (*Att.* 1.19.6, 20.3, and 2.1.7). Cicero advocated a *consensus omnium bonorum*, whereby the Italian middle class and rich, industrious citizens (even freedmen) who also wanted to complete a *cursus honorum* got the opportunity to participate in politics.[11] Sallust thought that the élite had become greedy, had degenerated, and only served personal interests. In the second Letter to Caesar, which is ascribed to Sallust, suggestions are made to add members to the senate and to improve its function.[12]

The competition within the upper strata, particularly in the case of popular politics, was accompanied by large expenditures of politicians on behalf of their political careers. The task of the aediles was to organize the various games in Rome. Although they received recompense from the treasury, they usually contributed from personal funds to make the games especially grand and spectacular. Private persons on their own initiative organized games too, such as gladiatorial shows. Furthermore, public feasts and banquets were organized and food and other commodities were distributed. Bribery of voters increased. Finally, aediles had to carry out public works, generals erected monuments to commemorate their campaign, and buildings were constructed by private persons. All this entangled the politically ambitious members of the upper strata in ostentatious expenditure, which subsequently had to be recovered through a provincial command or a military campaign.[13] This was one of the causes of late Republican imperialism.[14]

Personal and political relationships within the élite were founded on the system of *amicitia*, in principle a system of reciprocal services between equals.[15] It was important for a politically ambitious person to provide himself with *amici*. Friends were obtained by providing services, through the membership of a political club (*sodalitas*), and through marital ties and kinship (*Com.Pet.* 16-17). The services which *amici* provided to a politician could consist of escorting a candidate during elections or the donation of tickets for games (Cic. *Mur.* 70 and 73), or of putting clients, freedmen, and slaves at his disposal, and of letters of recommendation (Cic. *Red.Sen.* 20). In addition, help in repaying debts, finding an appropriate suitor for the offspring, and help in legal matters

[10] Cic. *Att.* 1.18.6, *Leg.* 3.9 and 31-32. See also LEHMANN, *Reformvorschläge*, pp. 18-19, 24-26, and 35.

[11] E.g. *Sest.* 96-99; see further NICOLET, *Métier*, 478. On the *boni* see HELLEGOUARC'H, *Vocabulaire*, 484-493.

[12] Sall. *Cat.* 10-13, *Iug.* 41, *Ep.Caes.* 2.11.5. See also LEHMANN, *op.cit.*, 85-88 and 94-99.

[13] On these political expenditures, see *SWRP* 84-91; VEYNE, *Pain*, pp. 387-390, 392, and 400.

[14] *SWRP* 167-176.

[15] See P.A. BRUNT, "Amicitia" in the Late Roman Republic, *PCPS* 11 (1965), pp. 1-20; *RPA* Ch. I; TAYLOR, *PP*, 7-11.

counted as services of friends (Cic. *Off.* 2.54 and 65-70). The expansion of the empire, which led to a growing inequality within the élite, resulted in a modification of the *amicitia* relationships; they became increasingly similar to patron-client relationships, in other words a relationship between unequals.[16]

The general picture of the Roman Republic in modern historiography holds that political parties, in the sense of an organized group of individuals whose concerted action is independent of the issue, did not exist. For certain political problems, ad hoc coalitions were formed between families and their supporters or between politicians and an interest group. They were factions who at every political discussion had a different composition. They were *gegenstandsabhängig* as opposed to modern political parties which are *gegenstandsunabhängig*. This also concerned the senatorial majority when it united to offer resistance to a popular leader who obtained too much power. The senatorial majority did not form a close-knit group either.[17]

In the political language of the late Republic a distinction was made between *populares* and *optimates*. Although these terms, which usually were employed in the plural form, indicate a dichotomy in Roman politics, it was not a distinction between parties. These terms rather served to express a certain type of political behavior. A *popularis* was a politician who wanted to pursue a career through a policy directed towards the people and who at the same time placed his personal interest above the common good. The best translation of the word is *demagogue*.[18] An *optimus* was a politician who endorsed the traditional values of the senatorial oligarchy.[19] In this book both terms will be used to characterize certain politicians in a short way.

### *Top Leaders*

A number of popular leaders appeared in the years before Sulla.[20] Popular politics started with the Gracchi (133-121), who combined their political ambitions with a number of plans for necessary reform. Tiberius Gracchus wanted to help the impoverished peasant class and to solve the recruiting problems of the Roman army by parcelling out public land. His brother Gaius Gracchus added a law which distributed subsidized grain to the inhabitants of Rome. Senatorial repression however overcame the Gracchi brothers. Next came Marius, who reached the consulate six times

16 See DE BLOIS, *Army*, 29-30; idem, *Latomus*.

17 *LGRR* 47-61; *RPA* xxxii-xliii and 163-190.

18 See Chapter 6.

19 On the distinction between *optimates* and *populares*, see: TAYLOR, *PP*, 10-23.

20 On these popular leaders see: MARTIN Part B; MEIER, *RE*, 583-587; *RPA* 128-140 and 208-246.

in the years 107-100. He owed his popularity above all to his status as a *homo novus* and to his military achievements. For some time he cooperated with the tribune of the plebs Saturninus (104-100), who opposed the senate especially with the support of the rural plebs. The senate charged Marius, who as a consul was responsible for public order, with the repression of Saturninus in 100. Marius let this responsibility prevail above his private loyalties and interests, and he carried out the commission. Saturninus was killed during the subsequent riot. Finally, there was Livius Drusus the Younger (91), who tried to enfranchise the Italian allies. For his plans he received little support. He too encountered a violent death. The result was the Social War, in which the Italians gained the long awaited Roman citizenship. The popular leaders of this period are mostly characterized by their elevated status within the élite and by the combination of their political ambitions with attempts to reform the increasing problems which confronted Roman society.

Despite the repression of those who had introduced the plans, some of the proposed reforms were carried out. The problems of the growing city population were met by grain subsidies. The *equites* saw their political ambitions satisfied by a larger influence in the decision process. The professionalization of the armed forces by Marius provided a solution to the lack of recruits. The Roman state was forced to enfranchise the allies. Nevertheless it all turned to be merely a treatment of symptoms. The true cause, the inadequacy of institutions of a city-state for governing an empire, was not dealt with.

The tensions in Roman society and especially the growing tensions within the élite led to the civil war between Marius and Sulla (88-82). Sulla won, and during his dictatorship (81-78) he tried to solve the tensions by a bloody purge of the élite (the proscriptions) and a reinforcement of the senatorial oligarchy. He limited the powers of the tribunes of the plebs and prohibited former tribunes of the plebs from occupying other offices. He also enlarged the senate from 300 to 600 members and he extended the number of quaestors and praetors.[21]

The Sullan system persisted for ten years, but it proved too rigid to meet the ambitions of various persons. The senate Sulla had created was politically biased. Sulla did not bring about a reconciliation, but put his adherents in power. The supporters of Marius and their relatives who had survived the proscriptions were debarred from a political career. Between 80 and 60, as WARD demonstrates[22], the consulate was occupied mainly by Sulla's heirs. At the end of the 70s the political conflicts surfaced again. Now politicians who had won honor and fame under Sulla and who were unwilling to make their careers dependent on the ruling group within the élite began to sabotage the Sullan system. They gratefully availed themselves of the opportunities offered by the problems

[21] On Sulla's reforms: *RPA* 246-262.

[22] WARD, *Crassus*, Appendix I-B.

which confronted Roman society in the late Republic and of the methods which had been developed by popular leaders from the Gracchi.[23]

Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus[24] descended from a senatorial family of rather recent origin. His father Pompeius Strabo had been consul in 89 and a successful general in the Social War. The most important bequest he left his son was the patronage of the area of Picenum, in central Italy on the Adriatic coast. That region was under the patronage of the Pompeii, and throughout his career Pompey was able to draw clients from there as soldiers, voters, and personal assistants. Pompey's starting-point for a career was not quite advantageous: the nobility of his family was relatively recent, his father had not been that popular, and he died when Pompey was still considerably young. Under Sulla and afterwards Pompey achieved important military successes. Therefore he found that he could get ahead faster than others. He refused to adhere to the minimum ages for the completion of offices which had been fixed in the *cursus honorum*. This went against the principles of the Sullan state reform and against the principles of the oligarchical system.

Pompey turned to the people in order to realize his ambitions. His popularity brought him the consulate already in 70, and later he received extraordinary military commands. Thus he was charged in 67 with the war against the pirates. He fulfilled the task with great fervor; within three months he cleaned out the Mediterranean. Between 60 and 62 he stayed in the East and added large areas to the Roman empire. He personally divided the new territories into provinces. His military campaigns left him with a large clientele in the provinces. In 57 he received the assignment to control Rome's corn supply. Pompey's political career and his extraordinary commands in fact placed him outside the political system, albeit he himself did not aspire to such a position. Pompey wanted nothing but recognition within the ruling élite. After years of political conflicts he finally received that acknowledgement, and he made an alliance with the senate. It resulted in the conflict with Caesar in 49. They started a civil war which marked the end of the Republic.

Gaius Julius Caesar originated from a most respectable patrician house.[25] His family had belonged to the Marian faction and Caesar continued to propagate that association. Consequently, Caesar's opportunities for a political career after Sulla were slim. Furthermore, Caesar's family lacked financial means and clients to support a political career. Caesar, therefore, sought refuge with the plebs. He deeply

[23] On the popular leaders between 80 and 50, see: MARTIN Part A; MEIER, *RE*, 587-590; *RPA* 140-144. On the demolition of the Sullan reforms: MARTIN 7-23; *LGRR* Ch. I, esp. 23-37. (GRUEN, incidentally, does not consider it a "demolition", but rather "adjustments".)

[24] On Pompey see *LGRR* 62-66; VAN OOTEGHEM, *Pompée* ; SEAGER, *Pompey*.

[25] On Caesar see: GELZER, *Caesar* ; *LGRR* 75-81; YAVETZ, *Caesar*.

indebted himself to furnish *largitiones* to the people. He took a great risk at that, but as Plutarch argues:

> "He was unsparing in his outlays of money, and was thought to be purchasing a transient and short-lived fame at a great price, though in reality he was buying things of the highest value at a small price."[26]

After his consulate in 59, he received the governorship of the Gallic provinces. He used the command between 58 and 51 to conquer Gaul entirely. The Gallic conquest procured him a devoted army, prestige, and enormous financial means. Eventually his power became too big for the senate and Pompey. Caesar was victorious in the following civil war, which he had not started to attain supreme power but to keep his position. Subsequently he became dictator for life.

Marcus Licinius Crassus[27] was a member of the *nobilitas*. During the first civil war he aligned himself with Sulla. Crassus was able to enrich himself with the possessions of the persons who fell victim to the Sullan proscriptions. After that he enlarged his wealth with real estate in Rome and landed property. He got the name of being the richest man in Rome. He gained military fame by crushing the slave revolt of Spartacus. He became consul twice and fell in 53 in an expedition against the Parthians. Despite the assumption of numerous modern historians, Crassus was not the champion of the *equites*. [28] He figures less prominently as a popular leader than others. He has been included as such because of his political cooperation with important popular leaders. Crassus' wealth enabled him to operate independently and to stay in the background to a certain extent. He was able to create a large following, especially among the senators of lower rank. Unlike Pompey and Caesar he did not need to pursue a specifically popular policy to realize his ambitions.

The big three - Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus - cooperated from 60 in what is usually called the first triumvirate.[29] Individually, Pompey and Crassus had already been able to amass political and military fame against the will of their peers; Caesar stood at the beginning of his career, but had already gained great popularity among the urban plebs. The three

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[26] Plut. *Caes.* 5.4: "χρώμενος δὲ ταῖς δαπάναις ἀφειδῶς, καὶ δοκῶν μὲν ἐφήμερον καὶ βράχεῖαν ἀντικαταλλάττεσθαι μεγάλων ἀναλωμάτων δόξαν, ὠνούμενος δὲ ταὶς ἀληθείαις τὰ μέγιστα μικρῶν."
See on Caesar and others whose political activities led to debts: *SWRP* 80-81.

[27] On Crassus see: B.A. MARSHALL, *Crassus. A Political Biography*, Amsterdam 1976. WARD, *Crassus*. E.S. GRUEN, M. Licinius Crassus. A Review Article, *AJAH* 2 (1977), pp. 117-128, provides some important additions and corrections to these two biographies. See also *LGRR* 66-74.

[28] MARSHALL, *op.cit.n.27*, 96-98; GRUEN, *op.cit.n.27*, 118; *LGRR* 70. WARD, *Crassus*, 107-108 still holds on to that opinion.

[29] On the first triumvirate see, next to the biographies referred to in the previous notes: *LGRR* Ch. III; *RPA* Ch. VII.
The second triumvirate was formed in 44 between Antony, Octavian, and Lepidus to fight the assassins of Caesar: the third civil war.

politicians decided to pool their resources in order to realize their personal ambitions and to carry their plans through against the will of the Sullan oligarchy. As consul Caesar, partly due to his popularity with the people, passed a law for the benefit of Pompey's veterans and had Pompey's enactments in the new oriental provinces and vassal states ratified. Pompey had his veterans and his newly acquired richness behind him. Crassus contributed his wealth and political connections. In 56, at the conference of Luca, the cooperation was renewed and agreements were reached on the division of political power in Rome. Because of their power and because of the resources they had at their disposal the triumvirs are often called "magnates" or "dynasts". When Crassus died in battle in 53, Caesar and Pompey were left to themselves. They increasingly were at odds with each other and, when the senatorial oligarchy formed a coalition with Pompey by recognizing him as the leading statesman, it resulted in civil war.

Publius Clodius Pulcher, finally, was of most noble stock, the patrician family of the Claudii.[30] Instead of a normal political career, Clodius sought a shorter route to the top by operating as a popular leader. He had gained experience in the mobilization of large crowds in 68 when he, as an officer on Lucullus' staff in the East, incited a military unit to mutiny. In 61 he got involved in the Bona Dea affair, a religious scandal for which he was prosecuted. He was acquitted among other things because he could influence the trial through armed gangs. Early in his career Clodius already made contacts with the plebs and engaged in the manipulation of elections. He had himself adopted by a plebeian and thus could become tribune of the plebs in 58, an office that was closed to patricians. As a tribune he passed some important laws: free grain distribution for the people and the restoration of the *collegia,* the plebeian organizations. He also was responsible for the exile of the orator Cicero, who had repressed the conspiracy of Catiline in 63. In 56 Clodius became aedile and in 52 he was a candidate for the praetorship when he was killed by Milo (Ao-2).

Clodius' power base was the urban plebs, whom he controlled by efficient use of the plebeian organizations. Between 80 and 50 Clodius was the only popular leader who was able to keep an independent position from the tribunate of the plebs. We will never know what Clodius' role in the civil war would have been, since he was murdered in 52. Clodius lacked the financial and military resources of the magnates and, in view of

[30] On Clodius an extensive biography is lacking. To date see: BENNER, *Clodius,* passim; GRUEN, *Phoenix* ; MEIJER, *Verliezers,* pp. 106-160; W.M.F. RUNDELL, Cicero and Clodius: The Question of Credibility, *Historia* 28 (1979), pp. 301-328. On Clodius' early career see MOREAU, *Clodiana,* passim, esp. pp. 45-50 and 175-182; T.W. HILLIARD, P. Clodius Pulcher 62-58 B.C.: "Pompeii adfinis et sodalis", *PBSR* 50 (1982), pp. 34-44.
To qualify Clodius as an "anarchist", as ALFÖLDI, *Caesar,* p. 18 does, is an anachronism and wrongs Clodius' personality. For anarchism as a political philosophy did not exist in antiquity, and there are no indications that Clodius had an overthrow of the social and economic structure in mind.

the almost insignificant role of the *plebs urbana* during the civil war, we may assume that a firm grounding in the city of Rome by itself was insufficient to reach great political power.[31]

Clodius cooperated in part with the triumvirs. In 58 he was supported by Pompey in the banishment of Cicero. They severed relations when Clodius began to interfere with Pompey's enactments in the East. Clodius had Cyprus annexed and freed the son of the Armenian king Tigranes, who was a hostage of Pompey.[32] After the conference of Luca a renewed cooperation with the triumvirs was established. Clodius, contrary to frequent assumptions, had never been a subordinate henchman of big men. He was an independent politician, who in his own original way played an important part in the late Republic.[33]

Lucius Sergius Catilina was an unsuccessful popular leader.[34] Catiline was descended from a patrician family, which for a long time had been of minor political significance. He tried to attain the consulate three times, in vain. In 63 he tried to grasp power in Rome by a coup. The participants in his conspiracy were members of senatorial families with the same background or with little financial means or with large debts, who all were ambitious. Also among Catiline's following were politically ambitious *equites*. The Roman élite united under the leadership of the consul Marcus Tullius Cicero, and the conspiracy was aborted. The mobilization of the urban plebs failed completely. Only in the countryside was Catiline able to muster some support, which was destroyed by a Roman army.

What made these persons into popular leaders? The methods they used were at everyone's disposal. However the *populares* led an active as opposed to a reactive policy. The initiative to involve the people in political conflicts was taken by them. That is, they addressed the people and groups within the upper strata who did not belong to the top in order to realize new laws and thus to obtain a following which could support the personal ambitions of the popular leaders. Probably they will have engaged as well in the promotion of interests of groups in Roman society who received little attention from the senatorial élite. But such actions are difficult to trace in the sources due to their not very spectacular character. Furthermore, the tribunate of the plebs kept its traditional function of protector the plebs and institution of appeal. The persons who opposed the

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[31] Cf. LINTOTT 190.

[32] On the breach between Pompey and Clodius, see SEAGER, *Pompey*, 105-107.

[33] As has been convincingly established by GRUEN, *Phoenix*. See also BENNER, *op.cit.*, 17-18 and 133-147. Describing Clodius as a loser, as MEIJER, *Verliezers*, does, is an exaggeration. Clodius indeed lacked the resources of the magnates, as has been remarked before, but at the moment of his death he was still very influential and his death was too premature to draw any conclusions about his political future. After all, Crassus, who died at the zenith of his power as well, cannot be called a loser either.

[34] On Catiline see *LGRR* 416-433; L. HAVAS, Die Catilina-Bewegung und der Senatorenstand, *ACD* 14 (1978), pp. 25-36; MEIJER, *Verliezers*, 38-105.

popular leaders mostly employed the same methods to counter their politics, without offering any real alternatives. This policy was only directed towards maintaining the status quo, which was not satisfactory, so that new people constantly had to pursue a career through popular politics.[35] Although popular leaders cooperated, there was nothing like a popular party. There was no continuity in program, but there was a continuity in method. The same methods of mobilization constantly recur with different popular leaders who do not strive after the same goal. A *popularis* ideology, in the sense of a complex of ideas about what politics or society should look like, did not exist, let alone the pursuit of a democratic system.[36]

The persons who operated as popular leaders were by definition members of the élite, and they wished to figure prominently in that élite. In Cicero's words in 56:

> "No one who preferred to be a popular leader has ever here had it in his power to be the leading man in the state. But some men, either distrusting themselves on account of their own demerit or being driven from union with this order because of obstruction by the others, have often, almost out of necessity, left this harbor and dashed into those waves beyond And if, after a tossing on the seas of a popular career and after having rendered the state good service, they turn their gaze back upon the senate and seek to find favor with this most distinguished body, then, far from being turned down, they should even be courted."[37]

Essentially, the conflicts between what is called *populares* and *optimates* were conflicts between individuals and the rest of the oligarchy. There certainly was no question of an ascending group which sought its place within the ruling group.[38] The popular leaders were rather political

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[35] See for a typology of popular politics in the late Republic: MARTIN Part C; MEIER, *RE*, 590-591; *RPA* 144-151; F.J. MEIJER, Senaat en plebs urbana. Een ingewikkelde verhouding, *Lampas* 17 (1984), pp. 271-289, TAYLOR, *PP*, Chs. VI-VII.

[36] Cf. MARTIN 216-218.

[37] Cic. *Prov.Cons.* 38: "Nemo umquam hic potuit esse princeps, qui maluerit esse popularis. Sed homines aut propter indignitatem suam diffisi ipsi sibi aut propter reliquorum obtrectationem ab huius ordinis coniunctione depulsi saepe ex hoc portu se in illos fluctus prope necessario contulerunt. Qui si ex illa iactatione cursuque populari bene gesta re publica referunt aspectum in curiam atque huic amplissimae dignitati esse commendati volunt, non modo non repellendi sunt, verum etiam expetendi."
Cicero here expresses the thoughts of the first triumvirate and especially Caesar's, with whom he had aligned himself after the conference of Luca. See on Cicero's alliance with Caesar: H.E. BUTLER, M. CARY, *M Tulli Ciceronis De Provinciis Consularibus Oratio Ad Senatum*, New York 1979[2] (1924), pp. 102-104. The speech can also be considered as one of Cicero's attempts to draw Caesar (*ibidem*, 71) and Pompey back into the senatorial camp. See on Cicero's policy towards Pompey in his orations: ACHARD, *Pratique*, pp. 150-159.

[38] In other words the problem of élite circulation did not exist in Rome. According to MARTINES élite circulation was one of the main causes of political conflict during the late middle ages: MARTINES, in: MARTINES,*Violence*, pp. 332-338. FOURQUIN however relativises that (*op cit*, 93-95).

contenders within the ruling élite or with a certain leeway. Their membership of the élite on the one hand gave the popular leaders the resources to pursue a successful policy. On the other hand they adhered to the same ideology as their fellow members of the élite. For that reason the popular leaders did not produce any innovations or alternatives to the existing power structure.

Typical in this respect is Pompey's dream, as it is described by Plutarch (*Pomp.* 68.2). On the night before the battle of Pharsalus in 48, during the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, Pompey had a dream. The battle, as both opponents knew, would be decisive. The victor would rule Rome. Pompey, however, did not dream of sole rule, but he dreamt that he entered the theater and that the people applauded. What Pompey, like Caesar, was aiming at was not a monarchy, but a prominent position in Roman society, recognition as leader and statesman, and popularity with everyone, in other words: status, prestige, and authority. The Romans had one word for that: *dignitas*. That the ambitions of these great men were not compatible with the existing political system, perhaps is the tragedy of the Roman Republic.

Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, cos. 54, can serve as an example of how much popular leaders and their political opponents resembled each other.[39] Ahenobarbus was a *nobilis* and counted as a principled defender of the senatorial oligarchy, who constantly opposed popular leaders. He started as an assistant leader of the *optimates* and developed into an independent politician. In the 50s he tried to deprive Caesar of his command in Gaul and in 48 he fell in the battle of Pharsalus against Caesar.

The question is: Can Ahenobarbus' behavior be explained from political principles? In the first place Ahenobarbus, like other nobles, had big financial interests in the conquered territories (especially Gaul) through intermediaries and *publicani*. During the Roman expansion of the second and first centuries we can trace the development of a regional specialization among families of the Roman upper class. When wars had to be waged in certain geographical areas, persons from the same families constantly came to the fore to wage them. Consequently, these families obtained great influence in the provinces and could count these regions among their clientele. Thus we see the Aemilii Paulli operate in Greece and Macedon, the Scipiones in Africa and Spain, the Pompeii in Spain. For the Domitii Ahenobarbi it was Gaul.[40] Grandfather Cn. Domitius, cos. 122, defeated the Gallic tribes of the Allobrogi and Arverni. Next, he added the province of Gallia Narbonensis to the Roman empire. He also constructed the Via Domitia in that area. Father Domitius, cos. 96, was involved in the foundation of the Roman colony of Narbo. Lucius tried to

[39] For the references see Ao-37. I have not been able to consult: A. BURNS, *The Life and Political Career of Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus*, Diss. Washington 1964.

[40] See E. BADIAN, *Foreign Clientelae (264-70 B.C.)*, Oxford 1958, pp. 263-265 and 313.

take over Caesar's command in Gaul, because he thought it belonged rightfully to him in view of his family background. In 49, the senate appointed him governor of Gaul and without much success he tried to defend Marseilles against Caesar's army.

Ahenobarbus was a rich landed proprietor. He called his slaves and peasants to Rome as shock troops in politics. It is possible that he was short of liquid assets, for in the civil war he promised his soldiers land as payment; it was customary in those days that soldiers receive cash for pay and possibly land after discharge. Due to his lack of cash Ahenobarbus supposedly could not entirely prove himself in politics. Furthermore, Caesar was constantly a step ahead of him. Caesar became consul sooner and snatched Gaul away. Ahenobarbus probably wanted to achieve the same as any other ambitious politician, but circumstances forced him to take the side of the opponents of the popular leaders.

The lack of opportunity within the existing institutions on the one hand, the great possibilities of the empire on the other, the political obstruction as a result of the fear of individual increase of power, and conversely the fear of individuals of losing face and power, led to an escalation of political conflicts without anyone wanting to implement actual modifications in the system. That would take years of civil war and the genius of Augustus.

Characteristically, popular leaderhip in Rome was by definition a formal leadership.[41] The higher level leaders who were involved in collective behavior all held a magistracy. In this we discover a distinctive Roman modality which distinguishes the Roman Republic from other periods. Only Clodius was able to develop into an informal leader, i.e. he was able to mobilize the crowd also beyond his magistracies. We will return to this distinctive feature of Roman leadership in more detail in Chapter 3, where the role of leadership will be discussed. Another, weaker form of informal leadership consisted of a top leader, with a certain popularity, who wanted to continue to exert influence by way of the people as a private person, i.e. without the possession of a magistracy. To do so, he needed others who did hold an office. This brings us to the second level of the leadership structure, the assistant leaders.

### *Assistant Leaders*

On a lower level we come across the second group of leaders: the assistant leaders. These middle level leaders, just like the great popular leaders, were members of the élite but they held a lower magistracy, the tribunate of the plebs. They joined a leader and supported him in his popular

[41] On the difference between formal and informal leadership, see: WELSH, *Leaders*, p. 20.

politics by serving as a link between the leaders on the one hand and the intermediate leaders and the people on the other.

To find out who these persons were, a prosopography has been made of tribunes of the plebs who aligned themselves to popular leaders. They will be compared to their counterparts who supported the policy of the opponents of the popular leaders.[42] It is a known fact that political parties in the modern sense were nonexistent in the Roman Republic, and that political alliances often were short-lived and were formed on an ad hoc basis. Nevertheless there were politicians who pursued a policy oriented towards the people and who through that policy were in opposition to the rest of the élite, i.e. the senatorial majority. For the sake of convenience, Roman terminology will be employed here, as it will be throughout this book; that is to say that the assistant leaders of the popular leaders will be indicated with *populares* and the assistant leaders of the senatorial majority with *optimates.*

Why the tribunes of the plebs? The tribunes of the plebs in view of their function and the possibilities of their office were the most suitable to support popular policy. Tribunes of the plebs could convene meetings and tribal assemblies, preside over them, and introduce bills. The cooperation between leaders and tribunes of the plebs was necessary, because a Roman statesman was not allowed to propose a bill which was beneficial to himself[43]. A leader, therefore, needed an assistant who introduced a bill in the assembly to grant his leader, for example, a lucrative provincial command. In addition, tribunes of the plebs had the right of veto (*intercessio*) to the decisions of all other magistrates and in the assembly. Thus they could obstruct unfavorable decisions for their leader. Moreover, there was a consciousness among the plebs that the tribunes had been established to promote the interests of the people. A tribune of the plebs, therefore, had a great advantage in the mobilization of the plebs in comparison to other magistrates.[44]

In the years 80-50 the tribunes of the plebs did not have the independent function in popular politics they had once had. Politicians such as the Gracchi and Saturninus had been top leaders in popular politics, although even they could not do without the support of important magistrates and senators. As a result of the measures of Sulla, who limited the powers of the tribunate of the plebs and who blocked further career possibilities of the tribunes, the office had become less attractive during the 70s. Only after "desullanization" could the tribunes of the plebs fully

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[42] For the prosopographies see Appendix A. The assistant leaders will be referred to as follows: Ao-x means *optimates* assistant leader no. x; Ap-x means *populares* assistant leader no. x.

[43] According to the *leges Liciniae Aebutiae* : Cic. *Leg.Agr.* 2.21.

[44] On the tribunes of the plebs as the pace-makers of popular politics, see: MARTIN 213-214. Even in 49 Caesar could rouse indignation among his soldiers by telling them about the tribunes Antony and Curio who had been driven from Rome in shame: DE BLOIS, *Army,* 46.

participate in politics again. But at that time, the formation of a large-scale society had progressed so far already that the office of tribune of the plebs was insufficient for the power struggle among the élite. The army and enormous financial resources now were of overriding importance. Therefore the tribunes of the plebs by definition had to join a powerful leader, which meant that the once independent office had been reduced to a subordinate function.[45] Clodius was the only exception, albeit an important one.[46]

How did leaders and assistant leaders get together? Some connections went back to the period before the beginning of the assistant leader's career. Thus Pompey could recruit a number of persons from Picenum, the traditional recruiting ground of his clientele.[47] An important way of recruiting a following was the army. A general could reward political allies with a lucrative position on his staff, and officers often remained faithful after the campaign was terminated. Pompey thus acquired a following among the nobles during his campaigns in the 60s. After he joined the triumvirate against the senate, he lost most of them, and in the 50s he depended on new men, former *equites,* and Italians. Caesar's officers seem to have been more faithful than Pompey's. Caesar acquired a following among senators of lower rank and Italians.[48]

Furthermore, persons engaged in business together or had other kinds of economic relationships. Many contacts were made in Rome. The vast number of trials provided ample opportunity for people to get acquainted or to draw attention to oneself. The small Roman upper class was interconnected through marriage and there were adequate ways and means available to introduce potential allies to each other.

In this section a number of quantitative comparisons will be made between the assistants of *populares* and *optimates*. Quantitative research in ancient history is always a hazardous affair, because the researcher never has any certainty about the representativity of his data. So also for this research. Each year ten tribunes were elected in Rome, which results in 300 persons in the 30 years between 78 and 49, the period under

[45] See also MARTIN 221-226; *RPA* 135 and 141.

[46] Cato the Younger might be seen as an exception too. During his tribunate he was an independent politician, but his heyday came after the tribunate, during the 50s. Before that others led the *optimates,* for example Cicero, Hortensius, and Catulus. Therefore Cato is listed among the assistant leaders (Ao-27).

[47] Ap-23, 54, and perhaps Ap-20. See also *SWRP* 138-140 and Ao-17.

[48] On Pompey's and Caesar's following, see *LGRR* 106-119.

investigation.[49] Of those 300, 114 are known by date and year of office.[50] Of 87 of those, some political activity is known, so that they can be classified in one of the two categories: 52 *populares* and 35 *optimates*.[51] Although we may presume that the most politically active persons will have been recorded in the sources, we will never know if 87 out of 300 tribunes of the plebs are a representative sample. A quantitative analysis of one group, for example *populares*, therefore is not meaningful, apart from significant differences and tendencies[52]. A quantitative comparison between two groups, e.g. between *populares* and *optimates*, is however meaningful, since both groups will have suffered as much from premature death, fragmentary source material, and historical oblivion. Nonetheless, in comparisons between the groups a wide margin of significance will be employed: significant is a difference between the outcomes of at least 20 %. Furthermore, individual cases will be examined to underscore the numerical conclusions.

The main purpose of the prosopographical research has not been to find any new prosopographical data. The results of a series of prosopographies made by other historians have been combined in order to find the data relevant to this research. In order to determine the background of the assistant leaders, their relationship with top leaders, and their motives to pursue a certain type of political behavior, the two categories have been researched for social status, career opportunities (which in Rome meant opportunity for social mobility), political allegiance, and political loyalty.

Let us start with some general comparisons. First, social status. I have investigated whether the assistant leaders appear in the list of *homines novi* in *NMRS*. Unlike in *NMRS*, no distinction has been made between *homines novi certi* and *incerti*, since it is not relevant to this research if someone was a "real" new man or not. What counts is if someone was of obscure social descent, and that includes the *incerti* too. *NMRS* only lists the persons who were the first of their family to enter the senate. Those of senatorial descent who were the first to reach the praetorship or the

[49] 300 different persons, since the occupation of an magistracy twice was exceptional and against custom. If someone had held the tribunate twice, it most likely would have been reported in the sources. Conversely, I have found no indications of any successors to tribunes who died in office.

[50] 113 + Varro (Ao-34), whose tribunate probably fell at the beginning of the period under discussion (*MRR* 85-271 and 473). Apart from him a few persons are known by name who possibly have been tribune of the plebs between 78 and 49, but of whom not much more is known (*MRR* 468-474).

[51] Clodius, of course, is excluded from the 87 tribunes, because he should be counted among the top leaders during his tribunate.

[52] The sample of one group is likely to be representative as far as political activity is concerned, but this remains uncertain. Therefore, in case a comparison within one group will be made, I will adhere to a high margin of significance: if the difference between the outcomes in terms of percentage amounts to at least 50 %, the outcome will be considered significant.

consulate and therefore should be counted among the *homines novi* as well[53], do not appear in WISEMAN's list. But that is not important for our purposes, because we are dealing with lower magistrates and their social status at that point.

Tribunes of the plebs came from a wide variety of backgrounds: the nobility, the equestrian order, the Italian municipalities. In general the tribunate was a magistracy which was more open to new men than the aedilate or the praetorship.[54] There appears to be no difference between *populares* and *optimates*. Both number as many *novi* as *non-novi* among their ranks:

Table 1: Social status

| | *Novi* | *Non-Novi* |
|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=52 | (21) 40 % | (31) 60 % |
| *optimates* n=35 | (14) 40 % | (21) 60 % |

This tendency is confirmed by BRUHNS' research. When the civil war broke out in 49, the Roman politicians, who had been fighting each other individually until then, gathered in two camps around a leader: the *populares* under Caesar and the *optimates* with Pompey in command. Most high-ranking *nobiles* were on Pompey's side. The majority of the nobles of lower rank and the young were with Caesar. In both parties, however, there were considerable numbers of all categories. Caesar had a heterogeneous following and was not a rallying point for the outcasts and have-nots of the Roman élite.[55]

Next, the career opportunities. Were the assistant leaders able to rise in office after their magistracy as an assistant leader? By career is meant that the assistant leader held a higher magistracy after the tribunate of the plebs (aedile or up):

Table 2: Careers

| | Career | No Career |
|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=52 | (27) 52 %[56] | (25) 48 % |
| *optimates* n=35 | (20) 57 %[57] | (15) 43 % |

The opportunities for both groups prove to have been about equal. A little over half of both groups rose to aedile, praetor or consul. Moreover, it was a marked career: of the *populares* two tribunes did not go beyond aedile and of the *optimates* one tribune did not go beyond aedile. All the

53 On this category see: DONDIN-PAYRE, *op.cit.*, 43-47; HOPKINS, *Death*, 40; VANDERBROECK, *op.cit.*, 241.

54 *LGRR* 188.

55 BRUHNS, *Caesar*, Ch. 3.

56 2 aediles, 16 praetors, 9 consuls.

57 1 aedile, 15 praetors, 4 consuls.

others attained the praetorship or the consulate. Of both groups a little less than half did not rise beyond the tribunate.

The situation becomes different if we look at the attainment of a high office (praetor or consul) and the time at which the office was reached. The times roughly match for both groups. Both groups were active as assistant leaders between 78 and 49. From 70 the first reached the praetorship, and as from 58 we come across consuls. The table below distinguishes between the attainment of the highest magistracy before (<49) and after (>49) the beginning of the civil war. Those who held their highest magistracy in 49 are included in the first column, because they were elected in 50, before the outbreak of hostilities.

Table 3: Career opportunities before and after the outbreak of the civil war

| | | pr<49 | pr>49 | | cos<49 | cos>49 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *populares* | n=16 | (14) 87 % | (2) 13 % | n=9 | (2) 22 % | (7) 78 % |
| *optimates* | n=15 | (12) 80 % | (3) 20 % | n=4 | (2) 50 % | (2) 50 % |

The assistant leaders of both groups had nearly equal opportunity to reach the praetorship before the civil war began. Of all assistant leaders who became praetor, 80 % or more reached the office in 49 or earlier. With the consuls, however, there is a substantial difference.[58] Although *populares* assistant leaders and *optimates* assistant leaders started their official career in the same period, the *optimates* were more successful in attaining the highest office: the consulate.

The absolute numbers are of course small for far-reaching conclusions. But, unlike the tribunes of the plebs, all the consuls in this period are known. Furthermore, it is not remarkable that the difference occurs at the consulate. For Sulla had augmented the number of quaestors during his dictatorship from 10 to 20 and the number of praetors from 6 to 8, while the number of consuls was kept to 2. These reforms remained in force until the dictatorship of Caesar. The result was that more opportunity for a magistracy was created on the lower level and also for the entry to the senate. The competition at the top level, conversely, was intensified, because now each year there were more candidates for the same number of consulates. Up to and including the praetorship the chances were equal, but it took much more effort to attain the consulate. The fierce competition for the highest offices in the late Republic also follows from the fact that persons of senatorial descent who were the first of their family to reach the consulate or the praetorship were counted among the new men.[59]

[58] The intervals between the careers hardly differ. The average interval between the tribunate and the praetorship before 49 for the *populares* is 4.4 years and for the *optimates* 4.7 years. The interval between tribunate and consulate before 49: for *populares* on average 6.5 years; for *optimates* 6.5 years as well.

[59] N. 53 above.

The difference could imply that the *populares* before 49 had more difficulty in attaining the consulate and that they owed their career to the civil war. We could then suppose that it did not matter much for a career on a lower level if a young politician joined a popular leader or if he sought support with the senatorial majority. But as soon as a *populares* assistant leader wanted to become consul, he was obstructed because of his political allegiance. The power of the Sullan oligarchy, which virtually controlled the consulate before 60[60], was declining after 60 under the influence of the triumvirate. But even in the 50s the triumvirs were unable to control the consular elections. The power of the oligarchy was still most strongly felt in the consulate.[61] It led to a biased attitude towards those who did not put themselves under the patronage of this powerful group within the senatorial élite.

A supplementary reason could be that the top leaders reserved the consulate for themselves and conceded to their assistants only other magistracies. The consulates of the assistant leaders for both groups fall in the period starting with 58. In that period, Pompey became consul twice (in 55 and 52), Crassus once (in 55), and Caesar, who had already held the consulate in 59, stood for the office in 49. Support in consular elections also was a good way to win for the *populares* persons who should be counted among the *optimates* (Ao-8 and 15). Considering the fierce competition there was not enough room to have assistants hold the consulate as well.

A political career was often connected with a military career. Those who strove after a political career in Rome often needed a position in the army or a governorship in a province to finance their political career. An assignment as an officer, as *legatus*, during a military campaign was very adequate for that purpose.[62] What about the distribution of known *legati* among the assistant leaders? During the civil war the entire Roman élite bore arms. In consideration of the special situation resulting from the civil war, the table below only shows the legations which were held in the "normal" period, i.e. 49 or earlier.

Table 4: Legates (before the outbreak of the civil war)

| | *Legati* | *Non-Legati* |
|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=52 | (19) 37 % | (33) 63 % |
| *optimates* n=35 | (5) 14 % | (30) 86 % |

Comparatively more legates are to be found among the *populares* than among the *optimates*. Great popular leaders, such as Caesar and Pompey,

60 N. 21 above.

61 *LGRR* 141-159.

62 The nomination of legates during the late Republic had become a personal affair of the general: B. SCHLEUßNER, *Die Legaten der römischen Republik.* Decem Legati *und ständige Hilfsgesandte,* München 1978, pp. 172-185. It was an effective means of acquiring personal adherents (*ibidem* 204-215).

were also successful military commanders and owed a large part of their political success to their military conquests. The legations of the *populares*, consequently, fell primarily in the 60s and 50s, when Pompey and Caesar held their big campaigns.

Did social status play a part in making a career?

Table 5: Social status and career opportunities

| | *Novi* and Career | *Novi* and No Career | | *Non-Novi* and Career | *Non-Novi* and No Career |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=21 | (13) 62 % | (8) 38 % | n=31 | (14) 45 % | (17) 55 % |
| *optimates* n=14 | (6) 43 % | (8) 57 % | n=21 | (14) 67 % | (7) 33 % |

Although the difference between the *novi* who had a career amounts to 19 % (62-43=19) and therefore falls below the 20 % margin of significance adhered to in this research, there does seem to be a tendency for new men to have better career perspectives with a popular leader than with the *optimates*. [63]

The difference becomes significant when we introduce the time factor for the highest magistracies. Of the 21 *populares* assistant leaders of low social status, i.e. the first senators of their family, eight reached the praetorship and four the consulate. Among the *optimates novi* we come across four praetors and one consul. The table below shows when the *novi* attained their highest magistracies: in 49 or earlier, or after 49.

Table 6: Career opportunities of *novi* before and after the outbreak of the civil war

| | pr<49 | pr>49 | | cos<49 | cos>49 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=8 | (7) 86 % | (1) 14 % | n=4 | (0) 0 % | (4) 100 % |
| *optimates* n=4 | (2) 50 % | (2) 50 % | n=1 | (0) 0 % | (1) 100 % |

As appears from the table, the new men with the popular leaders had a better chance to reach the praetorship than their political counterparts (86 versus 50 %). Typically, the two *optimates* assistant leaders who became praetor after 49 (Ao-10 and 13) thanked the office to their switchover to Caesar. For the category *homines novi* which is employed here (the first senators of a family) the attainment of the praetorship implied an enormous social advancement.

No new man among the assistant leaders reached the consulate before 49. They all had to wait until the civil war. For the *populares*, attention can be drawn to Afranius (Ap-54), not a tribune of the plebs but a new man who became consul in 60 thanks to Pompey's patronage, and Gabinius (Ap-18), an assistant leader and consul in 58. Gabinius falls into another category of *homines novi* : the first consul of a senatorial family. The only *novus* among the *optimates* who reached the consulate was C.

[63] Of all tribunes known between 70 and 50 almost half of the new men reached curule office: *LGRR* 188.

Furnius (Ao-19), who changed his allegiance to Caesar in 49 and became consul in 29.

It appears that new men who joined a popular leader stood a better chance of social promotion, from which follows that social prejudice played a more important part with the *optimates*. During Caesar's dictatorship more new men became consul than before the beginning of civil war. BRUHNS argues plausibly that this was not a deliberate policy of Caesar's, but that the cause lay in the larger possibilities created by the civil war: there was an insufficient number of *nobiles* candidates.[64] Nevertheless, this explanation seems too one-sided. The tendency of new men before the civil war to have the best career perspectives with the popular leaders will have continued under Caesar's dictatorship.[65]

The difference is even more obvious among the *legati*, where the *novi* among the *populares* evidently had more chances.

Table 7: Social status and legates (before 49)

| | *Novi Legati* | *Non-Novi Legati* |
|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=19 | (12) 63 % | (7) 37 % |
| *optimates* n=5 | (0) 0 % | (5) 100 % |

Among the *optimates novi* no one was able to attain a legation. The majority of the legations among the *populares* werd occupied by new men. For *homines novi* a successful career in the army was an important way of social advancement.[66] On a lower level a military career, e.g. as a military tribune, provided opportunities to members of the municipal élite in Italy to enter the equestrian order of Rome.[67] In fact, the army and especially long-term military campaigns provided opportunities of gain and social mobility to every member of the Roman élite and to those who aspired to enter it. But new men distinctively had the best opportunities with the *populares*.

If we take a look at the political allegiance of the assistant leaders, it becomes obvious that Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus were the big three among the popular leaders. Of the *populares* assistants 41 out of 52 or 79 % were connected during their active period with one or more members of the triumvirate, and the great majority (38) clearly with

64 BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 149-154. See also YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 169-172.

65 On Caesar's promotion of new men to the consulate during the civil war, see: R. SYME, *The Roman Revolution*, Oxford 1966[7] (1939), p. 94.

66 *NMRS* 122 and 147. On the attractiveness of legacies for senators of lower rank, see: SCHLEUßNER, *op.cit.n.62*, 161-167. On the careers of *homines novi* with popular leaders, see further *NMRS* 176-177.

67 S. DEMOUGIN, Notables municipaux et ordre équestre à l'époque des dernières guerres civiles, in: *Bourgeoisies*, pp. 279-298.

Caesar and/or Pompey.[68] The *optimates* assistant leaders were less clearly aligned to a person or persons. Of the *populares* only two assistant leaders or 4 % are classified as "independent", i.e. not having a clear personal alignment (Ap-46 and 48). Among the *optimates*, on the contrary, 17 independents or 43 % of the total can be discovered.

The newly established difference in personal alignment between the two groups is reflected in their political loyalty. The table below reports how many changed allegiance after their activity as assistant leader:

Table 8: Loyalty

| | Change | No Change |
|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=52 | (13) 25 % | (39) 75 % |
| *optimates* n=35 | (16) 46 % | (19) 54 % |

Of the *populares* a quarter changed allegiance, while the ratio among the *optimates* is almost fifty-fifty. This proves that the *optimates* were more willing to change allegiance than their counterparts. The *populares*, therefore, not only were more personally aligned but also had a stronger political loyalty. In other words the *populares* had a stronger "leadership loyalty". Leadership loyalty is defined here as the degree of personal alignment in combination with the degree of loyalty in political allegiance.

There is another form of loyalty: group loyalty, i.e. the degree of loyalty to one's own group of those who changed political allegiance. For two types of changes of political allegiance are possible: a transfer to another leader within one's own group and a transfer to the opposing group. It appears that when a change of allegiance was made, comparatively more *optimates* switched to the *populares* than vice versa. The *populares* had a stronger group loyalty; more than the *optimates* they tended to stay within their own group. If *populares* changed, they usually made a transfer from one popular leader to another:

Table 9: Group loyalty

| | Change Within Group | Change to Other Group |
|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=13 | (11) 85 %[69] | (2) 15 % |
| *optimates* n=16 | (7) 44 % | (9) 56 % |

To put it in another way, only two *populares* assistant leaders or 4 % of the total appear to have switched to the *optimates* (Ap-9 and 20). For the *optimates* the number is 9 or 26 % of the total who have made the reverse move. In two respects, then, differences in political loyalty between

[68] Crassus hardly appears in the story. Only Quinctius (Ap-41) was probably aligned to Crassus alone.

[69] Messius (Ap-29) included in this group.

*populares* and *optimates* assistant leaders can be ascertained: the *populares* had a stronger leadership loyalty and a stronger group loyalty.

What was the reason for the difference in political loyalty? Was it perhaps social status? Although the occurrence of new men in both groups was comparatively equal, the *novi* with the *populares* perhaps were less prepared to change than those of a more elevated social descent. The relationship between social status and change of political allegiance is described below:

Table 10: Loyalty and social status

| | *Novi* and Change | *Novi* and No Change | | *Non-Novi* and Change | *Non-Novi* and No Change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=21 | (5) 24 % | (16) 76 % | n=31 | (8) 26 % | (23) 74 % |
| *optimates* n=14 | (7) 50 % | (7) 50 % | n=21 | (9) 43 % | (12) 57 % |

If we compare this table to the overall loyalty (Table 7 above), the new men do not differ from those with a higher social status. Of the *populares* about 25 % were willing to change allegiance, and of the *optimates* the number was about half. The *homines novi* showed the same behavior as those of higher social status. Both groups reflect the general picture of political changings: the *populares* were less willing to change allegiance than the *optimates*. Social descent, therefore, cannot account for the difference in political loyalty.[70] For the *homines novi* this does not seem odd, because after all it was profitable for them to stay with the *populares* because of the better career opportunities and the higher chances of a legation. The *optimates novi* tended more to transfer to the other group because, as we have seen, they had better career opportunities under a popular leader.

If social status does not account for the difference in leadership loyalty, what does? Political motives for a change of allegiance, in the sense of an ideological choice, will not have come into it, since such ideas played a minor part in the political process of the late Republic. It could be hypothesized that career perspectives must have been the most important reason for a change of allegiance. Did a chance of allegiance have in fact a favorable influence on one's career? The table below gives the interrelationship of political change and career opportunities for both groups. Since some had already reached their highest office before their change of allegiance, only those who rose in office after the change are included in the first column.

[70] Contra WISEMAN (*NMRS* 173-174), who argues that new men tended to turn away from a popular leader as soon as they had made a career. For proof, WISEMAN merely cites the cases of Marius, Cicero, and Caesar's officer Hirtius. But the careers of Marius and Cicero are too exceptional to be representative of the average new man. Indeed, the aim of the new men was to be accepted by the nobility, but the obstruction they had to face from that same nobility made them loyal to the popular leaders.

Table 11: Leadership loyalty and career opportunities

| | Change and Career | Change and No Career | | No Change and Career | No Change and No Career |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=13 | (4) 31 % | (9) 69 % | n=39 | (18) 46 % | (21) 54 % |
| *optimates* n=16 | (7) 44 % | (9) 56 % | n=19 | (8) 42 % | (11) 58 % |

The difference between *populares* and *optimates* is not significant. In spite of the fact that *populares* were more loyal than *optimates*, the difference in loyalty did not influence the career opportunities. For both groups it can be said that weak leadership loyalty was not rewarded with higher career opportunities. Some individual cases will be discussed shortly.

Did it make a difference for the career perspectives which type of change took place? In other words, did a relationship exist between group loyalty and career perspectives? Listed below is the interrelationship of group loyalty and career perspectives, again adjusted for time period, as a result of which only those who were promoted after their transfer have been included as having a career:

Table 12: Group loyalty and career opportunities

| | Within Group and Career | Within Group and No Career | | To other Group and Career | To other Group and No Career |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| *populares* n=11 | (4) 36 % | (7) 64 % | n=2 | (1) 50 % | (1) 50 % |
| *optimates* n=7 | (0) 0 % | (7) 100 % | n=9 | (7) 78 % | (2) 22 % |

Although the majority of the *populares* who changed within their group did not make any career progress, it was more profitable for the *populares* to change within their own group than it was for the *optimates*. To put it in another way, in comparison to the *optimates* a stronger group loyalty was more favorable to the *populares*. The explanation is provided by the civil war. The *optimates* who changed within their group all were persons who joined Pompey in 49. At that time, Pompey had opted for the senatorial majority. Because Caesar controlled Rome during the civil war and could distribute the magistracies in the capital, career possibilities for *optimates* evidently were nonexistent.

Out of eleven *populares* who switched within their group, five did so before the civil war broke out. Fufius Calenus (Ap-17) switched to Caesar after Clodius died; he became Caesar's legate and then consul in 47. Messius (Ap-29) went to Caesar in 54, became his legate, but did not rise above his aedilate of 55. Cato (Ap-39) changed allegiance from Clodius to Pompey after the conference of Luca in 56 and became praetor in 55. Curio (Ap-46) became an adherent of Caesar during his tribunate in 50 and subsequently Caesar's legate. Trebonius (Ap-49) opted for Caesar in 54, became legate in Gaul, praetor in 48, and eventually consul in 45. In short, all of the *populares* who changed allegiance within their own group received at least a legation. This leads to the conclusion that for the

careers of the *populares* it was profitable before the beginning of the civil war to change within their group.

As for the relationship between a weak group loyalty and career possibilities, the following picture emerges from Table 12: For *optimates* a weak group loyalty is more profitable than for *populares*. 78 % of the *optimates* who changed to the opposing group were then promoted against 50 % of the *populares*. Out of seven *optimates* who switched to the *populares*, three did so before 49. Metellus Scipio (Ao-8) in 53 aligned himself to Pompey, at that time still a *popularis*, and managed to become consul in 52. Caelius Rufus (Ao-10) transferred to Caesar in 50 hoping to receive financial support. He became praetor in 48. Domitius Calvinus (Ao-15) became consul in 53 thanks to Caesar's support. Thus all *optimates* who switched gained from their lack of loyalty to their group.

The two *populares* who changed to the *optimates* before the outbreak of the civil war were Calpurnius Bestia (Ap-9) and Labienus (Ap-20). Bestia was the only *popularis* who also rose in office. He sympathized with Catiline, but did not actively partake in the revolt. The only thing he did was to denounce Cicero for his execution of the conspirators. The exact time of his change is unknown, but it probably took place after his tribunate. He supposedly became aedile in 59. His activities as a partisan of the *optimates* were limited to providing shelter for Sestius (Ao-31) during a riot. In short, his political allegiances were uncertain and his career was not significant. He therefore should perhaps not be taken into consideration.

Labienus is an interesting case. His foremost motive for a change of allegiance most likely was ambition. The *optimates* probably will have offered him career opportunities and perhaps an army of his own. But since at this point we only look for results and not for motives, Labienus must be classified as a changer who did not profit from his transfer. Labienus became a legate with the *optimates*, but he had held that position already under Caesar. He did not get any other office. Of course, the *optimates* did not have the possibility of granting Labienus a magistracy since Caesar ruled Rome. But on the other hand, Labienus' switch took place in extraordinary circumstances. In January 49, war was at hand and for the *optimates* at that point Labienus' military capabilities took higher priority than his low social status as a new man. They probably offered him career opportunities they normally would never have considered.

To sum up, the following conclusions can be drawn from the interrelationship of group loyalty and career opportunities. *Populares* had a stronger group loyalty than *optimates*. The difference cannot be explained by a comparison between the career opportunities of those who were loyal to their group, since all of the *optimates* who changed within their group did not do so until 49. Considering the situation in the civil war, nothing can be said about their careers. But for the *populares* it seems to have been profitable to remain loyal to their group, because

those who transferred to another popular leader before the civil war all took advantage of it.

The stronger group loyalty of the *populares* can be explained, however, by comparing the careers of those in both groups who changed to the opposing group. The *populares* were less change-minded than the *optimates* and, if they changed, they usually made a switch within their own group. The only *popularis* who changed to the *optimates* with some promotion (Ap-9) should actually be dismissed because of the unclarity of his case. Conversely, all *optimates* who joined a popular leader before 49 took advantage of the transfer. A weak group loyalty among the *optimates* was rewarded with more favorable career opportunities.

Popular leaders exerted an attraction for the *optimates* assistant leaders. Those who made the transfer could count on support in their careers. Support in consular elections was an especially good way of receiving political support from *optimates* adherents. The cases of Scipio (Ao-8) and Calvinus (Ao-15) have already been mentioned.When Pompey wanted to recall Cicero from exile, he promised Milo (Ao-2) the consulate in exchange for his help.[71] Some examples of persons who had not been tribunes of the plebs are M. Pupius Piso, a Pompeian legate who thanks to Pompey's support and against the wish of the senate became consul in 61[72], Afranius (Ap-54) who was rewarded by Pompey for his loyal services with extensive financial support during his election campaign in 61, Aemilius (Ap-53) who as a consul changed allegiance after having received financial support from Caesar, and Piso (Ap-55) who became consul with Caesar's support and who during his consulate buttressed popular politics. The most obvious example of the attraction exerted by popular leaders is the conference of Luca in 56, at which Caesar distributed the Gallic spoils of war among a large number of senators.[73]

The important difference in leadership loyalty between the two groups can be partly explained by the fact that those who pursued popular politics, from a political perspective, formed an opposition group, a group which resisted the majority in the senate. In order to persevere effectively against that majority a strong bond within their own *factio* was necessary.

More importantly, there was a forced loyalty and particularly a forced group loyalty: a *populares* assistant leader had compromised himself to such an extent that he could count on little support from the *optimates* for the rest of his career. That is why Cicero during his election campaign in 64 for the consulate had to play down his good relations with Pompey and

[71] App. *BC* 2.16. On acquiring political allies by offering career opportunities, see also: Cic. *Att.* 10.8.2, *Dom.* 129; NISBET, *De Domo,* pp. 89-90, 119, and 177.

[72] *MRR* 178; SEAGER, *Pompey,* 70-71.

[73] For the details see A.M. WARD, The Conference of Luca: Did it Happen?, *AJAH* 5 (1980), pp. 48-63. See further on how Caesar availed of his position in Gaul to obtain support in Rome: *SWRP* 124-128.

had to pose, to the extent he could, as pro-*optimates* and anti-*populares* in order not to antagonize the *nobilitas*.[74] The careers of the *populares* assistant leaders depended on a popular leader, especially if they wished to reach the highest office, the consulate. That was pre-eminently true of persons of lower social status. The *populares* assistant leaders had little to expect from the political opponents of the popular leaders. It forced them to loyalty. The opportunity of a legation, which the *populares* assistant leaders had, provides an additional explanation of the strong group loyalty which was to be found in this group. Thus popular leaders and assistant leaders were closely bound to each other.

A example is Aulus Gabinius (Ap-18), one of the most exemplary assistant leaders. From the beginning of his career, he worked under the patronage of Pompey. Gabinius as a tribune of the plebs in 67 was responsible for Pompey's extraordinary command against the pirates. Subsequently, he was a successful legate under Pompey in the East. Thanks to Pompey he became consul in 58. As such he supported Clodius, with whom Pompey was on friendly terms at that time. When the cooperation between Pompey and Clodius was terminated in the course of the same year, Gabinius too turned away from Clodius. Gabinius remained faithful to Pompey during his subsequent provincial command in Syria. Probably as a result of the arrangements between the magnates at the conference of Luca, Gabinius left the expedition against the Parthians to Crassus and returned to Rome against his liking. Pompey thought Gabinius expendable. In 54 Gabinius was prosecuted for his intervention in Egyptian affairs. Pompey did help him, but not sufficiently. Pompey dropped him or at least Gabinius thought he did, and Gabinius was exiled. Despite his successful career Gabinius could not do without his patron's support. Politically and socially he collapsed. No one spoke up for him. He was saved at the outbreak of the civil war, when Caesar recalled him from exile and he revengefully joined Caesar.

Popular leaders did not need to be afraid of their assistants joining the *optimates*. But an attraction was exerted by competing popular leaders. Although *populares* assistant leaders were not very change-minded, those who did make a transfer could count on career support or at least a lucrative legation. A leader had to make an effort to retain his followers.[75] Even as a dictator Caesar did not have a free hand: while distributing the offices he had to reckon with the claims of his talented legates, the young nobles who had been on his side from the beginning of

[74] *Com.Pet.* 4-5; *NMRS* 175.

[75] Labienus (Ap-20), who switched to the *optimates* in 49, can serve as an example as well of the pains popular leaders had to take in order to hold on to their assistant leaders. Labienus was, certainly as a soldier, one of Caesar's most successful assistant leaders. His ambitions made him switch to Pompey. See further on how popular leaders tried to keep their following: *SWRP* 124-125 and 138-140.

the civil war, and the Pompeians whom he drew into his camp[76]. It goes to show that popular leaders were obliged to hold on to their assistants by continuously guaranteeing them promotion. This must have been one of the reasons why popular leaders meddled in elections so regularly. That interference subsequently led to a competition with other candidates.

The popular leader-assistant leader relationship shows how much the magnates surpassed their peers in the Roman élite. In 52 no less than all ten tribunes of the plebs supported the proposal to let Caesar stand for the consulate *in absentia*.[77] Another example is C. Curio (Ap-46), tribune of the plebs in 50. Curio was a scion of an important Roman family. He had the potential of becoming a popular leader with the status of Clodius. Curio had been with Clodius in his youth and had married Clodius' widow. His policy seemed to be inspired by Clodius. He started his tribunate as an independent politician and proposed bills on the grain distribution and on the building and repairing of roads, which made him very popular.[78] However the growing enmity between Pompey and Caesar forced him to make a choice for the latter. The resources of the magnates outside Rome were far too important for an independent tribune in Rome to compete with.

In the years 80-50 those who rose to the consulate generally were capable of pursuing an independent policy of their own. But as a result of the enormous resources of the magnates, even consuls at a certain moment were reduced to assistant leaders.[79] The consulate, Rome's highest and most powerful magistracy, thus had gone through the same development as the tribunate of the plebs. It was a harbinger of the Principate: the occupation of a magistracy did not suffice for political power if it was opposed by persons with a huge private fortune and a strong army.

Due to its expansion, Rome had developed into a large-scale society in the late Republic. The rewards of political competition were higher, but so were the risks. It took a greater effort to reach the top. As a result of this development, junior politicians more than ever needed to secure the political patronage of an influential person, especially if they lacked the backing of an important family. The forced group loyalty of the *populares* possibly reveals an important cause of the political conflicts of the late Republic. The senatorial majority was not prepared to forgive a *populares* assistant leader for his political choice. If the oligarchy would have evinced some flexibility in that respect, they could have undermined

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[76] Dio 42.19.1-2; Plut. *Caes.* 58.1; BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 166. See also Cic. *Att.* 4.9.3; YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 169-172. To provide more career opportunities for his following was one of the reasons behind Caesar's measures to increase the number of magistrates during his dictatorship: YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 109-110.

[77] *MRR* 236. Among those there were even some who should be counted among the *optimates* assistant leaders (see Ap-31).

[78] On Curio and his independence, see *LGRR* 470-483; W.K. LACEY, The Tribunate of Curio, *Historia* 10 (1961), pp. 68-98.

[79] Ap-18, 53, 54, and 55; Ao-8 and 15.

an important part of the power of the popular leaders. This too foreshadows the Principate; the power of the emperors from Augustus on rested largely on the private financial means of the emperor and the canalization of ambitions of the élite by a conscientious support of magisterial careers.

The development of Roman society in the late Republic has recently been described in the terms of structural differentiation.[80] Structural differentation these days is a classic sociological concept, but still usefully applied to the late Republic. As a result of the growing complexity of Roman society in an expanding empire, some institutions became more functionally specific. Roman law, for example, became more professionalized; the late Republic was the time of the rise of legal experts.[81] Increased competition was accompanied by professionalization and specialization.[82] These developments provide a parallel to the development of the assistant leaders.

One of these parallel developments occurred in the Roman army. The lack of interest among young members of the nobility in a military career increased. Serving in the army was not considered the certain and compulsory springboard to a political career any more. Officer's duties were increasingly performed by scions of low ranking senatorial families, *equites,* or Italian families. Just like soldier, military officer became a profession. This group had little to expect from the Roman oligarchy, who even excluded them from a political career. As far as their social and material advancement was concerned, these officers, evidently, had more to expect from their general than from the traditional Roman élite.[83]

Another parallel is provided by the orators. From the time of the Gracchi, the criminal trials, which were conducted within the Roman élite and which often were started by popular politicians, offered young orators from Italian stock the opportunity to prove themselves. In that way they could attract attention and advance socially. Because of their low descent, it was advancement they otherwise would have achieved with more difficulty.[84]

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80 HOPKINS, *Conquerors,* 74-96.

81 See *ibidem* 80-90 and especially. B W. FRIER, *The Rise of the Roman Jurists· Studies in Cicero's Pro Caecina,* Princeton 1985, passim.

82 See in general on the different types of specialization in this period: DE BLOIS, *Army,* 16-18; idem, *Latomus*

83 H.C. BOREN, Rome: Republican Disintegration, Augustan Re-Integration: Focus on the Army, *Thought* 55 (1980), pp 50-64, esp 58-59. On the social descent of these officers and the declining importance of military service for a political career: J. SUOLAHTI, *The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period A Study on Social Structure,* Helsinki 1955, passim.

84 J.M. DAVID, Promotion civique et droit à la parole: L. Licinius Crassus, les accusateurs et les rhéteurs latins, *MEFRA* 91 (1979), pp. 135-181, idem, Les orateurs des municipes à Rome· intégration, réticences et snobismes, in· *Bourgeoisies,* pp 309-323. See also *NMRS* 118-121.

The assistant leaders developed into specialists of popular politics. The *Commentariolum Petitionis*, the "Handbook of Electioneering" most likely written by Cicero's brother Quintus for the benefit of Cicero's campaign for the consulate in 64, tells us about another form of specialization (*Com.Pet.* 18-19). The fierce competition in the late Republic produced electioneering experts. They concentrated on winning support in their tribe. For that purpose they had established *sodalitates*, electoral organizations. They could put these organizations at the disposal of candidates. One such an expert was the assistant leader Cornelius (Ap-13). Clodius had started his public career as an electioneering expert.[85]

On the one hand, structural differentiation and the rigidity of the Roman élite forced young politicians to join a leader in order to get promotion. On the other hand, the problems which faced Roman society offered opportunities for professionalization and specialization, which could lead to a career: as an officer in the army, as an orator, or as an assistant leader of a popular leader.

In the late Republic, as has been said before, there was no question of political parties in the modern sense. But the coalitions formed among the *populares* were more than mere ad hoc alliances.The observed loyalty with the *populares* points to the existence of a political organization: persons at different levels, who cooperated with each other and who were dependent on one another. Popular leaders needed assistant leaders to realize their political plans. The political latitude of the popular leaders was limited by the ambitions of the assistant leaders. Those ambitions had to be met in order to prevent a desertion to other leaders. Assistant leaders required the patronage of a popular leader in order to make a career. Their loyalty, consequently, was to their leader and not to the Republic.

The importance of a political organization to a leader appears from the characters L. Cornelius Balbus and the less known C. Oppius. They were rich influential persons who stayed in the background and, at first (Balbus became cos.suff. in 40), did not strive for a magistracy. They were engaged by Caesar. During the 50s they had created an efficient communication network between Rome and Caesar's headquarters in Gaul. They conducted Caesar's money flow to the right people in Rome and represented Caesar in politics. After Caesar's death, the organization they had set up remained in their hands. The contacts and channels they had at their disposal enabled them, among other things, to convert immovables into cash quickly, which gave Octavian the means to win the loyalty of large groups of veterans and plebeians and to organize splendid games. By putting themselves and their organization behind Octavian, Balbus and Oppius were able to launch him as Caesar's successor.[86]

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[85] MOREAU, *REL*, pp. 225-229; idem, *Clodiana*, 182-188; HILLIARD, *op.cit.n.30*, 42-43.

[86] This paragraph is based on ALFÖLDI, *Oktavian*, Ch. V. See also YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 171 and 173.

As Caesar stood at the Rubicon in 49, he was not faced with the choice between a civil war, with the possible result of one-man rule, and peace. Caesar did not aspire to supreme power. His options were on the one hand the resignation of his offices and, simultaneously, the complete loss of prestige (*dignitas*) and the ability to support his assistants, and on the other hand civil war. Caesar must have realized that he was not alone and that the people who had served him in Gaul and in Rome and also a number of malcontents and opportunists still were expecting a lot from him. Caesar's supporters will have exerted a tremendous pressure on him not to give in to his opponents. After all, they had nothing to expect from a settlement with the *optimates*. [87]

*Intermediate Leaders*

The low level of the leadership was formed by the intermediate leaders. This term has been chosen, because these persons constituted the true intermediaries between popular leaders and crowd. They operated as a relay in the communication between leader and public. They were the ones who had to translate the policy of the leaders to the plebs and accomplish the alliance between popular leader and people. These relays had become necessary in the late Republic, because the distance between top and bottom in Roman society had grown larger. The economic and social differentiation resulting from the expansion into a large-scale society as well as the development of the city of Rome into a metropolis rendered communication more difficult. Intermediaries were needed to bring leaders and plebs together. Roman aristocrats had always used slaves and especially freedmen as go-betweens and assistants in their social and economic as well as their political activities.[88] On a larger scale, intermediate persons were now employed as agents in popular politics.

First of all there existed a category of intermediate leaders who actually mobilized parts of the crowd on behalf of a popular leader and provided leadership for collective behavior. Mostly they are indicated with the term *dux multitudinum* (Liv. 4.13) or *dux operarum*. Other terms used are *dux seditionis* (Cic. *Dom.* 12-13), *satelles* (Cic. *Mil.* 90, *Dom.* 72), and *minister* (Cic. *Dom.* 48). According to Sallust, there even existed professional *duces* in the late Republic.[89] That is probably

[87] K. RAAFLAUB, *Dignitatis contentio Studien zur Motivation und politische Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius*, Munchen 1974, pp. 182-192 and 219-225, argues that Caesar's motives for entering the civil war were highly personal· Caesar refused to give up his position of status, authority, and prestige; he was prepared to fight for his *dignitas* However, Caesar owed his position mainly to his political organization That as well was at stake if Caesar lost his *dignitas* Caesar's motives might have been personal, but they certainly were influenced by his followers Caesar's future was inextricably bound up with theirs

[88] On freedmen as political agents, see TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, pp. 177-192.

[89] *Cat.* 50.1: "duces multitudinum, qui pretio rem publicam vexare soliti erant."

exaggerated, but it goes without question that there existed persons who performed an important function in the mobilization process.

We have some indications that intermediate leaders existed already before the years 80-50. Plutarch describes Scipio Aemilianus' election campaign for the censorship in 143. On the Forum Scipio surrounded himself with "men who were of low birth and had lately been slaves, but who were frequenters of the Forum and able to gather a mob and force all issues by means of solicitations and shouting"[90] Plutarch also reports the names of two of them: Licinius Philonicus and Aemilius, a herald (*kèrux* ; *Aem.* 38.5). The herald Aemilius, considering his profession and his name, probably was a freedman of the Aemilii family, of which Scipio was by birth a member. Elsewhere[91], Plutarch mentions that Philonicus was a publican, which means that his social status was that of an *eques* or lower. It is, of course, possible that Plutarch's description is anachronistic and that he projected facts from a later period into this scene. Plutarch's sources for this particular case are unknown[92], but we may believe him since his description is very detailed.

Nothing is known of possible intermediate leaders of the Gracchi. The next notice concerns the popular leader Saturninus. Orosius (5.17.5) mentions a C. Mettius as *satelles* of Saturninus. Mettius killed the consular candidate Memmius in 100. Nothing further is known of him. Despite Orosius being a late source, the notice seems to be truthful, because there are more indications for the occurrence of intermediate leaders with Saturninus. In his speech against Lepidus in 78, Sallust has Phillipus say that Saturninus' *satellites* had come by way of Sulpicius and Marius into the service of Lepidus (*Hist.* 1.77.7M). Florus, finally, mentions *duces factionis* in Saturninus' company. Therefore, the popular leader Saturninus employed intermediate leaders.

After Sulla the records of intermediate leaders are more numerous. In 66 Cornelius' (Ap-14) prosecution was interrupted with the help of *operarum duces* (B-16). In 65 Manilius (Ap-26) did the same in his trial (B-18). In 63, Catiline's fellow conspirators tried to mobilize the shopkeepers in Rome by means of *duces multitudinum* (Sall. *Cat.* 50.1), one of whom was a pimp (Cic. *Cat.* 4.17; B-23). In 59 Vatinius (Ap-50),

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[90] Plut. *Aem.* 38.3: "ἀνθρώπους ἀγεννεῖς καὶ δεδουλευκότας, ἀγοραίους δὲ καὶ δυναμένους ὄχλον συναγαγεῖν καὶ σπουδαρχίᾳ καὶ κραυγῇ πάντα πράγματα βιάσασθαι".

[91] *Mor.* 810B (=*Praec. Rei Publ. Ger.*).

[92] According to C. LIEDMEIER, *Plutarchus' Biographie van Aemilius Paullus. Historische Commentaar*, Nijmegen 1935, p. 282, Plutarch's source probably was the same as the one he used for his Life of the Gracchi: a later author of a pro-*popularis* persuasion. The descriptions attached to the names of Aemilius (*kèrux*) and Licinius (*philonicus* = wrangler) were, according to LIEDMEIER, nicknames. In my opinion, this is not true of Aemilius because, as this section will show, *apparitores*, such as heralds, acted as intermediate leaders.

tribune of the plebs and assistant leader of Caesar, employed the services of a certain C. Fibulus and other "furies".[93]

Not only those known as popular leaders made use of intermediate leaders. During the 50s Milo (Ao-2) attempted to fight Clodius with his own methods. He organized small groups, which operated violently. One of his intermediate leaders is known: M. Saufeius (*RE* 6). He was a *dux operarum* of Milo (Asc. 55C) and commanded Milo's slaves during the fight at Bovillae, where Clodius met his death (Asc. 32C).

We are best informed about Clodius' intermediate leaders, who were extremely numerous. This results from the size of the Ciceronian source material and also from the fact that Clodius was the most efficient popular leader of the late Republic. Several modern historians have already researched Clodius' *duces*. NOWAK mentions six.[94] FAVORY gives fourteen, one of whom does not belong to Clodius and three of whom are tribunes of the plebs. The latter, however, should be qualified as assistant leaders.[95] The best and most extensive research thus far has been done by FLAMBARD.[96] He has made a prosopography of twelve *duces*. I largely agree with his conclusions, which means that I wish to retain eleven of FLAMBARD's *duces* as intermediate leaders and add three. This results in a total of fourteen Clodian intermediate leaders known by name. They are classified below according to social status. The numbers between brackets refer to FLAMBARD's numbering, where the sources are to be found, and to the numbers, if any, in *RE*.

The first six intermediate leaders are of servile descent:

1. (*RE* 7) C. CLODIUS, a *de plebe notus homo* (Asc. 31C; for the justification see below). Considering his name, probably a freedman of P. Clodius. He was present at Clodius' assassination in 52 (Cic. *Mil.* 46; Asc. 31C) and perhaps during the riots afterwards (B-86).

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93 Cic. *Vat.* 31; B-34. See also B-30 for another example.

94 NOWAK, *Garden*, pp. 115-116: Sex. Clodius (no. 2), Titius (no. 7), Lollius (no. 12), Firmidius (no. 9), Plaguleius (no. 5), and Damio (no. 3). NOWAK, unlike FAVORY (*infra*), does distinguish between persons of higher and lower social status who supported Clodius. He mentions (pp. 105-107): Curio (Ap-46), Antonius (Ap-5), Cato (Ap-39), Metellus (Ao-8), and Plautius (Ap-56). He lists Gellius (no. 14) among the latter group, but I would like to consider him an intermediate leader because he did not hold a magistracy.

95 FAVORY, *Texte*, pp. 139-145: Decimus (no. 4), Gellius (no. 14), Lollius (no. 12), Sergius (no. 6), Titius (no. 7), Sex. Clodius (no. 2), Fidulius (no. 8), Lentidius (no. 11), Plaguleius (no. 5), and Firmidius (no. 9). Fibulus, as has been stated above, was an intermediate leader of Vatinius (Cic. *Vat.* 31). The three tribunes mentioned by FAVORY are: Aelius (Ap-1), Atilius (Ap-6), and Numerius (Ap-33).

96 *MEFRA*, 127-131. BENNER, *op.cit.*, 156-165, provides a list of eleven Clodian *duces operarum*, which mainly corresponds with FLAMBARD's list, except that he has left out Scato (n.100 below) and had added Servius Pola (*RE* 5). Servius was a supporter of Clodius and prosecuted in 56 (Cic. *Q.Fr.* 2.4.6). BENNER supposes that he was prosecuted *de vi*, which however does not follow from Cicero's letter. If it could be established that Servius indeed was prosecuted for violence, I would agree with BENNER. Until then, I prefer to leave Servius out.

2. (F1; *RE* 12) SEXTUS CLODIUS[97], the most important of all; a freedman or a descendant of a freedman of the Claudii family. He not only was an agitator, but also Clodius' counsellor and secretary (*scriba*). Sextus had a considerable career. He organized the *Compitalia* of 58, during which he wore the *toga praetexta*, the symbol of Roman magistracy (B-40). He was charged with the corn supply in 58 (*cura annonae* ; Cic. *Dom.* 25-26). After Clodius' assassination he mobilized the crowd and provided leadership during the subsequent riots (B-86). In 44 he was the subject of a correspondence between Cicero and Antony; Sextus had been exiled from Rome and Antony wanted to call him back. (Cic. *Phil.* 2.9; *Att.* 14.13B.3 and 15.13.3.)

3. (F2) DAMIO, a freedman and *apparitor* of Clodius (Asc. 47C).

4. (F3) DECIMUS, a *dissignator* according to Cicero (*Att.* 4.3.2), i.e. an attendant in the theater or an undertaker. Both functions were usually performed by freedmen. FLAMBARD correctly links a Republican inscription to this person (*ILLRP* 771 = *CIL* I$^2$ 2519): L. Maecenas, son of Decimus, is mentioned as *dissignator* and *patronus* of the *societas cantorum Graecorum.* [98]

5. (F9; *RE*) PLAGULEIUS, probably a freedman of Ateius, Milo's prosecutor in 52. With nos. 6, 11, and 12, a leader of the shopkeepers mobilized by Clodius (Cic. *Dom.* 89).

6. (F11; *RE* 15) L. SERGIUS, probably a freedman of Catiline. Together with no. 12 one of the intermediate leaders mentioned by name who provided leadership to the crowd during a food riot in 57. Known as a *concitator tabernariorum*, an agitator of shopkeepers. (B-60.) See no. 5.

The next intermediate leader is of Italian descent:

7. (F12; *RE* 2) TITIUS. A Sabine from Reate.

The next six are freeborn or of unknown descent:

8. (F4; *RE* ) FIDULIUS, who was poor according to Cicero. He led the *operae* during the popular assembly in which Clodius in 58 passed his law on the exile of Cicero (B-47).

9. (F5; *RE* ) FIRMIDIUS.

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[97] In the controversy about the name of this person (CLODIUS or CLOELIUS) I agree with J.M. FLAMBARD, Nouvel examen d'un dossier prosopographique: le cas de Sex. Clodius/Cloelius, *MEFRA* 90 (1978), pp. 235-245. For the opposite view, see D.R. SHACKLETON BAILEY, Sex. Clodius-Sex. Cloelius, *CQ* 10 (1960), pp. 41-43; idem, *Atticus I*, p. 376. BENNER, *op.cit.*, 156 takes up a neutral stand, but considers him a freedman.

[98] See also A. SOGLIANO, Sunhodus Decumianorum, *Mouseion* 3 (1927), pp. 197-203, esp. 202. According to T.P. WISEMAN, Two Friends of Clodius in Cicero's Letters, *CQ* 18 (1968), pp. 297-302, esp. 299-302, DECIMUS is to be identified with D. IUNIUS BRUTUS ALBINUS, one of Caesar's assassins. WISEMAN's main argument is that *dissignator* in this case means gangleader and that therefore DECIMUS did not exercise the profession of a freedman. This conclusion, in my view, is wrong. Considering the large number of freedmen among Clodius' intermediate leaders and considering the inscription mentioned above, it is more likely that Cicero employs *dissignator* in its usual sense.

10. (*RE* 3) L. GAVIUS. Cicero calls him a *Clodi canis* (*Att.* 6.3.6). Since Cicero also qualifies the known intermediate leaders nos. 2, 7, and 13 as such (*Har.Resp.* 59, *Pis.* 23), Gavius should be included among the intermediate leaders. Cicero, as governor of Cilicia in 50, offered him a prefecture on Brutus' request (Cic. *Att.* 6.1.4 and 3.6).

11. (F7; *RE* 1) LENTIDIUS. See no. 5.

12. (F8; *RE* 10) M. LOLLIUS. See nos. 5 and 6.

13. (*RE* 12) P. POMPONIUS, together with no. 1 present at Clodius' assassination and a *de plebe notus homo* (Asc. 31C; for the justification see below).

The fourteenth and last intermediate leader belonged to the equestrian order:

14. (F6; *RE* 1)[99] GELLIUS POBLICOLA, a ruined *eques* of senatorial descent.[100]

Among Clodius' intermediate leaders we see quite a few freedmen or people from outside Rome. These persons, who were in close contact with the popular leader, probably had a patron-client relationship with Clodius. It is very well possible that these intermediate leaders tried to have a career with the help of Clodius: through him they could receive paid offices and their prestigious position enhanced their social status within the plebs.

C. Clodius and P. Pomponius (nos. 1 and 13) have been included among the intermediate leaders because Asconius calls them *noti homines*. The term *notus homo* occurs several times. Asconius calls M. Aemilius Philemon, freedman of Lepidus, a *homo notus* (37C) and L. Luscius a *notus centurio* of Sulla (91C). The word *notus* can mean "well-known" or "notorious", like the *noti operarum duces* who assisted Cornelius in 66 (B-16); Eudamus and Birria, Milo's *gladiatores noti* in 52 (Asc. 31C); and the *notissimi latronum duces* in Antony's army in 43 (Cic. *Fam.* 10.14.1).[101]

In a political sense, *notus* can also have the meaning of "being well-known among a certain group". In the *Commentariolum Petitionis* (28, 31, 41-42, and 50) we read how important it was to a politician to show that he knew people of the lower social strata. These people were the *noti homines*. They were not just anybody, but the *principes*, the leading

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[99] *OE* 2, no. 170.

[100] VETTIUS SCATO (F 10, *RE* 17), an Italian, cannot be considered an intermediate leader. He served as Clodius' straw man for the purchase of Cicero's house in Rome, but he is nowhere indicated as an intermediate leader.
In Clodius' entourage we come across a couple of other persons, whose function is obscure: T. PATINA from Lanuvium (*RE* ), a *familiarissimus* of Clodius (Cic. *Mil* 46); C. CAUSINIUS SCHOLA (*RE*, *OE* 2, no. 90), an *eques*, *familiarissimus* and *comes* of Clodius, who gave false evidence during the Bona Dea trial in 61 (Cic *Mil* 46, Asc. 49C). He was present at Clodius' assassination and testified against Milo (Asc. 31 and 40C). See further on Clodius' entourage BENNER, *op cit* , 165-169.

[101] See also the notorious dice-player Curius (*notissimus aleator*, Asc. 93C) and the *homines ex omni latrocinio Clodiano notissimi* (Cic *Att* 4 3.3).

persons, of the *collegia,* the suburbs, the country districts, and the Italian townships (*Com.Pet.* 30). Their support implied the support of the crowd, for they were capable of winning entire tribes for a politician:

> "Inquire and seek out men everywhere, get to know them, pursue them, secure them, see that they canvass their localities for you and act like candidates on your behalf. (...) Yet merely to know them, though important, is not enough unless it is followed by the hope of advantage and friendship, so that you are seen to be a good friend and not only a recollector of names. So, when those who have the most influence with their tribesmen because of their own political ambition are busy for you in the centuries - and when you have made desirous of your interests those others who carry weight with some of their tribesmen by reason of their home town, district, or college - then your hopes should be high."[102]

The same occurs with Rullus' *lex agraria* in 63. Rullus wanted to have his law implemented by a commission, as was usual. The members of this commission, the *decemviri,* would be elected by nine tribes. "And the decemvirs, to show themselves grateful and not forgetful of the favor, will allow that they do owe something to the *noti homines* of these nine tribes."[103] These *noti homines* were persons with a certain degree of prestige and influence among the plebs, the ideal persons to act as intermediate leaders. They were the *noti homines* who were present at Clodius' cremation in 52 (B-86).

In order to get in touch with these persons and placate them, Roman aristocrats employed a *nomenclator,*[104] a slave who prompted his master with the names of the persons he had to greet, so that the impression was

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[102] *Com.Pet.* 31-32 (see also 30): "perquiras et investiges homines ex omni regione, eos cognoscas, appetas, confirmes, cures ut in suis vicinitatibus tibi petant et tua causa quasi candidati sint. (...) Neque id tamen satis est, tametsi magnum est, si non sequitur spes utilitatis atque amicitiae, ne nomenclator solum sed amicus etiam bonus esse videare. Ita cum et hos ipsos, propter suam ambitionem qui apud tribulis suos plurimum gratia possunt, studiosos in centuriis habebis et ceteros qui apud aliquam partem tribulium propter municipi aut vicinitatis aut conlegi rationem valent cupidos tui constitueris, in optima spe esse debebis."

[103] Cic. *Leg.Agr.* 2.21: "Atque hi, ut grati ac memores beneficii esse videantur, aliquid se novem tribuum notis hominibus debere confitebuntur." Cf. JONKERS, *Commentary,* p. 68. Election to a land commission not only was a matter of prestige, but also of economic interest, because the members of the commission could reserve for themselves part of the land for distribution: *SWRP* 69; C. NICOLET, Économie, société et institutions au IIe siècle av. J.-C.: de la lex Claudia à l'ager exceptus, *Annales ESC* 35 (1980), p. 890.

[104] B-59; *Com.Pet.* 28 and 32; Cic. *Q.Fr.* 1.2.9, *Mur.* 77; Plut. *Cat.Min.* 8.2; J. VOGT, Nomenclator. Vom Lautsprecher zum Namenverarbeiter, *Gymnasium* 85 (1978), pp. 327-338, esp. 329-332. Crassus and Caesar both made themselves popular by calling Romans of lower social status by their names: Plut. *Cras.* 3.3, *Caes.* 4.2.

created that he knew them. Such a *nomenclator* formed an important link within the communication process between politician and people.[105]

Particularly in the city of Rome, the *noti homines* owed their influence to the fact that they belonged to the group of persons who presided a plebeian organization. Rome knew various kinds of associations. The *collegia* were professional organizations in which people with the same profession, mostly artisans and shopkeepers, were associated. The *collegia* could also be religious or territorial organizations. Sometimes several functions were combined in one *collegium.* Next to those there were the territorial organizations of the *vici* (city neighborhoods), the *pagi,* and the *vicinitates* (suburban and country hamlets). *Magistri,* elected by the members, stood at the head of these associations. Free-born, freedmen, and slaves participated in the colleges and probably also in the other organizations. But within the colleges the social stratification and ideological prejudices of the city were reflected, which means that slaves had a subordinate position and that the *magistri* already before their election possessed a higher social status.[106]

These *magistri* were vital for receiving the support of the crowd:

> "Then, reckon up the whole city - all the colleges, the suburbs, the environs; if you strike a friendship with the leading men from among their number, you will easily, through them, secure the remaining crowd."[107]

The plebeian organizations were important for mobilizing the crowd. They offered an organizational framework through which large groups of people could be reached and, through their leaders, incited to action. We will return to this subject more extensively in Chapter 3. The *magistri* formed one of the links between leaders and crowd; from them intermediate leaders could be recruited. We have already seen that

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[105] In the late Empire the *nomenclatores* still occurred. Ammianus Marcellinus (14.6.16) tells us that they could decide who was admitted to the doles and banquets, and that they accepted bribes for this. See on *nomenclatores* in the Empire: VOGT, *op.cit.n.104,* 332-338.

[106] FLAMBARD, *Ktema,* 143-161. On the *magistri collegiorum* see also: WALTZING, *Corporations,* pp. 383-446.
Freedmen regularly appear as *magistri* in inscripions. *Magistri vici* and *magistri pagi* : *ILLRP* 702 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1002 = VI 2221 = 32452 = DESSAU 6078); *ILLRP* 704 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 2514 = VI 1324 = DESSAU 6075).
*Magistri collegii* : *ILLRP* 96 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 977 = VI 36771 = DESSAU 9253); *ILLRP* 97 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 978 = VI 167 = DESSAU 3682 a); *ILLRP* 98 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 979 = VI 168); *ILLRP* 185 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 988 = VI 3696 = 30932 = 36756 = DESSAU 4964); *ILLRP* 770 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1307 = VI 9202 = DESSAU 7823); *ILLRP* 771 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 2519); *ILLRP* 772 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1005 = VI 10317); *ILLRP* 775 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 989 = VI 3877); *ILLRP* 776 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 2125 = XI 6211 = DESSAU 7275).

[107] *Com.Pet.* 30: "Deinde habeto rationem urbis totius, conlegiorum omnium, pagorum, vicinitatum; ex his principes ad amicitiam tuam si adiunxeris, per eos reliquam multitudinem facile tenebis."

through an inscription a connection can be established between one of Clodius' intermediate leaders (Decimus, no. 4) and a *collegium*. Another inscription shows another possible link between Clodius and the headmen of the colleges. C. Causinius Schola, a partisan of Clodius, had a freedman, who was *curator* of a funeral college.[108]

The next group of intermediaries who played a role in the political process of the late Republic were the so-called *apparitores*, mostly freedmen, sons of freedmen, or free-born from the Italian *municipia*, who socially were to be ranked below the *equites*.[109] They were civil servants who assisted the magistrates in the performance of their tasks, but they were not themselves allowed to hold a magistracy while in office. The *apparitores* can be subdivided into several functions: the *scriba*, a secretary who, among other things, drew up bills; the *praeco*, a herald who summoned the people to the assemblies, read out the results of the voting, and sometimes acted as *nomenclator* ; the *viator*, a messenger; and the *lictor*, the escort of the magistrate and the symbol of his authority.[110]

The *apparitores* were not appointed by an incumbent magistrate, but were appointed in advance (since Sulla three years in advance). They remained in office for several years.[111] A magistrate, therefore, had to work with the persons who were put at his disposal; the *viatores* were assigned to him by lot (Cic. *Cat.* 4.15). Nevertheless, patronage, especially during the Republic, played an important part in the appointment, and patronage ties remained in force after the appointment also. A position as *apparitor* paved the way to upward mobility. The position itself and the ties of patronage offered the opportunity to have a career. The position could be a reward for merit or a springboard to success. It could lead to acceptance in the equestrian order, it could serve as an entry to political life in Rome for Italian dignitaries, and it could even lead to a magistracy.[112]

The group of *apparitores* was subdivided into professional organizations (*decuriae*), in which *apparitores* of the same profession

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[108] *ILLRP* 767 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1274 = VI 10326 = D ESSAU 7878): "C. Causinius Scolae l. Spinter in hac societate primus cur(ator) factus est et hoc monumentum aedificandum, expoliend(um) curavit socisq(ue) probavit, habet partes viriles IIII, oll(as) XX. Campia L.l. Cassandra Causini (uxor) sibi et suis." On Causinius Schola see n.100 above.

[109] PURCELL, *PBSR*, pp. 126-131, 137, and 161-163. For freedmen as *apparitores* see: TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, 153-159. For some freedmen *apparitores* on inscriptions: *ILLRP* 808 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 210 = VI 32311 = DESSAU 1932): A. Granius M.l. Stabilio, *praeco* ; *ILLRP* 796 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1289 = VI 1899 = D ESSAU 1902): M. Cornelius M.l. Apollonius, *lictor*, M. Cornelius Q.l. Macedo, *lictor*. For epigraphical evidence on *apparitores* see further: A.H.M. JONES, The Roman Civil Service (Clerical and Sub-Clerical Grades), *JRS* 39 (1949), pp. 38-55, esp. 40; PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 171-173.

[110] PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 147-148 (*praeco*), 148-152 (*lictor*), 152-154 (*viator*), and 154-161 (*scriba*).

[111] COHEN, in: *Ordres*, pp. 39 and 41-44.

[112] PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 127, 131, and 136-142. See for the *scribae* who attained a magistracy during the Republic: COHEN, *op.cit.*, 58 n.160.

were associated.[113] One even spoke of *ordines*, i.e. recognized status groups.[114] Among the plebs the *apparitores* held a prestigious position, because they were part of the state machinery and connected to the persons who controlled the political process and because they were ceremonially involved in the public life of the state.[115] Their prestige is evident from the fact that they proudly mentioned their office in funeral inscriptions.[116]

In order to function properly as a magistrate it was of great importance to a politician to be on good terms with the *apparitores*. They constituted the link between magistrate and people. Furthermore, they could be helpful with electoral fraud in the assemblies.[117] The *apparitores'* intermediate position between plebs and élite is clarified by the case of Cn. Flavius. Flavius, the son of a freedman, was a *scriba* at the end of the fourth century. He laid down his office, and was subsequently elected aedile by the Forum crowd, which consisted of freedmen.[118]

It need not surprise us that some intermediate leaders were recruited from the *apparitores* or that they were appointed *apparitor*. We have already seen that Aemilius, one of the known intermediate leaders of Scipio Aemilianus in 143, was a herald. Among Clodius' intermediate leaders we come across two *apparitores* : Sex. Clodius (no. 2) was a *scriba* and Clodius let him organize the *Compitalia* dressed in the *toga praetexta*, the magisterial garb. Damio (no.3) is called an *apparitor* of Clodius.

The importance of these officials appears from a passage from Cicero's *De Legibus*, where Atticus says:

> "For, like you just have said, that the laws have to be requested from the librarians, I remark that most people during their magistracy, because of ignorance of their rights, only know as much as the *apparitores* want them to know."[119]

Atticus' words are quite understandable. A Roman magistrate, after all, was in office only for one year and he had to work with civil servants who

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[113] PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 128-131; cf. COHEN, *op.cit.*, 46-48.

[114] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.183-184, *Mur.* 42; COHEN, *op.cit.*, 24-25, 35, and 38.

[115] COHEN, *op.cit.*, 49; PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 133.

[116] *ILLRP* 696 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1004 = X 6488 = DESSAU 1924); *ILLRP* 796 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1289 = VI 1899 = DESSAU 1902); *ILLRP* 808 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 210 = VI 32311 = DESSAU 1932).

[117] Liv. 30.39.7 (in 202), 38.55.5 (in 187); PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 132. *Viatores* could influence a trial by neglecting to summon certain persons whose presence was necessary (Cic. *Cluent.* 74). The killing of a *praeco* of the consul Opimius in 121 precipitated the repression of Gaius Gracchus (Plut. *G.Gra.* 13.3-4; *Vir Ill.* 65.5).

[118] Liv. 9.46.1-2. Probably anachronistic; see further on the *forensis factio* Chapter 2 below (*Plebs Contionalis*).

[119] *Leg.* 3.48: "Nam, ut modo te dictum est, leges a librariis exigi, sic animadverto plerosque in magistratibus ignoratione iuris sui tantum sapere quantum apparitores velint." For a specific case in 11, see: Dio 54.36.1. On the large influence of *apparitores* in the political process: COHEN, *op.cit.*, 54; NICOLET, *Métier*, 435-446.

generally had many years of experience behind them. Cato the Younger too, during his quaestorship in 64, encountered the problem of *apparitores* who operated independently because of the inexperience of the magistrates. When Cato tried to do something about it, the *apparitores* rose in revolt.[120] Here we see that the *apparitores* had developed into an interest group. The fact that the incumbent magistrate could not directly influence the composition of the *apparitores* fostered the independence of the group. The *ordo scribarum* in particular operated as a close-knit, solidary group with a political opinion of its own.[121] This is another example of professionalization and specialization during the late Republic.

The contact between politicians and *apparitores* passed through personal ties of patronage, and, in view of the independence of the *apparitores*, it was important to win the group as a whole through their organizations, the *decuriae*.

Sometimes civil servants were temporarily assigned to magistrates or governors of a province, such as *praefecti* (see the intermediate leader Gavius no. 10), general servants (*accensi*), architects and *medici* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.27, *Leg.Agr.* 2.32). Their appointment ended at the close of their superior's term of office. They did not have an organization and did not form an *ordo* either.[122] Their influence was less important than that of the *apparitores*, but they too could have a prominent role as an intermediary. An example of this is the *praefectus fabrum* (head of the military engineers) of Murena's army. During his consular campaign in 63, Murena had him distribute theater tickets among his tribesmen (Cic. *Mur.* 73).

The politicians of the late Republic surrounded themselves with a group of advisers and assistants from top to bottom who assisted them in politics. Such a group, a *consilium* (Cic. *Verr.* 2.2.27, *Att.* 4.3.2), was of utmost importance and only with difficulty could a politician extricate himself from it. The increasingly powerful position and the increasingly important tasks of *apparitores* and other intermediaries foreshadowed the position of imperial freedmen and *amici* in a future age.[123]

Another category of intermediate leaders was constituted by the claqueurs. During the Empire, the theater and the circus became the most important means of communication between the people of Rome and the

120 Plut. *Cat.Min.* 16. Cato the Younger's (Ao-27) quaestorship probably fell in 64 (*MRR* 163) and certainly not in 54, as PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 132 states. Perhaps Clodius introduced a law in 58 to restrict the private business activities of the quaestorian scribes: Suet. *Dom.* 9; *LGRR* 255.

121 Cic. *Cat.* 4.15, *Mur.* 42, *Dom.* 74.

122 COHEN, *op.cit.*, 33-35 and 36-38.

123 On the *consilium* see BEARD, *op.cit.*, 66-67. On Clodius' use of intermediaries in positions of confidence, see: BENNER, *op.cit.*, 99-101. On the *apparitores* as forerunners of the public role of the *familia Caesaris*, see: G. FABRE, *Libertus. Recherches sur les rapports patron-affranchi à la fin de la République romaine*, Rome 1981, pp. 352-354.

emperor. In the theater the people were able to express their grievances to the emperor or, more trivially, to indicate which games they would like to see in the circus. The emperor likewise could communicate with the people, and his presence at the public shows made him popular. Applause for performers and acclamations of the emperor were often organized by theater claques and cheerleaders. In that way, the mood of the crowd could easily be turned into a political demonstration. Occasionally, an emperor bribed claqueurs to have the public react favorably towards him. In A.D. 190, a cheerleader, probably engaged by senatorial conspirators, led the spectators in the circus in a successful popular demonstration against the praetorian prefect Cleander, a freedman of the emperor Commodus and in the eyes of the senatorial élite a dangerous parvenu.[124]

During the late Republic too, cheerleaders appear to have already been present at the games. The earliest report dates from 70, during the prosecution of Verres. According to Cicero a certain T. Allienus acted as a cheerleader (Cic. *Caecil.* 48-49). In those days there even were claqueurs who ascended to *scriba*.[125] The cheerleaders probably originated as claqueurs on behalf of actors, hired by the actors themselves or the organizer of the games; but they gradually received a political function by leading the public in acclaiming or hissing politicians.[126] The cheerleaders may have used a flute for rhythmic purposes (Cic. *Att.* 1.16.11). The method was derived from religious practice. On large public occasions, Roman priests employed flute-players to help them recite prayers.[127] The development of the cheerleaders is a typical example of how existing traditional features were used for different purposes as a result of the dysfunctions of the late Republic.

Cheerleaders also operated during trials (B-65, 88) and in popular assemblies, which, however, is not to say that they were the same persons as in the theater. Clodius' intermediate leaders Sergius and Lollius (nos. 6 and 12) acted as cheerleaders during a riot in 57 (B-60). Claques in the assembly could also be used against popular leaders (Cic. *Att.* 2.16.1).

The final group of intermediaries were the so-called *divisores*. A *divisor* was a person connected to a tribe who distributed presents or money among a tribe on behalf of a candidate in the elections. They were private persons without an official task. It was a traditional and accepted

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124 Dio 73.13; Hdn. 1.12.5; WHITTAKER, *Historia*, pp. 357 and 368.

125 Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.184. In this passage I share the interpretation of G. LONG (ed.), *M. Tulli Ciceronis Orationes. Text and Commentary. Vol. I,Verrinarum Libri Septem*, London 1851, p. 369. LONG considers *explosorum* as the genitive plural of *explosor* (claqueur) and not of *explosus* (the one who is hissed). The interpretation has been adopted in the LOEB edition by GREENWOOD (p. 226 n.c) as well as by PURCELL, *op.cit.*, 136, who refers to the passage in a different context.

126 In *Sest.* 115, Cicero awards little importance to the claques at the gladiatorial shows and the theater because he wants to prove that the Roman people there expressed their own opinion. (See Chapter 2 on the spectators at the games).

127 R.M. OGILVIE, *The Romans and their Gods. In the Age of Augustus*, London 1979, p. 36.

position, but during the late Republic the *divisores* increasingly developed into agents of electoral corruption.[128] It happened ever more frequently that candidates had money and commodities distributed in order to get elected. Now this was done not only among the candidate's own tribe, as was traditional, but among all tribes. *Divisores* had to be used in order to reach the right persons.

When Cicero was prosecuting Verres in 70 because of his crimes as a governor of Sicily, Verres counteracted him by calling in *divisores* to sabotage Cicero's election as plebeian aedile.[129] During his election campaign for the consulate in 64, Cicero was advised to reduce the influence of the *sequestri* [130] and the *divisores*, so that bribery would not interfere (*Com.Pet.* 57).

Some *divisores* belonged to the equestrian order. They must have been especially important in the elections in the centuriate assembly, considering the weight of the votes of the *equites* in those elections.[131] *Divisores* of lower social status will have operated during elections in the tribal assembly. The position of the *divisores* grew more important because of the increasing political competition and the related constant expansion of resources politicians had to muster for a successful career. Therefore it became a means of social mobility: Octavius, the natural father of the future Emperor Augustus, probably had been a *divisor*.[132] The senator C. Verres, father of the above mentioned Sicilian praetor, had been a *divisor* once.[133] C. Herennius, son of the *divisor* Sextus Herennius, became tribune of the plebs in 60.[134]

Just like the *apparitores*, the *divisores* became more independent and developed into an interest group.[135] At regular intervals during the late Republic, measures were enacted to check electoral corruption (*leges de ambitu*), without much success. In 67 the consul Piso proposed a severe anti-bribery bill. The *divisores* tried to sabotage voting on the law by staging a riot (B-13).

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[128] LIEBENAM, *RE* 5.1 (1903) s.v. *divisor*, 1237-1238.

[129] Cic. *Verr.* 1.22-25 and 2.3.161. Other cases of the involvement of *divisores:* Cic. *Att.* 1.16.12-13 (elections of 61), *Planc.* 45, 47-48, and 55 (aedilician elections of 55), *De Or.* 2.257 (the *divisor* Nummius). Cicero's accusation (*Har.Resp.* 42) that Clodius had murdered all of the *divisores* is probably exaggerated, see: LENAGHAN, *De Haruspicum Responso*, p. 164; MOREAU, *REL*, 225 n.2.

[130] A *sequester* served as a mediator during trials. In the late Republic he especially was an intermediary in election campaigns, who, because he is often mentioned together with the *divisores*, probably had a similar function in electoral corruption, see: Cic. *Planc.* 38, 45, and 48; Asc. 83C; E. WEISS, *RE* 2.4 (1923) s.v. *sequester*, 1659-1660. MOREAU, *REL*, 225 and *Clodiana*, 184, defines *sequester* as an intermediary between candidates and *divisores*.

[131] *OÉ* 2, pp. 911 and 1069; see nos. 179, 180, 293, 381, and 382.

[132] Suet. *Aug.* 3; *OÉ* 2, no. 249.

[133] *OÉ* 2, no. 382.

[134] Cic. *Att.* 1.18.4; *OÉ* 2, no. 180.

[135] *OÉ* 1, 603-604, calls the *divisores* an *ordo*.

What interest did the *divisores* have in preserving electoral corruption? For this, we have a very recent parallel. During the election campaign of the former Philippine President Marcos in January 1986, people were brought together for a payment to attend his election rallies. During a rally on the island of Negros, the public got into a quarrel with the issuing intermediaries, because they had pocketed two-thirds of the promised amount (100 pesos).[136] The late Republican *divisores* had developed from voluntary officials in the tribes into professionalized agents of electoral corruption, who appropriated part of the cash intended for distribution. Thus they could acquire the funds which opened the channel to a possible acceptance into the equestrian order and from there even into the senate. It goes without saying that these persons had every interest in preserving the existing system of campaigning.

It is impossible to assess whether the *divisores* should be considered intermediate leaders in the sense of providing actual leadership during collective behavior.[137] In any case they belonged to the network of intermediaries which a popular leader had to deploy for the mobilization of support and to be successful in politics. Among the *divisores* links can be established between popular leaders and intermediate leaders. Clodius started as an electioneering expert and later also kept up good relations with *divisores*.[138] The assistant leader Cornelius (Ap-13), despite a proposed bill against electoral corruption including measures against *divisores* (B-13), became an electioneering expert, which implies good contacts with *divisores*. The tribune Herennius, mentioned above, whose father was a *divisor*, was an assistant leader of Clodius (Ap-19).

To sum up, the following can be said on the intermediate leaders. There existed a group of persons in Rome who possessed a higher social status among the city plebs. It enabled them to pass on the political plans of a popular leader, to gain support for him, and occasionally to mobilize plebeians for popular assemblies, riots, and other types of collective behavior. They were "the ones who ruled the meetings" (*ii qui contiones tenent*, *Com.Pet.* 51). Next to this group of intermediate leaders, who actually provided leadership for collective behavior, there was a larger group of intermediate persons who were important to the operation of politics. Not all of them were actual intermediate leaders, but they were indispensable for the creation of a situation which was conducive to collective behavior. Moreover, the two groups merged into one another: we have seen intermediate leaders who were a *notus homo* in a tribe, or a *magister collegii*, or *apparitor*.[139] A late Republican inscription tells us

[136] See the eyewitness report of the correspondent Karel VAN WOLFEREN, *NRC Handelsblad*, 28-01-1986, p. 4.

[137] In B-13 it is unknown whether other persons than *divisores* participated in the riot.

[138] MOREAU, *REL*, 225 and n.2; idem, *Clodiana*, 184 and n.557.

[139] A parallel for this merger of functions can be found in the Empire. The mutiny of A.D. 14 in the Pannonian legions was led by Percennius, who had gained experience in mobilizing people as a *dux operarum* in the theater in Rome: Tac. *Ann.* 1.16.

that a certain Clesipus Geganius combined several functions or had occupied them in succession; he was *magister* of two *collegia* as well as assistant of a tribune of the plebs.[140] These persons, *noti homines, apparitores,* headmen of plebeian organizations, who did or did not act as intermediate leaders, should be considered one and the same group. They constituted a group of private persons and civil servants around a politician, who assisted the leader in conducting politics and who were especially useful for a policy directed towards the people: a *consilium* (Cic. *Har.Resp.* 53, *Dom.* 48). Politicians, particularly popular leaders, had to be on good terms with those persons in order to make a success of their politics and their career.

Popular leaders and intermediaries had a patron-client relationship. The client supported the politics of the patron, and, in exchange, the contact with the patron added to the client's prestige and ambitious persons could get ahead through their patron. The activity as an intermediary was an important booster of social mobility. Claqueurs rose to be *scriba.* A person could become *apparitor* or *praefectus* and from that position even ascend to the equestrian order or to a magistracy. Or someone was a *divisor* and his son attained a lower magistracy. The political conflicts of the late Republic and the ever increasing scale of the resources which had to be mobilized by politicians provided intermediaries with unprecedented opportunities. Increasingly, therefore, they became an independent factor in Roman politics. Reform proposals to improve the working of politics could be against the interests of the intermediate leaders or those of their patrons. In that respect, the intermediate leaders perhaps had a vested interest in maintaining the existing political system.

Leadership of collective behavior in Rome was provided on three levels. On the top level were the top leaders, the great men of the Roman Republic. The middle level consisted of assistant leaders, junior politicians holding a lower magistracy, particularly the tribunate of the plebs. Finally, on the lowest level, there existed intermediate leaders, persons with a wide range of functions. They were members of the plebs with an elevated social status.

The expansion of the Roman empire led to fierce competition at the top and social differentiation at the bottom. Top leaders, whose opportunities were limited within the existing system or who refused to compromise to the ruling oligarchy, needed a new power base: the people. In order to mobilize a following among the plebs in this expanded society it was necessary to build up an organization of assistant and intermediate leaders. These middle and low level leaders had to receive something in return: prestige, career opportunities, and financial gain. The different

[140] *ILLRP* 696 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1004 = X 6488 = DESSAU 1924): "Clesipus Geganius, mag(ister) Capit(olinorum), mag(ister) Luperc(orum), viat(or) tr(ibunicius)."

types of leaders, being in opposition to the oligarchy, had to work closely together and were mutually dependent. A large number of the persons involved, especially on the middle and lowest level, in some way benefited from the continuation of the existing political system. But their loyalty was with their patron and not with the Republic. It is quite possible that this contributed in an important way to the fact that an alternative to the dysfunctioning political system of the late Republic failed to materialize.

Chapter 2

# Participation

Until now, the words "crowd", "people", and "plebs" have been employed, in the best traditions of ancient historiography, indiscriminately and without further specification, as if the lower social strata in Roman society consisted of a uniform crowd of similar persons. In Appendix B all known cases of collective behavior in the years 78-49 are analyzed separately. The appendix shows that in the majority of the cases the determination of the participants does not go beyond "plebs". The problem with ancient sources is that only in a few occasions do they give a more exact indication of crowd composition. For the late Republic, as for any other period of ancient history for that matter, we lack sources such as police reports or voter registration lists. Nonetheless, it may be possible, after a more detailed analysis, to distinguish different groups in the lower strata of Roman society; groups which also display different behavioral patterns. In this chapter I will investigate which social groups participated in collective behavior, especially in collective behavior which was important to the political process of the late Republic.

## *Plebs Urbana and Plebs Rustica*

In early Roman history, Rome met the qualifications of the classical city-state. The citizens occupied the city and the surrounding countryside. There was no sharp identifiable division between urban population and rural population. The inhabitants of the country regularly visited the city, which formed the economic, religious, and administrative center. Most city-dwellers were farmers who worked the lands outside the city. The Roman expansion from the third century onwards, however, altered this situation. The territory of Roman citizenship expanded far beyond the boundaries of the city-state. In some parts of Italy the traditional class of peasant small-holders diminished in favor of large-scale landownership, while the city of Rome knew an enormous population growth. The difference between urban and rural population increased, which was expressed in their different participation and actions in collective behavior.

By the end of the second century, the rural citizen population, the *plebs rustica,* consisted of free peasants with a piece of land of their own, tenants, day laborers, and hybrids of these. Many independent small-holders found additional income as seasonal workers on large estates. The main labor force on mid-size and large estates was made up of slaves,

supplemented by hired free labor of day laborers and tenants in times of peak production. After the Social War (88), all free inhabitants of Italy south of the Po possessed Roman citizenship.[1]

From the third century, the population of the city of Rome had been growing steadily, especially as a result of the migration of landless peasants to the city and the manumission of slaves.[2] The number of inhabitants at the end of the Republic is difficult to establish. The only exact figure is for 45, when Caesar reduced the number of grain recipients from 320,000 to 150,000.[3] In any case, more than 320,000 people lived in the Rome of the late Republic, for to those recipients (male citizens) should be added women, children, slaves, and foreigners. But concerning those groups there are no quantitative data available. Therefore the city population can only be estimated. I choose HOPKINS' estimate: 800,000-1,000,000 inhabitants at the end of the Republic. HOPKINS uses the most convincing arguments; his estimate is based on the number of grain recipients and the number of other inhabitants who should be added, the possible density of population, the estimated total grain consumption and the number of tenement blocks (*insulae*).[4] In any case, Rome was densily if not surpopulated.

Regarding social status the lower population in Rome, the *plebs urbana,* consisted of freeborn Roman citizens, freedmen, and slaves. The average standard of living of these groups will not have much surpassed the subsistence level[5], although there existed considerable economic differentiation. The freeborn, if possible, eked out a living by working as day laborers, by seasonal work, and by unskilled labor in the building

[1] See NICOLET, *Rome,* 206 and 295. On rural labor relations see: P. G ARNSEY, Non-Slave Labour in the Roman World, in: GARNSEY, *Non-Slave Labour,* pp. 34-47; NICOLET, *Rome,* 108-116.

[2] On the growth of the city population see: BRUNT, *Manpower,* pp. 383-384.

[3] Dio 43.21.4; Plut. *Caes.* 55.3; Suet. *Iul.* 41.3; RICKMAN, *Corn Supply,* pp. 175-179. Another source, App. 2.102 (apparently overlooked by RICKMAN), says that Caesar made a *recensus* of the people, which turned out that only half of the pre-war citizen population existed. This almost matches the difference of 320,000 and 150,000. The passage from Appian most likely applies to the grain recipients. It therefore is possible that Caesar did not exclude a number of people from the distributions, but merely made a new registration of the survivors. See also YAVETZ, *Plebs,* p. 46, *Caesar,* 156-158.

[4] HOPKINS, *Conquerors,* 96-98. See also BRUNT, *Manpower,* 382-383; RICKMAN, *op.cit.,* 8-13; both estimate the number of inhabitants at 750,000-1,000,000. *LGRR* 358-359 gives an estimate of about 1,000,000; NICOLET, *Rome,* 87: 800,000.

[5] BRUNT, *Conflicts,* 128-129; idem, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, *Sozialgeschichte,* pp. 271-310, esp. 285-296 (revised edition of *P&P* 35 (1966), 3-27); NICOLET, *Rome,* 204-205; YAVETZ, Die Lebensbedingungen der "plebs urbana" im republikanischen Rom, in: SCHNEIDER, *Sozialgeschichte,* pp. 98-123 (= *Latomus* 17 (1958), 500-517).

trade and the docks.[6] The freedmen often had learned a trade as a slave and therefore made up the majority of the artisans and shopkeepers (*opifices* and *tabernarii* ).[7] Freedmen had Roman citizenship, but were not allowed to occupy a magistracy.[8] Manumissions were a frequent phenomenon in Rome. One of the motives for manumission was economic. Since the introduction of the corn distributions it was advantageous, especially for poorer masters, to manumit slaves. Being citizens, freedmen were entitled to receive subsidized and later free grain. Thus the master could pass the liability of maintenance onto the government, while still being able to request certain services from his freedman.[9] Freedmen made up a large part of the urban population, probably even the majority.[10] Here as well quantitative data are lacking. Slaves moved freely around in Rome and often independently practised a profession or were employed as domestic staff in the houses of the rich citizens.

Political participation of the urban and the rural plebs differed increasingly. These differences can be largely explained by the centralism of the Roman political system. Political decision-making, such as elections and legislation, took place in Rome. In Roman politics neither a compulsory voting nor a necessary quorum in the popular assemblies existed. It goes without saying that not all Roman citizens, and certainly not the less wealthy, could afford to travel to Rome frequently to participate in political life. For the inhabitants of the city it was easier, of course.[11]

As has been set out in the Introduction, Rome had several popular assemblies. The elections took place in July, together with sumptuous games. At that occasion many people from outside Rome flocked to the city. They then could attend the popular games and participate in the elections. In the centuriate assembly, which during the late Republic mainly engaged in election of the highest magistrates and hardly in legislation, the rich population groups were favored. In that assembly the inhabitants of the countryside and especially the members of the Italian upper class had an important vote. In the elections of the lower magistracies, held in the tribal assembly, the members of the rural tribes

[6] *LGRR* 362; BRUNT, *JRS*, passim; idem, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, *Sozialgeschichte*, 289-290.
There also were day laborers and workmen who could enter a contract for a longer period of time (*mercenarii* ): S.M. TREGGIARI, Urban Labour in Rome: *mercenarii* and *tabernarii*, in: GARNSEY, *Non-Slave Labour*, pp. 48-64, esp. 51.

[7] BRUNT, *Manpower*, 110; idem, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, *Sozialgeschichte*, 291-293; *LGRR* 362; TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, 95-102.

[8] TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, 37 and 52-64.

[9] *Ibidem* 11-20, esp. 16.

[10] *Ibidem* 31-36; *LGRR* 360. According to BRUNT, *Manpower*, 385-388, freedmen made up between 2/3 and 3/4 of the urban plebs around 70, but that is only an estimate.

[11] Cic. *Verr.* 1.54; BLEICKEN, *Lex publica*, pp. 251-258 and 264; NICOLET, *Métier*, 391-401.

(31 out of 35 tribes) could have a decisive role, because these elections too were held in Summer. Only in the legislative tribal assembly did the urban plebs carry the day. This was so, first, because of the time factor: legislative activities took place at times when few people from outside Rome were in the city. No bills could be proposed later than 24 days before the start of the elections. Since there existed a statutory interval of 24 days between the proposal of a bill and the vote, the next legislative assemblies took place at least 24 days after the elections. Few members of the rural plebs could afford an absence of more that two months from their jobs. Of course people could be summoned from Italy to Rome to vote on laws, but that was not always easy in the 24 days between the introduction of a bill and the vote.[12]

Second, the city plebs ruled the legislative tribal assembly because of the composition of the tribes. The inhabitants of the city who were inscribed in the four urban districts, among whom were all the freedmen, had only 4 out of 35 votes in the assembly. But former peasants who had moved to the city often kept their registration in a country district. Moreover, the presiding magistrate of the assembly had the possibility of transferring members of one tribe to another during a vote, if the members of one or more tribes had not shown up.[13] The difference in participation between the several popular assemblies becomes obvious from the exile and return of Cicero. Clodius passed his law which sent Cicero into exile in a tribal assembly (B-47). The law on Cicero's recall failed to pass in a tribal assembly (B-51). Cicero had to be recalled by a law which was passed in a centuriate assembly filled with people from outside Rome (B-58). It was the only time in the investigated period that the centuriate assembly enganged in legislative activity.[14]

In addition to political centralism, the differences between urban and rural plebs can be explained through a difference in interests. The first great popular leader of the late Republic was Tiberius Gracchus. For his political support he depended on the rural plebs, who had the greatest interest in the proposed agrarian law of 133. Therein lay also the weakness of Tiberius' following. Because the country folk were busy with

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[12] TAYLOR, *PP*, 50-62; idem, *RVA*, 67-68; NICOLET, *Métier*, 393-401.

[13] Cic. *Sest.* 109; TAYLOR, *PP*, 53-54 and 60; NICOLET, *Métier*, 419; STAVELEY, *Voting*, 136-137, 198-202, and 209-211.
METAXAKI-MITROU, *AC*, pp. 181-182 states that the urban plebs consisted of immigrated Italian peasants, slaves from the conquered territories, and immigrated freedmen and that these three groups were registered in the four urban tribes. The assessment of the registration is entirely wrong: slaves were not citizens and, therefore, were not registered in the voting districts; many ex-peasants kept their registration in their rural district. The article shows the author's apparent unfamiliarity with the most important publications on this subject, such as L.R. TAYLOR's.

[14] Another example: Antonius in 44 managed to get the provincial command he wanted by turning the centuriate assembly, in which the proposal was to be introduced, into a tribal assembly (App. 3.30).

the harvest, they could not come to Rome to support Tiberius at the crucial moment. This resulted in the downfall of Tiberius Gracchus.[15]

Tiberius' brother Gaius learned from his mistakes. The strong point of Gaius Gracchus' policy was his ability to hold on to several groups: the *equites*, by granting them more political influence; the rural plebs, by a new agrarian law; and the urban plebs, by a corn law. Through the latter, Gaius showed that he recognized the specific interests and the singularity of the city population of Rome. In spite of the fact that the big population growth in Rome during the second century was primarily due to immigration from the countryside, the city-dwellers had other needs and demands than the peasants. They wished to find a living in the city, and an agrarian law, the goal of which was to distribute lands among the peasants, had little appeal for them.[16] Therefore Gaius Gracchus proposed his *lex frumentaria*, which provided for state-subsidized grain prices. Furthermore, Gaius was able to secure the favor of specific groups among the urban plebs, particularly artisans, by providing employment through public works, such as the construction of granaries and roads.[17]

Just like Tiberius, Gaius Gracchus was brought to ruin by senatorial repression. Before that, the senate had tried to undermine Gaius' popular support through the tribune of the plebs Livius Drusus. Livius Drusus especially tried to gain support from the rural plebs and possibly from dispossessed peasants who had recently moved to Rome. He promised land distributions which went far beyond Gaius' plans.

When Gaius was killed in 121, he had virtually lost the support of the people. It is likely that he kept the support of the urban population until the end. Just before the tribunician elections he endeared himself by moving to a popular neighborhood close to the Forum and by providing access to the gladiatorial shows for poor Romans. The latter he did by having the stands demolished by "all the craftsmen whom he had under his

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15 App. 1.14, STOCKTON, *Gracchi*, p 75.

16 Some other attestations of the attractiveness of urban life: Liv. 4 12, Cic. *Leg Agr* 2.71; Sall. *Cat* 37 7. On the different interests of the urban and rural plebs during the late Republic, see also: LINTOTT 178-181.

17 *Cheirotechnai*, App. 1.23. See further on the urban side of Gaius' policy: STOCKTON, *op cit*, 18-21, 126-129, 136-137, and 164-167.
H.C. BOREN, The Urban Side of the Gracchan Economic Crisis, *AHR* 63 (1957/58), pp. 890-902, was the first to relate the urban element to the Gracchi. BOREN argues that the crisis which precipitated the Gracchan laws was primarily urban and that it was due to a lack of revenues and a decrease of public and private building activities. His thesis has recently been attacked, on the basis of archeological and numismatic evidence, by F. COARELLI, Public Buildings in Rome between the Second Punic War and Sulla, *PBSR* 45 (1977), pp. 1-23, esp 3-9. COARELLI demonstrates that the economic crisis was not as bad as BOREN makes it appear. It still remains a fact, however, that Gaius got a large part of his support from the city population and that his projects which were aimed at that part of the citizenry obviously met certain demands. Moreover, it is quite possible that, although there was not a severe crisis, the increase of public and private building simply did not keep pace with the flow of migrants to the city. See also BRUNT, *JRS*, 98 n 91.

orders in public contracts".[18] These *technitai,* whom Gaius had obliged by his public works, now were of use in his politics. Another clear indication for this is to be found in the events during the final fight. On the run from his pursuers, Fulvius Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus' political partner, hid in a workshop of an acquaintance. After the pursuers had threatened to burn down the entire alley, Fulvius was handed over.[19] This shows that Gracchus and Fulvius Flaccus had a following among the *tabernarii* and *opifices.*

Thus at the end of the second century there existed clear-cut differences of interest between two groups of Roman citizens, the *plebs rustica* and the *plebs urbana.* Although they sometimes operated together, e.g. in support of Marius[20], both groups had to be mobilized by popular leaders in different ways. This becomes more obvious with Saturninus, tr.pl. 103 and 100. According to Appian (1.29-33), in 100 street fights even arose between urban plebs (*politikos ochlos, astikoi*) and rural plebs (*agroikoi*) over Saturninus' land bill. According to BADIAN[21], however, this was not true and the urban plebs remained faithful to Saturninus until the end. BADIAN attaches more credence to Livy's account, which, according to him, has come down to us through Orosius. Appian is the only source which in this particular case differentiates between groups. However that need not be a reason for discrediting his description. For Appian is the only author who, in his history of the late Republic, regularly notes the existence of different groups in the lower strata of Roman society.[22]

Saturninus tried to establish a coalition similar to that of Gaius Gracchus. He received the support of the *equites* by exiling Q. Metellus

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[18] Plut. *G Gra* 12 4: "τῶν τεχνιτῶν ὅσους εἶχεν ἐργολάβους ὑφ' ἑαυτῷ". See also NIPPEL, *JRS,* p. 27, STOCKTON, *op cit* , 178

[19] App. 1 26: *ergastèrion* (workshop) and *stenopos* (narrow street, alley, also *vicus* ; in this case probably a street with *tabernae*).

[20] Sall *Iug* 73 6. Note that Sallust in this passage indicates the two groups as a matter of course with *agrestes* and *opifices*

[21] E. BADIAN, The Death of Saturninus. Studies in Chronology and Prosopography, *Chiron* 14 (1984), pp 101-147, esp 108-109 For a survey of opinions in modern historiography on this question, see: SCHNEIDER, *Ancient Society,* pp 193-194.

[22] App. 1.10 (concerning Tib. Gracchus' agrarian law in 133: several groups of people from the countryside [*plèthos allo*] come to Rome, among others colonists and *isopolitai* [inhabitants of the municipalities with Roman citizenship]), 14 (absence of the rural plebs at the reelection of Tib. Gracchus, who is forced to seek support with the urban plebs); 24 (artisan support for G Gracchus ), 55 and 64 (conflict between old and new citizens over the distribution over the tribes in 88 and 87), 2.2 (Catiline's following in 63: senators, *equites,* plebeians, foreigners, slaves, and the veterans of Sulla), 5 (artisans [*cheirotechnai*] support Catiline), 22 (slaves and rustics [*agroikoi*] mobilized against the urban plebs by Milo in 52 = B-87), 113 (artisans and shopkeepers [*cheirotechnai* and *kapèloi*] as a separate and politically active group in 44), 119 (the presence in Rome of several groups in 44 after Caesar's assassination: the *dèmos,* Caesar's soldiers, some of whom recently discharged, and veterans who had already been settled); 3.28 (in 44 Octavian seeks support against Antony among the *dèmos,* those who had received favors from Caesar, and Caesar's veterans ).

Numidicus (Or. 5.17) and by allying himself with the new man Marius. In 103 he proposed a corn bill on behalf of the urban plebs.[23] He tried to win the rural plebs, and especially Marius' veterans, by an agrarian law.

Saturninus' popular leadership also was put down by senatorial repression. The senate, by means of the emergency decree (*senatus consultum ultimum*), ordered the consul Marius to stop Saturninus' activities. Marius now had to act against his own ally. Probably Marius looked upon this assignment as recognition, at last, that as a new man he had sought so long from the ruling élite. This was more valuable to him than the ad hoc coalition with Saturninus. Along with Marius, the *equites* also turned their backs on Saturninus. The rural plebs possibly had to make a difficult choice between the proposer of the agrarian law and their former general. Did the urban plebs, as BADIAN argues, continue to back Saturninus? In that case, what had Saturninus to offer this group?

Saturninus had proposed a corn bill, but it was never passed. The senate, by replacing Saturninus in 104 as quaestor Ostiensis, responsible for the corn transport, with the *princeps senatus* M. Aemilius Scaurus, showed its consciousness of the supply problems and the possible political consequences. The senate wanted to prevent a repetition of Gaius Gracchus' policy, and it is likely that a sufficient corn supply was provided for.[24] The senate carried on counterpropaganda against Saturninus by referring to the corn supply on coins.[25] The urban plebs, consequently, had more reason to look upon the senate as the guardian of its interests than upon Saturninus. Furthermore, in 100 Saturninus was responsible for the murder of the consular candidate Memmius, who had been a most popular tribune of the plebs in 111. Saturninus' agrarian law did not produce any advantages for the urban plebs and a conflict between city-dwellers and country folk, as described by Appian, therefore was quite possible.[26]

Another argument of BADIAN's is that Orosius' remark, that Marius had to calm down the *commota plebs* in order to be able to proceed against

[23] For the date I accept A.R. HANDS, The date of Saturninus' corn bill, *CR* 22 (1972), pp 12-13; contra H.B. MATTINGLY, Saturninus' corn bill and the circumstances of his fall, *CR* 19 (1969), pp. 267-270.

[24] See SCHNEIDER, *Ancient Society*, 210, RICKMAN, *op cit*, 162-164.

[25] ZEHNACKER, *Moneta*, I, pp. 550-552, NICOLET, *Métier*, 260-261.
M H. CRAWFORD, *Roman Republican Coinage Volume I*, Cambridge 1974, pp. 73 and 330-331 no. 330, states that Saturninus' corn law was implemented and that the coin of Piso and Caepio indicates that the senate furnished the necessary funds. It is more probable, however, that the senate took measures to compensate for the corn law sabotaged by Caepio and, for example, financed some extra distributions in connection with the slave war in Sicily.

[26] In Diod. 36.15.2 we read that Saturninus directed himself towards the urban plebs (*kata tèn polin ochlos*) in order to prevent his conviction in a trial By taking up an anti-senatorial stand, he succeeded and was elected tribune of the plebs for the year 100 This shows that a clear-cut division had arisen between urban and rural plebs and provides a parallel with Tiberius Gracchus, who in 133 was forced to turn to the urban plebs for support (App. 1.14).

Saturninus, contradicts Appian's account. But such a contradiction need not exist. It concerns the following passage, in which Orosius describes the reactions to the assassination of Memmius:

> "When the senate and the people of Rome screamed in rage because of such a great misfortune to the state, the consul Marius, with an ingenuity which fit the times, associated himself with the consensus of the better citizens and calmed the aroused plebs by a measured speech."27

It also is possible to interpret this passage thus: The death of Memmius aroused great indignation in the entire society (*senatus populusque Romanus*). Among the *boni* a consensus existed that Memmius' murder could not be tolerated. The urban plebs (who in the eyes of someone like Orosius always reacts in a less civilized manner) agreed and wanted to lynch Saturninus. Marius, however, as the responsible consul could not permit this. The proclaimed *senatus consultum ultimum* was an ideal way to play Marius and Saturninus off against one another. Marius realized that, but he also knew that, if he brought his assignment to a satisfactory conclusion, the senate would not be able to deny him his recognition. (Not surprisingly, Orosius awards Marius a sense of *Realpolitik* : *accomodato ad tempus ingenio.*) That is why the repression of Saturninus had to be a legitimate action and not lynch law. Marius calmed the people and subsequently, as is mentioned by Orosius as well, let them, divided into maniples, partake in the fight against Saturninus.[28] This reaction of the urban plebs makes more sense than, as BADIAN represents it, an anti-Marius and pro-Saturninus attitude which, by means of an oration, was turned into participation in the assassination of Saturninus.

A comparable antagonism is visible in a case in 88. The tribune of the plebs Sulpicius proposed to distribute the votes of the former allies, who had recently been enfranchized, over all the tribes. This would imply that their influence in voting and elections would increase. The old citizens resisted the proposal and it resulted in violent conflict. (App. 1.55.)

Finally, the difference in participation can be explained by a shift in the dependence relationships. Within the urban plebs a group can be distinguished which was less strongly bound to the élite than formerly, as we will see in the section on the public clientele. The rural plebs, as is demonstrated by DE BLOIS[29], was more strongly bound through vertical

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27 Or. 5.17.6: "Fremente pro tantis reipublicae malis senatu populoque Romano, Marius consul accommodato ad tempus ingenio consensui bonorum sese inmiscuit commotamque plebem leni oratione sedavit." *Senatus populusque Romanus* indicates Roman society as a whole, in this case subdivided into *boni* and *plebs*, and not, as BADIAN, *op.cit.n.21*, 108, claims, only the *consensus bonorum*.

28 The arming of the plebs by Marius also in Cic. *Rab.Perd.* 18. Like BADIAN, SCHNEIDER believes that Appian is wrong, because he seems to be contradicted by other traditions. SCHNEIDER, incidentally, does admit that the urban plebs did not protest when Saturninus was murdered: *Ancient Society*, 220.

29 DE BLOIS, *Army*, 10 and 36.

ties and had lost a part of its past independence. At the time of the Gracchi the country folk were still prepared to defend their interests as independent peasants. During the first century the situation was different. The estates of the senatorial élite were mainly concentrated in Central Italy (Latium, Campania, and Etruria)[30]. Increased urbanization resulted in rising corn prices and more market-oriented ways of production. This promoted the expansion of larger estates and the use of tenants and other forms of dependent free labor (*coloni*) instead of slave labor in that geographical area. Landlordism also expanded because free independent small-holders were bought out or driven away by large rural proprietors after the agrarian laws of the end of the second century. Similarly, the veterans, who had received plots during the first century, lost their possessions as well. Mostly, it did not result in joined-up estates; large rural property consisted of a number of plots of different sizes which were rented out.[31]

Roman citizens, who travelled to Rome from the countryside to visit the market, to attend the games, and to partake in politics, will mainly, considering the geographical circumstances, have had their domicile in Central Italy. These farmers must have had few possibilities to take up a political stand different from their patrons.[32] Consequently, for popular leaders it was not interesting anymore to make attempts to mobilize the rural plebs, unless its members belonged to their personal clientele or the clientele of their friends. The farmers, who still possessed a piece of land of their own and thereby some independence, were located in areas much farther away. Their participation in political life in Rome may be considered minimal. As far as patron-client relationships and political participation are concerned, we therefore observe an opposite development between urban plebs and rural plebs during the first century.

When we look at the years 80-50, we see that it sometimes was necessary for politicians to mobilize supporters from the countryside in order to win an election in Rome (*Com.Pet.* 3 and 30-31) or an important vote in the popular assembly, when sufficient support in the city was absent; we can also count veterans or soldiers among these rural supporters. Several such cases are known, but it is typical that it almost

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[30] *SWRP*, 29-33 and 45.

[31] P.W. DE NEEVE, Colonus. *Private Farm-Tenancy in Roman Italy during the Republic and the Early Principate*, Amsterdam 1984, pp. 127-149.

[32] DE NEEVE, *ibidem*, 13-15 and 187-192, makes a legal distinction between tenants and clients. Patron-client relationships in Roman society, however, rested more on common law than on written law. Considering their socio-economic situation, tenants, evidently, had a stronger dependence relationship towards rural proprietors than free small-holders. This had immediate repercussions on their political operation. (See also NICOLET, *Rome*, 114-115.) According to Plutarch (*Crass.* 2.5), Crassus possessed many estates, on which workmen worked (*ergazomenoi*). They were not slaves. These rural laborers could be recruited for political purposes.

exclusively concerned elections.[33] These rural groups also participated in several attested cases of collective behavior. Thus Caesar in 59 called the veterans of Pompey to Rome to pass his agrarian law in the popular assembly, because the law was particularly in their interest (B-34). Cicero's recall from exile in 57 was mainly accomplished by the mobilization of people from all over Italy.[34] It nevertheless remained an exception. If the rural plebs, Italians, and military men participated, this was mainly was in elections. It was the urban plebs which ruled the popular assemblies and especially the legislative tribal assembly, and ambitious politicians had to work on that group in order to make the voting pass off to their advantage.

The difference between city population and country folk increased through the years. For popular leaders the urban plebs was much more important to gain support, since the rural plebs was present in Rome only at certain occasions (such as games, the census, and important elections). In view of the expansion of the territory of Roman citizenship and the centralism of the Republican system, it was generally impossible for Roman citizens on the countryside to participate in political life in Rome. The members of the urban plebs, on the contrary, were constantly able to participate in political activities. Moreover, city-dwellers and country folk had distinct interests, and the rural plebs was increasingly bound by vertical ties to the large rural proprietors.[35]

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[33] *Rustici* : Cic. *Att.* 1.1.2. (consular elections of 65); *Mur.* 42 (consular elections of 63); *Q.Fr.* 2.3.4 (Pompey's support in 56); *Att.* 4.16.6 (consular elections of 54); App. 2.22 (Milo's support after the death of Clodius in 52; see B-87).
Veterans/soldiers: Cic. *Mur.* 37-38 (consular elections of 63); Sall. *Cat.* 16 (Catiline and the veterans of Sulla in 63; see B-23); B-70 (consular elections in 56); Cic. *Att.* 4.16.6 (consular elections of 54); Plut. *Pomp.* 58.1 (elections in 50); Cic. *Att.* 14.14.2 (in 44).

[34] B-57, 58, 59. Other cases of participation of veterans and rurals in collective behavior: B-1, 28, 49.

[35] On the declining political importance of rural *clientelae,* see also: ROULAND, *Pouvoir politique,* p. 433.
L. HAVAS, The *plebs romana* in the late 60's B.C., *ACD* 15 (1979), pp. 23-33, claims that it was the urban plebs which was more loyal to authority than the rural plebs and that the rural plebs was the vehicle of social change, which is demonstrated by the events in Catiline's conspiracy. Besides what has been said thus far in this chapter, I would like to bring forward, against HAVAS' contentions, the fact that Catiline's support (B-23) indeed was mainly rural. But it resulted from his abortive mobilization of the urban plebs, which was not due to a lack of interest of the urban plebs but to a lack of legitimacy and an effective repression. HAVAS, a Hungarian, corroborates his arguments further (p. 31) with the claim that the *tabernarii* would hardly be interested in social change, because many among them indulged in unproductive or socially useless labor as innkeepers and brothel keepers. I am afraid this says more about puritan prejudice in the communist world than about the social history of Rome.

Expressive collective behavior in the theater and the circus was a recurrent phenomenon during the late Republic. It was to become increasingly common in the Principate. At the games the people present could declare their opinion on politicians and current political issues. Cicero assigned an important political function to these demonstrations. He considered it the best measure of public opinion. The question that arises is, who participated in these types of collective behavior?[36]

From an analysis of the cases of collective behavior in the years 80-50, it appears that the public in the theater seems to have been decidly anti-*popularis*. In 59, when Pompey and certainly Caesar were popular and successfully controlled the assemblies, both they and their assistant Gabinius were hissed in the theater (B-35 and 36). Among other things the public reacted enthusiastically to a verse of an actor which was critical of Pompey's power. Shortly afterwards, C. Cato was almost lynched when he denounced Pompey as a despot at a meeting (B-37). The great popular leader Clodius never was able to gain the favor of the public in the theater. In those cases which involved Clodius and which were related to the shows, Clodius' support always came from outside the theater. In 57, a crowd under the leadership of Clodius twice interrupted the games in order to protest against a corn shortage, during the *ludi Apollinares* in July and again during the *ludi Romani* in September (B-55 and 60). In the same year we also know of two cases in which Cicero and his adherents were applauded at the shows, while Clodius and his supporters were hissed (B-53 and 54). In 56, Clodius himself organized the *Megalesia* as aedile. The result was a riot when Clodius had people from outside enter the theater (B-66). Cicero additionally remarks that the past *populares*, such as the Gracchi and Saturninus, received applause in the theater, unlike the popular leaders of Cicero's days.[37]

How can we explain the expressions of the crowd in these and other cases? Except for one case[38], the documentation for the behavior of the public at the shows comes from Cicero or the Ciceronian tradition (B-20: Plutarch's Life of Cicero). Of course it is possible that Cicero has declined to mention displeasing, i.e. pro-*popularis*, cases, but the cases he does mention cannot be sheer fantasy. A biased Cicero cannot explain the absence of mentions of theater demonstrations in other authors. The other authors do not mention these demonstrations because they were relatively unimportant in the political process. After all, no elections or legislative activity took place during the shows. Cicero thought the reactions of the

[36] The theater demonstrations found are: B-20, 35, 36, 53, 54, 76, 77, 90. See also NICOLET, *Métier*, 479-494.

[37] *Sest.* 105. See also *Pis.* 65: Piso, in 58 consul and a supporter of Clodius, in 55 had to fear the hisses of the theater public.

[38] B-36: Valerius Maximus. But this case too is mentioned by Cicero.

public at the games politically important, because, unlike in the assemblies, popular leaders were not popular at the shows. Therefore, it is likely that the theater indeed had an anti-*popularis* tendency.

In his speech *Pro Sestio* (106-127), Cicero dwells on the topic extensively. According to Cicero, the opinion of the Roman people is best measured on three occasions: at the meetings (*contiones*), in the assemblies (*comitia*), and during performances in the theater and gladiatorial games (106). The expression of opinion in the *contio* is not always trustworthy, because it is often composed of a certain public or hirelings. Only meetings at which the *verus populus*, consisting of *omnes ordines* and the Italian citizens, are present are good measures of public opinion. (106-108). The same goes for the assemblies. Here too there are good measures and bad ones. A bad measure is a tribal assembly in which not all of the tribes are sufficiently represented or in which people vote in another tribe than their own. A good assembly is pre-eminently the centuriate assembly, because there all the orders are represented (and implicitly, of course, because the élite has the largest influence in that assembly). (109, 112-114, and *Dom.* 90.)

The opinion of the Roman people, however, is best expressed in the theater and during gladiatorial shows, for at the games, just like at meetings, attempts are made to influence the expression of opinion by means of claques, but it is unsuccessful. That is why *optimates* are applauded and *populares* are hissed. At the gladiatorial shows many more people are present than at meetings or assemblies; the public at the games, therefore, is the most representative of the Roman people as a whole. (*Sest.* 115 and 124-127.) In Cicero's opinion the public at *contiones* differed from the public at the games (114 and 127).

Cicero's observation offers a plausible explanation for the difference in behavior of the plebs at the games and at other types of collective behavior that has been established above. Who, then, were the spectators? When Cicero describes the cheering of Brutus, one of Caesar's assassins, during the *ludi Apollinares* in 44 (*Phil.* 1.36), he holds it a representative judgment of the Roman people, because it came not from a small group but from the entire theater, i.e. the cheers came *a summis, mediis, infimis* (*caveis*) "from all the rows of seats" (*ibidem* 37). Cicero's description of the reactions of the public in this case is probably exaggerated, but the passage is important to establish the composition of the public. In the Roman theater all social strata of Roman society were present and the higher status groups had separate seats: the senators since the beginning of the second century and the *equites* from 67.[39] The members of the élite were seated on the bottom rows and the common people on the upper and cheapest rows. In that way the public attending the shows indeed was a reflection of the social structure of Roman population. At first sight

[39] Cic. *Mur.* 40; BOLLINGER, *Theatralis*, Ch. I. Augustus later introduced a more strict separation of the spectators: separate seats for married men, soldiers, young people, and women (Suet. *Aug.* 44; BOLLINGER, *op.cit.*, Ch. II).

Cicero's claim, that a unequivocal expression of opinion in the theater was representative of the Roman citizenry as a whole, seems to be right.

Popular assemblies during which important political decisions were to be made sometimes were planned for a moment at which a considerable number of people were already about for traditional occasions. The tribune of the plebs Manilius called an assembly during the *Compitalia*, a festival for the city population which was organized by neighborhoods. During that assembly Manilius passed a law to abolish the confinement of the freedmen to the four urban tribes. Clodius passed his four important laws in an assembly which took place three days after the *Compitalia*, which had been celebrated under Clodius' leadership despite a prohibition.[40] Cicero's return from exile, at which point he was greeted by a huge crowd, took place when Rome was filled with visitors to the *ludi Romani* originating from the Italian countryside (B-59).

During the games and during public manifestations such as triumphs many people flocked to Rome from the countryside. Among the spectators, consequently, were not only city dwellers, but also inhabitants of the surrounding countryside, who, as we have seen, during the late Republic had a strong patron-client relationship with the élite and different interests than the urban population. This definitely must have effected their behavior. Moreover, the theater and the circus, like the assembly, could not accomodate all the inhabitants of Rome, let alone the entire Roman citizenry. The Circus Maximus was the largest and could hold 250,000 spectators.[41] Whatever its composition, the public always was no more than a fraction of the total number of citizens.

The composition of the public was subject to manipulation. The shows were free, but not freely accessible. Providing tickets for clients or the members of a tribe was a proven means to gain popularity.[42] Gaius Gracchus already had opened the gladiatorial shows for the poor in order to enhance his popularity (Plut. *G.Gra.* 12.3-4). In short, the spectators in the theater differed from the participants in the popular assembly and they were not representative of the Roman citizenry.[43] We should not forget

[40] B-14, 40. Compare also the support which Murena received at the consular elections of 63 from Lucullus' soldiers, who were in the city to participate in the triumph (Cic. *Mur.* 37). Catiline planned his coup in the city for the *Saturnalia* (B-23).

[41] BALSDON, *Leisure*, pp. 248 and 268.

[42] *Ibidem*, 258; VILLE, *Gladiature*, p. 431. *Clientes:* Cic. *Att.* 2.1.5. *Tribus:* Cic. *Mur.* 67 and 73, *Q.Fr.* 3.1.1. See also *Mur.* 72 and B-66.

[43] A text which seems to contradict this conclusion is Cic. *Att.* 1.16.11. Cicero claims that he is popular with the *contionalis plebecula* because of his good relationship with Pompey and that he therefore receives applause in the theater and during the gladiatorial shows. The letter was written in 61 and at that point Pompey probably was popular with the entire people due to his conquests and his solution of the pirate problem. BOLLINGER, *op.cit.*, 28 attaches credence to Cicero's contention that the theater public was a representative reflection of the Roman people. Close to Cicero's text also remains F.F. ABBOTT, The Theatre as a Factor in Roman Politics under the Republic, *TAPhA* 38 (1907), pp. 49-56. BENNER, *op.cit.*, 29, 98-99, and 111-115, assumes that the urban plebs in general constituted the public in the theater.

that the games were not merely a popular entertainment of the lower strata, but that they were popular with the entire population. The members of the élite enjoyed the spectacles as much as the plebs. The possession of separate seats gave senators and *equites* the possibility to act as a claque.[44] The composition of the public was determined by the presence of members of the élite and partly by the organizer and other important persons who could furnish tickets to city-dwellers and country folk.[45]

The importance of participation becomes obvious in a number of theater demonstrations which took place shortly after the death of Caesar in 44. After the assassination of Caesar on the Ides of March, Brutus, Cassius, and their comrades were rebuffed by the urban plebs of Rome. The cremation of Caesar's corpse resulted in riots and the tyrannicides had to flee from the city.[46] Shortly afterwards, during the performance of a mime by Publilius Syrus at the *Megalesia* (April 4-10), a demonstration in favor of Caesar's murderers occurred.[47] It is unknown which aedile had organized these games.[48] In the second half of April, the consul Dolabella ordered the execution of Amatius, who had gained popular support by pretending to be Marius' grandson. Next, Dolabella bloodily repressed a pro-Caesar demonstration. For these deeds he received applause in the theater.[49]

Next followed the *ludi Apollinares* in July. They were planned to be magnificent and financed by Cicero's affluent friend Atticus. The goal was to turn these games into a demonstration of popular support for the tyrannicides.[50] The organizers undoubtedly will have seen to the attendance of the right public. At the outset, it went well; the public, thanks to the presence of a claque, expressed its support for Brutus (App. 3.24). But Cicero was not very pleased with the applause.[51] What had happened? Appian provides the answer: Before the games, Octavian had distributed large amounts of money among the tribes. Subsequently, he

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[44] B-20, 36; VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 396. See also B-66.

[45] Contra F. MILLAR, The Political Character of the Classical Roman Republic, 200-151 B.C., *JRS* 74 (1984), pp. 1-19, esp. 12, who holds that games were not given for a certain part of the plebs, but for whoever showed up.

[46] App. 2.121-122 and 146-147. Before the funeral, funeral games took place at which Antony let the senatorial decree granting Caesar all divine and human honors be read in public (Suet. *Iul.* 84.2). The reactions of the spectators, however, are unknown.

[47] Cic. *Att.* 14.2.1 and 3.2; SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Atticus VI*, 355; ALFÖLDI, *Oktavian*, 56.

[48] *MRR* 322-323.

[49] Cic. *Phil.* 1.5 and 30; J.D. DENNISTON, *M. Tulli Ciceronis In M. Antonium Orationes Philippicae I et II. Text and Commentary*, Oxford 1965[5] (1926), pp. 69-70 and 89. The date of the event in the theater is unkown. ALFÖLDI, *Oktavian*, 56-57, situates it at the end of April. The organizer of the games is equally unknown.

[50] ALFÖLDI, *Oktavian*, 57-59.

[51] *Att.* 16.2.3. In a speech Cicero later inflated the matter by calling the demonstration a tremendous success (*Phil.* 1.36).

made a sizable crowd of people rush into the theater during a performance and put a stop to the pro-Brutus demonstration.[52] In other words, it was not the attitude of the spectators which changed, but their composition.[53]

At the end of the same month the *ludi Victoriae Caesaris* were celebrated. These games became an expression of popular support for Octavian and disapproval of the tyrannicides.[54] The reason is obvious. Octavian organized the games himself and could determine the composition of the spectators (probably the urban plebs). The theater demonstrations which followed Caesar's death once again show that the urban plebs did not by definition make up the public at the games and that the reactions of the spectators depended on their composition, which could be manipulated by the organizer and other members of the upper strata.[55]

*Patronage and the Development of a Public Clientele*

The relationship of the plebs *vis-à-vis* the élite was determined by patronage. These vertical ties were an important feature of Roman society. The patron provided legal or economic support (*beneficia*) in exchange for political services of his clients (*officia*). The patron-client relationships, just like many other aspects of Roman society, were not couched in a legal framework, but consisted of a trust relationship (*fides* ) to which both parties were morally bound.[56]

The enormous population growth of Rome during the late Republic rendered personal contact between patron and client increasingly difficult. The wishes and grievances of the plebs could no longer be passed on to the élite through the existing primitive communication channels. In politics, moreover, the introduction of the secret ballot in the latter half of the second century resulted in a reduced control of the client by the

[52] App. 3.23-24. We have already seen that Clodius operated in the same manner at the *Megalesia* of 56 (B-66).

[53] ALFÖLDI, *Oktavian*, 56 and 59, sees in these events and in the subsequent reactions during the *ludi Victoriae Caesaris* a change in attitude of the city population, because he assumes that group to be present in the theater. Thus also VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 395.

[54] ALFÖLDI, *Oktavian*, 59 and 96-98; VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 403.

[55] See also BRUNT, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, *Sozialgeschichte*, 302.

[56] On patron-client relationships see: *RPA* 24-45; NICOLET, *Rome*, 230-235; ROULAND, *op.cit.*, 345-491; TAYLOR, *PP*, 41-47. On Roman clientelism from a comparative and sociological perspective: L. RONIGER, Modern patron-client relations and historical clientelism. Some clues from ancient Republican Rome, *Archives européennes de sociologie* 24 (1983), pp. 63-95; S.N. EISENSTADT, L. RONIGER, *Patrons, clients and friends. Interpersonal relations and the structure of trust in society*, Cambridge 1984, pp. 52-64.

patron.[57] Consequently, the vertical ties relaxed and it can be surmised that parts of the Roman plebs were even entirely free from such relationships with the ruling élite. This will particularly have concerned those groups among the plebs who possessed a certain degree of economic independence, the persons with a small business of their own: the artisans and shopkeepers.

The process of relaxing patron-client relationships was intensified by the declining unity within the ruling élite, as a result of which politicians turned to the plebs for political support. Because of the bad functioning of the old forms, the need arose among the plebs for new forms of articulation of demands. That is why politicians, operating as popular leaders, were able to rally behind them large groups of the plebs, composed of plebeians who were free from vertical ties and of clients who were drained away from other members of the élite. Thus developed what could be called a public clientele, since the popular leader (the patron) was almost per definition a magistrate. The relationship between popular leader and public clientele was less personal than the traditional bonds, because direct material gain became more important than considerations of personal loyalty. As a consequence, this type of clientele was more volatile, as Gaius Gracchus had already experienced to his detriment (*Rhet.Her.* 67), and few popular leaders managed to keep their patronage of the plebs after the expiration of their term of office.[58]

The *Commentariolum Petitionis* is an important source on the type of support a candidate should acquire in order to be elected. In addition, it is a manual for a new man, who had fewer resources at his disposal than a *nobilis* and therefore had to make more effort. Next to *amici* and relatives, Cicero had to obtain the support of the members of his tribe, his neighbors, his clients, his freedmen, and even his slaves.[59] Thus a distinction is made between several groups, one of whom are the clients. A similar distinction between groups also is evident during the conspiracy of Catiline. According to Sallust (*Cat.* 50.1), Lentulus' freedmen and some of his clients (*pauci ex clientibus*) tried to mobilize artisans and slaves in Rome for the liberation of Lentulus from prison. This shows that clients constituted only a subdivision of the following which politicians had to obtain and that not all social groups in the city of Rome belonged to the clients.

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[57] On the reduced control as a result of the secret ballot: Cic. *Leg.* 3.34-39; E.E. BEST, Literacy and Roman Voting, *Historia* 23 (1974), pp. 428-438, esp. 437.

[58] See also NICOLET, *Rome*, 233 and 235. On the relaxation of the patronage relationships, see: *RPA* 30-31 and 41-45; ROULAND, *op.cit.*, 403-422. Cf. BENNER, *op.cit.*, Ch. 2.

[59] *Com.Pet.* 17: *tribules, vicini, clientes, liberti, servi.* A similar distinction also in Cic. *Mur.* 69, on the support for Murena in 63 (*clientes, vicini, tribules, exercitus totus Luculli* ), and in *Red.Sen.* 20, where Cicero says that Sestius in 57 supported Cicero's recall from exile with *clientes, liberti,* and *familia.* On the declining importance of the traditional clientele in politics and especially in the elections, see: ROULAND, *op.cit.*, 422-425 and 480-483.

For a candidate at the elections it was important to surround himself constantly with large groups of people as a demonstration of his importance and the size of his following. There were three ways of escorting a candidate during an election campaign, according to the *Commentariolum Petitionis* (34-38): *salutatio* (calling at a candidate's home in the morning), *deductio* (escorting a candidate to the Forum), and *adsectatio* (full-time attendance); the last was the most important.

The salutation especially formed a part of the show which members of the élite generally staged to emphasize their social status, and it also occurred with non-candidates.[60] It was a traditional *officium* of clients. The morning-callers, however, had developed a new habit in the late Republic. They went to call upon several candidates in order to determine which candidate had the best chances of election and, therefore, from whom most was to be expected. This was a sign of disloyalty, according to Cicero. (*Com.Pet.* 35; Cic. *Mur.* 44.) It meant they were not bound by a strict tie of patronage to one person anymore.

Cicero also offers us some indication who participated in the various forms of escorting. The *deductores* had the highest status, for Cicero was advised to go to the Forum each day at fixed hours lest he kept them waiting.[61] Senators and *equites* already performed a major service if they took part in the *deductio*, for they did not have the time to escort a candidate during the whole day. Those who did have the time and who participated in the *adsectatio* were the *homines tenues non occupati*, poor people who had nothing else to do.[62]

The people who did have an occupation were the artisans and shopkeepers. They were unable to abandon their business during a whole day for full-time attendance, but could perform a salutation in the morning. And they were the persons who visited several candidates and were not tied to a single patron. This group made up the public clientele. The *tabernarii* and *opifices* were mostly freedmen and either their own

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60 On salutation during the Republic, see: *Com Pet* 3; Cic. *Cat* 1.10, *Att* 1.16.5; BALSDON, *Leisure*, 21-24, R P. SALLER, *Personal Patronage under the Early Empire*, Cambridge 1982, pp. 11 and 128-129 On *salutatio* and *adsectatio* : ROULAND, *op cit*, 484-488. On *salutatio, deductio*, and *adsectatio* HELLEGOUARC'H, *op cit*, 160-163.

61 *Com Pet.* 36, TAYLOR, *PP*, 43.

62 Cic. *Mur* 70: "Homines tenues unum habent in nostrum ordinem aut promerendi aut referendi beneficii locum hanc in nostris petitionibus operam atque adsectationem. Neque enim fieri potest neque postulandum est a nobis aut ab equitibus Romanis ut suos necessarios candidatis adsectentur totos dies; (...), tenuiorum amicorum et non occupatorum est ita adsiduitas quorum copia bonis viris et beneficis deesse non solet." BENNER, *op cit*, 25-26 and n 41, discusses the passages from Cicero as well. His main thesis is that the vertical ties did not relax, but merely lost their moral ground and were reduced to a material relationship. According to him, *homines tenues* participated in both *salutatio* and *adsectatio* Since, however, he has overlooked that Cicero specifically distinguishes between the participants in the various types of escorting and that the behavior of the morning-callers differed from the behavior of the *adsectatores*, he does not realize that the vertical ties were relaxed among a certain group, while they remained intact among the rest of the urban plebs.

bosses or the subordinate agents of an aristocrat[63]. At their manumission, slaves often received some capital from their ex-master to set up a business. Sometimes the relationship of dependence remained in force; sometimes too freedmen became relatively independent. The perspective of manumission was an important means of social control of the master over the slave and it made slaves work harder. As GARNSEY justly remarks, it is not obvious that a slave who had bought his own freedom still would find himself in a strong relationship of dependence as a freedman. Furthermore, the Roman government in the late Republic limited the duties of the *libertus* towards his patron by the edict of the praetor Rutilius Rufus around 118.[64] Before, the master had the right to demand obedience (*obsequium*) in exchange for freedom or the performance of manual labor (*operae*) after manumission. After the edict, only the *operae* remained, but those too were limited by law in scope and duration.[65] Finally, we could wonder why the oligarchy resisted time and again the distribution of the freedmen's votes over the rural voting districts if the freedmen would have possessed a strong patron-client relationship.[66] Within the group of freedmen large differences in wealth and social status existed. Due to their relative independence from patronage bonds the freedmen pre-eminently made up the public clientele.[67]

The *non occupati* probably were freeborn day-laborers, who had a lower socio-economic position and whose subsistence partly depended on the *sportulae* and similar material benefits which they received for their

[63] Cicero for example owned *tabernae* in Puteoli: *Att.* 14.9.1. On freedmen as artisans and shopkeepers: n.7 above.

[64] P. GARNSEY, Independent Freedmen and the Economy of Roman Italy under the Principate, *Klio* 63 (1981), pp. 359-371, esp. 363-364. See also NICOLET, *Rome*, 223. The edict of Rufus: Ulp. *Dig.* 38.2.1.

[65] TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, 68-81; NICOLET, *Rome*, 219.

[66] STAVELEY, *Voting*, 140.

[67] On the *tabernarii* and their social and economic relationship towards the élite: GARNSEY, *op.cit.n.64*, 362-366; TREGGIARI, *op.cit.n.6*, 53-55. See also J.E. SKYDSGAARD, The Disintegration of the Roman Labour Market and the Clientela Theory, *Studia Romana. In honorem Petri Krarup Septuagenarii*, Odense 1976, pp. 44-48. SKYDSGAARD's article is too general; he does not reckon with *tabernarii* who were more or less independent from patronage ties.
It should be obvious that I disagree with the central thesis of G. FABRE, *Libertus. Recherches sur les rapports patron-affranchi à la fin de la République romaine*, Rome 1981. According to FABRE, a strong patronage tie between patron and freedman remained in force whatever the circumstances. That also applied to the *tabernarii* (pp. 338-342; FABRE himself relativises his position with regard to the *tabernarii* by remarking that his opinion on this matter remains hypothetical, because he is unable to prove it with sources, pp. 338-339). See also the appropriately critical review of this book by J.H. D'ARMS, *CPh* 79 (1984), pp. 170-174.

*adsectatio*. This was a typical feature of patron-client relationships.[68] In any case, they were citizens, for they had the right to vote, as Cicero tells us: "Allow the men who hope for everything from us to have something (the *adsectatio*) to give us in return. If poor men have nothing but their vote, then, even if they vote, their support is valueless."[69] This group among the urban plebs was still vertically bound to individual members of the élite and their participation in collective behavior was determined by these patronage ties. In the light of what has been said in the previous section on the composition and the reactions of the spectators at the games, it is characteristic that precisely the *homines tenues* belonged to the people who received theater tickets (Cic. *Mur.* 72-73).

The following statements may serve as a preliminary conclusion: The political influence of the substrata of Roman society was largest in the tribal assembly, in which laws were passed and lower magistrates were elected. In the timocratically organized centuriate assembly, which elected the higher magistrates, senators and *equites* controlled a major part of the votes and were able to call the shots. From a political and social perspective a differentiation, perhaps even a disintegration, arose in the lower social strata during the late Republic. The members of the rural plebs had limited opportunities for participation in political life in Rome. Those who dwelled at a reasonable distance from the city were increasingly bound by vertical ties. The urban plebs had many more opportunities for participation in collective behavior, but here too we need to differentiate. The participants in the types of collective behavior which were most important to the political process - the tribal assemblies and meetings - differed from the spectators at the games. The freeborn remained tied in dependence and they, together with people from the countryside, made up a substantial part of the theater public. The freedmen shopkeepers and craftsmen, on the contrary, developed into an independent group. They exchanged their personal vertical ties for a

[68] On callers and *sportulae* : Juv. *Sat.* 1.95-96; BALSDON, *Leisure*, 21-24. Cf. BRUNT, *JRS*, 95. According to J. LE GALL, La "nouvelle plèbe" et la sportule quotidienne, in: R. CHEVALLIER (ed.), *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire offerts à A. Piganiol. Vol. 3*, Paris 1966, pp. 1449-1453, daily distributions of *sportulae* did not exist during the late Republic. This will indeed have been the case, because contemporary proof is virtually nonexistent, but there will have been sufficient occasions on which private food distributions occurred: See e.g. Sall. *Cat.* 37.7 (*privatae largitiones*). Material assistance was an important component of the*beneficia* which a patron was expected to bestow on his clients.

[69] *Mur.* 71: "Sine eos qui omnia a nobis sperant habere ipsos quoque aliquid quod nobis tribuere possint. Si nihil erit praeter ipsorum suffragium, tenue est, si, ut suffragantur, nihil valent gratia." See also *Off.* 2.70.

more independent and more relaxed relationship with politicians: the public clientele.[70]

*Plebs Contionalis*

Our sources do not offer any information on the number of participants in collective behavior. In some cases one might conjecture that it concerned thousands, in others it related probably to small groups of some tens or hundreds. Unfortunately, that is all which can be said on the number of participants. In any case, it was technically impossible to assemble the entire urban plebs. Many gatherings and manifestations took place in or near the Forum. The Forum, for example, had not even enough space for the 320,000 grain recipients of the 50s. Only a fraction of the voters participated in elections and popular assemblies.[71] In all cases of collective behavior, therefore, we are dealing with a part of the citizenry, mostly city-dwellers.

MEIER postulates that a specific category among the urban plebs, which he calls the *plebs contionalis*, made up the bulk of the participants in the meetings and the tribal assemblies. This group consisted mainly of *tabernarii*.[72] The term *plebs contionalis* as such does not occur in the ancient sources. Cicero only uses *contionalis plebecula* (*Att.* 1.16.11), *contionarius populus* (*Q.Fr.* 2.3.4), and *turba forensis* (*De Orat.* 1.118). Nevertheless, I will continue to employ MEIER's term here. In the previous section it has been demonstrated that there existed a group among the urban plebs, the public clientele, which pre-eminently was suitable for mobilization by popular leaders. This group, for the most part, was composed of artisans and shopkeepers. Did this group, then, match the group which participated in assemblies and meetings?

Cicero, like other authors, employs various terms in his description of the Roman people, but that is usually more conclusive on the value judgment an author attaches to their behavior than on the composition of the crowd.[73] Nonetheless, there are a number of sources which allow us some insight in the composition of the *plebs contionalis*. Cicero as well

[70] MILLAR, *op.cit.n.45*, passim, tries to demonstrate that the Roman people already in the second century became detached from clientele-bonds. MILLAR's article offers good arguments that the process of changing relationships between élite and plebs started in the second century. But MILLAR does not differentiate. In my view, the most independent citizens in the second century were to be found among the peasant population, as is shown by the composition of the following of the Gracchi.

[71] On the topographical limitations to popular participation in elections and assemblies, see: R. MACMULLEN, How many Romans voted?, *Athenaeum* 58 (1980), pp. 454-457. On the basis of the dimensions of the Campus Martius, which could hold the greatest number of people, MACMULLEN (p. 455) arrives at a maximum voter turn-out of 2 % during the late Republic (= 40,000 voters).

[72] MEIER, *RE*, 614; *RPA* 114-115.

[73] See Chapter 6 on the Image of the Crowd.

sometimes distinguishes between different groups. His designation of the *plebs contionalis* has already been mentioned. At the games, according to Cicero, the real Roman people were present. The following of the popular leaders, the public in the *contiones*, on the contrary, were a peculiar group (*peculiaris populus, Sest.* 125). Cicero also remarks that those who are mobilized by closing the shops cannot be equated with the *populus Romanus* (*Dom.* 89).

As was remarked before, the artisans with Gaius Gracchus already constituted a separately mobilizable group. In several cases of collective behavior the participation of shopkeepers and artisans is specifically attested or highly likely.[74] In Chapter 1 has already been established that several intermediate leaders of Clodius particularly mobilized *tabernarii*. In Chapter 3 on mobilization it will be shown that some important methods of mobilization were specifically aimed at the artisans and shopkeepers: the closing of the shops (*tabernae*) and the use of organizational frameworks, such as *collegia* and *operae*. In the plebeian organizations, the *collegia*, there were many freedmen. The *operae* were small groups organized for political purposes in which artisans and shopkeepers played an important role. Especially Clodius' following was made up primarily of such organizations.[75]

The vicinity of the Forum in Rome, where collective behavior generally took place, was surrounded by shops. It was easy to mobilize *tabernarii* and *opifices* (Cic. *Flac.* 18). They are the people meant by "many energetic city folk, many influential and active freedmen are about the Forum", who were important in an election campaign.[76]

Later, too, this group was seen as the most politically active. The popularity Caesar the dictator enjoyed was largest among the artisans and shopkeepers. According to Appian (2.112), in 44 slogans were written on the tribunal of M. Brutus and on the statues of his ancestors to urge him to take action against Caesar's dictatorship. It was said that this was done by the people, but Brutus' friend Cassius said to him:

> "If you want to defend the Republic, whom of the aristocracy will you not rally to your standard? Do you think it is artisans and shopkeepers who have written anonymously on your tribunal, or is it rather the Roman aristocrats, who,

[74] *Tabernarii* and *opifices* : B-23, 41, 60, 86, 87, 88. Freedmen: B-14, 47, 51, 66. Politicians occasionally had contacts with single groups of artisans: Cic. *Cat.* 1.8 (Catiline and the *falcarii*, scythe makers); Cic. *Pis.* 24 and Asc. 10C (Piso and the *unguentarii*, perfume sellers, of Capua).

[75] BRUNT, *Conflicts*, 137; FLAMBARD, *MEFRA*, passim; MEIJER, *Verliezers*, 125; TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, 167-175; WALTZING, *op.cit.*, 49, 93-111, and 174-177.

[76] "Multi homines urbani industrii, multi libertini in foro gratiosi navique versantur", *Com.Pet.* 29.

though they ask from other praetors games, horse-races, and combats of wild beasts, ask from you liberty, a deed worthy of your ancestry?"[77]

Indeed, when Brutus and Cassius shortly afterwards actually took steps against Caesar, the people by no means reacted enthusiastically.[78]

An interesting parallel is to be found in Livy (9.46). Cn. Flavius was aedile in 304. He was of humble stock: his father was a freedman and Flavius had been a scribe. He had been elected aedile by the *forensis factio*. This faction had become powerful because Appius Claudius the censor of 312 had distributed the *urbani humiles* over all 35 tribes. The result was that the Forum and the Campus were corrupted. Since then there existed an opposition between the *integer populus* and the *forensis factio*. Shortly afterwards, to prevent that the latter group would continue to rule the *comitia*, the measure was repealed and the *forensis turba* was restricted to the four urban tribes.

It is necessary to examine this passage in greater depth. Livy's description is an anachronism on account of the following considerations, starting with the "corruption" of the Forum and the Campus. With that, Livy means to say that the city-dwellers, because of Appius' reform, received a greater influence in the tribal assembly and the centuriate assembly respectivily. The tribal organization, however, was introduced in the centuriate assembly only after 241. Modifications in the distribution of the votes in the tribes, therefore, could not have had any influence on the elections in the centuriate assembly in 312.[79]

BAUMAN recently has contested this interpretation. He devotes an entire chapter to the policy of Appius Claudius. He departs from Livy's description and does not deal with the question of anachronism in his sources.[80] Against the interpretation that the reallocation of the tribes by Appius could not have had any influence on the centuriate assembly BAUMAN puts a "common sense argument": "(...) if Appius' reforms did not affect the voting strength in the comitia centuriata, then the factio had nothing whatever to do with Appius' own electoral successes, since all his major offices depended on centuriate elections. In that case why did he

[77] App. 2.113: "τίνα δ' οὐ προσλήψῃ τῶν ἀρίστων οὕτω φρονῶν; ἤ σοι δοκοῦσιν οἱ χειροτέχναι καὶ κάπηλοι καταγράφειν σου τὸ δικαστήριον ἀσήμως μᾶλλον ἤ οἱ Ῥωμαίων ἄριστοι, παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν θέας αἰτοῦντες ἵππων ἢ θηρίων, παρὰ δὲ σοῦ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ὡς σὸν προγονικὸν ἔργον ;"

[78] App. 2.120-121. Plutarch as well mentions the grafitti on the statues of the Bruti (*Caes.* 62.4). Although he does not say it in so many words, the tenor of Plutarch's description is that in any case it was not done by the people.

[79] NICOLET, *Latomus*, pp. 707-709 and 719; TAYLOR, *RVA*, 87-88. Furthermore, before the end of the second century the tribal assemblies were usually convened on the Capitol and not on the Forum and the Campus: TAYLOR, *VD*, p. 136.

[80] BAUMAN, *Lawyers*, Ch. 1. In his introduction, where he treats the sources he uses (p. 15), the question of anachronism does not come up either. See also the critical review of R. RILINGER, *Gnomon* 58 (1986), pp. 313-321, esp. 315-318.

have anything to do with the factio?"[81] What BAUMAN does not mention is that after 300, when his reform was annulled and the influence of the *forensis factio* was nullified, Appius became praetor in 297 and 295 and consul for the second time in 296. BAUMAN's common sense argument, therefore, does not hold, because the reduced voting strength of the *forensis factio* apparently did not influence Appius' subsequent career.[82] Thus Livy's description should be considered anachronistic.

Second, Livy's description is anachronistic because the *forensis turba*, the Forum crowd, consisted of freedmen. Livy does not say it in so many words, except for Flavius' father's servile descent, but his description of the redistribution of the city-dwellers strongly corresponds to a late Republican problem. The freedmen in Rome had Roman citizenship, but, despite attempts by popular leaders to distribute them over all 35 tribes and thereby increase their weight in the voting[83], they remained registered in the four urban tribes. Plutarch does mention that Appius' measure concerned freedmen (*Publ.* 7.5). Although Rome had grown considerably at the end of the fourth century, it still was a traditional city-state without a clear separation between town and country. Freedmen will have made up a much smaller part of the urban population than in the late Republic. The distribution of the *urbani humiles* over all the tribes, as stated by Livy, therefore, is a projection of the author's contemporary experiences onto the early Republic.[84]

Third, Livy's presentation of Appius Claudius' policy bears too close a resemblance to the popular policy of the late Republic: public works (Via Appia and an aqueduct) to gain popularity and a policy directed towards the freedmen (Diod. 20.36). Plutarch, moreover, calls Appius a *dèmagogos* on the basis of granting the voting right to the freedmen (*Publ.* 7.5).

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[81] BAUMAN, *op.cit.*, 51.

[82] BAUMAN himself has difficulty with it also. When he discusses the downfall of the *forensis factio* and Appius' career after 300 (*ibidem* 55-66), the only possible explanation for Appius' successful elections he can adduce is that Appius owed these to his qualities as a lawyer. But on this see RILINGER, *op.cit.n.80*, 317-318.

[83] On the various *leges de libertinorum suffragiis* and the voting rights of the freedmen: FLAMBARD, *Asconius II*, 269-294; idem, *MEFRA*, 149-153; ALFÖLDI, *Caesar*, 19-22; *LGRR* 407-409; TAYLOR, *VD*, Ch. 10; TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, 37-52.

[84] See also NICOLET, *Latomus*, 690-691.
Contra E.S. STAVELEY, The Political Aims of Appius Claudius Caecus, *Historia* 8 (1959), pp. 410-433. STAVELEY claims that the *factio forensis* was not an anachronism and that it was composed of rich merchants instead of freedmen (pp. 413-418). BAUMAN (*op.cit.*, 32-39 and 53) adopts STAVELEY's interpretation and adds citizens without the voting right. He apparently has not seen Plut. *Publ.* 7.5. Moreover, he says that the *factio forensis* confirmed a division between urban and rural plebs. The urban plebs gained the upper hand because the rural plebs lacked sufficient time to engage in politics in Rome (p. 32). That, however, is an anachronism; this situation only occurred as from the middle of the second century. Thus stated, BAUMAN's claims on the rural plebs in fact come down to denying completely that the enormous Roman expansion during the second century and the influx of capital and slaves had any influence whatsoever on the Roman socio-political situation.

Finally, Livy employs the terminology of the late Republic in the passage mentioned[85], which particularly follows from the fact that Cicero (*De Orat.* 1.118) and Livy both use the term *forensis turba.* Cicero even speaks of the *turba et barbaria forensis,* which might imply a pejorative reference to the freedmen, who usually were of foreign origin.

Something, of course, was going on at the end of the fourth century. Probably Appius wanted to increase the influence of those who had been recently (by the *lex Poetilia* of 326) released from debt slavery.[86] Livy expresses all this in anachronistic terms. Livy tries to project the origin of the importance of the urban plebs in Roman politics, and especially the freedmen, in the fourth century. His Forum crowd is a reflection of his own days and was composed of freedmen.[87] Freedmen made up the bulk of the artisans and shopkeepers. Once more, we have an indication that the *plebs contionalis* or the *forensis factio* in the late Republic consisted of that group. Another indication of the political importance of the freedmen is to be found in the fact that Gellius Poblicola, one of Clodius' intermediate leaders, was able to gain popularity among the plebs by means of a marriage with a freedwoman (Cic. *Sest.* 110).

We still have to deal with the participation of slaves in collective behavior. Cicero especially accused Clodius of recruiting his following mainly from slaves. That was a rhetorical exaggeration, which was particularly aimed at the freedmen who were insultingly indicated by their former servile status.[88] In one of his philosophical works, the *Academica,* Cicero recounts how this was done:

> "Why then, Lucullus, do you bring me into disfavor, and summon me before a public meeting, so to speak, and actually order the shops to be shut, like seditious tribunes are used to do? For what is the object of your complaint that we are abolishing the practical sciences, unless it aims at stirring up the crafsmen? But if they all come together from every quarter, it will be easy to incite them to attack your side! First I will make the snide remarks, that all the

[85] NICOLET, *Latomus,* 690-691 and 696-704.

[86] *Ibidem,* 691. NICOLET (709-719) adds the hypothesis that possibly two types of popular assemblies were created after the model of Capua, a more democratic one and a more aristocratic one. But, as he himself admits, this is most uncertain. See also BAUMAN, *op.cit.,* 52-53. Later, by the way, NICOLET seems to accept the view that the *forensis factio* concerned normal freedmen: *Rome,* 220-221.

[87] TREGGIARI, *Freedmen,* 38-42 deals with Livy's passage at length to demonstrate that the *forensis factio* consisted of freedmen. I agree, of course; but I disagree with TREGGIARI's implicit assumption that Livy's account was not anachronistic. For that matter, I would like to quote her own words: "Not much reliance can be put on reports from historians of the first century B.C. on the traditions of Rome's early history" (*ibidem* 38). See also TAYLOR, *VD,* 132-138, who argues along the same lines as TREGGIARI.

[88] See ACHARD, *Pratique,* 213-220; BRUNT, *Conflicts,* 137; TREGGIARI, *Freedmen,* App. 4. For an analysis of Cicero's terminology on participants, see: FAVORY, *op.cit.,* 129-138.

persons then standing in the meeting are on your showing exiles, slaves, and madmen;..."[89]

On the one hand, this passage proves that slaves made up only a minor part of the participants; on the other hand, it provides us yet another indication that the following of the popular leaders was mainly composed of artisans and shopkeepers.

Catiline refused to accept slaves as participants in his revolt, because it was against his interests (Sall. *Cat.* 56.5). Only after his uprising in the city proved abortive was he prepared to admit fugitive rural slaves as auxiliary forces.[90] Slaves will have been part of the *operae,* the small groups Clodius and others employed for agitation. These slaves will have been recruited especially from the personal *familia* of the politician concerned. The recruitment of slaves was an emergency measure[91] and was considered most offensive. Furthermore, because of a tradition of the use of slaves as a last resort, the involvement of slaves might give potential participants the impression that the cause was already lost. There was not much sense in a political strategy directed towards slaves, since only citizens had the right to vote and a certain control at the voting may be assumed. A popular leader, moreover, was in danger of losing his indispensible support among members of the upper strata by the mobilization of slaves.[92]

What is more, the mobilization of slaves quite possibly might prove counterproductive. Despite the freedom of movement of the urban slaves, there existed a major social distinction between slaves and free. In the *collegia,* plebeian organizations which formed an important mobilization factor, freeborn, freedmen, and slaves participated together. But these colleges reproduced in themselves the social stratification and the ideological prejudices of the city; that is to say, the slaves had a

[89] Cic. *Acad.* 2.144: "Quid me igitur, Luculle, in invidiam et tamquam in contionem vocas, et quidem, ut seditiosi tribuni solent, occludi tabernas iubes? quo enim spectat illud cum artificia tolli quereris a nobis, nisi ut opifices concitentur? Qui si undique omnes convenerint, facile contra vos incitabuntur! expromam primum illa invidiosa, quod eos omnes qui in contione stabunt exsules servos insanos esse dicatis;..."

[90] J. ANNEQUIN, Esclaves et affranchis dans la conjuration de Catilina, *Actes du colloque 1971 sur l'esclavage,* Paris 1972, pp. 193-238; K.R. BRADLEY, Slaves and the Conspiracy of Catiline, *CPh* 73 (1978), pp. 329-336; *LGRR* 428-429; K.W. WELWEI, Das Sklavenproblem als politischer Faktor in der Krise der römischen Republik, in: MOMMSEN, *Elend,* pp. 50-69, esp. 61-63.

[91] E.g. B-15, 25, 70.
On the low participation of slaves in the late Republic: WELWEI, *op.cit.n.90,* 61-69.

[92] See also J. ANNEQUIN, M. LéTROUBLON, Une approche des discours de Cicéron: les niveaux d'intervention des esclaves dans la violence, *Actes du colloque 1972 sur l'esclavage,* Paris 1974, pp. 211-247, esp. 235-247. According to the authors it is impossible, despite a detailed content analysis of a number of Cicero's speeches from the 50s, to establish how many slaves participated in collective violence. The slaves, in any case, did not operate independently.
ALFÖLDI, *Caesar,* 15-19, and METAXAKI-MITROU, *op.cit.,* 182 and 186, do attribute an important role to the slaves as participants.

subordinate position and the leaders of the colleges were recruited from persons who already before their election possessed a higher social position.[93]

Citizens of low social status, to be sure, were aware of the stratification of Roman society. Freedmen had citizenship, but all the same they were restricted to such an extent that they were not eligible for office and were only allowed to vote in the four urban tribes. Attempts to change that encountered resistance (B-14). Therefore it is not conceivable that Roman citizens would have accepted political participation of the unfree. Hence Cicero's invectives stress exactly this point. Roman society was vertically stratified; there was no question of horizontal solidarity.

The socio-political stratification of the Roman urban plebs, which became manifest in the participation in collective behavior, had the following appearance: The slaves, whose influence from a political point of view was slightest, were at the bottom. Above them were the free citizens who still found themselves in a position of dependence on the élite. The upper stratum of the urban plebs was formed by the public clientele, or the Forum crowd, or the *plebs contionalis*, for the major part composed of freedmen artisans and shopkeepers. Socially and economically, and consequently politically, these persons took up an independent position. Among this group the participants in the politically relevant collective behavior were to be found, for their independence granted them a larger freedom of choice in political matters.[94] A popular leader had to turn to the artisans and shopkeepers if he wanted to mobilize a following which went beyond his personal clientele. The public clientele finds its equivalent in RUDÉ's "Preindustrial Crowd" and HOBSBAWM's

[93] FLAMBARD, *Ktema*, 156-158. On the inferior position of slaves in the colleges see also: WELWEI, *op.cit.n.90*, 66.

[94] There is an indication that in the Principate too there was a group which was more politically active than the rest of the plebs. In A.D. 238 the people of Rome rose in revolt against the Emperor Maximinus Thrax and besieged the *castra praetoria*. When the praetorians drove the people back into the city, street fights arose, at which point "the criminals and the lower people" joined the soldiers: Hdn. 7.12.7 (*kakourgoi kai eutelai dèmotai* ). On this riot see P.W. TOWNSEND, The Revolution of A.D. 238: The Leaders and Their Aims, *YCS* 14 (1955), pp. 49-105.
In Alexandria during the first century A.D., a continious contrast existed between politicized craftsmen and shopkeepers on the one hand, and the conservative proletariat on the other hand: L. CRACCO RUGGINI, Nuclei immigrati e forze indigene in tre grandi centri commerciali dell'imperio, *MAAR* 36 (1980), pp. 55-76, esp. 60.

"Church and King Mob", which did not consist of *Lumpenproletariat*, but of respectable artisans and shopkeepers.[95]

*The Participants and their Susceptibility to Popular Policy*

How did the policy, as it was pursued by popular leaders, fit in with the needs and expectations of the participants? We will now pass in review a number of important matters which formed part of the program, insofar as something of the sort existed, which popular leaders presented to the people. First of all, there was largess, the *largitiones*. There were two forms of largess: *largitiones* financed from public means and *largitiones* financed from private means.

An important type of public largess were the corn laws. The city of Rome, which had expanded into a metropolis, was no longer able to supply its own food from the immediate vicinity. That is why grain had to be imported to an increasing degree, initially from Italy and later from the conquered territories such as Sicily and Africa.[96] Gaius Gracchus had introduced the practice of distributing subsidized grain in 123. During the late Republic this practice was several times abolished and reintroduced until Clodius instituted the distribution of free corn by the government.[97] Not only the price of grain was important, but also the care for an

[95] G RUDÉ, *The Crowd in History. A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England 1730-1848*, New York 1964, pp. 195-213; idem, *Paris*, 21 and 28-29; HOBSBAWM, *Primitive Rebels*, Ch. VII, esp. pp. 118-122.
BRUNT, Der romische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, *Sozialgeschichte*, 301-307, argues that the participants in collective violence did not consist of a certain group, but of the urban plebs as a whole, plus an important element of the rural plebs. He also compares the Roman situation to RUDÉ's research by arguing that the participants were not composed of criminals and slaves in the way they are depicted by Cicero. Although BRUNT in his article contributes to the determination of participation, he remains too bogged down in his hypothesis that the urban plebs as whole participated It should be obvious that, in my view, it is possible to trace a clearly more active part among the city population, i e. the *plebs contionalis*
The argument that popular leaders depended on have-nots and slaves occurs, among others, in ALFOLDI, *Caesar*, 13-27 (this study, although recently published, was concluded in 1955). ALFOLDI (p 15) qualifies the situation of the *Hablosen* in Rome as *Faulenzerleben*, which seems to me a prejudiced qualification. M GELZER, *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1962-1964, Band I, p 176, speaks of a *Parasitentum* And further also in METAXAKI-MITROU, *op cit*, 182-186 The fact, that in my opinion a group among the urban plebs is traceable which regularly and actively participated in collective behavior, makes me in the eyes of METAXAKI-MITROU a "most simple-minded person" (p. 186) BENNER, *op cit*, 71-83, most recently, also holds on to the classic nineteenth-century concept that it were the poor and the unemployed who were the most eager to agitate on behalf of any leader in exchange for material gain, while respectable artisans and shopkeepers were too occupied with their businesses.

[96] On the organization of the corn supply during the Republic, see· RICKMAN, *op cit*, Ch II.

[97] On the corn distributions in the late Republic, see. NICOLET, *Métier*, 255-279, RICKMAN, *op cit*, Ch. VII, esp 166-175.

adequate supply and storage. Clodius' law not only provided for a free monthly ration, but also for measures concerning the infrastructure to improve the supply.[98] In 57 Pompey was put in charge of the corn supply.[99] At times magistrates, from their own pockets, handed out grain and oil to the people.[100]

During the Principate the grain recipients received a kind of identification (*tessera*) with which they could collect their monthly ration. In that way it was also possible to put a limit on the number of recipients. But during the Republic the distribution was arranged by means of lists with the names of the corn recipients.[101] Clodius' arson of the temple of Nymphs was connected with the organization of the distribution. Clodius' corn law had resulted in a wave of manumissions, which led to an enormous increase of the number of corn recipients and caused problems in the corn supply. As a part of his *cura annonae* Pompey wanted to revise the lists of recipients and to remove the recent freedmen. The lists were placed in the temple of Nymphs and Clodius had them destroyed. Thus, Clodius tried to prevent freedmen from not benefiting any longer from the distributions, since he would lose an important part of his support among the urban plebs. For the increased number of freedmen probably had strengthened Clodius' following.[102]

We know that the distributions amounted to a monthly ration of five *modii* of corn for each male citizen. We also know that this quantity largely sufficed to feed one person, but not a whole family.[103] The corn distributions were insufficient for Romans without a fixed income to keep afloat and they remained dependent on casual work and occasional gifts from members of the élite. Furthermore, it is questionable whether the very poor were capable of raising the money to pay for the subsidized grain; only after the introduction of the free distribution did all citizens benefit[104].

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98 FLAMBARD, *MEFRA*, 145-149; C. NICOLET, La *lex Gabinia-Calpurnia de insula Delo* et la loi "annonaire" de Clodius (58 av. J.-C.), *CRAI* (1980), pp. 260-287.

99 On Pompey's *cura annonae* see: RICKMAN, *op.cit.*, 55-58.

100 In 75 by the aedile Q. Hortensius Hortalus, the famous orator (Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.215; VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 450); in 74 by the aedile M. Seius (Cic. *Planc.* 12, *Off.* 2.58; Plin. *NH* 15.2 and 18.16); and in 70 by the consul Crassus (Plut. *Crass.* 2.2 and 12.2). Out of gratitude for his action against Verres, Cicero received many gifts from the Sicilians, which enabled him as aedile in 69 to keep a lid on the food prices on the market in Rome (Plut. *Cic.* 8.1).

101 C. NICOLET, Tessères frumentaires et tessères de vote, *L'Italie préromaine et la Rome républicaine. Mélanges offerts à J. Heurgon. Vol. II*, Rome 1976, pp. 695-716; RICKMAN, *op.cit.*, App. 8.

102 Cic. *Cael.* 78, *Har.Resp.* 39, *Mil.* 73, *Par.Stoic.* 4.31, *Red.Pop.* 14, *Red.Sen.* 7, *Sest.* 84 and 95; C. NICOLET, Le temple des Nymphes et les distributions frumentaires à Rome à l'époque républicaine d'àpres des découvertes récentes, *CRAI* (1976), pp. 29-51, esp. 37-46.

103 RICKMAN, *op.cit.*, 10.

104 On this see R.J. ROWLAND, The "Very Poor" and the Grain Dole at Rome and Oxyrhynchus, *ZPE* 21 (1976), pp. 69-72.

For the *tabernarii,* however, these distributions, on top of the normal income from their business, could be sufficient to make them economically independent from their patron. Consequently, the grain laws were especially in their interest. The city plebs regularly rose in revolt because of a corn shortage, and politicians could take advantage of it by enacting measures concerning the corn supply, i.e. measures concerning the corn distributions or measures to improve the corn supply. The participation of *tabernarii* in a food riot can be traced in one case.[105] They had something to lose and were prepared to fight for it. Catiline tried to mobilize especially this group among the urban plebs (B-23). Therefore, it is characteristic that the senate deemed it necessary to calm the urban plebs and to prevent its participation in the conspiracy by means of a corn law.

The identification of the *plebs contionalis* with the *plebs frumentaria* becomes obvious in a quote in Cicero: "that wretched and starveling *plebs contionalis,* blood-sucker of the treasury". An important argument of the opponents of *leges frumentariae* has always been the pressure on the treasury. Because Cicero depicts the *plebs contionalis* as being disastrous to public finance, it may be suitably assumed that he has the corn recipients in mind.[106] After the fall of the Republic the grain distributions remained in force, and the emperors went to great lengths in order to provide for an adequate grain supply. It was one of the most important ways by which the emperors secured the support of the Roman urban plebs.[107]

The banquets which were organized for the plebs and the increasing habit of distributing money among the voters in elections can be mentioned as *largitiones* in a material sense.[108] By inviting people to a banquet tribe by tribe (*tributim, Com.Pet.* 44), their favor could be curried by voting unit. AIGNER has recently claimed that money distributions particularly went to the higher strata, considering their control of the centuriate assembly.[109] Money distributions at elections for the higher magistracies certainly must have occurred on a larger scale,

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105 Food riots: B-2, 55, 60. See also B-8, 9. *Tabernarii* : B-60.

106 Cic. *Att.* 1.16.11: "illa contionalis hirudo aerari, misera ac ieiuna plebecula". See also TAYLOR, *PP,* 72; idem, *RVA,* 32.

107 On the corn supply and the distributions during the Empire, see: RICKMAN, *op.cit.,* 58-66, Ch. IV, 175-197, and Ch. VIII; J.M. CARRIé, Les distributions alimentaires dans les cités de l'empire romain tardif, *MEFRA* 87 (1975), pp. 995-1101.

108 Banquets: Cic. *Mur.* 72 (consular elections in 63); Plut. *Crass.* 12.2 (consul Crassus in 70). Public banquets were also organized during the Principate by the emperor, mostly in the theater: Suet. *Nero* 16.2, *Dom.* 4.5 and 7.1; Mart. 8.50. Distribution of money: Cic. *Att.* 1.16.13 (consular elections in 61), 4.17.4 (consular elections in 54); Asc. 30-31C, Dio 40.48.1 (consular elections in 52), Asc. 33C (Milo after the murder of Clodius in 52). On electoral corruption see further: NICOLET, *Métier,* 412-415.

109 H. AIGNER, Gab es im republikanischen Rom Wahlbestechungen für Proletarier?, *Gymnasium* 85 (1978), pp. 228-238.

given the interests at stake and the fierce competition. But also at elections for lower magistracies in the tribal assembly such electoral corruption took place. For Cicero's speech *Pro Plancio* is a defense of Plancius, who was accused of having committed electoral corruption with the aid of *divisores* during the aedilician elections of 55. Besides, Verres had tried to sabotage Cicero's election to aedile through his contacts with the *divisores.*[110] The aediles were elected by the tribal assembly.

Agrarian laws were another type of favors bestowed on the plebs by the government.[111] *Leges agrariae,* however, were unable to meet the demands of the urban plebs. The city-dwellers did not much fancy the idea of farming. This was especially true of the group which we have been able to distinguish as the most politically active: the artisans and shopkeepers. The situation was perhaps different for the poor freeborn and for former peasants who had recently migrated to Rome. The agrarian law of Rullus in 63 failed because Rullus was unable to muster sufficient support. Rullus himself realized it in some way and he proposed to let the members of the land-distributing committee be elected by only half of the tribes.[112] Rullus' scheme to mitigate demographic pressure in Rome by means of land distributions[113] was completely outdated and a misinterpretation of the needs of the urban plebs.

The agrarian laws which did have success were intended for veterans, such as the *leges agrariae* of Sulla and Caesar. Tiberius Gracchus already had to rely on the support of the country folk for his agrarian law. Despite his popularity among the urban plebs, Caesar deemed it necessary to call soldiers to Rome in order to pass his agrarian law in 59. An agrarian law

110 On the *divisores* with Plancius see Cic. *Planc.* 45, 47-48, and 55. Verres: Cic. *Verr.* 1.22-25 and 2.3.161.

111 For some good surveys of this period, see: BRUNT, *Manpower,* Ch. XIX, esp. pp. 300-319; D. FLACH, Die Ackergesetzgebung im Zeitalter der römischen Revolution, *HZ* 217 (1974), pp. 287-295; NICOLET, *Rome,* Ch. III.

112 Cic. *Leg.Agr.* 2.16. See also *LGRR* 388-396.

113 Cic. *Leg.Agr.* 2.70. Cicero used this argument against Rullus in his speech before the people. Three years later, however, Cicero thought it was a good idea with regard to another agrarian law: *Att.* 1.19.4. See also JONKERS, *op.cit.,* 110-111.

was insufficient to make the urban plebs enthusiastic.[114] Caesar also added a supplement to his agrarian law in 59: the *lex Campana*. This law provided for a land distribution in Campania for 20,000 poor citizens with more than three children, the proletarians in the literal sense of the word. But this law was directed towards citizens in general and not only towards city-dwellers.[115] During his dictatorship Caesar also started a project to found overseas colonies, in which a considerable number of the colonists was composed of urban proletarians.[116] Agrarian laws in the late Republic could only count on response from a limited proportion of the urban plebs, if they were meant for that group in the first place. An agrarian law was mainly aimed at acquiring support among soldiers, who received a piece of land on discharge and who thereby returned to their original profession. But this, incidentally, was the group which would play a decisive part in the eventual power struggle.

The public works were a mixture of public and private largess. Some magistrates, such as the aediles, had the duty of carrying out certain public works. These were financed by the treasury, but the provided funds were not always adequate. In that case, or if the person in charge wished to make his project especially grand, private money was invested in the public works. The constructions were part of the élite's conspicious consumption. There were also private persons who, on their own initiative and at their own expense, erected temples and other buildings. Finally, there was the construction of non-public buildings, such as residences, an undoubtably frequent phenomenon of which there are but few references in the sources. Many Romans lived in ramshackle tenement blocks (*insulae*). The construction of such buildings provided work for plebeians and popularity to the commissionar. Thus Crassus was

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114 Already in 60 Pompey had tried to propose an agrarian law through the tribune of the plebs T. Flavius, but it failed. According to Cicero the bill was not popular with the people. (*Att* 1.19 4.) Cicero thought that Caesar's law would not have any chance of success either, because only a part of the *multitudo* would profit from it (*Att* 2 16 11). I disagree with SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Atticus I*, 336, who states that Cicero undeservedly presumed that Flavius' agrarian law would not be popular, since the lower population would benefit from it SHACKLETON BAILEY, however, does not reckon with the lack of interest of the city population in farming. See e.g. Liv. 3.1.7 (the urban population in 467 was unwilling to move to the countryside to take up farming) and n 16 above.
Again it is Appian who draws our attention to the existence of different groups with distinct behavioral patterns: In his description of the reaction of the people in Rome after Caesar's death, Appian (2.120) distinguishes between the urban plebs as a whole and the demobilized soldiers who were waiting in Rome for the promised land distribution.

115 App. 2.10; Dio 38.7.3; Suet. *Iul* 20 3; BRUNT, *Manpower*, 314-318; *LGRR* 397-401.

116 BRUNT, *Manpower*, 235-259. YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 143-150.

in the habit of buying up *insulae* damaged by fire and subsequently to restore and rent them.[117]

Public works provided employment for craftsmen and day laborers. They supplied a need and the person who financed the works made himself popular.[118] Lucius Caesar, a distant relative of Gaius the dictator, won the consular elections in 65 as a result of his actions as *curator* of the Via Flaminia (Cic. *Att.* 1.1.2). Gaius Caesar owed his popularity among the urban plebs largely to his building projects. At the beginning of his political career, Caesar invested a lot of his own money in the Via Appia. As aedile he ordered the construction of buildings. (Plut. *Caes.* 5.5; Suet. *Iul.* 10.1.) Later, in 52, he started the construction of a forum as part of his election campaign for a second consulate. He financed it with the Gallic war booty. (Suet. *Iul.* 26.2.) Pompey too knew how to use this method. In 55 he started the construction of a theater which, according to Cassius Dio, still won admiration in the third century A.D. (Dio 39.38.1; Plut. *Pomp.* 52.4). We can further point to the Pons Fabricius, with which the aedile L. Fabricius spanned the Tiber in 62; the plans for a large-scale construction and repair of roads, proposed by the tribune of the plebs Curio in 50; and the Basilica Aemilia, reconstructed by order of the consul Aemilius Paullus in 50.[119]

An important type of *largitiones* was the organization of games. There were games which took place at fixed intervals as religious manifestations. These were public games organized by a magistrate, mostly an aedile. By putting their own money into the organization of the games magistrates could receive important publicity for their subsequent political career.[120] The obligatory games were often concluded with a supplement of *venationes*, popular animal fights which the organizer payed from private means.[121] Next to those, there were *munera*, games

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117 Plut. *Crass.* 2.4; B.W. FRIER, *Landlords and Tenants in Imperial Rome*, Princeton 1980, pp. 32-34; NICOLET, *Rome*, 151. Plutarch mentions that Crassus employed 500 slaves as architects and master builders for this work. They probably were a permanent skilled labor force, which, according to need, was supplemented by rented labor of freeborn and freedmen.
On the private economic interests of the Roman aristocracy in urban property, see: FRIER, *ibidem*, 21-34; P. GARNSEY, Urban property investment, in: M.I. FINLEY (ed.), *Studies in Roman Property*, Cambridge 1976, pp. 123-132.

118 BRUNT, *JRS*, 97-98; NICOLET, *Rome*, 150-156. BRUNT (98) justly remarks that there are few mentions of public works in the sources, since these projects served a demonstrable general purpose as well. There were more obvious points against which the criticasters of the *populares* could inveigh. See also Cic. *Off.* 2.59-60.

119 Pons Fabricius: Dio 37.45.3; *ILLRP* 379 (= *CIL* $I^2$ 751 = VI 1305 = DESSAU 5892).
Curio and Basilica Aemilia: App. 2.26; B-92. Not only triumphatores, therefore, erected buildings: contra VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 434-436.

120 On the number of games which were organized each year and at which time, see: BALSDON, *Leisure*, 68-70.

121 VILLE, *op.cit.*, 95-97. For a survey of the *venationes* which were given in the late Republic, see *ibidem*, 88-94.

offered by private persons which consisted in the well-attended gladiator fights.[122] These were organized in honor of a deceased relative, but that increasingly became a pretext. Because the organizer was entirely free in the choice of the scope and the time of the *munera*, these games were pre-eminently fit for obtaining goodwill. During the late Republic, therefore, *munera* were not organized until the giver was on the verge of an election.[123]

The question that arises is for whom these *largitiones* were meant. Considering the difference in composition between the public at the games and the participants in the popular assembly, it is plausible that such *largitiones* were not only meant for the *plebs contionalis*. Characteristically, the offering of games, and the same goes for electoral corruption and banquets, is almost exclusively mentioned in conjunction with elections for higher magistracies, i.e. the offices elected by the centuriate assembly, and the time of the *munera* was determined by impending elections.[124] For the subsequent careers of the aediles, who were charged with the organization of the official games, depended on the centuriate assembly, and there existed a positive correlation between the offering of games and the further career of an aedile.[125] These *largitiones* served to acquire the favor of the entire Roman people, from bottom to top. Consequently, they were not only used by typical popular leaders. It was a normal feature of the career of every member of the élite. Unlike corn or agrarian laws, which aimed at a specific part of the Roman people, *largitiones* such as games were not considered specifically demagogic during the late Republic. The image of the politician determined whether his largess was judged positively or negatively.[126]

The *Compitalia*, on the contrary, were a type of games aimed solely at the urban plebs. These were semi-official games, i.e. they did not belong to the official public games, nor were they a private initiative like the *munera*. The *Compitalia* were organized at the turn of the year by the *collegia compitalicia*. They were a religious festival of the city population to honor the gods of the crossroads (*lares compitales*).[127] The *collegia* were an important resource for popular leaders. That is why the senate in 64 prohibited these organizations and thereby the festivals organized by the colleges, such as the *Compitalia* (Asc. 75C). Despite the ban, a tribune of the plebs in 61 attempted to organize the popular festival of the

[122] For a survey of the *munera* which were given in the late Republic, see *ibidem*, 57-72.

[123] *Ibidem*, 57-88; VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 417-419.

[124] E.g. Cic. *Fam.* 11.16.3 and 11.17. When Cicero generalizes on *largitiones*, he usually associates them with elections: *Mur.* 37-38, 40, and 77; *Com.Pet.* 44. See VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 394-396.

[125] *SWRP* 159-165.

[126] Cic. *Sest.* 104, *Off.* 2.54-64.

[127] On the *Compitalia* : Dion.Hal. 4.14.1-4; FLAMBARD, *MEFRA*, 133-144; idem, *Ktema*, passim; SCULLARD, *Festivals*, pp. 58-60; WALTZING, *op.cit.*, 40 and 93-108.

*Compitalia*, but the consul designate Q. Metellus Celer prevented it.[128] Clodius, who saw to the organization of the games at the beginning of his tribunate in 58, was more successful (B-40). Shortly afterwards, the games were again authorized through the *lex Clodia de collegiis*, which reinstated the colleges and permitted the institution of new ones.[129] Clodius obtained great popularity by the law.

A final aspect of popular policy was composed of technical political measures which concerned the operation of political decision-making and the political rights of the people.[130] Already before Sulla, a number of innovations in that respect had been introduced, such as the secret ballot and the narrowing of the voting bridges to prevent manipulation of the vote. Such measures facilitated the operation of the popular assembly because traditional methods of manipulation were taken from the élite. Thus, Clodius passed a law in 58 which abolished the *obnuntiatio*, a type of religious obstruction of the assembly, and which increased the number of days on which legislation through the popular assembly was permitted.[131] In addition, the law on the colleges provided Clodius with the opportunity to use the organizations of the plebs for mobilization purposes.

An especially popular measure was the restoration of the powers of the tribunate of the plebs, which had been restricted by Sulla. The urban plebs was aware of the importance of the tribunes of the plebs for the promotion of its interests and the plebs was prepared to work for this political issue. After Sulla, L. Quinctius in 74 (Ap-41) was the first to appoint himself again as a popular leader through the tribunate of the plebs:

> "Since the rostra had long been unoccupied and because that spot since the coming of Sulla had been deserted by the voice of the tribunes, (Quinctius) seized upon it and recalled the crowd, now long unused to *contiones*, to a semblance of its former practice. That is how he became popular, among a certain class of people, for a short period of time."[132]

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128 Asc. 7C; Cic. *Pis.* 8; FLAMBARD, *MEFRA*, 119-120. The tribune possibly was Herennius (Ap-19): FLAMBARD, *Asconius II*, 37.

129 The restoration of the colleges is also demonstrated by an inscription. *ILLRP* 701 (= *CIL* $I^2$ 984 = VI 30888 = DESSAU 6081): "mag(istri) He(rculis) suffragio pag(i) prim(i creati) ludos feceru(nt)."

130 For a survey of this kind of measures which were introduced by popular leaders, see: MARTIN 210-213; MEIER, *RE*, 599-608; WIRSZUBSKI, *Libertas*, pp. 58-65.

131 Asc. 8C; Dio 38.13.3-6; Cic. *Sest.* 33; *LGRR* 255-257; J.P.V.D. BALSDON, Roman History, 58-56 B.C.: Three Ciceronian Problems, *JRS* 47 (1957), pp. 15-20, esp. 15-16.

132 "Qui quod rostra iam diu vacua locumque illum post adventum L. Sullae a tribunicia voce desertum oppresserat, multitudinemque desuefactam iam a contionibus ad veteris consuetudinis similitudinem revocarat, idcirco cuidam hominum generi paulisper iucundior fuit.", Cic. *Cluent.* 110. See also MEIER, *RE*, 614.

In this quotation from Cicero, it is stated that a part of the plebs (*quiddam hominum genus*, "a certain kind of people") deemed the tribunate of the plebs important. The *plebs contionalis* is meant, the most politicized and the one for whom the tribunes were the most important. By restoring the *tribunicia potestas* as consul in 70, Pompey made himself very popular.[133]

Another example is the bill proposed in 63 by the tribune of the plebs Labienus (Ap-20) with the support of Caesar. Until then the priestly colleges of the pontiffs were complemented by cooptation. Because of the new law, they now were elected by the people. The law contributed to Caesar's election to *pontifex maximus* that same year, despite competition from a strong candidate like Catulus; thus Caesar secured a prestigious office.[134]

The question of the distribution of the votes of the freedmen over all tribes came to the fore twice in the period under investigation. The grant of the opportunity to the freedmen to vote in all tribes, instead of merely the four urban tribes to which they were restricted, would enormously increase the political weight of this important group among the urban plebs. None of the proposed *leges de libertinorum suffragiis*, however, was passed. Manilius attempted one unsuccessfully in 66 and Clodius had one in his program when he was killed in 52.[135]

Within this framework also fits the *lex Clodia de capite civis*, a law which Clodius passed in the popular assembly in 58. The law provided for legal protection, for it prohibited the execution of Roman citizens without trial. The law was obviously aimed against the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators in 63 by the consul Cicero, and Clodius therefore followed the law up by a *lex de exsilio Ciceronis*. The object of Clodius' laws was to cast doubt on the *senatus consultum ultimum*, an important means of repression of the senatorial oligarchy.[136]

In some cases interest groups participated, when measures concerning their specific interests were promulgated. Thus, slaves and freedmen took up a politically active position with the *lex Manilia de libertinorum*

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133 B-4 and 5; Sall. *Hist.* 3.48.23, *Cat.* 38.1; App. 1.21; Plut. *Pomp.* 21.4-5. On the restoration of the *tribunicia potestas* and Pompey's involvement, see: MARTIN 10-19; VAN OOTEGHEM, *Pompée*, 143-146; SEAGER, *Pompey*, 18-24. According to G RUEN, *LGRR*, 23-28, the restoration of these powers was not a typical *popularis* measure, but meant to reinstate the tribunate as a weapon of the oligarchy. But why then was this measure popular with the people? Moreover, the measure evidently created opportunities to acquire popular support.

134 GELZER, *Caesar*, 42; TAYLOR, *PP*, 91-92; *LGRR* 253. In 104 too such measure had already been promulgated, but it was repealed by Sulla. According to GRUEN, *LGRR*, 79 and n.138, Labienus' law and Caesar's election were not related, because the supreme pontiff, unlike the rest of the college, had always been elected by the people. That is correct, but Caesar's support for the popular measure undoubtedly will have yielded him support during the election.

135 N. 83 above.

136 On these laws: *LGRR* 244-246.

*suffragiis* in 67 (B-14), already mentioned. The consul Piso in 67 proposed a bill to combat electoral corruption. The *divisores*, who acted as intermediaries in the distribution of money among the tribes, rose in revolt against the proposal and attempted to sabotage the voting in the assembly with violence. (B-13.) Finally, in the same category fit the laws which were beneficial to the *equites*, such as measures giving access to the court juries, and measures in favor of the tax farmers.[137] These laws were not as much meant for obtaining popular favor, but were aimed at influential groups in the upper strata of Roman society. They could possibly receive a popular character if they were presented as measures directed against the senatorial oligarchy.

At the beginning of his tribunate in 58, Clodius proposed four bills simultaneously.[138] Two of those had an obviously popular character: the *lex frumentaria* and the *lex de collegiis*. The character of the other two was more technical political: the already mentioned law on the regulations of the popular assembly and a law on the limitation of the powers of the censors. Gaius Gracchus had offered a similar package to the popular assembly in 123. Technical political measures as such perhaps were not sufficient to win the plebs for a popular leader and, therefore, were offered together with a measure which offered the plebs direct material advantages.

To sum up, it can be stated that popular policy consisted of laws which offered material benefits to the people, public works, games, and laws which technically facilitated popular politics or which could produce the support of interest groups. The most active group, as far as participation is concerned, - the *plebs contionalis* - was only partly susceptible to the listed components of popular policy. Measures concerning the corn supply and distribution were certainly in their interest, agrarian laws were not. Building was beneficial to artisans, but especially also to the poor freeborn citizens. The *plebs contionalis* took advantage of the games in the theater and the circus only insofar as they gained access to these; furthermore, the games were not only aimed at that group. Technical political measures could possibly count on a certain response.

All things considered, we must conclude that a large part of the "program" of the popular leaders did not fit the needs and expectations of the *plebs contionalis*. What is more, the matters mentioned could be introduced by any member of the élite, of which Cato's corn law is an obvious example. Finally, a politician could not implement such measures at any desired moment. For example, in a time of surplus there was not much sense in proposing a law concerning the corn supply. Popular policy, as it has been set forth in this section, resulted in fame and contributed to the leader's popularity, but it was not of overriding

[137] Juries: MARTIN 8-10; *LGRR* 28-35. *Publicani* : *LGRR* 91 and 319.

[138] Asc. 8C; MARSHALL, *Asconius*, pp. 96-98.

importance.[139] Some politicians, however, were more proficient in popular politics than others; to induce the plebs and in particular the *plebs contionalis* to collective political action, clearly more was needed than the measures enumerated above. How it was done will be explained in the next chapter on mobilization.

[139] Contra BENNER, *op.cit.*, Ch. 2, who in his argument on the changes in the traditional clientele ties states that material benefits were sufficient to mobilize a following (esp. p. 27). BENNER, however, looks upon the urban plebs as one amorphous group and fails to differentiate. He has not asked the question who the clients were.

Chapter 3

# Mobilization

In this chapter we will deal with how the various forms of collective behavior came about, how the assembly of a number of people developed into collective behavior, and especially in what way cooperation between leaders and participants was established. It concerns the problem of mobilization. Mobilization means the process of actions and events that lead to the gathering of a number of people, who subsequently act as a group. Mobilization equally concerns the way in which leaders and participants are brought together and act jointly. In this chapter the factors will be treated which resulted in the mobilization of larger groups of people and incited them to collective behavior.

## *Communication and Propaganda*

How did leaders and people communicate with each other? And how was a leader able to convey to the people that he deserved their support? From time immemorial the communication between the élite and the collectivity of the plebs passed through personal contacts and orations. As the city grew larger without corresponding technical improvements in the means of communication, these two ways of communication declined in importance, and new channels had to be sought to establish the contact between leaders and crowd. Two important new communication structures - the organizations of the plebs and the intermediate leaders - will be dealt with in the sections on organization and the role of leadership. Intermediate leaders could approach the right groups among the plebs to acquire support and to mobilize them. Through colleges and neighborhoods larger groups of people could easily be reached. In this way, too, rumors spread.[1]

Personal contact still existed with one's own clients and at the escorts and salutations of an important person.[2] In that way a politician could propagate his plans and his personality. At the salutations at his home more was required from the host during the late Republic, since the *plebs*

[1] On the role of rumors see: *Com.Pet.* 50-53; Cic. *Mur.* 35; Sall. *Cat.* 29.1.

[2] In *Com.Pet.* 17 is listed whom a candidate should approach personally: fellow-tribesmen, neighbors, clients, freedmen, and slaves. The latter were important because they spread gossip on what was going on in the houshold of their master. See also Cic. *Mur.* 69 and 72-73.
On escorts and salutations see Chapter 2 nn. 60-62.

*contionalis* was in the habit of visiting several candidates before making a choice (*Com.Pet.* 35; Cic. *Mur.* 44).

Notwithstanding the necessity of new means of communication, oratory, the pre-eminent persuasion of antiquity, was still playing a not insignificant part in influencing the plebs. Cicero's Second Speech on the Agrarian Law is an example that not only popular leaders commanded this method. Oratory could serve to launch slogans and to communicate the policy and the personality of the leader. Thus also political opponents could be blackened.[3]

In a hierarchical society, such as the Roman, the orator's effectiveness to an important degree depended on his status. In Rome this status was determined by the orator's social background, the offices he held, the military commands he obtained, and his liberality towards society.

In the propaganda of the popular leaders political slogans were frequently launched.[4] A recurrent theme was *libertas*. *Libertas* meant the citizen's freedom of action within the *res publica*, legal protection, and sovereignty. Connected to that and in a certain sense part of it were the rights of the people, such as the vote, and the tribunate of the plebs as the protector of the plebs and the promoter of its interests. Thus the restoration of the *tribunicia potestas* by Pompey was a restoration of *libertas*.[5]

The *populares* exhorted the people to defend their rights and to preserve their *libertas*, which were endangered by the oligarchy.[6] When Cicero in 65 acted as a lawyer for Cornelius, the popular tribune of the plebs of 67, he took over the themes of the *populares* in his oration and extolled the laws which had extended the *libertas* and the rights of the people (Asc. 78C). The *populares* accused the senate of repressing the people by a tyrannical rule.[7]

In turn, the *populares* were accused by their political opponents of endangering *libertas*. The latter especially stressed the authority of the

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[3] On the style and the use of oratory of the *populares*, see: J.M. DAVID, "Eloquentia popularis" et conduites symboliques des orateurs de la fin de la République: problèmes d'efficacité, *QS* 6 (1980), pp. 171-211.

[4] On the propaganda of the *populares* see: MEIER, *RE*, 595-599; TAYLOR, *PP*, 142-148 (only on the 50s).

[5] HELLEGOUARC'H, *op.cit.*, 542-551. See also FERRARY, in: *Storia*, pp. 761-766; A.U. STYLOW, *Libertas und Liberalitas. Untersuchungen zur innenpolitischen Propaganda der Römer*, Diss. München 1972, pp. 12-17 and 20-28.

[6] A characteristic example is the speech of the consul Lepidus, who called upon the people to restore *libertas* after the tyrannical rule of Sulla together with him (Sall. *Hist.* 1.55M). The same in the speech of the tribune of the plebs Macer in 73 (*ibidem* 3.48M). See further Sall. *Cat.* 38.1 and 3, *Iug.* 41; HELLEGOUARC'H, *op.cit.*, 551-556; MARTIN 45, 57, 64, and 214; SEAGER, *CQ*, pp. 331-332; TAYLOR, *PP*, 72; WIRSZUBSKI, *op.cit.*, 63-76.

[7] Plut. *Cat.Min.* 29.1, *Cic.* 12.1; HELLEGOUARC'H, *op.cit.*, 559-565. It is a theme which especially occurs in Sallust, who expresses the tradition of the *populares* : *Cat.* 20.11, *Hist.* 3.48.1-4M, *Iug.* 31.23; cf. *Iug.* 41, *Ep.Caes.* 2.3.6. See also the already mentioned *Pro Cornelio* by Cicero (Asc. 79C).

senate, which allegedly was the best guarantee for the *libertas populi*. The *populares* were also pictured as tyrants and it was pointed out that the extraordinary commands could lead to one-man rule.[8]

The popular leaders linked the slogan *commodum* ("interest", particularly material interest) to the slogan *libertas*, by which they stated that they would defend the interests of the people. Thus Labienus accused Cicero of being contrary to the people's interests (*alienus a commodis vestris*, Cic. *Rab.Perd.* 15). *Commoda* increasingly became a substitute for *libertas*. [9] *Commoda* pre-eminently consisted of corn and agrarian laws and all kinds of *largitiones*. To gain the favor of the people Cicero was advised in his election campaign to take care that the multitude considered him as someone who was attentive to its interests (*Com Pet.* 53). The following year Cicero called himself before the people a *consul popularis*, who had the *commoda* of the people in mind (*Leg.Agr.* 1.14-15), and he stressed the right of the people to elect those magistrates who attended to the promotion of their interests (*ibidem* 17). According to Cicero, Pompey, who at that moment was the most popular leader, had the guardianship of *libertas* and the patronage of the *commoda*.[10] Cicero exhorted the people to follow him and to save their "influence, *libertas*, votes, dignity, city, forum, games, festivals, and all other *commoda* ".[11] Later as well Cicero mentioned *libertas* and *commoda* in one breath, now as part of the anti-propaganda against the popular leaders. It was the senate, according to Cicero, who protected and extended the *libertas* and the *commoda* of the plebs.[12]

At the end of the 50s, the value of slogans such as *libertas* and "rights of the people" declined, probably as a result of the increasing violence and corruption in politics, but also of a shift towards *commoda*. In 56 Cicero claimed that the people were more in need of peace and quiet under an honorable government than *libertas* (*Sest.* 98 and 103-105). After Caesar's death these slogans were unable to mobilize the plebs anymore. Despite an appeal to *libertas* and *res publica*, the tyrannicides were

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[8] Cic *Leg Agr* 2 9, 15-17, 24, 29, 71, 102, and 3 16, *Rab Perd* 11-13, Sall *Cat* 38 2-3, HELLEGOUARC'H, *op cit*, 551-555 and 557-565, SEAGER, *CQ*, 338 n 2, WIRSZUBSKI, *op cit*, 51-55 and 76-81 The oration of the consul Philippus in 77, in which he accuses Lepidus of repression of *libertas* (Sall. *Hist* 1 77 3 and 6M), was not held before the people (HELLEGOUARC'H, *op cit*, 552), but in the senate

[9] HELLEGOUARC'H, *op cit*, 556-557. See also SEAGER, *CQ*, 332

[10] *Custodia libertatis, patrocinio commodorum* (*Leg Agr* 2 25)

[11] *Ibidem* 71. "Vos vero, Quirites, si me audire vultis, retinete istam possessionem gratiae, libertatis, suffragiorum, dignitatis, urbis, fori, ludorum, festorum dierum, ceterorum omnium commodorum " Tickets for the shows were counted among *commoda* (Cic *Mur* 72-73) Matters concerning the corn supply too were an important argument before the plebs *Leg Agr* 2 80

[12] *Sest* 137. Another example in the same speech is that Cicero says that the *populares* from the past gained support with *largitio* and *spes commodi* (105, see also *Leg Agr* 2 81) By that Cicero means the *lex tabellaria* of Cassius, the *lex agraria* of Tiberius Gracchus and the *lex frumentaria* of Gaius Gracchus (103)

received by the people with hostility.[13] From a political point of view the tyrannicides were right, of course. The coup against Caesar's dictatorship re-established the *libertas populi,* which enabled the people to exert their rights again. At that time, however, other matters had become more important than *libertas*. The urban plebs considered a leader who promoted its interests of higher importance than political rights. The *plebs contionalis* had recognized that its interests were better realized through a popular leader like Caesar than through traditional patronage ties or political structures. The shift in meaning and mobilization potential of these slogans reflected the development of the leader as a promoter of interests, as *patronus* of the public clientele.

It goes without saying that slogans such as *libertas* and *commoda* reached their greatest impact if they were coupled with tangible actions, such as games, corn laws, and political reform proposals. In this respect we discover the communicative value of *largitiones,* such as games, *munera,* and also large constructions. These were veritable spectacles, in which the greatness and the altruism of the giver could be expressed. This liberality involved enormous amounts of money, but it was not a redistribution of income. Part of it was public service, but the supplementary personal expenses were neither obligatory nor were they made on a structural basis. Building activities indeed yielded employment for many members of the plebs, yet their initial purpose was symbolic and communicative. They were not meant as a poor relief, but as a demonstration of the giver's social status and magnanimity.[14]

The *populares* from the past had an important propagandistic function. For a long time they remained beloved and known to the people. In some cases, such as the Gracchi, one might even speak of the creation of a legend. Statues were erected for the Gracchi, sacrifices were made on the spots were they had been killed, they were worshipped like gods. Marius was similarly adored. It is said that even Catiline's grave was covered with flowers.[15] By praising these popular leaders from the past, by worshipping them, and by recalling their memory in orations, the popular leaders in the years 80-50 suggested a solidarity with and a continuity of their policy, although in practice they often pursued quite different

[13] App. 2.120-121; Plut. *Brut.* 18.5-7, *Caes.* 67.4. Earlier, in 49, Caesar in a speech to his soldiers before the crossing of the Rubicon pointed to the fact that the rights of the tribunes of the plebs had been violated (*BC* 1.7, see also 1.5). On the use of *libertas* as a slogan by Caesar in that period, see: K. RAAFLAUB, *Dignitatis contentio. Studien zur Motivation und politische Taktik im Bürgerkrieg zwischen Caesar und Pompeius,* München 1974, pp. 160-174. Caesar had difficulty with showing his credibility while using that slogan (*ibidem* 174-180).

[14] See also VEYNE, *op.cit.,* 81-84.

[15] Gracchi: Plut. *G.Gra.* 18.2. Marius: Cic. *Off.* 3.80; Sen., *De Ira,* 3.18.1. Catiline: Cic. *Flac.* 95.

goals.[16] Good aspects of past popular leaders lived on in memory, while bad were forgotten.[17] Although the urban plebs in 100 helped to murder Saturninus, a generation later he nevertheless appeared to live on in memory as a good leader who wished the people all the best and who fell to ruin by senatorial repression. Caesar and his assistant leader Labienus were able to gain favor in 63 by the prosecution of one of Saturninus' assassins, the old senator Rabirius. Rabirius was defended by Cicero; when in his speech the latter termed Saturninus an enemy of the Roman people, the public reacted furiously (B-21).

It was also important to align oneself to contemporary leaders who at a certain moment were the most beloved with the people. Thus Caesar, at the beginning of his career, became Pompey's associate, and later the triumvirs sought popular support by way of Clodius.[18] Cicero, in his defense of Cornelius, invoked Manilius (Ap-26), Pompey, and Crassus (Asc. 76C). In 59 Caesar incriminated the senators for intending to murder Pompey and himself (B-38), thereby arousing popular sentiments against the senate. In 56 Clodius made it publicly known that he had reconciled with Pompey, with whom he had quarreled shortly before over the exile of Cicero and the problem of the *cura annonae*.[19]

Noticeably, the opponents of the popular leaders used the same slogans in order to undermine the popular support of the *populares*. Cicero, in his usual role of an anti-*popularis*, favorably compared the *populares* from the past with the *populares* of his own day and publicly associated himself with the contemporary popular leader Pompey.[20]

Coins served as a means of communication for propaganda. The images referred to the ancestors' great deeds, to *largitiones*, to agrarian and corn laws, to the restoration of *libertas*, and to civil rights. References

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[16] Cic. *Acad* 2 13, Caes *BC* 1 7 Thus also Cicero in the *Pro Cornelio* : Asc 80C See MARTIN 219, MEIER, *RE*, 596, SEAGER, *CQ*, 332-333 It was a well-tried theme, the tribune of the plebs of 111 Memmius had already used it· Sall *Iug* 31 2 and 7

[17] Thus also App 1 114, generalizing with reference to the furious reaction of Sertorius' soldiers against his assassin Perperna, despite the grudges the soldiers had held towards Sertorius

[18] Caesar and Pompey· Dio 37 22 1; Plut *Cat Min* 31.4 In 73 the tribune of the plebs Macer as well made an appeal to Pompey in a speech before the people Sall *Hist* 3 48 23M In 66 Manilius tried the same Dio 36 42.3-4.
Triumvirs and Clodius App 2 14, GRUEN, *Phoenix*, 122 and 127, MEIJER, *Verhiezers*, 130-131 and 144-147.

[19] Cic *Har Resp* 51 Before this, Clodius had read a letter from Caesar in a meeting, in order to demonstrate his friendship with Caesar (Cic. *Dom* 22) See further B-29, 33, 45, 46, 88.

[20] Old *populares* . Cic. *Leg Agr* 2 10, 31, and 81, *Rab Perd* 14-15, *Sest* 105, *Mil* 14 and 72
Pompey· *Com Pet* 51, Cic *Att* 1 16 11, *Leg Agr* 2 23-25, 46, and 49-55 See also JONKERS, *op cit* , 71-72.

to past events served to legitimate contemporary actions.[21] In our period new coins were issued each year[22], and the possibility to anticipate coming events, e.g. elections, therefore in principle existed. As far as they had any propagandistic value, coins mainly served as a reinforcement of a personality cult. Political issues were of minor importance, as is shown by the markedly low number of references to the grain supply on coins.[23] We should wonder to what extent coins as a means of propaganda towards the plebs were effective. CRAWFORD argues that the effect in the Empire was small, because too many coin types from earlier issues were in circulation for the contemporary coins to have any effect and because only the higher social strata received sufficient coins in hand.[24] *Mutatis mutandis* this will also have been true in the late Republic. But with regard to CRAWFORD's second argument it can be said that the artisans and shopkeepers, considering that they were connected to the money economy by their profession, will in any case have come into touch with money more than the rest of the plebs.

Written communication existed in Rome as well. It goes without saying that the phenomenon of mass media was completely absent in antiquity. Ancient culture in general and the political culture in particular were mainly oral. Nevertheless there was enough to read in Rome. Everywhere on statues and buildings texts were inscribed. Texts of laws were set up in public. Probably price lists were posted in shops and taverns. Furthermore, there were quite a few grafitti. They were used as a means of communication in politics as well. Plutarch mentions that already in 133 the people wrote slogans on monuments, doorways, and houses as an appeal to Tiberius Gracchus to distribute public land to the poor (*Tib.Gra.* 8.3-4).

By means of inscriptions on monuments and statues rich Romans could show the greatness of their family and themselves. Thus M. Claudius Marcellus (cos. 166, 155, and 152) erected statues for his grandfather, his father, and himself. The accompanying inscription mentioned that the statues represented the three Marcelli, who had been consul nine times. Marcellus' father, however, had only been consul once (in 196) and his grandfather (the famous Marcellus from the Second Punic War) five times. By means of this short inscription Marcellus said nothing untrue, but he did enhance the prestige of his father. (Asc. 12C.)

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[21] A. ALFÖLDI, The Main Aspects of Political Propaganda on the Coinage of the Roman Republic, in: R.A.G. CARSON, C.H.V. SUTHERLAND (eds.), *Essays in Roman Coinage Presented to H. Mattingly*, Oxford 1956, pp. 63-95, esp. 84-86 and 91-93 (*populares*); ZEHNACKER, *op.cit.*, 477-627, esp. 509-516 and 577-600.

[22] M.H. CRAWFORD, *Roman Republican Coinage II*, Cambridge 1974, pp. 654-658.

[23] See RICKMAN, *op.cit.*, App. 11, esp. pp. 257-259.

[24] M.H. CRAWFORD, Roman imperial coin types and the formation of public opinion, *Studies in Numismatic Method presented to Philip Grierson*, Cambridge 1983, pp. 47-64, esp. 57-59. For the soldiers it might have been different, because they received their pay in cash.

In 62 Caesar saw to it that the care for the restoration of the temple of Jupiter on the Capitol was taken from Catulus and granted to Pompey. The work was almost finished, but Pompey now could put his name on it.[25] In 58 Clodius demolished the porticus of Catulus, together with the adjoining house of Cicero. Clodius erected a new porticus with his own name on it.[26] In that way he could show that he had financed the construction. Possibly it was also a demonstration of his power that he, in the name of the people, had been able to demolish the existing buildings. Another form of written communication were the advertisements on the walls, by which *munera* (gladiatorial games and animal fights) were made known to the people.[27]

Then there is also the question of the distribution of pamphlets and political statements. Cicero says that Bibulus in 59 published edicts against Pompey, which were read by a great number of people (*multitudo*) and even copied (*Att.* 2.20.4 and 21.4). Milo did something similar against Clodius in 57 (Cic. *Att.* 4.3.3). In the same year writings were found around the Forum and the Curia about the question of the Egyptian succession to the throne (Plut. *Pomp.* 49.6). In 49 Pompey publicly posted his answer to Caesar on the possibility of civil war, in order to enable many Romans to take notice of it (Cic. *Att.* 7.12.2). In 44 Octavian ordered the distribution of pamphlets (*biblia*) among the crowd (*plèthos*) of Antony's soldiers in order to undermine Antony's support among his army.[28]

All this brings us to the problem of literacy. Who could read in Rome? Was it the great majority of the population? Or were they the *tabernarii,* who possibly had learned to read and write as slaves and passed on the art to their offspring, or who had to have a certain level of literacy in order to practice their trade? Or did the intermediate leaders in this area, too, possess a special function? Perhaps they, considering their higher social and economic status and considering that many among them were former slaves, had the ability to read and did read the written propaganda to the members of their college or their neighborhood.

Since the introduction of the secret ballot, voting in Rome was done in writing. In legislature and the administration of justice it was a simple matter. Ballots were issued engraved with two letters: respectively V and A (*Uti rogas* = yes and *Antiquo* = no) or L and D (*Libero* = acquittal and *Damno* = conviction). The voter had to erase one of the two letters so that his judgment was left. For this, consequently, literacy was hardly necessary. At elections, however, the voter himself had to write down

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[25] Dio 37.44.1-2; SEAGER, *Pompey,* 69.

[26] Cic. *Dom.* 51 and 137, *Har.Resp.* 58; LENAGHAN, *op.cit.,* 149.
The generous givers took care that their name was inscribed on the constructions they had financed, see for example the inscription on the Pons Fabricius from 62: *ILLRP* 379 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 751 = VI 1305 = DESSAU 5892).

[27] VILLE, *op.cit.,* 357-362.

[28] App. 3.31 and 44. For other examples see YAVETZ, *HSCP,* 42-43.

either the initials or, more likely, the whole name of his favorite candidate. On the basis of this argument BEST reaches the conclusion that widespread literacy must have existed in Rome.[29]

HARRIS, on the contrary, using good arguments based on epigraphical evidence and on a comparison with early modern history, states that widespread literacy did not exist in antiquity and that only a small part of the population was able "to write a simple message with comprehension", his definition of literacy. The advertisements for gladiatorial games and the election bills in Pompeii were probably written by professionals and were directed towards the upper strata of the population.[30] HARRIS admits that literacy among the city population must have been relatively larger than among the country folk, and that furthermore in the city at least a part of the artisans and small tradesmen must have possessed a rudimentary reading and writing skill, which they needed for their profession. The great majority of the freeborn poor were illiterate.[31]

What was the situation in the late Republic? A fact that I have not mentioned thus far concerns a practice during triumphs. Plutarch tells us that during Pompey's triumph in 61 inscriptions were carried in the procession on which the names of the conquered territories were written, that 1000 fortresses had been taken and almost 900 cities, that 800 pirate ships had been confiscated, that 39 cities had been founded, that 85 million drachms extra tribute were added to the state revenue, and that 20,000 talents worth of gold and silver were deposited in the treasury.[32] In short, not a simple message. Triumphs were the pre-eminent way in which a leader could adduce proof of his military achievements. The people were present in great numbers on such an occasion. One way or another, it must have been the intention that the inscriptions were read. Or were they perhaps read aloud by literate persons among the public?

There is an indication that in Rome the shopkeepers and artisans could read and write somewhat. Appian says that in 44 grafitti were inscribed on the tribunal and the statues of Brutus to prompt him to a coup d'état against Caesar. There was a rumor that it had been done by the people. Cassius then says to Brutus that those grafitti were not written by artisans and shopkeepers, but by the aristocracy.[33] What should be noted here is

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[29] E E. BEST, Literacy and Roman Voting, *Historia* 23 (1974), pp. 428-438. Additionally, BEST uses as arguments that nothing is known about a protest against the secret ballot because of large-scale illiteracy and that there is no case known of the marking of a ballot by an aristocrat for an illiterate voter, *ibidem* 433. I do not adopt these arguments, because they seem to me dangerous *argumenta e silentio*

[30] W.V. HARRIS, Literacy and Epigraphy, I, *ZPE* 52 (1983), pp. 87-111.

[31] *Ibidem*, 91, 94, 108, and 110.

[32] *Pomp* 45 1-3. See further on Pompey's triumph· VAN OOTEGHEM, *Pompée*, 281-287 During Lucullus' triumph in 63, too, inscriptions were taken along listing the amounts of money which Lucullus had given to Pompey for the war against the pirates and the amounts which he had handed over to the treasury (Plut. *Luc* 37 4).

[33] App. 2.113. The relevant passage is quoted in Chapter 2 in the section on the *plebs contionalis* The grafitti are also mentioned by Plut *Caes* 52 4.

that Brutus and Cassius (or at least Appian if he made the story up) took for granted that these members of the plebs were literate.

Written communication was not an important mobilization factor during the late Republic. But written communication mainly reached the *tabernarii* and *opifices*, and written propaganda which addressed the plebs was pre-eminently directed towards the *plebs contionalis*. Although there is no proof, the role of the intermediate leaders as a communication link should not be ignored in this area.

A final type of communication was by pictures. To show the people which victories a general had won during his military campaign, not only inscriptions were carried in a triumph but also pictures of conquered cities and battle scenes. Octavian, among other things, carried in his triumph a portrayal of Cleopatra's suicide with a snake.[34]

*Organization*

Organization was an important mobilization factor. In 43 of the 92 attested cases of collective behavior, the involvement of some type of organization is traceable or likely. We have to distinguish between pre-existing organizations of the plebs and new forms of organization which were especially established for mobilization.

Among the pre-existing organizations we first come across the *tribus*, of which there were 35 in Rome serving as voting units. At elections as well as at legislative assemblies it was important to win these groups as a collectivity. To do so a leader tried to contact the *noti homines*. These voting groups could be subdivided into small groups (*decuriae*) in order to control the voting within the individual tribes.[35] The increasing electoral corruption was accomplished by money distributions among the tribes (App. 3.23; Suet. *Aug.* 40), for which the *divisores* served as intermediaries. Each tribe had its headquarters in the Circus Flaminius (Cic. *Planc.* 55).

A substantial part of the urban plebs was organized in *collegia*. The colleges were professional, religious, and also territorial organizations.[36] These organizations served as associations of people of the same profession, worshippers of a certain god, or the inhabitants of a neighborhood. Most colleges had combined functions. The members together organized feasts and religious festivities, and there existed a

[34] Val.Max. 2.8.7 (Sulla in 81); App. 2.101 (Caesar in 46); Plut. *Ant.* 86.3 (Octavian in 29).

[35] Cic. *Planc.* 45 and 47; WALTZING, *op.cit.*, 50.

[36] FLAMBARD, *Ktema*, 149-151. See further on the *collegia* : ALFÖLDI, *Caesar*, 29-91 (ALFÖLDI only deals with colleges as religious organizations of the plebs); WALTZING, *op.cit.*, passim, esp. 33-34, 42-56, 61-92, 162-173, and 379-383.
On the colleges during the Empire, see: MACMULLEN, *Enemies*, 173-178; idem, *RSR*, pp. 74-85; MEIGGS, *Ostia*, Ch. 14.

solidarity among the members, which, among other things, was expressed in the collective care and financing of the funerals of deceased members. The colleges had a long tradition which went back to the origins of Rome. The colleges had administrators, the *magistri*, elected by the members. In the colleges freeborn, freedmen, and slaves were to be found, but they especially were organizations of freedmen artisans and shopkeepers. Support from *collegia* implied support from organized electoral groups (*Com.Pet.* 3). Cicero mentions colleges as one of the groups, besides *tota Italia, municipia, scribae,* and *publicani,* which had voted in favor of his return from exile.[37]

The pre-existing organization and the leadership structures could serve to mobilize important parts of the plebs.[38] Clodius especially employed the colleges.[39] He removed the ban on the colleges and personally saw to the institution of new colleges (B-41).

Next to *collegia* were the *vici* as pre-existing organizations.[40] The *vici* were the organizations of the neighborhoods in Rome, which served as geographical structures of communication and solidarity. In that respect they are comparable to the neighborhoods in modern Latin-American cities.[41] The neighborhoods had an organizational framework, in the sense that they were led by elected administrators, the *vicomagistri*. The function of the *vici* was comparable to the function of *collegia,* and the neighborhoods often provided the topographical framework for the colleges. For example, the *Compitalia* were celebrated in each neighborhood on the crossroads under the leadership of the *magistri vicorum*. The *collegia compitalicia* had a territorial basis. The first attested appearance of the neighborhood organizations in politics took place in 85 in support of Marius Gratidianus' policy of improving the quality of coinage.[42] Again it was Clodius who recognized the importance of these organizations for the mobilization of the plebs (B-40, 41, 66). Clodius' opponent Milo as well attempted to use the *vici* ; he was accused of having houses with armories in many neighborhoods (Cic. *Mil.* 64).

How important the neighborhoods became in the urban organization is clear from the fact that Caesar in 45 took a census in a novel way, i.e. per neighborhood (*vicatim*), to reduce the number of grain recipients (Suet.

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[37] *Dom.* 74, *Sest.* 32, *Vat.* 8, and *Pis.* 41.

[38] Colleges as mobilization factor: B-14, 16, 39, 40, 41, 52, 55, 56. See also: ALFÖLDI, *Caesar,* 35-79; FLAMBARD, *MEFRA,* 117-122; idem, *Ktema,* 161-165.

[39] H. KÜHNE, Die stadtrömischen Sklaven in den collegia des Clodius, *Helikon* 6 (1966), pp. 95-113, esp. 103 and 106 qualifies Clodius' colleges as *Sturm-Abteilungen*. That is an unwarranted anachronistic projection; Clodius' organization types were not in any respect comparable to the *SA* of Nazi-Germany. KÜHNE's article incidentally tends to Vulgar Marxism.

[40] See FLAMBARD, *Ktema,* 144-149 and 158-161; NICOLET, *Rome,* 231-232.

[41] See e.g. S. ECKSTEIN, *The Poverty of Revolution. The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico,* Princeton 1977, esp. pp. 75-77.

[42] FLAMBARD, *Ktema,* 162; ALFÖLDI, *Caesar,* 75-76.

*Iul.* 41.3). In an enumeration of the measures (including the institution of night watchmen and a fire brigade) with which Augustus reorganized the city in a more orderly fashion, Suetonius (*Aug.* 30) mentions also the subdivision of the city into regions and *vici* in 8 B.C. The *vici* were to be administered by *magistri* elected by the inhabitants of the neighborhood. Cassius Dio mentions this measure as well and adds that the *vicomagistri*, within their district and on certain days, were allowed to wear the *toga praetexta* and to have two lictors.[43] Both were magisterial symbols and granted prestige to the person who was allowed to be adorned with them. The city was already subdivided into such wards, but Augustus redid it officially. Significantly, the *vici*, which during the late Republic had been used to mobilize popular support, now through Augustus' institutionalization became a binding force of the new regime.[44]

If soldiers were involved in collective behavior, their army organization was of course most useful in mobilization, for the Roman army was subdivided into several disciplined groups under the leadership of officers and NCO's.[45]

In collective behavior in the theater, organized groups likewise could be of significance (Cic. *Sest.* 115). Thus the *equites*, who had separate seats, occasionally acted as a claque.[46] Outside the theater, too, organized groups precipitated collective behavior by means of rhythmic slogans (B-60, 65). During the Empire the importance of claques in collective behavior in the theater increased[47], and the colleges often attended the games as a group, which facilitated mobilization.[48] It is not known

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[43] Dio 55 8 6-7. The translation of *stenôparchos* with *magister vici* I adopt from H J. MASON, *Greek Terms for Roman Institutions A Lexicon and Analysis*, Toronto 1974, s v. *stenôparchos* This translation seems to me more to the point than *curator viarum* (E. CARY in the LOEB edition).

[44] For geographical structures of communication and solidarity some parallels from later times are available. On the neighborhoods during the Principate, see MACMULLEN, *RSR*, 67-69
Neighborhood organizations were important to gain political support in Pompeii J L FRANKLIN, *Pompeii the Electoral Progammata, Campaigns, and Politics, A.D 71-79*, Rome 1980, pp 92-94.
MARTINES points to the significance of the physical conditions of the city, such as neighborhood organization, for mobilization in political violence during the middle ages· MARTINES, *op cit*, 345 See also MOLLAT, *Popular Revolutions*, p 304.
The Parisians who stormed the Bastille in A D. 1789 were mainly composed of the inhabitants of the surrounding Faubourg St. Antoine RUDé, *Paris*, 82-95 and 108.

[45] B-1, 34, 49, 70, 71.

[46] B-20, 36 See also the concerted action of senators and *equites* during a riot in the theater in 56 (B-66).

[47] On the role of theater claques in the Principate, see. A. ALFOLDI, Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells am romischen Kaiserhofe, *MDAI (R)* 49 (1934), pp 1-118, esp. 79-88; BOLLINGER, *op cit*, 32-44, R. BROWNING, The Riot of A D 387 in Antioch. The Role of the Theatrical Claques in the Later Empire, *JRS* 42 (1952), pp 13-20, MACMULLEN, *Enemies*, 168-173.

[48] See *CIL* VI 2 10099, MACMULLEN, *Enemies*, 170 and 175, WHITTAKER, *op cit*, 360

whether that already occurred during the Republic, but probably it was a later development.

Important types of organization were groups especially established for mobilization. They were new types of organization that, however, mostly originated in the pre-existing organizations, and both types overlapped. They were often armed gangs which were indicated with terms such as *operae, manus,* and *cheira.*[49] Sometimes they were recruited from the personal following of a politician, such as slaves and clients, or they were composed of gladiators.[50] Such groups were also deployed by Sestius (Ao-31) and Milo (Ao-2) against Clodius.[51] Mostly, however, they were composed of the usual participants in collective behavior, i.e. artisans and shopkeepers.[52] They were especially important in the mobilization of the urban plebs for violent actions.[53] Clodius employed these groups on a large scale. Considering the fact that the information on Clodius' organizations mostly comes from his enemy Cicero and considering the fact that Clodius reinforced the organization of the colleges after the model of the army (B-41), we may assume that, when *operae* are mentioned with Clodius, this is usually a pejorative indication of *collegia.* Clodius gangs, therefore, consisted of his normal following, i.e. mainly artisans and shopkeepers, and not slaves and criminals.[54] Moreover the gangs of Sestius and Milo, for the major part composed of armed slaves, gladiators, and rural clients, proved to be more effective in street fights than Clodius' gangs.[55]

For politicians it mattered to establish contacts and patronage relations with important groups and individuals among the plebs. We have already

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[49] On the employment of these gangs before 78 and after 49, see: NOWAK, *op cit*, Chs. I, II, and IV.

[50] B-15, 23, 25, 51, 57, 58, 69, 78, 83, 91; LINTOTT 83-85.
Rich Romans made use of gangs of armed retainers for the settlement of their disputes on the countryside as well (Cic *Caec* 23-27 and 32-33); see further B W. FRIER, Urban Praetors and Rural Violence: The Legal Background of Cicero's *Pro Caecina, TAPhA* 113 (1983), pp. 221-241.

[51] Asc. 30C; Cic *Red Sen* 19, *Red Pop* 15, *Sest* 78, 84, 86-92, 95, *Q Fr* 2.4.5, 3 8 6.

[52] Cicero, in any case, associates them with the *plebs contionalis* : "scis quanta sit manus, quanta concordia, quantum valeat in contionibus", *Flacc* 66.

[53] *Operae* in collective behavior, besides the cases mentioned before: B-11, 18, 30, 31, 34, 37, 47, 48, 49, 52, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70, 73, 81, 84, 85. See also the *manus* of Rullus in 63 (Cic *Leg Agr* 1 22).
See further J ANNEQUIN, M LÉTROUBI ON, Une approche des discours de Cicéron: les niveaux d'intervention des esclaves dans la violence, *Actes du colloque 1972 sur l'esclavage,* Paris 1974, pp. 211-247, esp 235-247, FAVORY, *op cit*, 117-128, FLAMBARD, *MEFRA,* 122-131, LINTOTT Ch VI; NOWAK, *op cit*, Ch III.

[54] See FLAMBARD, *MEFRA,* 123-124 and 144; LINTOTT 77-83; cf. NOWAK, *op cit*, 108-115.

[55] On the composition of Milo's gangs LINTOTT 85; NOWAK, *op cit*, 147-151. That Milo's following clearly differed from Clodius' also follows from the mobilization of country folk and slaves by Milo after Clodius' death (B-87).

seen that such opportunities were mainly provided through intermediate leaders. Contacts between nobles and plebeian organizations also existed in the Principate, especially with theater claques and circus factions.[56]

*Symbols*

We will now pass in review the symbols and symbolic actions which played a part in the mobilization process. Some elements of popular policy which we have come across in the section on communication and propaganda received a symbolic expression.

Status symbols were important for successful leadership in Roman politics. Through symbols the descent, the capability, and the greatness of the leader were shown and not least his legitimacy and authority as a magistrate of Rome. It was a general aspect of the Roman élite, not reserved for popular leaders. The fact that popular leaders surrounded themselves with the same status symbols as the other members of the élite, demonstrates that popular leadership in Rome did not or was not meant to bring about innovation, but was set within the traditional frameworks of Roman politics and society.

Status was expressed by clothing (the *toga praetexta,* B-40), the *fasces* (symbols of magistracy, B-1, 86), the presence of lictors (B-40), soldiers, or veterans, and escorts and salutations by friends and clients. A man like Cicero, a new man without military fame, especially depended on his extraordinary qualities as an orator. He had to take care that sufficient people during his election campaign publicly showed their attachment to him. (*Com.Pet.* 2, 24-37, 41, and 51-53.) At public manifestations, such as triumphs, the prestige of the person who was to be honored was expressed by showing the conquered booty, prisoners, and pictures of scenes from the campaign.[57]

Another type of symbolism occurred in 58, when Clodius constructed a temple, dedicated to the goddess Libertas, on the site of the residence of the exiled Cicero (Cic. *Dom.* 51, 108, and 110-112). It was a symbolic act with which Clodius wished to express that the *libertas* of the people had been restored by the exile of Cicero. The temple was a symbol of Clodius' influence and served to indicate that the interests of the plebs were guaranteed by him. When Cicero's house after his return in 57 was rebuilt by senatorial decree, Clodius staged a riot to prevent the destruction of the temple (B-61). During the riots after Clodius' death, Sextus Clodius, Clodius' foremost intermediate leader, showed the box with Clodius'

[56] See WHITTAKER, *op.cit.*, 357 and 368; MACMULLEN, *Enemies,* 173. MACMULLEN's critique (*ibidem* 341 n.13 and 344 n.19) on WHITTAKER's article is too harsh. Unlike MACMULLEN, I do not think that WHITTAKER used his sources in a "misleading and unreliable fashion"; MACMULLEN fails to provide examples.

[57] B-32, 68. See also B-1. On the use of status symbols, see: A. MARSHALL, *Phoenix,* passim.

bills. In that way he wanted to indicate that Clodius' death did not mean the end of his policy (B-86).

Former popular leaders could serve as a symbol. Caesar gained great popularity when in 68 he carried portraits of Marius in a funeral procession and in 65 restored the veneration of Marius (B-7, 19). Similar is the trial (discussed above) that the tribune of the plebs Labienus instituted in 63 against Rabirius because of his involvement in the murder of the popular leader Saturninus. During the trial, for which there was a lot of popular attention, Labienus showed a portrait of Saturninus.[58] In 47, when the tribune of the plebs Dolabella proposed the abolition of debts and riots occurred, he erected a statue for Clodius.[59] This symbolism fit in with Roman tradition. At funerals, for example, it was customary to show portraits of the deceased and his ancestors to demonstrate the greatness of the family (Pol. 6.53).

Interesting is also the already mentioned destruction of Cicero's residence and the adjacent porticus of Catulus. Q. Lutatius Catulus had erected this porticus after his defeat of the Cimbri in 101 together with Marius. The site of the porticus, on which Clodius built a new one, had a symbolic meaning. It was located on the site of the house of M. Fulvius Flaccus, Gaius Gracchus' companion in arms who had been liquidated by the senate (Cic. *Dom.* 102 and 114; Val.Max. 6.3.1).

Comparable is the use of the Circus Flaminius for meetings. The Circus Flaminius was located in the Campus Martius, therefore outside the *Pomerium,* which made it a convenient spot to let a military commander appear in a meeting; generals under arms were not allowed within the city walls. This was not the only reason for using the circus. The circus was used only by popular leaders as a location for meetings. We should wonder why, since the Campus Martius itself was frequently used for assemblies and meetings. The construction of the circus with its stands was suitable for a meeting of course, but the Circus Flaminius especially had a symbolic value. The circus was built by the popular leader Flaminius in the third century. It was situated on the spot where in the fifth century an important popular assembly had taken place, which had considerably extended the rights of the people. In twofold respect,

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[58] B-21. Sextus Titius, tribune of the plebs in 99 and friendly with Saturninus, attempted to continue Saturninus' policy with an agrarian law. In 98 he was convicted and exiled for the possession of a portrait of Saturninus: Cic. *Rab Perd* 24-25, Val.Max. 8.1.damn.3.

[59] Cic. *Att* 11.23.3; BRUHNS, *Caesar,* 130. See also the statues of the Gracchi (Plut. *G Gra* 18 2) and the statue of Cornelia, which was erected in Saturninus' days: F. COARELLI, La statue de Cornélie, mère des Gracques, et la crise politique à Rome au temps de Saturninus, *Le dernier siècle de la République romaine et l'époque augustéenne,* Strasbourg 1978, pp. 13-28. In 85 the plebs erected statues of Marius Gratidianus because of his measures against monetary fluctuations: Cic. *Off* 3.80; FLAMBARD, *Ktema,* 162.
This symbolism could be used by any party: Lucius Sestius in 23 kept the memory of Brutus the tyrannicide alive by portraits (Dio 53.32.4).

therefore, the Circus Flaminius had a symbolic value for popular politics.[60]

Leaders could serve as a martyr symbol, such as after the murder on Clodius (52) and Caesar (44). The people took the view that they had died for the people's interests and their funerals became great manifestations of popular fury and sorrow. The corpses of both leaders, together with a number of buildings, were burned in the resulting riots.[61]

Contemporary popular leaders also had a symbolic value. Contemporary popular leaders were often brought to the fore in a meeting in order to sanction certain plans. Thus the solidarity and the support of those leaders could be shown to the people.[62]

The next type of symbolism consisted of actions that expressed a solidarity with the people. In 59, the patrician Clodius had himself made a plebeian through adoption. According to Cicero, this was against the *mos maiorum*. [63] Cassius Dio and Suetonius thought it was Caesar's idea, in order to be able to deploy Clodius against Cicero.[64] Clodius' transition to the plebs not only enabled him to become tribune of the plebs, an office which was closed to patricians, but also had a symbolic function to express his solidarity with the plebs. Dolabella did the same thing to become tribune of the plebs in 47.[65] Cicero accused L. Gellius Poblicola, one of Clodius' intermediate leaders, of having married a freedwoman, not because of his lust, but in order to win respect among the plebs (*Sest.* 110).

Before his election to pontifex maximus in 63, Caesar resided in the Subura, one of the poorest quarters of Rome (Suet. *Iul.* 46). The tribune of the plebs Gabinius in 67 showed a picture of his simple residence in a popular assembly to appear incorruptible and not greedy.[66] A parallel for these symbolic actions we already find with Gaius Gracchus, who went to live among the people to gain popularity.[67]

An analogous symbolic behavior can be seen in the habit of imploring the favor and compassion of the plebs by assuming a humble and poor

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[60] *Contiones* in the Circus Flaminius: B-4, 29, 45, 46 For the symbolic value B-29

[61] Clodius: B-86 Caesar: App 2 147 and 3 2, Cic *Att* 14 10 1, *Phil* 1 5 and 2 91; Dio 44 50 and 45 23.4, Plut. *Ant* 14 3-4, *Brut* 20, *Caes* 68. Another example from 72: The soldiers of Sertorius reacted furiously against his assassin Perperna (App. 1 114).

[62] B-29, 33, 46, 67. See also B-5 and 92.

[63] *Dom* 34-38, *Sest.* 16. Plutarch shares this opinion, *Cat Min* 33.3-4. See also Asc. 26C, Cic. *Att* 1 18 4 and 1 19 5, Dio 37.51.1-2, Liv. 103.

[64] Dio 38 12 2; Suet *Iul* 20 4. See also Liv. 103; Vell Pat 2.45.1.

[65] BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 130.

[66] Cic *Sest* 93. A parallel from the early Republic: Valerius Publicola (end of the sixth century) tore down his beautiful house, because such pomp and circumstance made him unpopular with the people, according to Plut *Publ* 10.3-4 (perhaps anachronistic)

[67] Plut. *G Gra* 12.1; STOCKTON, *op cit*, 178 On such behavior see YAVETZ, *Plebs*, 98-99.

appearance with old and torn clothes.[68] Even Cicero did so when in 58 exile was hanging over his head (App. 2.15).

There are some cases known from the Principate which prove that the colleges possessed banners carried during ceremonial processions. From the Republic, unfortunately, no information has come down to us on this subject. But considering the importance of colleges for mobilization the possibility exists that banners, like the medieval guilds, were used as rallying points during collective behavior and especially in riots.[69]

A symbol which comes close is the use of the cap of liberty; no examples from the years 80-50 are available, but only from the previous and subsequent periods. Valerius Maximus (8.6.2) tells us that Saturninus in 100 showed the cap of liberty (*pileus*) to the slaves "as a banner" (*modum vexilli*) in order to call them to arms. Valerius mentions this case together with Marius who did the same thing in 87. It is questionable, however, whether Saturninus used this symbol for the slaves. No other source mentions that Saturninus resorted to this, in Rome, very rare emergency measure. It is more likely that Saturninus used the cap of liberty to exhort the people to defend *libertas*. For Caesar's assassins did exactly the same in 44 (App. 2.119). Furthermore, they pictured the *pileus* as a symbol of *libertas* on coins to commemorate the murder of Caesar.[70] The symbol of the cap of liberty regularly occurs on coins of the late Republic.[71] The employment of this symbol as a banner and the use of *libertas* as a political slogan show that an appreciation of *libertas* in large parts of the Roman population was thought to exist.

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[68] Diod. 36 15.2 (Saturninus in 101) and 16 1 (Metellus Pius in 98); Cic. *Leg Agr* 2 13 (Rullus in 63) See also Oros. 5 17. Such behavior was a part of traditions of popular justice and was a cry for help LINTOTT 16-20
In B-3 another case of symbolic clothing is to be seen.
An interesting parallel for this behavior is the case of Michele di Lando, a reasonably wealthy wool worker, who in A D 1378 led the insurgents in Florence while barefoot and in torn clothes· E. PIPER, *Der Aufstand der Ciompi,* Berlin 1981², pp. 82-83.

[69] For banners of *collegia* during the Empire, see MEIGGS, *op cit* , 330, who mentions two references from the third century A D. Scriptores Historiae Augustae, *Gallienus* 8 6, *Aurelianus* 34 4. The SHA, as always, should be used with care, because the stories are filled with exaggerations The mention of the banners, however, seems to be a casual remark and therefore might be true See also Tert *Spect* 11, who mentions that colleges took part in the *pompa circensis* Perhaps they used banners to identify their organization.
On the importance of banners for mobilization during the late middle ages, see: MOLLAT, *op cit* , 146-147, R.C. TREXLER, *Public Life in Renaissance Florence,* New York 1980, pp 342-347.

[70] Cap of liberty· H A. GRUEBER, *Coins of the Roman Republic in the British Museum,* London 1970² (1910), II, p. 480, nos. 68-69 (*denarii* of M. Brutus from 43 in memory of Caesar's murder); ZEHNACKER, *op cit* , I, 619-620 Cassius Dio (47 25.3) mentions the striking of this coin

[71] GRUEBER, *op.cit n 70,* I, p 153, nos 1032-1034 (*denarii* of C. Cassius, the author of the *lex tabellaria* of 137), I, pp 401-403, nos. 3285-3311 (*denarii* from 75). See also n. 21 above

All these symbols had one thing in common. they were rooted in Roman tradition. They evoked images from the past· responsible and capable magistrates, who were attentive to the interests and the rights of the people and who lived austerely and virtuously; great champions of the people, who had not lost their fame in popular tradition. The symbols helped to create a norm which made the crowd rally behind popular leaders and incited them to active behavior.

*Precipitating Incidents*

In the years 80-50, several examples are to be found of unanticipated events that precipitated collective behavior. First of all, of course, a situation of acute deprivation could precipitate popular protest, particularly if a scapegoat could be found or was suggested by leaders Scapegoats were found in magistrates or other members of the élite The corn supply to the expanded city of Rome was a perpetual problem The supply could not always be secured because of crop failure, piracy, and the influence of the elements on sea Famine or high corn prices were never far away.[72] An additional problem was that the increased demand for grain in Rome created opportunities of enrichment for corn traders If they kept corn off the market they could inflate prices [73] A corn shortage three times precipitated collective behavior in the period under investigation (B-2, 55, 60).

Another type of acute deprivation were disasters. In 54, during Gabinius' trial, Rome was struck by a devastating flood. It was popularly considered a divine punishment for the acquittal of Gabinius, with which the people did not agree at all (B-80) In this pattern also fit the arsons in the conspiracy of Catiline, which were planned to precipitate collective behavior (B-23).

Other precipitating incidents were the deaths of popular or prestigious leaders or of their relatives. These incidents provoked actions of the plebs to render the funerary rites especially honorable. In case of murder, they could also result in violence, such as with Clodius and later with Caesar, and similarly if there were persons who wanted to repress the participants' behavior (B-1, 7, 50, 78, 86.) At the death of Caesar and especially during his funeral there was an outburst of collective violence

[72] On the supply problems see RICKMAN, *op cit*, 13 20 On the problem of piracy see *ibidem* 50-52, NICOLET, *Rome*, 163 164 On famines in Rome see GARNSEY, in GARNSEY, *Trade*, passim, MACMULLEN, *Enemies*, App A

[73] The supply problems in 67 were possibly aggravated because of price inflation by corn dealers, for immediately after Pompey had received his command against the pirates, the grain prices fell (B-10) Perhaps the *eques* M Furius Flaccus, who was ousted from a number of colleges in 56, was involved in the supply problems of 56 Cic *Q Fr* 2 6 2, NICOLET, *Rome*, 178
Some, possibly anachronistic, examples of grain speculation from the early Republic Liv 4 12, Plut *Coriol* 12 2

Senators were attacked. The people looked for Caesar's assassins; the innocent poet Cinna was mistaken for the tyrannicide with the same name and was torn to pieces. Marc Antony was strongly suspected of having incited the people to such behavior.[74]

Cases of injustice could equally be precipitating incidents. If in the view of the plebs an individual was treated unfairly or threatened, or, conversely, if a person was acquitted at a trial while being guilty in the eyes of the plebs, this could precipitate protest.[75]

In the theater and the circus, the lines of the actors on the stage could provoke reactions from the public[76], or the entrance of public personalities could precipitate expressions of enthusiasm or disapproval.[77]

*Opportunity: Time and Place*

The possibilities to win a large group of people for a certain leader and to mobilize them for collective behavior were limited by time and place. The presence of an opportunity was necessary in order to achieve a successful mobilization. The proposal of a corn law, ever since Gaius Gracchus' *lex frumentaria* in 123, was one of the best ways to gain the favor of the urban plebs. GARNSEY has recently claimed that a relationship between corn laws and corn shortages did not exist.[78] This impels us to pass in review the much discussed theme of the corn laws from Gaius Gracchus on.

Before Gracchus' corn law, the slave revolt in Sicily (135-132) had partly cut off the corn supply to Rome; it would take some years before Sicily would be able again to serve as Rome's granary. Moreover, a plague of locusts in 124 had destroyed the crops in Africa.[79] In 104 Saturninus, as *quaestor Ostiensis,* was responsible for the transport of grain. The senate discharged him because his activities were supposedly unsatisfactory. It is more likely that the senate feared that he would abuse his position and exploit a dearth for political purposes. That is why he was replaced by the *princeps senatus* Scaurus. The supply problems resulted from the second slave revolt in Sicily, war in Africa, and piracy. Shortly afterwards, Saturninus as a tribune of the plebs proposed a *lex frumentaria,* but it was not implemented. The senate took action to improve the corn supply.[80]

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[74] For the references see n. 61.

[75] B-3, 24, 26, 52, 87. See also B-30, 31, 43, 67, 80, 90.

[76] B-36, 53. Compare also the reactions to phrases in a speech: B-21.

[77] B-20, 35, 36, 53, 54, 76, 77, 90. At other occasions, too, the appearance of known persons precipitated collective behavior, see: B-2, 28, 65, 75, 79.

[78] GARNSEY, in: GARNSEY, *Trade,* 63.

[79] Liv. 60; Oros. 5.11.2; STOCKTON, *op.cit.,* 126. See also RICKMAN, *op.cit.,* 158.

[80] RICKMAN, *op.cit.,* 162-164.

In 75 a food riot occurred (B-2). It induced a number of food distributions by magistrates, from which they gained popularity. Shortly afterwards, in 73, the *lex Terentia Cassia* re-established the corn subsidies, which had been abolished by Sulla. Pompey obtained his command against the pirates in 67 in a period of high grain prices in consequence of the problems in Rome's corn supply (B-8, 9, 10). In 62 Cato's corn law calmed the people at the time of the conspiracy of Catiline (B-22, 23). It is known that at that time the economic situation of many Romans was precarious, since Catiline found a willing ear among the plebs with his proposal for the abolition of debts.[81]

Eventually free distribution was instituted in 58 by the *lex Clodia.* Nothing is known of a dearth or high prices in this period. But Clodius' law also provided for the *cura annonae,* the care of the corn supply, under the administration of Sextus Clodius. This could be an indication that in 58 as well there were supply problems. In 57 riots occurred as a result of corn shortage (B-55, 60). Was the dearth caused by Clodius' law? The people anyway did not think so, for they accepted Clodius' leadership in the riots. The shortage was possibly deliberately caused by Pompey, so that he would be entrusted with the *cura annonae.* Clodius in any case held that view.[82]

In consequence, a relationship between corn shortages and laws did exist. Shortages provided the opportunity for action and for mobilization by means of a corn law. In 75 Hortensius on his own initiative distributed corn rations. It was a year of high prices and scarcity, witness a food riot (B-2). Hortensius' distributions did not amount to much and if the prices had been low he would never had gained as much popularity, as Cicero aptly remarks (*Verr.* 2.3.215). It goes without saying that the lot of the Roman plebs was never enviable, but only in times of crisis was this situation exploited. At such a moment a corn law was most effective, for then the least opposition of the élite was to be anticipated because an obvious necessity was on hand. Furthermore, the authority of the senate should not be underestimated. In case of senatorial counteraction, support of the plebs could only be expected if there was genuine deprivation.

Corn shortages could lead to violent outbursts of popular protest of a higher intensity than other types of collective violence. The élite realized this, and also that scarcities provided an opportunity for popular leaders. The actions of the senate in response to Saturninus have already been

[81] Also in 48 and 47 a debt crisis precipitated large-scale rioting: BRUHNS, *Caesar,* 124-127.

[82] See also B-65. During the Principate a corn shortage was occasionally caused on purpose in order to provoke a riot: during the reign of the emperor Claudius, his wife Messalina and Claudius' freedmen provoked a shortage (Dio 60.17.8; see also Suet. *Claud.* 18.2; Tac. *Ann.* 12.43). In A.D. 190 a riot arose due to a corn shortage, which was caused by the *praefectus annonae* Papirius Dionysius as part of a power struggle within the aristocracy. Papirius' scheme was successful. The people blamed the *praefectus praetorio* Cleander and the emperor Commodus was forced to have him executed: Dio 73.13.1-2; WHITTAKER, *op.cit*, 350 and 352-356.

mentioned. The *lex Terentia Cassia* of the consuls in 73 was meant to calm feelings of discontent among the city plebs (Sall. *Hist.* 3.48.19-20M). Cato's grain measure obviously was related to the conspiracy of Catiline. At the time of the vote on Cicero's recall from exile, the corn prices were artificially kept down by the senate to conciliate the plebs.[83]

Assemblies, in which important political decisions were to be taken, sometimes were planned for times when a significant number of people were already about for traditional occasions. This facilitated mobilization for the assembly. In 67 Manilius called a tribal assembly for extending the voting rights of the freedmen during the *Compitalia,* when large numbers of slaves and freedmen had already gathered (B-14). Clodius passed his four important laws in an assembly which took place three days after the *Compitalia.*[84] Cicero's return from exile, at which he was greeted by a great crowd, took place when Rome was filled with visitors at the *ludi Romani* (B-59). The tribune of the plebs Fufius Calenus seized the opportunity of holding a meeting in the Circus Flaminius when a large group of people had gathered there for a market day (B-29).

The opportunity to act, at any rate within an official framework, was partly determined by the temporal restrictions which were imposed on the assemblies. Between the prorogation of a law and the actual vote a consultative period of at least 23 days had to be observed (*trinum nundinum*). Furthermore, voting was only allowed on the 195 *dies comitiales,* which were yearly assigned for the purpose.[85] For that reason Clodius passed a law in 58 to increase the number of comitial days.

Many cases of collective behavior, and certainly those with an official character such as meetings and assemblies, took place on the Campus Martius or in or near the Forum.[86] It offered an important opportunity for mobilization. Public spots, where the public and political life of Rome mainly occurred, could serve as rallying points for participants. The Forum, moreover, offered the opportunity to mobilize the most important group, the *plebs contionalis* ; the Forum was surrounded with the *tabernae* of artisans and shopkeepers.

Finally, the temple of Castor on the Forum and the adjoining tribunal of Aurelian had a special function. The temple was used as the focal point

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[83] B-57. Some other examples: When Marius and Cinna besieged Rome in 87 and had cut off the corn supply, the senate was forced to start peace negotiations for fear of violent protests of the plebs against the dearth (App. 1.69). In 40 Antony and Octavian were forced by popular protest to make a truce with Sex. Pompey, who had cut off the corn supply (App. 5.67-69).

[84] B-40. Compare also the support which Murena received at the consular elections of 63 from the soldiers of Lucullus, who were in the city to take part in the triumph (Cic. *Mur.* 37). Catiline planned his coup in the city during the *Saturnalia* (B-23). Conversely, Tiberius Gracchus' re-election failed because his following (the rural plebs) was too busy harvesting to come to Rome (App. 1.14).

[85] BALSDON, *Leisure,* 75-77; STAVELEY, *Voting,* 143-144; TAYLOR, *PP,* 78.

[86] On the location of the assemblies and meetings, see: STAVELEY, *Voting,* 149-152; TAYLOR, *RVA,* 5-6, 21-25, and 47.

of meetings and assemblies, and its steps for voting. Clodius had this spot occupied in order to be able to control the assemblies. According to Cicero, he also installed an armory in the temple. Probably the temple and the tribunal served as a known and fixed rallying point to which the plebs could proceed in case of mobilization.[87]

*The Role of Leadership*

Leadership was of utmost significance in mobilization. In the great majority of the attested cases of collective behavior (81 out of 92) some type of leader was involved. Next to these there are a number of cases in which the involvement of leaders is difficult to establish. This particularly concerns the theater demonstrations.[88] But since the importance of these types of collective behavior in the political process was limited, they can be left out of consideration here. Three riots (B-2, 75, 89) are treated so summarily in the sources that the presence or absence of leaders is impossible to establish. But considering their similarity to other cases the involvement of one or another type of leadership can safely be assumed. Only in two cases is it possible to determine with some certainty that leadership was absent and that these cases should be considered spontaneous: the Isis riot in 58 (B-39) and the intervention of the plebs at the funeral of Lucullus in 57 (B-50).

This need not imply that spontaneous cases of collective behavior were very uncommon in the late Republic. It is, of course, possible that the substantial difference in the number of cases with and without leadership can be blamed on the sources. It may be that only the most interesting, the most spectacular, and the most successful cases have been recorded in the sources, plus the ones that involved big names. Be that as it may, from a political viewpoint collective behavior only had a chance of success if leaders were involved and especially leaders from the ruling class.[89]

This becomes obvious if we look at the two spontaneous cases. In both cases of collective behavior the goal was not achieved. This is more striking in the Isis riot. In that case the plebs protested to the consul Gabinius against the senatorial ban on the Egyptian cults. Gabinius, an assistant leader of Pompey who actively supported Clodius during his consulate, refused to meet the grievances of the plebs. At the same moment (1 January 58), another case of collective behavior took place: the illegal celebration of the *Compitalia* at the instigation of Clodius (B-

[87] B-41 (with references); Cic. *Flacc.* 66, *Har.Resp.* 28. See also B-25, 52.

[88] B-20, 35, 36, 76, 77, 90.

[89] This was equally true in later periods. During the eighteenth century several food riots took place in Paris. Success and an actual revolution, however, were only achieved in 1789 because of a coalition of people and bourgeoisie. (RUDÉ, *Paris*, 65-79.) On the involvement of élite leadership in popular revolts in the middle ages, see: FOURQUIN, *op.cit.*, 87-105.

40). Neither Gabinius nor any other member of the élite took action against it. Clodius in no way interfered in the Isis affair. On the one hand, we have to conclude that the Isis riot did not achieve its goal because of the absence of élite leadership. On the other hand, we have to conclude that the participants in the Isis riot did not belong to Clodius' target group. He took no steps to protect the popular Isis cult, while he did do so for the *Compitalia,* which were organized by colleges.[90]

The significance of leadership also follows from the fact that the symbols listed above were almost exclusively furnished by leaders and did not, as in other periods of history, arise from the crowd more or less spontaneously. Besides, the members of the Roman élite, in addition to their status and prestige, were trained in oratory, which provided them with an important basis for popular leadership. Leadership in the late Republic was more important as a mobilization factor than in other periods or than modern theories postulate. An explanation perhaps is to be found in the fact that Roman collective behavior mainly sprang from institutionalized types of collective behavior, in which the people assembled under the leadership of a member of the élite. The Roman political system provided opportunities to leaders and participants for concerted action to promote their mutual interests.

Let us now distinguish between the various types of leadership. The top leaders actively participated in mobilization. In 66 out of the 81 cases with attested leadership, the involvement of one or more top leaders can be traced. In the next section we will deal with these individuals in greater detail.

Assistant leaders occur in almost half (38) the cases. That is an considerable number. From the involvement of assistant leaders it becomes obvious that there actually existed a group of politicians whose engagement in popular politics was remarkably more active than that of others'. If we look at which assistant leaders were certainly or probably involved as leaders in one or more cases of collective behavior, we see that it amounted to 48 % of the *populares* assistant leaders and 29 % of the *optimates* assistant leaders.[91] The pattern becomes even more obvious if we look at the individual cases of collective behavior in which assistant leaders were involved. In 80 % of the cases it concerns *populares* assistant leaders and in 20 % of the cases *optimates*.[92] In the other cases of

[90] Even if we consider spontaneous the cases in which the presence or absence of leadership cannot be established, the vital importance of leadership to achieve success is still evident: of the cases with leadership (81), 61 are successful and 20 are not; of the rest (11), only 4 (B-2, 76, 77, 90) are successful and 7 (B-20, 35, 36, 39, 50, 75, 89) are not.

[91] See Appendix A: 25 *populares* and 10 *optimates*.

[92] The figures: 31 *populares* and 8 *optimates*. In this case the total amounts to 39 instead of the mentioned number of 38: B-82 has not been taken into account because of the uncertain political meaning, and B-71 and 87 have been counted twice. Left aside are also B-81, 79, and 80, because in these cases the type of leadership is uncertain (top or assistant).

collective behavior in which *optimates* assistant leaders were involved their activity was limited to a repressive role. Besides, it is noticeable that the cases in which *optimates* assistant leaders actively attempted to mobilize the plebs or parts thereof almost exclusively occurred in the 50s. It is an indication that the oligarchy in that period increasingly felt forced to contend against the popular leaders with their own means. A transition had taken place. The power of the senatorial majority was declining. The oligarchy was not anymore the ruling élite which had to deal with the popular leaders as an opposition group; it was forced to compete with the popular leaders for the favor of the plebs.

Eighteen cases are known with intermediate leaders. One of the functions of the intermediate leaders was to serve as a communication link between popular leader and plebs. Cicero's *nomenclator* for example played an active part in rousing the assembled people at Cicero's return (B-59). Through intermediaries theater tickets could be distributed to the right persons (Cic. *Q.Fr.* 3.1.1, *Mur.* 73). The most important function of the intermediate leaders was to mobilize and lead the various organizations of the plebs: the *noti homines* in the tribes, the *magistri* of the *collegia* and *vici*, and the *duces* of the *operae*. The latter gangs, as we have seen, mainly originated from the pre-existing organizations of the plebs, and their leaders probably were for the most part the administrators of these organizations. In the majority of the cases in which intermediate leaders were involved (11), therefore, some type of organization can be traced.[93]

In Chapter 1, I have already drawn attention to the fact that the persons who provided leadership for collective behavior, or at least the top leaders and the assistant leaders, generally held a magistracy. In 55 out of the 81 cases with leadership, the authority and/or powers of a magistrate were (partly) responsible for mobilization, against 26 in which this was not the case. "Authority" is conceived here as "legitimate power"[94], which in Rome meant power derived from an office to which an individual was lawfully elected.

How can the substantial number of magistrates among the leaders be explained? The competence and function of a magistracy automatically granted a leader possibilities for the mobilization of a crowd and facilitated the involvement of the crowd in political decision-making: the calling of assemblies and the proposing of bills by consuls and tribunes of the plebs, and the organization of games by aediles. A special competence of the tribune of the plebs was the proclamation to close the *tabernae* (Cic. *Acad.* 2.144). It was a method especially used by Clodius (Cic. *Dom.* 89-90). Two explicit cases are known: in 58 by Clodius (B-41) and in 52 by Clodius' assistant leaders (B-88). Possibly Catiline had wanted to apply

[93] B-14, 16, 18, 23, 30, 34, 40, 47, 52, 60, 78. The other cases with intermediate leaders: B-6, 13 44, 53, 59, 86, 88.

[94] WELSH, *op.cit.*, 16.

this method as well (B-23). The closing of the shops obviously was pre-eminently suited for the mobilization of the *plebs contionalis*. It was a sign of major distress, the proclamation of a *iustitium* during which public life had to be stopped[95], and an indication that something important was about to happen.

Lower magistrates, especially the aediles, *ex officio* had frequent dealings with the plebs. In that way contacts could be made with important subdivisions of the plebs and especially with headmen or organizations of the plebs. Thus the aediles Varro Murena and Trebellius in 44 assigned a spot where four *magistri vici* were allowed to erect a silver statue.[96] The aedile M. Caelius Rufus (Ao-10) in 50 came into conflict with *tabernarii* and *aquarii* (Cic. *Fam.* 8.6.4). The shopkeepers had bribed the *aquarii* (responsible for the water supply) to direct more than the permitted quantity of water to them. It was the aedile's responsibility to take action against it. Obviously a good settlement of such problems and the contacts made could be advantageous to a magistrate. An aedile who had gained favor could count on support in his ensuing career. Patron-client relationships were thus established.[97]

A number of matters could be accomplished by a private person, such as gladiatorial games and the construction of buildings. A magistracy, in addition to the obligations that came with it, opened even more possibilities. The organization of games and the execution of public works was the responsibility of the aedile. The public funds which were made available for these were inadequate; magistrates were traditionally expected to contribute from private means. Therefore, there was an inherent possibility to execute these tasks in an especially grand scale. To propose a bill, a magistracy was by definition necessary. Leaders had to see to it that they themselves or their assistants held the office required.

The role of leadership, and in particular of the magistracy, was important because of the lack of an effective organization among the people to promote their own interests. On the one hand promotion of interests traditionally occurred by way of vertical ties. This system remained operative in the late Republic, except that the type of clientele and the type of patron changed.

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[95] App. 5.18; Liv. 3.27; BENNER, *op.cit.*, 115-116; R.M. OGILVIE, *A Commentary on Livy Books 1-5*, Oxford 1965, p. 397.

[96] *ILLRP* 704 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 2514 = VI 1324 = DESSAU 6075): "Varro Murena, L. Trebellius aed(iles) cur(ules) locum dederunt, L. Hostilius L.l. Philargus, A. Pomponius A.l. Gentius, A. Fabricius A.l. Buccio, M. Fuficius (Gaiae) l. Aria, magistri veici faciund(um) coer(averunt) ex p(ondo) (quinquaginta)."

[97] A parallel from the Empire: In A.D. 190 the corn prefect Papirius Dionysius deliberately caused a riot by creating a corn shortage. *Ex officio* Papirius naturally had contacts with corn merchants, which must have been of use to him in this case. It is also possible that he was helped by the senator C. Allius Fuscus, of whom we know that he was the patron of a college in Ostia whose members were responsible for the shipment of corn to Rome. Fuscus was executed after 190 and therefore might have been involved in the conspiracy of Dionysius: WHITTAKER, *op.cit.*, 358.

On the other hand there existed barriers for the political action of the plebs[98]: the people were not able to act independently. Someone outside the people, in this instance a magistrate, had to set the will of the people in motion by bringing them together (in an assembly) and making proposals. In this respect it is possible to speak of the making of a "contract".[99] For that, the people were unable to take any initiative. In Rome, laws with material advantages for the people were often coupled to laws from which only the proposer of the law would profit. Since the opportunity to act was limited to the making of a "contract", the contracting parties had to be present. Therefore only those present in the assembly could decide on the matter. Efficiency also necessitated that leaders directed themselves pre-eminently to that group, the *plebs contionalis,* which frequented the assemblies the most. The "contract" had to be entered according to certain forms and procedures in order to be lawful, from which stemmed the regulations of the assemblies. The people were assigned a passive role and depended on a magistrate, especially the tribune of the plebs. The tribunes of the plebs, therefore, were essential as assistant leaders to top leaders.

The most important reason, however, why the leaders who were involved in collective behavior were magistrates was that their presence constituted a legitimation of the action. A magistrate was a legitimized leader; the legitimacy connected to the magistracy rendered the relationship between leader and followers a relationship of authority.[100] This becomes obvious if we look at a case in which mobilization failed: the conspiracy of Catiline (B-23). How did this case differ from other cases which succeeded?

The revolt seemed to be well-planned. Leadership was provided by various members of the senatorial élite, among them the praetor Lentulus, by an assistant leader (the tribune of the plebs Bestia), and by intermediate leaders. The participants were sought among artisans and shopkeepers, to whom abolition of debts was promised. The personal clients and slaves of the conspirators could serve as the organization of small groups. A precipitating incident was to be found in arson and in the murder of a number of important senators and magistrates. The opportunity to act was there: the chaotic festival of the *Saturnalia* and the deprivation of the urban plebs as a result of indebtedness. The authority and powers of magistrates were represented by the involvement of the praetor Lentulus and the tribune Bestia, who was to call a meeting and proclaim the closing of the shops. What went wrong?

It has been stated that the conspiracy aborted because the proposed abolition of debts was insufficient to meet the demands of the artisans and shopkeepers; they were unprepared to put their possessions at stake. The

98 BLEICKEN, *op.cit.*, 244-258; MARTIN 213; NICOLET, *Métier,* 289-291; idem, *Rome,* 338-339; G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World. From the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests,* London 1981, p. 355.

99 Thus NICOLET, *Métier,* 289-291; idem, *Rome,* 338-339, after TH. MOMMSEN.

100 See WELSH, *op.cit.*, 18.

fear of the involvement of slaves and the danger of arson was too big. These, in fact, are the reasons Cicero gives.[101] It is obvious, however, that the economic situation of the urban plebs in 63 was precarious. Not in vain did the élite oblige the plebs through Cato's grain measure. Moreover, the *plebs contionalis* in similar situations was prepared to riot, despite the risks of fire and chaos. The fear of involvement of slaves was unfounded. Slaves seldomly participated in collective behavior, and Catiline had explicitly excluded their participation (Sall. *Cat.* 56.5). The main cause of failure, therefore, is not to be found in Catiline's program.

What did wreck the uprising was, first, the effective repression. The repression consisted in the grain measure, the virtually unanimous action of the élite, the taking of repressive measures from the start (such as posting guards), the proclamation of the state of emergency, and the imprisonment of the chief leaders.

On other occasions when the state of emergency was proclaimed, e.g. against Saturninus and Gaius Gracchus, a group remained which had risen in revolt and which had to be violently repressed. Remarkably, with Catiline actual mobilization entirely failed to materialize. The reason was that the uprising lacked legitimacy. It is exactly this which distinguishes Catiline's conspiracy from successful cases of collective behavior. Catiline himself did not hold a magistracy, for he had lost the consular elections in 63. The praetor Lentulus was taken prisoner and discharged from office. The tribune Bestia withdrew from the conspiracy. Considering the fact that he was neither imprisoned nor convicted and that he later could become aedile, he quite likely was no longer involved in the conspiracy when he entered office. Consequently, there was no longer a leader who could legitimize the revolt by means of his magistracy. That was crucial. The plebs was ready for action, but not for an action without any official sanction. Catiline realized this, for when he left the city he took military standards and the status symbols of office, the *fasces*, with him in order to enhance his authority and legitimacy among the country folk whom he went to mobilize.[102] It is therefore noticeable that mobilization of the rural plebs did succeed.

The importance of official legitimation becomes even more obvious in the events after Caesar's assassination, according to the description of

[101] These arguments are used by Z. YAVETZ, The Failure of Catiline's Conspiracy, *Historia* 12 (1963), pp. 485-499, esp. 490-497. Thus also MEIJER, *Verliezers*, 75-79, 88, 93-94. The explanation of Cicero: *Cat.* 4.17.

[102] Cic. *Cat.* 2.13, *Sull.* 17; Plut. *Cic.* 16.4; Sall. *Cat.* 36.1. On the rods as symbols of legitimate power, see A. MARSHALL, *op.cit.*, 127-141. In other cases of power usurpation, too, the *fasces* were employed for legitimation: App. *Mithr.* 52 (mutiny of Fimbria in 86); Diod. 36.2.4 (slave revolt in Sicily in 104).

Appian.[103] The tyrannicides could reckon with little support from the urban plebs after killing Caesar. Shortly after the announcement of Caesar's death, the tyrannicides gathered a crowd on the Forum by distributing money. This crowd, however, was reluctant to support the assault wholeheartedly but called for peace, for fear of the reactions of the rest of the people. At that moment the praetor Cinna appeared. He addressed the crowd and before speaking he ostentatiously laid down the insignia of his office. By that gesture he wanted to demonstrate that he refused to hold an office which had been assigned to him by the dictator Caesar. He should not have done that, for nothing changed in the attitude of the crowd. Those present were still afraid of the rest of the people. The situation changed, however, when the consul Dolabella appeared. He was in full regalia and adorned with all the status symbols of his office. At that moment the crowd found new courage, now that it found a consul as well as a praetor on its side, and with all its heart it supported the tyrannicides. In other words, Cinna's action was unsuccessful, because he gave up his legitimacy by laying down his insignia. The crowd only proceeded to action after action had been supported by a magistrate and therefore legitimized.[104]

Finally, attention can be drawn to the behavior of the tribune of the plebs Quinctius in 74. At that time, the tribunate was still suffering from the Sullan restrictions. Quinctius adorned himself not with an undecorated toga, as was customary, but with an entirely purple garb. This was a symbol to show himself with the authority of the higher magistrates (B-3).

The importance of legitimation of action by the leadership of a magistrate says much about the politicization of the participants. A revolution was far from their minds. In Chapter 5 we will return to this point in more detail.

*Image Building*

Most methods to gain support which were used by popular leaders were set within traditional frameworks and did not significantly deviate from

[103] 2.121-122 YAVETZ, *Plebs*, 65-66, interprets App. 2 121 and 126 wrongly. He claims that Cinna was stoned after his speech But Appian (126) explicitly states that this happened the next day and that it was not done by the crowd which Cinna had addressed the previous day but by the unbribed part of the people and Caesar's veterans

[104] Dolabella's possible popularity as a result of his agitations as a tribune of the plebs in 47 will probably not have been an important factor in the attitude change of the crowd This crowd had a particular composition, and furthermore there are no indications that the tyrannicides could count on the support of the rest of the urban plebs simply because they had Dolabella on their side. The bulk of the urban plebs remained pro-Caesar On Dolabella's actions as a tribune of the plebs, see BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 123 137.

common political methods. That is why popular leaders had to distinguish themselves in another way to win the support of the *plebs contionalis*. Many of the mobilization factors mentioned above (communication, propaganda, symbols, and magistracies) contributed to image building of the popular leader. This was a crucial factor in mobilization.[105]

What was an image composed of? It had little to do with charisma, in the sense of a strong man with an extraordinary personality who appears in a time of insecurity and crisis and who promises change to the people. There were leaders, like Caesar and Clodius, who probably were more charismatic than others.[106] But the image of the leader in Rome was more based on the traditional relationships between élite and people. At the top as well as at the bottom of society, with the élite and with the people, expectations existed with respect to right leadership. The accepted image was that of the responsible aristocrat, who put his life in the service of the *populus* and the *res publica*, who was attentive to the interests of the plebs, who showed his liberality through *largitiones*, and who added to the glory of Rome. Such a person also had to show himself capable of leadership. That is why a leader had to prove that he was an able military commander and an able magistrate. To put it differently, the image did not as much depend on the politician's status and personality as on his behavior.[107] In a status-sensitive society like the Roman a certain social standing was indispensible to become a politician in the first place, but beyond that, behavior counted. From his behavior a leader derived his legitimacy.[108]

This matter becomes clear from an oration delivered before the people by the consul C. Aurelius Cotta in 75 (Sall. *Hist.* 2.47M). The speech was related to a food riot in the same year (B-2) and was probably delivered afterwards, because Cotta in his speech mentions "unworthy actions" (*indigna*, 2.47.8), which must refer to the riot. Cotta's purpose is to explain to the people that the government is not responsible for the existing problems in the corn supply. The shortages are due to the wars Rome has to wage against Sertorius in Spain and Mithridates in Asia Minor. The armies need money and grain, the revenues from the provinces have decreased, and the pirates have cut off the corn supply (6-8). Cotta states that from his youth he has dedicated himself, both as a private person and as a magistrate, to the Republic and its citizens (4). He owes his return to Rome to the victory of the citizens over Marius. The consulate too, the highest honor, he owes to the citizens. (4-6.) It goes without saying that he is indebted to the people. To describe what he owes

[105] We therefore observe that in the sections of the *Commentariolum Petitionis* (41-53) which mainly deal with gaining popular support, matters such as status symbols, social contact, and slogans are put within the context of obtaining a good image with the crowd. See also Liv. 3.14; OGILVIE, *op.cit.n.95*, 422; YAVETZ, *HSCP*, 38-41.

[106] On Caesar as a charismatic leader among his adherents: YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 209-212.

[107] See also idem, *Plebs*, 52-53 and 138.

[108] On the image of the good ruler among the plebs, cf. *ibidem* 137-139.

the people, Cotta uses the humble term *beneficia* [109], something that patrons usually bestow on clients. The consul Cotta therefore poses as a client of the Roman people. "Look, here I stand, C. Cotta your consul" (*adsum en C. Cotta consul,* 10), thus says Cotta, and he offers his life as sacrifice for the Republic. It will be up to the citizens to decide to whom they will entrust the Republic, but no one will feel called to assume that responsibility in this extremely difficult situation. Finally, Cotta exhorts the people to show themselves strong and keep the public interest in mind, just as their ancestors had done (13-14).

Why did Cotta deliver this oration? It would be too simple to suppose that it was only meant to subdue the plebs with smooth talk. More was happening, and Cotta's speech grants us an insight into the ideology of the Roman élite. Cotta thanks the citizens for his consulate and even calls it a *beneficium.* Those, however, who had participated in the food riot and who had especially suffered from the dearth, will have had the least influence in Cotta's election to the consulate, for their votes counted little in the centuriate assembly. Cotta was an aristocrat, a *nobilis,* with a long and honorable ancestral tradition. He did not need the lower social strata to achieve something. Yet he takes up a humble posture and recognizes the sovereignty of the people. Furthermore, he deems it necessary to account for the policy pursued. Cotta was consul of Rome, the top magistrate of an empire. He was member of a senatorial élite that took pride in an age-long tradition of efficient government and quality: the persons with *virtus,* who were best capable of accepting governmental tasks, a group whose ideology was based on the idea that they were the ones most able to promote the interests of state and society. Cotta took that responsibility and explained to the people why the élite, despite good efforts, had not achieved the required result.[110]

In the early Republic, in the days of the patrician aristocracy, leadership was based on birth. After capable and rich plebeians were accepted in the aristocracy, the Roman élite increasingly became an achievement-orientated upper class, an élite whose authority and legitimacy were derived from its achievements. This élite, moreover, was engaged in continuous competition and had to prove itself time and again in the elections. Success in this competitive élite could be judged from the

[109] 5 and 12. Thus also Cic *Red Pop.* 4.

[110] The appreciation of accomplishment, combined with integrity and devotion to duty, also appears in the image of the ideal general, as Cicero describes Pompey in 66 in order to legitimize his command in the East: *Imp Pomp* 27-50 On this see VAN OOTEGHEM, *Pompée,* 192-197. In 67, Gabinius described Pompey in the same terms in a speech before the people: Dio 36.27-29. Perhaps Dio's rendering of Gabinius' speech was influenced by Cicero's oration

completion of the *cursus honorum,* in other words from the evaluation the citizens expressed in the popular assemblies.[111]

But when the élite, as a result of the backward governmental system, proved no longer capable of adequate administration of the *res publica* and also showed itself rigid by making the recruitment of new members more dependent on birth than ability, it lost its authority and legitimacy. This cleared the way for individuals to demonstrate that they could do what the oligarchy could not.[112]

How was the image of the leader built? *Largitiones,* besides satisfying an actual need, also had an important communicative value. In this way a leader could show that he was prepared to give something to the people and that he was attentive to the interests of the people. Despite the fact that the *plebs contionalis* constituted merely a part of the theater public, the games will not have failed to be effective on this group. The games took place in the city and, just like modern sports events and popular street festivals, will have been discussed in shops and taverns. The name of the organizer will undoubtably have been mentioned in the discussion.[113]

It fitted the good leader to be modest and dutiful, which shows that the plebs endorsed the old values of the Roman élite, their *virtus.* This becomes manifest in the fact that Caesar made himself unpopular when he, as a dictator, engaged in the settlement of state affairs while attending the games instead of enjoying the show together with the spectators. This was seen as a mark of arrogance; Augustus was careful not to fall into the same mistake.[114] Already mentioned above was symbolic behavior, such as a sober lifestyle and even shabby clothes, with which a leader could demonstrate his unselfishness. As Cicero remarks: "The Roman people loathe private luxury, but they adore public splendor".[115]

The *cursus honorum,* the military assignments, and the provincial governorships of a popular leader were not only advantageous to the individual himself, but also a condition for good image and thereby successful leadership and subsequent career opportunities. In this way the

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111 On the attitude of the senatorial élite towards the people, see also VEYNE, *op.cit.,* 488-490, who incidentally neglects the competition among the élite. This competition explains why public accomplishments and liberality played a significant role in obtaining power by individual members of the élite.

112 See also W. NIPPEL, Die *plebs urbana* und die Rolle der Gewalt in der späten römischen Republik, in: MOMMSEN, *op.cit.,* pp. 70-92, esp. 90-91.

113 On the importance of pamphlets, public critique, and rumors for someone's reputation: YAVETZ, *HSCP,* 41-47.

114 Suet. *Aug.* 45.1. See further YAVETZ, *Plebs,* 100.

115 *Mur.* 76: "Odit populus Romanus privatam luxuriam, publicam magnificentiam diligit". Cf. *Flacc.* 28. See also YAVETZ, *Plebs,* 97-98.
At the end of Caesar's life there was discontent among the plebs because of his not very deferential attitude towards the tribunes of the plebs and his supposed monarchical aspirations: YAVETZ, *HSCP,* 60-64; idem, *Caesar,* 198-208.

leader could prove that he was worthy of his function as a leader. Politicians also could demonstrate their abilities as advocates in trials.[116]

A good example of the proof of successful leadership is Pompey's command against the pirates in 67 (B-8, 9, 10). Pompey's resounding success against the pirates (he cleared the Mediterranean in three months) showed that the design of Gabinius' proposal was the right way to deal with the problem. The senate was shown to be unable of dealing with the problem with regular procedures: a clear example of the dysfunctioning in an empire of a constitution based on a city-state. The solution, a great command for an individual, was diametrically opposed to the egalitarian principles of the oligarchy.[117] The senate, therefore, justifiably feared Pompey's expansion of power. From the perspective of the people, however, the problem was quite real; Rome's corn supply was endangered. Now that the senate was unable or unwilling to solve the problem, the people deemed it entirely reasonable to comply with Gabinius' proposal. Pompey adopted a modest and compliant attitude towards the people[118] and subsequently proved that, where others failed, he was capable of taking swift, decisive action.[119]

Interesting also is a reaction of the people during the debates on the *lex Gabinia*. The influential senator Catulus addressed the people in order to persuade them to vote against the bill. He particularly pointed to the danger of one-man rule if one individual obtained so much power. That, however, was a problem that concerned only the oligarchy, and the people were not receptive to it. When Catulus in addition pointed to the danger Pompey would incur in the campaign and rhetorically asked who else would be left to receive a great command if Pompey were killed, the public answered: "You, Catulus!"[120] In other words, never mind who goes, someone just has to do it.

An ability to make decisions and vigorous action were important aspects of the image of the good leader. This was already true of Marius. He became consul for the second time in 104 after having successfully terminated the war against Jugurtha. The year before, the arrogant

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116 See YAVETZ, *HSCP*, 51-54.

117 GRUEN, *LGRR*, App. III, argues that the extraordinary commands of the late Republic were not unconstitutional and also occurred before that period. This is correct, but what was an exception before Sulla now became a rule. Furthermore, individuals by means of extraordinary commands acquired such a quantity of resources that they towered above their peers in every respect. See also R.T. RIDLEY, The Extraordinary Commands of the Late Republic. A Matter of Definition, *Historia* 30 (1981), pp 280-297.

118 See Pompey's speech before the people: Dio 36.24 5-26. A similar play was staged by Marius and Saturninus in 103. Saturninus exhorted Marius not to neglect his duty and to lead the Roman armies against the Germanic invaders, while Marius modestly declined a fourth consulate (Plut. *Mar* 14 7-8.)

119 See BRUNT, *Conflicts*, 120-121.

120 B-9. See also SEAGER, *Pompey*, 35 I agree with SEAGER's view that the reaction of the people to Catulus was not meant ironically (*ibidem* n.61).

patrician Q. Servilius Caepio had suffered an ignominious defeat against the Cimbri and Teutones. The new man Marius subsequently obtained the command against the Germans and vanquished them, thereby averting a huge military danger for Rome. Marius rendered himself most popular and thereupon remained consul until 100. Similarly, Crassus became a beloved consul after having held back Spartacus from the gates of Rome at the end of the 70s.

It was pre-eminently Pompey who was able to acquire fame as decision-maker and troubleshooter.[121] In 72 he had defeated Sertorius and finally terminated the civil war. For the people, therefore, Pompey was an obvious choice for the command against the pirates in 67. When Catiline's uprising was still continuing on the countryside at the beginning of 62, Pompey attempted to have himself called back with his army to quell the rebellion (B-25). But this time the oligarchy was able to sabotage Pompey's schemes effectively. In 57 Pompey saw to it that he was charged with the *cura annonae*, again an influential position in the service of the Republic.[122] During the riots of 52 (B-86), the *fasces* were brought to Pompey and he was hailed as consul and even as dictator, the decision-maker from Roman tradition. The Pompeian assistant leaders led the behavior of the crowd into that direction, but to the people, in any case, it was acceptable and a logical choice.

The competition among the élite not only occurred at elections but also in obtaining military and provincial commands. Popular leaders attempted to acquire these assignments by means of a law in the popular assembly.[123] A command in the field was an excellent way for personal enrichment. Generals who returned from a victorious campaign could reckon with a great deal of attention and even acclamations of the plebs,

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[121] Not only with the people: In 51 Cicero was governor of Cilicia. When a Parthian invasion was imminent, he preferred the senate send someone of Pompey's stature (Cic. *Att* 5.18.1).
Pompey was adept at image building, thus he had the leaders of the Cretan pirates, who were Metellus Creticus' prisoners, go along in his own triumph (B-32) instead of Metellus' triumph. In that way Pompey enhanced his own prestige.

[122] B-60. The right performance of a magistracy, especially a magistracy which concerned the direct interests of the people, remained important for acquiring popularity. Thus Faenius Rufus under the emperor Nero made himself popular because he had taken care of the corn supply without pursuit of profit (Tac. *Ann* 14.51).

[123] Some examples. Lucullus' conflict with the *populares* over the command against Mithridates (Plut. *Luc* 6.2-4, 24.3, 33.4-5, and 35.7), Pompey's command against Mithridates (B-14, Cic. *Imp Pomp* passim), Caesar's anti-senatorial propaganda as a reaction to his failure to obtain a command in Egypt (B-19), Caesar's governorship of Gaul and the ratification of Pompey's arrangements in the East (B-34, App. 2.9 and 13); the provincial commands of Gabinius and Piso (Cic. *Dom* 55, *Pis* 12, 15, *Sest* 93); the partition of the provinces by triumvirate (B-73). See also the command against Mithridates taken from Sulla in favor of Marius, which precipitated the first civil war (Plut. *Sull* 8.3).

for example during a triumph.[124] That was not only true of popular leaders: the plebs wanted to honor Lucullus, a successful general but not quite a *popularis*, during his funeral (B-50).

With respect to their image, leaders took great effort to make their victories actually public and to reap the publicity harvest. During the final stage of the slave war of Spartacus, Crassus tried to finish the war as quickly as possible to prevent there being any honor left to be gained for Pompey, who was on his way with an army (App. 1.120). Afterwards Crassus, to his disappointment, had to settle for an ovation, a limited triumph for victories over unworthy enemies, while Pompey was allowed to have a full triumph for his war in Spain.[125] During his propractorship in Spain in 61, Caesar had vanquished some native tribes and therefore was entitled to a triumph. In 60 he also stood for the consulate. Both things at the same time, however, were not allowed, for a triumphator was still a military commander and therefore was not allowed within the city walls to stand for office. In order to keep the publicity advantage of the triumph, Caesar requested to stand for office *in absentia*, which the senate refused to allow. Caesar had to choose between a triumph and a consular campaign.[126] He chose the latter and became consul in 59.

We should wonder why military success was so important for success as a popular leader, for military fame was an important factor of mobilization. There were hardly any advantages for the urban plebs in the conquests of far away territories. The advantages were much more immediately available for the officers and the soldiers, who were recruited from the countryside and who received a share of the booty. The explanation should be looked for in the traditional character of Roman society. Despite the fact that the inhabitants of Rome during the late Republic differed significantly from their ancestors in the time when Rome still was a peasant community, beliefs from that period remained in force. The members of the urban plebs hardly took part anymore as soldiers in military campaigns. Yet Roman society kept its military character from time immemorial.[127] The symbols of it were everywhere clearly visible. The city was filled with monuments to commemorate victories, military victory was patently obvious in the triumphs, the

[124] B-5, 28, 32, 68, 82. On the publicity value of triumphs: A. MARSHALL, *op.cit.*, 123-127. See also the symbols of Sulla's military fame (among other things military standards) at his funeral (B-1). Some other triumphs in this period, to which the reactions of the people are unknown, were those of Pompey in 71 (Plut. *Crass.* 11.8, *Pomp.* 22.1), Metellus Creticus in 63 (Vell.Pat. 2.34.2), and Lucullus in 63 (*ibidem*; Plut. *Luc.* 37.2-4; J. VAN OOTEGHEM, *Lucius Licinius Lucullus*, Namur 1959, pp. 163-165).

[125] Gell. 5.6.23; Plin. *NH* 15.38.125; Plut. *Crass.* 11.8.

[126] App. 2.8; Dio 37.54.1-3; Suet. *Iul.* 18.

[127] On the military character of Roman society, see: M.I. FINLEY, *Authority and Legitimacy in the Classical City-State*, København 1982, pp. 19-21; idem, *Politics in the Ancient World*, Cambridge 1983, pp. 129-130; W.V. HARRIS, *War and Imperialism in Republican Rome 327-70 B.C.*, Oxford 1979, Ch. I.

centuriate assembly retained its original military organization, the higher magistracies had a strong military character and often were connected to a military command. In collective consciousness, further, the memory was kept alive of the many years of war which Rome had experienced from the beginning of its existence. The Romans even believed that they had conquered the world under divine sanction[128]. The inhabitants of Rome were proud of being Romans; the victories of the Roman armies were also their victories. In short, they knew that they were at the head of an empire. This also follows from the fact that the plebs actively interfered in matters concerning foreign policy, especially if it concerned the issue of a just or an unjust war (B-65, 74, 79, 80). Not surprisingly, therefore, in many speeches before the people or at occasions attended by a large public the power of *populus Romanus* over the entire world and its sovereignty were stressed.[129] The mentality of the Roman urban plebs in the late Republic was partly determined by collective undercurrents which originated in early Rome.[130] In that respect Rome, despite the expansion, still was in every way a *Gemeinschaft*.

Let us now observe what the image of some important popular leaders was based on. In the beginning of his career, Pompey made himself popular by restoring the powers of the tribunes of the plebs. Next to that, he was known as a great military commander, but above all as a troubleshooter. In times of emergency it was always Pompey's name which was called. But that, especially during the 50s, was all. In those years Pompey could boast great respect, but he was not really popular anymore. Perhaps he lacked the right manners with the plebs, showed off his achievements too much, and perhaps his too openly aired desire for recognition by the nobility was a reason for the people to consider him less attentive to their interests.

From the beginning of his career, Caesar had showed himself friendly to the people by his attitude, his public works and his games, his support of reform bills, such as the election of the pontiffs, his propagandistic activities by taking advantage of the reminiscences of the former popular leaders Marius and Saturninus, and his legislative activity during his

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128 P.A. BRUNT, Laus imperii, in: P.D.A. GARNSEY, C.R. WHITTAKER (eds.), *Imperialism in the Ancient World,* Cambridge 1978, pp. 159-191, esp. 162 and 164-168.

129 Sall. *Hist.* 1.55.1 and 11M (the consul Lepidus in 78); Cic. *Imp.Pomp.* 11, *Leg.Agr.* 2.22, *Mur.* 74-75, *Planc.* 11, *Red.Pop.* 4, *Dom.* 90. An example from the previous period: Sall. *Iug.* 31.20 (the tribune Memmius in 111). See also BRUNT, *op.cit.n.128,* 162-164.
On the collective consciousness of the advantages of imperialism and the accomplishments of the Roman state, see also: NICOLET, *Métier,* 526-527.

130 On the continuity of a collective morale from the early Republic, see: V. PÖSCHL, Die Einigung Italiens durch Rom, in: F. VALJAVEC (ed.), *Historia Mundi. Ein Handbuch der Weltgeschichte in zehn Bänden, Vol. 3,* Bern 1954, pp. 459-484, esp. 464-465; idem, Das Phänomen Rom, in: F. HÖRMANN (ed.), *Vom Menschen in der Antike,* München 1957, pp. 175-191, esp. 183.

consulate. Typically, it was said that Caesar gave substance to his consulate as if it were a tribunate (Plut. *Caes.* 14, *Pomp.* 47.5). As aediles he and his colleague Bibulus showed themselves very generous, but Caesar was able to get all the credit for the largess (Suet. *Iul.* 10.1). In Spain he gained military fame and during the 50s he enhanced it enormously. In that period Caesar was able to increase his prestige in Gaul by his military campaigns and with the help of his assistant leaders in Rome, while Pompey in Rome ran the risk of making himself unpopular. Pompey therefore incurred the hatred of the people when he dissolved his alliance with Clodius. Caesar had a most urbane personality and the gift not to make any mistakes in his image building. He knew how to ally himself with the right persons at the right time. During the 60s he aligned himself to the popular Pompey and his assistant leaders. At the time of the conspiracy of Catiline he took up the most moderate stand, which earned him suspicion of complicity from the élite but appreciation from the people, because he opposed oligarchical brutality. In 61 he refused to prosecute Clodius for the Bona Dea affair, despite the fact that Clodius' blasphemy had taken place in Caesar's residence. Clodius' popularity with the plebs at that time was already too valuable. Also thereafter Caesar remained on speaking terms with Clodius. As a dictator he continued his policy of good contacts with the people on an even larger scale.[131]

Clodius' image finally was not based on military fame. He could mainly boast actual promotion of the people's interests. He professed to dedicate himself unselfishly to the well-being of the people. By his legislative activity and symbolic actions he demonstrated that he had a good appraisal of the needs of the plebs. The tremendous popularity he gained with it was expressed in the reactions after his death.[132]

In the relationship between élite and people a shift occurred. In the past the élite, assembled in the senate, promoted the interests of state and people. The élite demonstrated its ability and its serviceability to society by magistracies, conquests, and largess. When during the late Republic some nobles attempted to rise above their peers, the interests of people and state were increasingly promoted by individuals instead of the élite as a collectivity. These individuals had to show themselves capable and compliant in the same way. Nothing therefore changed in the method of acquiring legitimacy and in the expectations of the plebs. The change was to be found in the shift from collectivity to individual. Augustus later would fulfil the expectations of the first citizen by putting his serviceability to the *res publica* first and by being modest in his display of power.[133]

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131 On the difference in popularity between Caesar and Pompey see also: YAVETZ, *Plebs*, Ch. 3. On Caesar's popular policy during his dictatorship, see: *ibidem* 45-48; idem, *Caesar*, 165-168 and 211-212.

132 See also BENNER, *op.cit.*, 102-108 and 119-124.

133 Augustus: A.B. BREEBAART, Het gedrag van Augustus: rollenspel en verwachtingspatroon, *Lampas* 13 (1980), pp. 5-22, esp. 18-19.

"It does not matter what is given, what counts is how it is given".[134] This profundity of the philosopher Seneca expresses the essence of the relationship between popular leader and crowd in the late Republic. A number of members of the Roman élite achieved a successful cooperation with the people, especially with a certain social group within the urban plebs. The success of the mobilization process depended on a number of factors, in which the leader's program was of less importance than his appearance and behavior.

A number of mobilization factors were responsible for the creation of a frame of mind which could lead to active mobilization of a group of participants in collective behavior. They have been treated here under the headings of communication, propaganda, and image building. These factors, if necessary, were complemented by concrete legislative proposals. In direct mobilization the most important factors appear to have been pre-existing organization and the presence of leadership. The availability of these factors for a large part determined the success of mobilization.

The common denominator of the mobilization factors, as far as they were not unexpected or due to outside interference, was their embeddedness in Roman tradition. Slogans went back to time-honored traditions of popular influence in Roman politics or to popular heroes from the past. The organization was based on pre-existing organizations. Even the *operae* were not basically new constructions, but merely a more efficient organizational type of the pre-existing *collegia*. The symbols that were employed appealed to the ideological concepts of the relationship between élite and plebs. The leaders by definition belonged to the group which had always governed the Republic; and they were the most successful if they were members of the official administration. Many leaders were magistrates, not only because it granted them the powers to assemble the plebs, but also because their office sanctioned collective behavior. A successful leader answered to the classical image of leadership by the Roman senator.

Mobilization therefore did not bring an innovation in Roman politics. What changed was the function and the impact of certain elements in the traditional forms of communication between élite and plebs. This was caused by structural differentiation and dysfunctions of the prevailing political system under the influence of the expansion.

In Chapter 2 we have observed that a differentiation had occurred within the Roman plebs. One group became detached from existing ties of patronage and sought new ways for the articulation of demands. This void

[134] Sen. *Ben.* 2.6.1-2: "Idem est quod datur, sed interest quomodo datur."

in the patron-client relationships was filled in by popular leaders. A new relationship of patronage was established, essentially equal to the old relationship, i.e. the mutual expectations remained the same. But the scale of the relationship and the distance between patron and client were larger. The personal relationships disappeared and were replaced by relationships between a leader and a collectivity. This required a new communication structure between patron and client. It was established by using pre-existing elements in Roman society. The leader addressed his following not only directly but also through intermediaries: assistant leaders and intermediate leaders. The employment of pre-existing organizations such as the colleges facilitated mobilization of larger groups. Mobilization resulted in cooperation between a popular leader and the public clientele. The members of that group, the artisans and shopkeepers, were the most susceptible to important mobilization factors: the organizations, the closing of the shops, the location of collective behavior in the Forum.

Considering the fact that mobilization was set within traditional frameworks and was not innovative, we should wonder how popular leaders differed from their political opponents and from each other. The difference consisted in the resources a leader had to mobilize and in his image. The resources first were composed of an efficient organization. This organization passed through assistant leaders to intermediate leaders to arrive finally at the organizations of the plebs. Second, financial means were important as a resource. The financial potential of the magnates far surpassed the means of their peers among the élite. It gave them the possibility of liberality and the acquisition of a personal following. Image, finally, was based on the demonstration of successful leadership. In this, they could utilize the failure of the prevailing governmental system as a result of an obsolete administrative structure and discord within the ruling class.

One leader, Clodius, did not quite conform to these conditions and can be qualified as unique. Without having to rely too much on assistant leaders and without military achievements he was able to provide direct leadership to the plebs in times when he did not hold a magistracy. That was already the case before his tribunate in 58. In 26 of the attested cases of collective behavior, leadership without the presence of a magistrate was involved. In almost half of those cases (12), leadership was furnished by Clodius.[135] The proportions change if we count from the moment at which Clodius started to move actively in Roman public life. Clodius' activity started with the Bona Dea trial in 61, when he already employed *operae*. From 61 on we know 62 cases of collective behavior. 19 out of the 62 are with leadership and without a magistrate. The majority of those (12) occurred under the leadership of Clodius.

[135] B-31, 51, 52, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 84, 85. The other fourteen: B-1, 7, 15, 16, 18, 24, 28, 43, 53, 54, 59, 78, 81, 83.

A primary explanation, of course, is to be found in the incompleteness of our data. Considering the animosity between Clodius and Cicero, Clodius stood a better chance of being mentioned in Cicero's works than other politicians. Yet this explanation is insufficient. Clodius counted as a notorious and successful popular leader among other authors as well.

The uniqueness of Clodius resulted from his efficient use of a number of important mobilization factors. Clodius, more than any other popular leader, realized the importance of the organizations of the plebs and he improved their organization to facilitate mobilization. Also he seems to have made the most use of intermediate leaders. In that way Clodius set up an extremely effective structure of communication and organization, with which he could attach the members of the public clientele to himself. In that, Clodius perhaps was the only one who brought some innovation in Roman politics.

Clodius' image as a leader was not based on military fame, but rather on a direct promotion of the interests of the urban plebs, in particular of the *plebs contionalis*. It may be surmised that Clodius received his inspiration from Gaius Gracchus, for there are many parallels between the two popular leaders. Just like Gaius Gracchus, Clodius proposed a package of bills in the popular assembly, which were a combination of direct advantages for the people (corn law and restoration of the colleges) and political reform (law on the censorship and adaptations of the Aelian and Fufian laws). Just like Gaius Gracchus, Clodius took measures to prevent senatorial repression (*lex de capite civis*). Just like Gaius Gracchus, Clodius sprang from very prestigious stock, and Clodius' family was even more powerful than the Sempronii Gracchi. Clodius' background promised him an illustrious career in public life. Yet Clodius took a different route, and as a tribune of the plebs he incurred the hatred of the oligarchy. Just like Gaius Gracchus, Clodius matched political ambition to a genuine perception of the problems of especially the urban plebs.

Chapter 4

# Collective Behavior

After having observed who the leaders in collective behavior were, whom the participants were composed of, and how collective behavior developed, in this chapter the actual collective behavior will be treated. First, some categories of collective behavior will be considered. Next, the violent cases will be discussed, and, finally, we will observe the ways in which the government tried to prevent or to control collective behavior.

## *Public Manifestations*

One category of collective behavior can be qualified as public manifestations. These belonged to the most traditional aspects of Roman public life. From the years 80-50, nine cases are known in which some action or reaction of the public present is discernable. The behavior displayed mostly was just expressive, but in some cases violent behavior also occurred.

The first type of public manifestations consisted of funerals. Funerals of members of the aristocracy were a public event, at which the opportunity was used to demonstrate the greatness of the deceased and his stock by means of laudatory orations and portraits.[1] In 78 the dictator Sulla was buried in great splendor (B-1). The public was particulary composed of those who owed much to Sulla, namely his soldiers and the veterans to whom he had allotted land. Considering the terror Sulla had exerted during his dictatorship, not everyone agreed with an honorary funeral. But those who were reluctant to participate were forced to join in under threat of the soldiers. Sulla's death was mourned with loud clamor.

The other cases of funerals were those of Caesar's aunt Julia (B-7), Lucullus (B-50), and Caesar's daughter Julia (B-78). The funeral of Caesar's aunt, Marius' widow, became a demonstration in favor of popular politics, because Caesar clearly propagated his allegiance to Marius. As already stated, the emphasis on family backgrounds at funerals was a normal phenomenon. Caesar incorporated this tradition into his popular politics.[2]

The traditions of public funerals also emerged in the collective behavior after the death of Clodius (B-86). The plebs assembled in great numbers at Clodius' residence. Clodius' death was mourned. Leaders put

[1] Pol. 6.53-54; NICOLET, *Métier*, 460-467; SCULLARD, *Festivals*, 218-221.

[2] On public funerals as part of popular politics, see: G. ACHARD, "Ratio popularis" et funérailles, *LEC* 43 (1975), pp. 166-178.

an end to the feeling of uncertainty of the crowd and directed the action which was to be pursued. Clodius' assistant leaders suggested carrying the corpse to a public spot - the Forum. The intermediate leader Sex. Clodius took the initiative to carry the corpse into the Curia and to cremate it there. In other words, the leaders appealed to the existing traditions of honorary funerals for great Romans and therewith found a response with the plebs, which set off a concerted action. A similar action pattern was visible at the cremation of Caesar by the people in 44.[3]

Another type of public manifestation was the triumphs (B-32, 68, 82), which attracted much attention. During a triumph, a victorious general passed through Rome with his army, the amassed booty, and the vanquished prisoners of war. The general was loudly acclaimed.[4] Following on his triumph in 61, Pompey was hailed by the people as Magnus, the Great.[5]

Public manifestations were rooted in Roman tradition. These events had great publicity value for anyone, and certainly for popular leaders who could act as leaders at such occasions.

*Demonstrations*

A second category of collective behavior was formed by demonstrations; to start with, demonstrations at the games.[6] In Chapter 2 it was concluded that the spectators at the games differed from the usual participants in urban collective behavior and that, consequently, political reactions in the theater and the circus tended to be anti-*popularis*. During public shows expressive collective behavior was habitual; the public reacted to the performances and showed its enthusiasm or disapproval towards the actors. Such behavior received a political meaning when there was a reaction to lines of an actor with a political connotation or to the entrance of a public personality. The behavior consisted of hisses or cheers and applause. Leadership in these cases is difficult to assess. Sometimes claqueurs acted as intermediate leaders (B-53). An important factor was the arrangement of the stands. Senators and equestrians attended the games. Each group had separate seats and could act as a claque. The collective expressions at the games foreshadowed developments in the Principate, during which their political meaning increased. Because of the abolition of the popular assemblies, the theater and the circus remained as

[3] App. 2.126, 147, and 3.2; Cic. *Att.* 14.10.1, *Phil.* 1.5 and 2.91; Dio 44.50 and 45.23.4; Plut. *Ant.* 14.3-4, *Brut.* 20, *Caes.* 68.

[4] On triumphs: NICOLET, *Métier*, 467-472; SCULLARD, *Festivals*, 213-218.

[5] B-32. Other public manifestations: B-5, 40.

[6] B-20, 35, 36, 53, 54, 76, 77, 90. See also NICOLET, *Métier*, 479-494.

the only accepted type of public communication between government and people.[7]

Next to theater demonstrations, there are a series of demonstrations which can be defined as behavior during meetings without an official character, i.e. not officially called by a magistrate such as a *contio*. They involved expressions of support or honor for a leader.[8] Thus Caesar (B-19, 24, 26) and Curio (B-92) could enjoy such public interest. Pompey was welcomed after his victories in the East with great splendor (B-28). Who received such support depended for an important part on the participants. Thus, the *equites* in Rome in 58 demonstrated as a collectivity in favor of Cicero (B-43), and when Cicero returned from exile he was welcomed by a cheering crowd of Italians and country folk (B-59).

*Assemblies*

Collective behavior most frequently occurred during popular assemblies (*comitia*) and meetings (*contiones*). There it was also the most significant for the political process. 38 out of the 92 cases fall into this category. If we itemize these cases, we observe the following proportions: the majority of the 38 cases (23) were meetings. Next to these, there were 8 legislative tribal assemblies, 3 elective tribal assemblies, 1 legislative centuriate assembly, and 3 elective centuriate assemblies.[9]

These proportions are not surprising. Considering the design of the various political assemblies, it is obvious that the opportunity for collective behavior was larger at meetings than at popular assemblies. For the *contio* was a meeting for political discussion prior to legislation, elections, or voting in public trials, which had been especially introduced for that purpose. The debate was mostly held between the presiding magistrate and members of the élite who received permission to speak from the chairman, but, besides that, there was an accepted space for participation by the public.

In the actual popular assemblies discussion was prohibited. The only permitted collective behavior of the citizens at those occasions was to cast

[7] On expressive collective behavior during the games in the Empire, see A. ALFÖLDI, Die Ausgestaltung des monarchischen Zeremoniells am römischen Kaiserhofe, *MDAI (R)* 49 (1934), pp. 1-118, esp. 79-88; BOLLINGER, *op.cit.*, 29-71; HOPKINS, *Death*, 14-20 (gladiatorial shows); KNEPPE, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 52-56; MACMULLEN, *Enemies*, 168-173; F. MILLAR, *The Emperor in the Roman World. (31 B.C.-A.D. 337)*, Ithaca 1977, pp. 368-374; C. ROUECHÉ, Acclamations in the Later Roman Empire: New Evidence from Aphrodisias, *JRS* 74 (1984), pp. 181-199; YAVETZ, *Plebs*, 9-24.

[8] On such demonstrations, see: NICOLET, *Métier*, 472-479.

[9] Meetings: B-3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 21, 25, 27, 29, 33, 37, 38, 41, 44, 45, 46, 57, 67, 74. Tribal legislative assembly: B-13, 14, 30, 34, 47, 51, 52, 73. Tribal elective: B-22, 72, 91. Centuriate legislative: B-58. Centuriate elective: B-70, 71, 85.

the ballot and that, in fact, was an individual affair. Furthermore, the voting procedures were structured. Elections took place on the Campus Martius. It was divided into 35 rows of individual tribes, the *saepta*. The voters in succession passed through these rows to cast their ballot in their own tribe. During the elective tribal assembly the voting took place simultaneously; in the centuriate assembly first the highest census classes voted. During legislation in the Forum there also existed a tribal arrangement, and the voters walked over the voting bridges to depose their ballot into the urns.[10] Actual collective action in these assemblies could only consist of illegal behavior. The cases which are known to us, therefore, only consisted of behavior which was exceptional or out of the order; the great majority of these cases were violent. The remaining cases concern the exceptional concourse of people at Cato the Younger's election to the tribunate of the plebs (B-22) and two cases we know of thanks to the involvement of Cicero, i.e. the voting on his exile (B-47) and the voting on his return (B-58). The latter case in itself was exceptional because of the mobilization of great numbers of Italians and because it was the only legislative centuriate assembly in this period.

Of one case, the voting on the *lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis* (B-47), some interesting incidental details are known. There were a few organized small groups (*operae*) present under the leadership of the intermediate leader Fidulius. Their task was to make the voting pass in a favorable way by loudly expressing support for the bill. The lot or Clodius, the presiding magistrate, designated Fidulius as the first voter, whose vote generally was considered an omen to be followed by the subsequent voters.

Since the violent cases will be discussed in the next section, we will now deal only with non-violent meetings.[11] In view of the official character of the *contiones* it goes without saying that leadership in all cases (including the violent ones) was provided by a magistrate. The purpose of the meetings was to arrive at a political opinion on the issue which was under discussion. A magistrate who called a *contio* wished to gain support for the eventual vote on a bill or the verdict in a trial. Such, too, was the goal of the known *contiones* between 80 and 50.

What collective behavior occurred during *contiones* ? In general it was limited to expressive behavior in the form of showing agreement or acclamations (B-4), showing disagreement (B-21), protest against senatorial obstruction (B-10, 38), a request for peace (B-6), and interested presence (B-29, 33, 45, 46). In these cases there were no spontaneous actions, but only reactions to remarks made by orators or to issues brought up by leaders. An actual type of peaceful action came about only in a meeting called by Clodius in 58, during which the assembled

[10] On the voting procedures in the various popular assemblies: NICOLET, *Métier*, 333-349, 365-375 and 380-385; STAVELEY, *Voting*, Ch. IX; TAYLOR, *RVA*, Ch. III and pp. 74-83.

[11] B-4, 6, 10, 21, 29, 33, 38, 41, 45, 46.

artisans and shopkeepers registered in the recently re-established colleges (B-41). Finally, it is remarkable that this was the only peaceful *contio* in which the presence of organization can be detected.

*Collective Violence*

The late Republic is known as a period of frequent violent crowd behavior.[12] It is thus no accident that out of the 92 known cases of collective behavior, 62 can be qualified as violent. An explanation, first of all, is to be found in the nature of our tradition. Collective violence, considering its spectacular and often dramatic character, naturally was more worth mentioning for ancient authors than other cases of crowd behavior. Furthermore, we have observed that in popular assemblies collective action by the participants almost automatically had a violent character, because the permitted behavior was limited. Rome had a long tradition of popular justice, which could express itself violently.[13] Self-help, also in a violent form, was an accepted principle in the Roman sense of justice.[14] Finally, the late Republic seems to have been a period in which collective violence, as a result of political conflict, occurred more frequently than before.

Collective violence consisted, on the one hand, of the previously discussed categories of collective behavior which took on a violent character, and, on the other hand, of cases which were violent from the start - to be qualified as "riots". At some public manifestations, dissension arose between protagonists and antagonists of the manifestation (B-1, 78, 82). One theater demonstration ended in a riot. In 63 a skirmish came about in the theater between the *equites*, who welcomed Roscius at his entrance, and the rest of the audience, who hissed Roscius (B-20). But in the other cases of theater demonstrations there was no conflict between various parts of the audience, possibly due to its composition. For the

[12] During the Principate, too, collective violence occurred with some regularity in Rome and other cities. On collective violence in the Principate in general, see: T.W. AFRICA, Urban Violence in Imperial Rome, *Journal of Interdisciplinary Hisory* 2 (1971), pp. 3-21; MACMULLEN, *Enemies*, Ch. 5; YAVETZ, *Plebs*, 24-37.
Some individual riots are analyzed by: L. CRACCO RUGGINI, Nuclei immigrati e forze indigene in tre grandi centri commerciali dell'imperio, *MAAR* 36 (1980), pp. 55-76; H. GALSTERER, Politik in römischen Städten: die "seditio" des Jahres 59 n.Chr. in Pompeii, in: W. ECK, et al. (eds.), *Studien zur antiken Sozialgeschichte. Festschrift F. Vittinghoff*, Köln 1980, pp. 323-338; T.E. GREGORY, *Popular Opinion and Violence in the Religious Controversies of the Fifth Century A.D.*, Columbus 1979; C.P. JONES, *The Roman World of Dio Chrysostom*, Cambridge 1978, Ch. 3 "Riot at Prusa"; KNEPPE, *op.cit.*, 20-91; W.O. MOELLER, The Riot of A.D. 59 at Pompeii, *Historia* 19 (1970), pp. 84-85.
On food riots: H.P. KOHNS, *Versorgungskrisen und Hungerrevolten im spätantiken Rom*, Bonn 1979.

[13] LINTOTT Ch. I.

[14] LINTOTT Ch. II.

composition of the audience was subject to manipulation, by which an unanimous expression of opinion was easily created. In one case Clodius was physically threatened by the theater public in 57 (B-53). The late Republic was still far from late antiquity, when *aficionados* of the teams in the chariot races frequently came to blows. The demonstrations in the theater offer parallels with events in the Empire, but the late Republican theater was still lacking the political function it had in the Empire, when riots with some regularity arose during the performances as an expression of social protest.[15] Finally, in our period two other demonstrations took place which took on a violent character (B-24, 26); the people threatened the senate which had treated Caesar unfairly in the eyes of the people.

We now come to the frequent violence in meetings and popular assemblies. Looking at the meetings, we observe that violence occurred as a reaction to matters which were considered unfair by the people, for example actions taken against popular leaders.[16] Further, it occurred to enforce a political decision (B-8, 11, 57) or as a reaction to senatorial opposition against a submitted proposal (B-25). Finally, it could serve to support a popular candidate at elections (B-12). In some of the cases mentioned, violence broke out in support of the policy which was pursued by the senatorial majority against the *populares* (B-57, 74).

The violence in the tribal assembly was similar to the violence in meetings. In the legislative tribal assembly it could involve acts of violence in order to support bills (B-14) or resistance to opposition from the senate during voting (B-9, 52, 73). On the other hand, it could also involve violent attempts to prevent the passing of unfavorable bills in the assembly (B-13, 30, 51). In the elective tribal assembly violence was used to support the election of certain candidates (B-72, 91), and so also in the centuriate assembly (B-70, 71, 85).

Almost half of the cases of collective violence (30) involved riots. An important number consisted of riots which took place during or in relation to a trial. The goal was to influence the judicial process. The people interfered in jurisdiction by either attempting to prevent the conviction of a popular leader (B-15, 16, 18, 31, 49, 83, 89) or, on the contrary, to achieve the conviction of a person who had obviously misbehaved in the eyes of the people (B-65, 79, 80, 88). These cases, together with the above mentioned cases in which the people violently reacted to injustice and the reactions after the death of Clodius (B-86, 87), formed part of the ever important traditions of popular justice.

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[15] Some examples from the first century A.D.: Tac. *Ann.* 1.77, 6.13 (Tiberius); Suet. *Cal.* 40; Jos. *AJ* 19.25-26 (Caligula); Plut. *Galba* 17.4 (Galba); Tac. *Hist.* 1.72 (Otho). WHITTAKER, *op.cit.*, 360-364, enumerates a series of riots in Rome between A.D. 182-238, which were linked to political events and most of which started or took place during the games. On the political function of the theater in the Empire, see: E. TENGSTRÖM, Theater und Politik im kaiserlichen Rom, *Eranos* 75 (1977), pp. 43-56.

[16] B-3, 17, 27, 37, 44, 67, 74.

Next to these, there were a series of riots which can be classified as "political", i.e. acts of violence outside the regular meetings and assemblies, whose goal was to influence political decision-making. It often concerned intimidation of or attacks on political opponents.[17] Finally, there were some food riots. High corn prices and perhaps the beginning of a food shortage could lead to violent protests of the plebs.[18] Acute material deprivation had a catalyzing effect. Food riots were more intense than other types of collective violence, and also, though proof is lacking, seem to have had a higher number of participants.

What is meant by collective violence?[19] In a few cases violence was limited to exclusively material damage. Most cases did not go beyond threatening opponents (18), or physical violence (31) in which people came to blows or threw stones and in which persons were injured. Only in 10 cases were some victims probably killed. The scale of the violence, therefore, was limited. As Cicero already said, violence in meetings mostly consisted of shouting and secessions in the public; only at the end and in rare cases did an actual scuffle come about (*Sest.* 77). Moreover, we should be careful with the sources. In his speeches Cicero made much of the acts of violence by his opponents. But in one of his letters (*Att.* 1.14.3) Cicero admits that in his speeches he tended to grossly exaggerate arsons and violence.[20]

If we look at the objects under attack, we observe the following: Most cases concerned violence against persons, i.e. attacks against opposing magistrates and senators or the adherents of the rival party. Also the homes of opponents were attacked (B-56, 61, 87). Considering the propaganda of popular leaders in which the senatorial oligarchy was depicted as being against the people's interests and as an oppressor of the *libertas populi,* it can be surmised that the senate in these cases became a symbol which evoked hostile reactions. In cases of acute deprivation it was a scapegoat. During a corn shortage in 75 the consuls were deemed responsible and were attacked by the plebs (B-2). In a food riot in 57 Clodius was able effectively to suggest Cicero as scapegoat (B-60). After a flood in 54 Gabinius was taken as scapegoat, because he was thought to have misbehaved towards the gods (B-80). These actions were cases of material deprivation; the death of Clodius could be called a case of severe psychological deprivation (B-86, 87). An obvious scapegoat was found in Clodius' murderer Milo, but popular fury was also directed against the senatorial élite as a whole, which was held responsible for Clodius' fate.

Some objects under attack had a symbolic value; the most important were the *fasces,* rods carried by the lictors as a symbol of the authority of the magistrate. Three cases are known in which the plebs broke the *fasces*

[17] B-23, 42, 48, 56, 61, 62, 63, 64, 69, 75, 81, 84, 86, 87.

[18] B-2, 55, 60. See furthermore B-39, 66.

[19] See also LINTOTT Ch. V.

[20] See further ACHARD, *Pratique,* 335-351.

of a consul who took up a position adverse to the will of the people (B-11, 34, 48). Breaking the *fasces* was a symbolic action whereby the people sought to deprive the magistrate of his authority.[21] The action indicated that the power of the magistrate was no longer considered legitimate. The person who held the magistracy had acted so contrary to the popular will that the people wished to deny him the right to hold the office. This behavior should be connected to actual legislative attempts to discharge from office magistrates who resisted the will of the people or who acted against popular interest (B-9, 10).

The counterpart of the breaking of the *fasces* is to be found in the events after Clodius' death when the crowd carried the *fasces* to Pompey, thereby indicating that he should hold the consulate and even the dictatorship in order to provide a solution for the emergency situation that had arisen (B-86). The counterpart of the deposition of the magistrates is to be found in the willingness of the plebs to maintain popular leaders in their office. In 62 the senate discharged Caesar from the praetorship because of his involvement in a violent popular assembly. The crowd, however, showed its readiness to support Caesar with violence, and Caesar was reinstated in office (B-26). Such symbolic actions once again demonstrate how much collective behavior in Rome was set in a traditional framework. The people did not wish to achieve state reform, but asserted itself if the responsible magistrates did not perform their task well, or if they did perform well and incurred opposition. Possibly a shift in the attitude of the *plebs contionalis* can be discerned. The power of the magistrates was no longer accepted or considered legitimate merely on the basis of their election, but only if coupled with proper behavior. If that was not the case, the magistracy was not to be replaced, but the individual, irrespective of possible constitutional implications.

Another case of a symbolic object under attack was the stoning of the statues of Pompey in 55 as a reaction to his unfair treatment of Cato the Younger.[22] Something similar happened in 48. After Caesar had defeated Pompey at Pharsalus, the statues of Pompey and Sulla were torn down in Rome to indicate that Caesar's enemies were not worthy of being honored by a statue (Dio 42.18.2; by the urban plebs according to Suet. *Iul.* 75.4). As a gesture of magnanimity Caesar had the statues re-erected in 44.[23]

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[21] See also A. MARSHALL, *op.cit.*, 138. Some other examples of the breaking of the *fasces* : App. 1.15 (during the reelection of Tiberius Gracchus to tribune of the plebs in 133); Liv. 3.49.4 (in 450).

[22] B-73. See also the demolition of a statue of Piso by his mutinous soldiers in Macedonia because they had not received their pay (Cic. *Pis.* 93).

[23] YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 96.

Such aggression against statues foreshadowed the Empire.[24] During the Republic, portraits of living persons were considered a condemnable form of personality cult. But during the late Republic it became increasingly common. A similar development is to be seen on coins from Caesar's dictatorship on. The popular reactions against statues provide an indication that leadership more and more came into the hands of individuals. The people showed their favor or disfavor towards individuals instead of the collectivity of the ruling oligarchy. The pendant of aggression against statues was the expression of joy over the erection of statues of past popular leaders, of which we have seen some examples in the previous chapter.[25]

In collective violence a division of labor often is visible: leaders direct the actions, small groups act as an active nucleus, and the rest of the crowd forms a more or less passive body of bystanders. The information from the sources, unfortunately, for the most part offers insufficient details on how the leaders were able to move the mobilized crowd to violent action. Mostly we do not know more than that a leader was responsible for the violence committed, or that he ordered a small group to turn to violence, or that he called upon the assembled crowd, for example, to attack a political opponent or to protect himself. In any case, the role of leadership was essential; leaders were responsible for mobilization in the first place, but in the majority of the cases of collective violence the leaders also took the initiative in provoking violence. Leaders pointed out the objects that were to be attacked, so that a maximum political effect could be achieved: opposing magistrates, the followers of opponents, or the residences of political opponents. The top leaders, especially Clodius, sometimes directed the action themselves. They took the initiative by exhorting the crowd to violence or by putting themselves at the head of a small group which turned to violent action.[26] They were aided by assistant leaders, or they remained in the background and left the initiation of violence to assistant leaders[27] and intermediate leaders.[28]

There are a few cases which provide us some more information on the role of the leadership and how leaders performed as directors of the action. In the first section on public manifestations, I have already discussed the role of the assistant and intermediate leaders during the riots

[24] E.g.: During a food riot in 40 B.C. the statues of Octavian and Antony were torn down (Dio 48.31.5). A statue of Piso, suspected of being guilty for the death of Germanicus, was demolished by the people (Tac. *Ann.* 3.14). Nero repudiated his wife Octavia in favor of Poppaea. The people reacted by throwing down the statues of Poppaea and revering those of Octavia (Tac. *Ann.* 14.61). See also KNEPPE, *op.cit.*, 60-62; YAVETZ, *Plebs*, 27.

[25] Chapter 3 n.59 and B-19.

[26] B-30, 42, 48, 49, 51, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 71, 72, 73, 81, 85.

[27] B-3, 12, 14, 25, 34, 37, 69, 73, 74, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91.

[28] B-13, 16, 18, 23, 30, 34, 44, 52, 60, 78, 86.

after Clodius' death. In addition, attention can be drawn to the fact that the assistant leaders probably suggested to the crowd to bring the *fasces* to Pompey in order to instate him as leader (B-86). The same assistant leaders incited the crowd to use violence in overcoming Milo's attempts to have his assassination of Clodius approved (B-87). Intermediate leaders mostly acted as leaders of small groups (*dux operarum*). They could also act as claqueurs (B-44). During the food riot of September 57 (B-60), Clodius and his intermediate leaders indicated Cicero as scapegoat, shouted slogans and started to throw stones.[29] We may also assume that it was Clodius who led the crowd to the Capitol, where the senate was in session to discuss the supply problems. For Clodius himself was a senator and knew the agenda of the meeting. A riot at that moment and on that spot, of course, had the highest chance of achieving the intended result. Furthermore, in the two food riots which were led by Clodius (B-55, 60), he selected the theater as the location for action. The interruption of a public festivity had a maximum publicity effect, not least because the decision-makers - the senate, magistrates, and the rest of the upper strata - were present at these occasions. Moreover, the emotions of the crowd thus received a logical expression: in times of emergency public business should be stopped.[30]

In violent behavior we observe the significance of small groups and organizations. In 37 of the 62 violent cases, organization was a factor in mobilization. To put it differently, in the total of 42 cases of collective behavior in which some type of organization can be traced, violent action occurred in the great majority (37). This proves that small groups were important to incite the crowd to violent action. On the other hand, in a large number of cases it becomes obvious that small groups, such as *operae*, acted as an active nucleus, while there were also present a large number of bystanders who remained passive.[31] A clear example is a *contio* in 67 (B-11): when the consul Piso tried to stop a discussion on a bill of the tribune of the plebs Cornelius, stones were thrown from the

[29] A parallel for this role of leaders as directors of the action is to be found in the food riot of A.D. 190. The corn shortage was artificially caused by a number of conspirators under the leadership of Papirius Dionysius, the corn prefect. The fury of the crowd, however, was not directed against the corn prefect, who would have been the most obvious target. Under the leadership of a cheerleader in the circus the popular fury was directed against Cleander, the praetorian prefect, who had endeared himself to the people by the construction of public baths (Dio 73.12.5; Hdn. 1.12.4). See further on this revolt: WHITTAKER, *op.cit.*, passim.

[30] Cf. BENNER, *op.cit.*, 111-115.

[31] During the Principate, too, small groups played an important part in collective behavior. On the role of the colleges during riots in the Empire, see: MACMULLEN, *Enemies*, 173-178; WHITTAKER, *op.cit.*, 359-360.

back of the meeting, therefore not by the entire crowd.[32] Another example is the riot after Clodius' death (B-86). In this case it is not clear whether organization was a factor in mobilization, but from a remark by Appian (2.21) it follows that a small group took the most daring action, namely the arson of the senate house.

Collective violence which served to influence political decision-making usually consisted of physical intimidation or removal of opponents. But other types of manipulation were possible as well, in which again an important role was reserved for small groups, such as the occupation of the voting bridges[33], the destruction of the voting urns (B-49), or the shouting of slogans (B-60, 65). The rhythmic use of slogans in the form of a game of questions and answers, incidentally, was not an innovation, but was associated with the techniques of rhetorics.[34] Yet another type of political manipulation consisted of the distribution of false ballots.[35] Small groups did not exclusively belong to popular politics; the *optimates*, too, were able to employ small groups to manipulate the popular assemblies (Cic. *Att.* 2.16.1).

Did violence pay? To answer this question, we have look at the success ratio of collective violence as compared to non-violent collective behavior. If we draw some careful quantitative conclusions, while keeping all options open because of lacunose data, the following picture appears: out of 62 violent cases of collective behavior, 41 achieved their goal (66 %); from the remaining 30 non-violent cases of collective behavior, 24 reached their goal (80 %). A preliminary careful conclusion could be that collective violence was not necessarily the best way to reach a goal. This becomes more plausible if we take into account that there perhaps have been more cases of unsuccessful collective behavior than we know of, for such cases stood a smaller chance of being recorded in the sources. Let us now itemize these cases and look at two categories of collective behavior that are important from a political point of view: popular assemblies as collective behavior within an official framework, and unofficial types of behavior such as riots. It turns out that there was no significant difference in success between violent and non-violent popular assemblies.[36] Violence, therefore, could not be a goal in itself.

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[32] Other cases in which small groups were responsible for the violence: B-15, 16, 18, 23, 25, 30, 34, 49, 51, 52, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 69, 70, 73, 81, 83, 84, 91. Cases in which organization was involved, but in which it is not obvious whether small groups initiated violence: B-1, 11, 14, 20, 31, 39, 48, 55, 56, 66, 71, 78, 85. The nonviolent cases with organization: B-36, 40, 41, 47, 58.

[33] B-30. A method which could also be used against popular leaders: Q. Caepio in that way sabotaged the voting on Saturninus' corn law in 103 (*Rhet.Her.* 1.21).

[34] The *conplexio* (*Rhet.Her.* 4.20). Cicero also used it (*Leg.Agr.* 2.22).

[35] B-30; Cic. *Dom.* 112; Plut. *Cat.Min.* 46.2. See further on the manipulation of the vote: NICOLET, *Rome*, 352-353; STAVELEY, *Voting*, 211-215.

[36] The figures: Violent popular assemblies (25): successful 19 (76 %) - unsuccessful 6 (24 %). Non-violent popular assemblies (13): successful 11 (85 %) - unsuccessful 2 (15 %).

Collective violence should be considered an ultimate means. This also follows from the success ratio of riots, of which only about half were successful.[37]

It is necessary to modify this picture somewhat. The infrequent food riots, of which three occurred during the late Republic, all were successful, in that sense that as a result of violent action measures were taken to improve the corn supply. These violent expressions of popular protest, in which probably many more people participated than in political riots between followers of politicians, found a response. This indicates that, although the riot in itself was not accepted, the real cause was not denied and measures were deemed necessary. It also indicates that there were few other means for the articulation of demands. This also follows from the remarkable absence of food riots before Sulla. In that period problems in the corn supply occurred as well, but violent expressions of popular protest did not take place. This cannot be explained from a difference in deprivation, for the food riots after Sulla did not spring from hunger, but from rising prices or from an expectation of a corn shortage. What emerges is a breakdown in communication between élite and plebs, because of which, in a part of the urban lower strata, there developed new ways to articulate demands: the public clientele.

The opportunity of the people to act collectively was limited as a result of restrictions in the mobilization opportunities and, as we have seen, the limited possibilities of peaceful action in the popular assemblies. Attention has already been drawn to the fact that action in popular assemblies and meetings was limited to reactive behavior. In collective violence, behavior sometimes also consisted of reactions to, for example, the opposition of a magistrate. In most cases, however, and especially in case of a riot, the behavior consisted of action, i.e. acts which were violent from the start, without provocation. It goes without saying that leaders and small groups were largely responsible for this, but it was also caused by the fact that there were few other possibilities of behavior available to the participants.

*Repression*

How did the Roman government react to collective behavior? What attempts were made to prevent it and to control or stop it when it occurred? These are the questions to be answered in this section. It has already been stated that, on the one hand, ample opportunity for (accepted) collective behavior existed in Roman society and that, on the other hand, institutional restrictions were imposed on mobilization and action. First, the specific measures which were taken to prevent or to limit collective behavior will be treated. Next, we will deal with social control.

[37] Riots (30): successful 17 (57 %) - unsuccessful 13 (43 %).

In 92 the censors Licinius Crassus and Domitius Ahenobarbus promulgated an edict against the Latin orators.[38] The purpose of the edict was to restrict the teaching of Latin rhetorics, because the censors feared that such eloquence fostered demagogy. The edict does not seem to have had any effect.

In the previous chapter we have observed that the opportunity to act was limited partly because of the fact that legislation was restricted to certain days. The Roman government sometimes used the possibility of making adaptations in the calendar, so that *dies comitiales* were limited in number to prevent popular leaders from putting undesirable laws to the vote.[39]

The Roman government soon realized the importance of organizations, such as the *collegia,* in the mobilization process. Several efforts therefore were made to neutralize this factor.[40] In 64 a senatorial decree banned subversive colleges, while the colleges with a long-standing tradition were allowed to exist. When a tribune of the plebs in 61 attempted to organize the *Compitalia* through the colleges, this was prevented by the authorities. (Cic. *Pis.* 8; Asc. 7 and 75C.) But the decree of 64 does not seem to have been very effective. Clodius, in any case, organized the *Compitalia* in 58 without opposition and a few days later passed a law to legalize the colleges (B-40). Subsequently, in 56, a *senatus consultum de sodaliciis* was proclaimed (Cic. *Q.Fr.* 2.3.5), which was put into law a year later - the *lex Licinia de sodaliciis* (Cic. *Planc.* 44-48). These measures were equally directed against colleges which were misused for political purposes and against *sodalitates* - organized groups within the upper strata which served to manipulate elections. But their effect seems to have been limited as well. In reaction to the riots in 48 and 47 under the leadership of Caelius and Dolabella, the dictator Caesar passed another *lex de collegiis* in 46, which again put a ban on the colleges.[41]

Furthermore, a series of laws were passed which were especially directed against the leadership. First, there were laws whose purpose was to contain political violence (*leges de vi* ).[42] Their effect however was

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[38] *MRR* 17.

[39] Cic. *Q.Fr.* 2.4.4-5 (In 56 against C. Cato Ap-39), *Fam.* 8.11.1 (In 50 against Curio Ap-46); TAYLOR, *PP,* 78-80. Also in 88 against Sulpicius: App. 1.55; Plut. *Sull.* 8.3.

[40] On the various attempts to prohibit or restrict the colleges during the late Republic, see: ALFÖLDI, *Caesar,* 79-90; *LGRR* 228-231; FLAMBARD, *MEFRA,* 117-122; idem, *Ktema,* 162-165; YAVETZ, *Caesar,* 85-96.
Tertul. *Apol.* 38.2 is a nice example from the Empire of the perception of the colleges as a danger to public order.

[41] BRUHNS, *Caesar,* 131; YAVETZ, *Caesar,* 94-95.
In 68 there also seems to have been introduced a measure against the employment of *nomenclatores* at elections, but only Cato the Younger complied with it (Plut. *CatMin.* 8.2).

[42] On *leges de vi* : LINTOTT Ch. VIII; YAVETZ, *Caesar,* 77-79. On statutory measures against private violence: LINTOTT Ch. IX.

limited, the more so because political opponents kept suing one another, and the verdict often depended more on the composition of the jury and manipulations than on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Trials often were the scene of collective violence. On the other hand, the annulment of laws which were passed by violence was hardly practical and did not have a preventive effect[43].

Second, laws were passed against treason (*leges de maiestate*).[44] These laws were not only directed against persons who engaged in subversive activities in internal affairs, but also against individuals who during their provincial command had not observed their instructions or had gone beyond their orders. The same was true of these laws as of legislation against violence: partly due to Roman judicial process they were not very effective.

Finally, a number of laws were passed against electoral corruption (*leges de ambitu*).[45] These were especially directed against electoral corruption in the centuriate assembly, where the magnitude of bribery was largest. The laws were inadequate to counteract the increasing practice of electoral corruption. In short, extensive legislation was unable to prevent collective behavior or to limit its extent. Other instruments were necessary to do that. As Tacitus aptly remarked: "corruptissima re publica plurimae leges" (*Ann.* 3.27).

We now arrive at repression in the form of terminating collective behavior. Repression did not occur very frequently. Only in 35 out of 92 cases of collective behavior were attempts at repression undertaken. Remarkably, the majority of the cases (23) involved repression of collective violence.[46] There were also a few cases in which repression provoked collective violence.[47] This is an indication that, at least in the cases known to us, opportunities for collective behavior were fairly abundant, especially in a peaceful form. The Roman government had no policy of immediate suppression of collective behavior. In addition, almost all collective behavior had élite leadership, which implied dissension among the élite and impeded repression. When repression occurred, it was not always successful; only half the attempts at repression succeeded.[48]

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[43] LINTOTT Ch. X; R.E. SMITH, The Use of Force in Passing Legislation in the Late Republic, *Athenaeum* 55 (1977), pp. 150-174, esp. 150-167.

[44] On *leges de maiestate* : YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 79-85.

[45] On *leges de ambitu* : *LGRR* 212-224; *SWRP* 89.

[46] Repression of collective violence: B-13, 14, 20, 23, 26, 30, 39, 51, 57, 62, 63, 65, 70, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89.

[47] Collective violence in reaction to repression: B-1, 8, 9, 11, 25, 34, 67.

[48] Successful repression: B-10, 13, 14, 20, 23, 25, 26, 30, 39, 43, 50, 63, 65, 74, 85, 88, 89, 71. Among these there were three cases (B-10, 26, 71) in which the popular leader himself put an end to collective behavior.
Failed repression: B-1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 34, 51, 57, 62, 67, 70, 73, 75, 78, 80, 84, 86.

Which repressive methods were applied? For the most part, common political procedures or traditions. A protest was lodged, orations were held to change the attitude of the participants, tribunes of the plebs put their veto (*intercessio*), or magistrates tried to terminate collective behavior by means of their powers and authority.[49] A special method in this respect was *obnuntiatio*.[50] Before each popular assembly the gods had to be consulted (*auspicia*) to see if the omens were favorable. If the presiding magistrate during the assembly saw unfavorable omens, he was allowed to terminate the assembly (*obnuntiatio*). Clodius passed a law which restricted this practice, but obnuntiation was still applied afterwards. Feigning the observation of unfavorable omens was an accepted method among the élite to sabotage undesirable popular assemblies (Cic. *Leg.* 3.27). The effectiveness of the method however declined, because it was counteracted by violence.[51]

At times of extreme emergency, the possibility existed of appointing a dictator. This person received absolute power during six months in order to avert dangers in the form of war or rebellion which threatened the state. The dictator could not be called to account for his deeds after his term of office. After the second Punic war, however, the office fell into disuse. The senatorial oligarchy was unwilling to grant unlimited powers to one individual again.[52] The dictatorship was replaced by a novelty: the proclamation of the state of emergency - the *senatus consultum ultimum*.[53]

It was applied for the first time in 121 to repress Gaius Gracchus. The *senatus consultum ultimum* was a vague decree by which the consuls and if necessary other magistrates were ordered to avert the danger for the state by any means ("Videant consules ne quid detrimenti res publica caperet"). The ultimate decree was proclaimed when the élite was able to unite in great majority to suppress a rebellious popular leader. It was applied several times after Sulla: in 63 in reaction to the Catilinarian conspiracy (B-23), in 52 to repress the riots after Clodius' death (B-88, 89), and also

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[49] B-1, 7, 8, 9, 11, 20, 23, 25, 30, 34, 39, 43, 50, 51, 67, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80.

[50] On *obnuntiatio* : BLEICKEN, *op.cit.*, 454-458; STAVELEY, *Voting*, 206-209; TAYLOR, *PP*, 81-83.

[51] B-52, 73. Pompey, too, used it once (B-71). Bibulus, Caesar's colleague in the consulate in 59, locked himself into his residence to consult the heavens. On such an occasion, legislation was prohibited according to tradition. Caesar did not care less, and his laws were regularly enforced: *RPA* 282-284; GELZER, *Caesar*, 70-72.

[52] Sulla and Caesar became dictators as well, but as a result of civil wars. Significantly, the dictatorship did not serve to grant them absolute power, for they had usurped it already by violence, but merely to confirm and legitimize their power. Furthermore, they were invested with the dictatorship for a longer period than six months, Caesar even for life. The dictatorships of Sulla and Caesar differed from the original office and underlie the modern meaning of the word.

[53] On the *scu* : LINTOTT Ch. XI; C. MEIER, Der Ernstfall im alten Rom, in: *Der Ernstfall*, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 40-73, esp. 50-64; T.N. MITCHELL, Cicero and the Senatus Consultum Ultimum, *Historia* 20 (1971), pp. 47-61; NIPPEL, *JRS*, 25-27.

in 78 against Lepidus as a result of the civil war and in 49 after Caesar had crossed the Rubicon.

Enforcement of the decree mostly meant slaying the insurgents. Since the legality of the decree was debatable and since the powers which the magistrates received were not clearly defined, the *senatus consultum ultimum* occasioned discussion. Opimius, who had implemented the decree against Gaius Gracchus, already was convicted and exiled for it in 109 (Asc. 17C). Popular leaders were the victim of the measure and, therefore, opposition against the decree came from their side. This was the reason why Labienus in 63 prosecuted Rabirius, one of the oppressors of Saturninus (B-21). After the main suspects of the Catilinarian conspiracy had been arrested, a heated discussion arose in the senate on the sentence. Eventually, the suspects were summarily executed by the consul Cicero. That is why Clodius could force Cicero into exile in 58 (B-42, 46, 47). In itself the ultimate decree of the senate was an effective means of repression, but it was only applicable if the élite was actually able to act in unison.

A means of repression the Roman government lacked was a police force. The important magistrates were accompanied by lictors, but their function was mainly symbolic and they were too small in number and inadequately armed to perform a real police task in case of violence. At most they could serve as instruments of crowd control, for example during triumphs (Plut. *Aem.* 32.1-2). The Roman magistrates' means of exercising power were clearly inadequate to counteract large-scale violence; for this they had to employ private means.[54] Police forces were introduced in Rome only during the Principate: the urban cohorts, which occasionally were assisted by the emperor's bodyguards, such as the praetorian guard and the imperial cavalry.[55] The Roman oligarchy during the Republic shrank from calling troups into the city; this was considered politically dangerous. Their fear of military intervention, moreover, had been confirmed during the civil war between Marius and Sulla, who both had taken the city with their armies.

Consequently, if violence was deemed necessary as means of repression, it was only possible to do so by employing body guards and personal retainers. In other words it was a matter of private initiative.[56] The latitude for private initiative was offered by the fact that self-help was an accepted form of conflict settlement.[57]

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[54] LINTOTT Ch. VII; NIPPEL, *JRS*, 21-23 and 25. See also BRUNT, Der römische Mob, in: SCHNEIDER, *Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 271-310, esp. 280-285.

[55] H. FREIS, *RE* Suppl. 10 (1965) s.v. *urbanae cohortes*, 1125-1140 (police task col. 1132); M. DURRY, *RE* 22.2 (1954) s.v. *praetoriae cohortes*, 1607-1634; LIEBENAM, *RE* 6 (1909) s.v. *equites singulares*, 312-321; W. NIPPEL, Aufruhr und *Polizei* in der späten römischen Republik und in der frühen Kaiserzeit, *Humanistische Bildung* 6 (1983), pp. 85-135, esp. 108-117.

[56] B-13, 14, 23, 25, 57, 62, 63, 65, 70, 84, 85, 86.

[57] LINTOTT Ch. II, esp. 29-34.

Eventually, the available means of social control were inadequate to cope with the chaos that had arisen at the end of the 50s. The solution was found in harsh action, but this solution could only be used if the élite was unanimous or if power was vested in one person. Since the first condition was absent, the solution that was opted for in 52 came close to the dictatorship. Pompey was nominated consul without a colleague, he was invested with extraordinary powers by means of the *senatus consultum ultimum*, and he received permission to levy troops and to use them to restore law and order in Rome (B-88, 89).

Interestingly, when Caesar as dictator was faced with collective violence in 48 and 47, he, as the child of his time, reacted with the same measures his political opponents had used in the period before the civil war. He passed a *lex de vi* and a *lex de collegiis* to be able to punish the ringleaders. Also a *senatus consultum ultimum* was proclaimed. But the collective violence was actually brought to an end by military action.[58] This proves that the Republican means of social control were inadequate.

During the late Republic deficient social control facilitated collective behavior and especially collective violence. It was not caused so much by the absence of a police force as by the dysfunction of its functional equivalents, for Rome had never needed a police force. A magistrate had limited repressive means and mainly depended on his authority to maintain public order.[59] For Rome, magisterial authority was the functional equivalent of a police force and for a long time it had been an effective means of social control. The Romans themselves realized that the authority of the élite usually sufficed as a means of repression.[60] In the late Republic, too, a number of cases are known in which the appearance of a magistrate and/or his address of the people was sufficient to stop collective violence (B-20, 39, 67, 75). When this authority, i.e. legitimate power, was no longer accepted, when the ruling class lost its legitimacy, things went wrong. This was the main cause of late Republican collective violence and the failure of social control. Because the élite was unable to solve existing problems adequately within the city-state structure and increasingly fell victim to internal conflicts, it lost its legitimacy and its

[58] *Lex de vi* : YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 77-79. *Lex de collegiis* : BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 131; YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 94-95. *Scu* : BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 125.
According to BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 127, the fact, that the riots of 48 and 47 were finished soon after Caesar's return and the employment of soldiers, proves that the actions of protest had little spontaneity and that the debt crisis was not very intense. But it seems more likely that collective action was stopped because of effective repression.

[59] NIPPEL, *JRS*, 21-25.

[60] Liv. 5.25.2-3; Verg. *Aen.* 1.148-152. See also Cic. *Sest.* 105.

most important instrument of social control was neutralized.[61] Social control was additionally reduced by the relaxation of the vertical ties of the *plebs contionalis*.

In this respect, the unsuccessful conspiracy of Catiline (B-23) is telling, since it was a case of abortive collective behavior and successful maintenance of public order. As has been stated in the previous chapter, an important reason why mobilization miscarried was the lack of legitimacy of the conspirators, because leadership was not provided by a magistrate. Two additional reasons accounted for the failure. First, there were effective police measures[62], which could be taken because in this case the élite operated unanimously. Although there was disagreement among the élite about what should happen to the conspirators, that action should be taken was not in question. Second, the grievances of the plebs were met by the enlargement of the number of corn recipients at the suggestion of Cato the Younger. Thereby senatorial power was legitimized.

But that was an exceptional case. The common means of social control proved inadequate and therefore at the end of the Republic harsh and violent action was opted for. In itself it was an effective means of repression.[63] The plebs were no match for trained troops. That was already the case with Milo's gangs of gladiators. After Pompey had restored order by means of soldiers in 52, soldiers would never disappear from Rome as a means of repression. During the Empire, troops usually were present at the games. When the emperor Nero removed the soldiers from the theater by way of experiment, he soon had to bring them back because the disorders got too much out of hand.[64] But soldiers by themselves were insufficient to keep public order, i.e. to prevent social protest. Such a means of repression only had a preventive effect if it was used by a legitimate power. That had already become obvious in 40. Antony, with the help of his soldiers, crushed a food riot, but nevertheless

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[61] W. NIPPEL, Die *plebs urbana* und die Rolle der Gewalt in der späten römischen Republik, in: MOMMSEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 70-92, esp. 81-91.
There was a parallel development in the armed forces: the élite's loss of authority facilitated military intervention in politics, see DE BLOIS, *Army*, passim, esp. 53-54.
In other periods, too, inadequate social control appears to have facilitated collective violence. During the Ciompi Revolution in Florence in 1378 and during the French Revolution, the available police forces were not employed because of dissension among the élite, see respectivily: MOLLAT, *op.cit.*, 147 and 149; RUDÉ, *Paris*, 79, 88-89, and 105.

[62] As is correctly stressed by MEIER, *RE*, 581. For an analysis of Cicero's repressive measures against Catiline, see: NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 71-81.

[63] Some random examples: In 121 Fulvius Flaccus was surrendered to the authorities after they had threatened to burn down the shops (App. 1.26). In 48 the voting of the plebs was influenced by the presence of soldiers (Dio 42.17.1-2).

[64] Tac. *Ann.* 13.24-25. Soldiers as a means of repression against collective violence in the Principate: Dio 59.28.11; Jos. *AJ* 19.25-26 (A.D. 40); Tac. *Ann.* 14.61 (A.D. 62); Dio 73.13.4-5; Hdn. 1.12.6-9 (A.D. 190); YAVETZ, *Plebs*, 10-12 (first century A.D.); KNEPPE, *op.cit.*, 84-86 (fourth century A.D.).

the triumvirs were forced to conclude an armistice with Sextus Pompey in order to secure the corn supply (App. 5.68 and 72; Dio 48.31.6).

In the Empire the problem of social control was solved because the emperors on the one hand received legitimacy by meeting the interests of the city population, for example by a constant corn supply, and on the other hand created effective means of repression in the form of police troops.[65] Furthermore, care was taken that conflicts within the élite remained limited to a minimum and that possible pretenders to the throne did not get a chance.

[65] NIPPEL, *op.cit.n.61*, 91-92; idem, *op.cit.n.55*, 105-118.

## Chapter 5

# Politics

Before turning to the treatment of popular leadership and collective behavior in the ancient sources, this chapter will analyze the relationship between these phenomena in the political process of the late Republic. Attention will also be paid to the outcome of collective behavior.

### *Impact*

What was the impact of collective behavior in the political process, or, to put it differently, what was the ratio between success and failure? If we look at the proportions as they appear from Appendix B, we observe that 65 out of 92 cases of collective behavior achieved their goal, and 27 did not. As has been stated before, it is quite possible that the ancient sources have recorded mainly successful and spectacular cases. That could explain the large difference. Nonetheless, collective behavior was a frequent phenomenon during the late Republic, also in the perception of contemporaries. We therefore may assume that collective behavior was a suitable means to reach a political goal, for otherwise successful mobilization would never have recurred time and again.

What were the goals that were or were not achieved? Goals of a material kind constituted a minor part of the total. They were only present in collective behavior linked to problems in the food supply. Material grievances and cases of acute deprivation caused a number of occurrences of collective behavior, but it appears that other motives were more common. Goals of a material kind could assemble a great number of people and had a catalyzing effect. But first and foremost they offered the opportunity for popular leaders to show themselves as new-style patrons, by, for example, offering a solution through a corn law.

Next to goals of a material kind, political reform proposals were supported or, on the contrary, obstructed. Another goal could be the manipulation of public trials by enforcing the acquittal or conviction of a defendant through collective action. The remaining goals can be classified as general support of a leader: support at elections and in legislation, protection and expression of support, or attacks on political opponents.

In general these goals, in fact, fall within the expectations connected with the traditional system of patronage. Clients supported their patron, especially politically, by their vote or by acts of violence, in exchange for which they expected economic, political, and legal support and protection from their patron. Popular politics in the late Republic resulted in the

elevation of patron-client relationships to a national level. It was basically the same relationship but now between a new-style clientele - the public clientele - and a new-style patron - the popular leader.

From the participants' point of view, collective behavior was the only way to have certain demands realized. The administration of the ruling oligarchy was not satisfactory anymore and thereby lost its legitimacy; the traditional personal bonds of patronage were not capable anymore of meeting certain grievances. Consequently, collective behavior appeared as a means to achieve demands. But this happened within the existing structure; leadership was provided by members of the élite who were officially sanctioned, i.e. through a magistracy, and most types of collective behavior sprang from institutionalized types of popular influence.[1]

At the same time collective behavior became conventionalized. Because politicians regularly turned to the people in order to pursue an opposition policy against the senatorial majority, because precedents were constantly established, because violence was accepted as a political means, and because the same behavioral patterns constantly repeated themselves, a conventionalization occurred: collective behavior received a regularized and repetitive character in the political process and deviated from existing norms of accepted collective behavior, such as existed, for example, in the popular assemblies. This was especially true of the *plebs contionalis,* which had a regularized behavioral pattern and anticipated collective behavior.

Popular leadership and collective behavior, through a convergence of factors, were important phenomena in the political process of the late Republic. Leaders from the ruling class - dissident members of the oligarchy - had access to public and private resources and took advantage of existing discontent in the lower orders. The relaxation of old vertical ties among a large group in the lower orders, particularly in the city of Rome, created a vacuum in the patron-client relationships between élite and plebs. The independence from traditional personal obligations granted the members of the public clientele an opportunity to follow on an ad hoc basis a popular leader who provided them with a new way to articulate their demands. Moreover, the ruling class - the old senatorial élite - was no longer homogeneous and as a collectivity no longer generally accepted as the center of power and point of integration of Roman society. These factors brought collective action about and gave it a political role. In other words, in Rome members of the polity or rather members of the government, i.e. popular leaders, who were seeking more power, made a coalition with other members of the polity, i.e. the *plebs contionalis,* and increased their influence in the polity.

[1] Both this and the elevation of patron-client relations to a national level are examples of how the political structure of the city-state was expanded and stretched to its limits.

Popular leadership and collective behavior were not responsible for the fall of the Republic, but did accelerate the process. The way in which these phenomena manifested themselves in the late Republic and the latitude they offered to fight out political conflicts made the dysfunctions of the Republican system clearly apparent. That system was inadequate for the administration of an empire and equally for steering political conflicts in the right direction. Because of this and because of the militarization of the crisis, a civil war eventually broke out, during which the decisive factors came from outside the structure of a city-state: the professional army and enormous private financial means which were especially derived from the provinces of the empire.

*The Strategy of the Leadership*

Why did popular leaders and participants cooperate? What interest did popular leaders have in mobilizing the plebs? The strategy of the leadership was not aimed at innovation or seizure of power. The goal of the popular leaders was to hold a prominent position within the existing structure. Since they saw their ambitions insufficiently met by taking the normal course, they took advantage of the opportunities which were offered by the dysfunctioning political structure in order to realize their plans along other paths. The fact that some leaders sought popular support during an extended period of time was more caused by the fact that they achieved success in this way or that they were forced to it because of obstruction by the senatorial majority, than by any strategy aimed at creating a more or less permanent popular movement.

In pursuing a career at the top, it does not seem at first sight purposeful to mobilize the group of artisans and shopkeepers, because their vote hardly counted in the centuriate assembly which elected the highest magistrates. Yet support of the *plebs contionalis* was necessary: to reach the top one first had to be elected to the lower offices by the tribal assembly. Popular support was necessary in competing with other members of the élite, for the people had the power to assign provinces and other commands whereby money and prestige could be accumulated; both were absolutely necessary to hold a position of power at the top of Roman society. Popular support was further important in the many public trials with which the members of the élite fought one another. Demonstrable support of large groups resulted in prestige, which in turn could create support from members of the upper strata, for prestige was a significant factor in Roman social and political culture. In general, considering the organization of the Roman polity, popular support was indispensable to exert a decisive influence on the legislative process.

The foremost reason for a politician to seek support among the lower citizenry was that it was the only legitimate alternative to work his will if agreement among the élite proved impossible. The Roman city-state

institutions offered ample opportunity for action, even if it was accompanied by violence. Another, but illegitimate alternative was the military. That had been used by Marius and Sulla and it was a spector that was obviously present in the years 80-50. Eventually the common means of conflict settlement proved inadequate and the illegitimate alternative was seized. The result was the civil war between Caesar and Pompey and eventually the downfall of the Republic.

At the highest level of Roman society individualism among the élite was rising. Private interest and prestige became more important than the traditional values and norms of the oligarchy. It is also possible that some rich and prominent citizens tended to place themselves less in the service of the collectivity, both in internal affairs and in external and military affairs, witness Cicero's sardonic and perhaps slightly exaggerated remarks about *piscinarii* - senators who merely worried about their fishponds (*Att.* 1.19.6, 20.3, and 2.1.7). In general, however, it seems that among the top leaders, to a certain degree, a consensus on the existing institutions and political procedures still existed and that the traditional authorities still were respected. For the ideas of these individuals remained within the existing institutional framework and they sought the realization of their ambitions and solutions of conflicts within that framework. When the existing system proved inadequate, partly due to the pressure of the obligations towards their following into which the leaders had entered, the civil war broke out.

As far as the middle level leaders - the assistant leaders - were concerned, their loyalty shifted from the *res publica* to individual *patroni.* Because of the high costs of political competition and for lack of career opportunities within the existing social and political structure, they joined a rich and powerful leader to realize their ambitions. In their eyes, the ruling oligarchy lost its legitimacy and the existing institutions needed modification. At the middle level the respect for traditional authorities was lowest.

The intermediate leaders tried to make a career within the existing structure, but to do so they were compelled to tie themselves to a leader. Being clients of a top leader their goals were derived from the leaders. Since the top leaders did not have a substantial change of the existing system in mind, such an initiative was not to be expected from intermediate leaders. Moreover, political conflict and competition offered opportunities to intermediate leaders which perhaps they would not have had if the oligarchy had still been ruling unanimously and efficiently. Improvements in the constitution, which would provide an efficient government and take away most of the causes for dissension while keeping the Republican social and political structure intact, did not fit the interests of intermediate leaders. Their loyalty was first of all to their patron, and they stuck to what they had until the system broke down in civil war.

We have observed that there existed a group among the Roman urban plebs - the *plebs contionalis* - which participated more actively in politically relevant collective behavior than the rest of the city population. We now have to wonder what the level of politicization of this group was. Was it politicized or depoliticized? Did the frequent collective behavior of the late Republic fit into the framework of a social movement?

What were the determining factors for the politicization of the crowd in Rome? First, there was the social stratification which was deeply rooted in Roman society. Social distances in Rome were much more extreme than in other societies. The great social differences impeded political education of the lower orders and transmission of political information from upper to lower strata. This is underscored by evidence from later periods: one of the reasons why riots in London were more politically sophisticated and more successful than in Paris during the eighteenth century, was London's more diversified social structure; there were more links between nobility and working classes which facilitated political education.[2]

Roman society was permeated with borders between social groups and census classes, which could not easily be bridged. At the bottom of society, too, important differences in social standing existed, such as between free and slaves. This stratification in itself was not challenged and it hampered the development of horizontal solidarity. Anything like a class structure was completely absent in Rome.[3] Among the *plebs contionalis* there existed no group solidarity, whereby this group could separate itself from other groups within the plebs and form part of a social movement. The members of the *plebs contionalis* only knew a vertical solidarity towards leaders. That they were politically more active was due to the fact that their traditional vertical ties with individual members of the élite were less strong than those of other members of the plebs.

Another factor was economic. The complete absence of labor conflicts in antiquity is striking. In the ancient city, production was organized on a small scale. We have an important text on division of labor in antiquity:

> "In large cities, on the other hand, inasmuch as many people have demands to make upon each branch of industry, one trade alone, and very often even less than a whole trade, is enough to support a man: one man, for example, makes shoes for men, and another for women; and there are places even where one man earns a living by only stitching shoes, another by cutting them out, another by sewing the uppers together, while there is another who performs none of these operations, but only assembles the parts. It follows, therefore, as a matter

[2] RUDÉ, *Paris*, 59-60.

[3] On this see W.G. RUNCIMAN, Capitalism without classes: the case of classical Rome, *British Journal of Sociology* 34 (1983), pp. 157-181, esp. 169-177.

of course, that he who devotes himself to a very highly specialized line of work is bound to do it in the best possible manner."[4]

Xenophon wrote this in the fourth century. A similar text does not exist for the cities in the Roman era, but the situation in the Rome of the late Republic and the Empire will not have been different. A *tabernarius* who had more work than he and his family could manage, bought a slave if he could afford it. As a permanent work force, especially if the slave had to learn a trade, a slave was more cost-efficient than hired free labor. The household was the central unit of production in the ancient economy. Next to households there were slightly larger units of production, which manufactured, for example, pottery for the market. There could be association through cooperation of family-based units. Larger units had ten or twenty slaves. Concentration of production did not exist, but these units of manufacture, through personal ties and capital investment, could be the building blocks of a big "company" with a member of the Roman nobility or his agent at its head.[5]

The hiring of free labor did exist, but it was on a temporary and casual basis. A substantial number of free-born Romans were employed in the public works at Rome, but they were day-laborers who were dismissed after the work was done, and at best they found regular, but not permanent, employment in the building trade. Wage-labor, long-term contracts, etc. were rare in the Roman economy.[6] The people who were employed on a permanent basis were slaves. They, of course, did not have a labor contract either, and if they rose in revolt, which seldom occurred, their concern was especially with their personal freedom and not to abolish slavery as an institution.[7]

These features of the ancient economy impeded the occurrence of labor conflicts; the aggrieved could not focus on salaries and labor conditions. This had an important impact on the formulation of claims. The difference between demands for food and demands for higher wages is the difference between short-term and long-term thinking. Moreover, strikes of the urban plebs in the late Republic would hardly have been

[4] Xen. *Cyr.* 8.2.5: "ἐν δὲ ταῖς μεγάλαις πόλεσι διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς ἑκάστου δεῖσθαι ἀρκεῖ καὶ μία ἑκάστῳ τέχνη εἰς τὸ τρέφεσθαι· πολλάκις δὲ οὐδ' ὅλη μία· ἀλλ' ὑποδήματα ποιεῖ ὁ μὲν ἀνδρεῖα, ὁ δὲ γυναικεῖα· ἔστι δὲ ἔνθα καὶ ὑποδήματα ὁ μὲν νευρορραφῶν μόνον τρέφεται, ὁ δὲ σχίζων, ὁ δὲ χιτῶνας μόνον συντέμνων, ὁ δὲ γε τούτων οὐδὲν ποιῶν ἀλλὰ συντιθεὶς ταῦτα. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὸν ἐν βραχυτάτῳ διατρίβοντα ἔργῳ τοῦτον καὶ ἄριστα δὴ ἠναγκάσθαι τοῦτο ποιεῖν."

[5] J.H. D'ARMS, *Commerce and Social Standing in Ancient Rome,* Cambridge 1981, pp. 36-47 and 162-168; J.P. MOREL, Les producteurs des biens artisanaux en Italie à la fin de la République, in: *Bourgeoisies,* pp. 21-39, esp. 35-39.

[6] See also FINLEY, *Economy,* pp. 65-68 and 73-75.

[7] See *ibidem* 68; idem, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology,* London 1980, pp. 72, 110, and 116.

effective. In the ancient economy agriculture prevailed, and the élite did not need the urban plebs as farmers or as soldiers.

The *collegia* were quite different from the medieval guilds. The purpose of the colleges was not to protect or to foster the economic interests of their members. The only thing they did in this respect was to find a rich patron, from whom they hoped to receive benefactions.[8]

In the middle ages, on the contrary, the question of wages and the demand for the establishment of new guilds for those who were excluded from the guild system could lead to popular protest. The hierarchy in the guilds (master-journeyman) may be considered as an institutionalization of vertical mobility. Guilds were an important political factor during the middle ages. Negotiations with employers and contractors, who also had political power, could gradually transform into political conflicts in the medieval city. Furthermore, unlike the colleges in the ancient city, the guilds were represented in the city government.[9] During the middle ages and the *Ancien Régime,* the organization of the labor factor differed from the ancient city, which in part accounted for the different level of politicization of the urban crowds in antiquity. The difference between the Roman urban plebs and the crowd in medieval cities is to a certain extent paralleled by the fact that the London mob during the eighteenth century possessed a higher level of politicization than the Parisian mob as a result of social and economic differences, for London at that time had a more modern economy and a more democratic city government than Paris.[10]

Further, the strategy of the leadership was by no means aimed at democratization, and this too formed a barrier to extensive politicization.

If, finally, we look at the duration of the collective actions in the late Republic, we observe that in most cases (80) they did not go on for longer than one day, irrespective of whether the goal of the action was achieved or not.[11] A number of cases which continued for two days or longer involved reactions during officially organized gatherings which in

[8] FINLEY, *Economy,* 80-81; MEIGGS, *op.cit.,* 313. See also YAVETZ, *Caesar,* 88. Contra WALTZING, *op.cit.,* 181-195. In the eastern cities during late antiquity possibly a development can be discerned towards an economic solidarity among colleges, which could be employed as a lever, see: MACMULLEN, *Enemies,* 176. In late Roman Alexandria, colleges of artisans provided employment for poor members of the Jewish community: *The Babylonian Talmud. Seder Mo'ed,* Oxford 1938, vol. 3, Sukkah V.51b (p. 245). This was a type of solidarity connected to religious charity and to the membership of a closed and sometimes oppressed community. It does not seem to have been an economic solidarity with a political implication of the type found in medieval guilds. (The reference to the Talmud I owe to Christopher Haas.)

[9] On guilds and riots see: MARTINES, *op.cit.,* 333-334; MOLLAT, *op.cit.,* 293 and 304.

[10] RUDÉ, *Paris,* 8 and 35-60.

[11] On the frequency of the actions it is difficult to make a statement considering the possibly poor representativeness of the data.
In the fourth century A.D., food riots usually went on for one day, while religious conflicts often continued longer: KNEPPE, *op.cit.,* 80-83.

themselves already had been planned for a number of days, such as the reactions during Pompey's return from the East (B-28), Pompey's triumph (B-32), and during games (B-54). Next to those, there was the conspiracy of Catiline (B-23) in which actions were planned for a number of days, but in which actual mobilization failed to materialize. Further, there were some cases which took place on several days and obviously were interconnected, but for which it is difficult to establish whether they involved a continuous action during an uninterrupted time period (B-3, 48). Finally, there were cases in which there was a continuous and unbroken pattern of action. They include two legislative popular assemblies (B-14, 73), the recruitment of the colleges (B-41), and the reactions after Clodius' death (B-86, 87, 88).

The latter cases are the most interesting and at the same time the most exceptional. After Clodius' death a continuous and successful mobilization took place, albeit that it led only occasionally to real action. The actions went on until the goal - revenge and the conviction of Clodius' assassin - was reached, while the intensity and the violence of the action towards the end were limited by police measures. Even food riots, which after all could incite a large group of people to violent action, never had such a duration. This indicates how strong the loyalty to its leadership among Clodius' following was. But, because of its exceptional character, this indicates as well that in most cases the continuance of the actions was very short. The mobilization process had to repeat itself time and again, because of which a social movement never occurred during the late Republic.

In the reactions to Clodius' death, a singular event occurred. During the cremation of Clodius' corpse in the Curia, Clodius' intermediate leader Sextus Clodius set up the wooden case with Clodius' bills as a *palladium* - a talisman (B-86; Cic. *Mil.* 33). Sextus Clodius thereby wanted to draw attention, not to what Clodius had done for which he should be honored, but to what Clodius had planned to do. To put it differently, a continuation was suggested. Despite the death of the leader the program would be continued. This implied a disconnection of leader and program, something that was unique, for until then leader and program had been inseparably linked and the program had been subordinate to the image and the behavior of the leader. We see here what Clodius had achieved. We have already observed that Clodius was the only one who could develop into an informal leader because he could maintain his leadership beyond the term of a magistracy. From this event after his death it follows that he also had given the initial impetus to an actual social movement. His program lived on after his death. But it never got beyond this impetus. Those who took over Clodius' leadership, in first instance the assistant leaders aligned to him and Pompey, steered the action in another direction. The goal of the action was restricted to revenge for the people and the fighting out of political conflicts for the leaders. Sextus

Clodius as an intermediate leader lacked sufficient authority to turn the action in another direction; Clodius' program was never heard of again.[12]

In comparison to other periods, therefore, the *plebs contionalis* had a low level of politicization. The level of politicization, however, had always been low, so that it is impossible to speak of depoliticization.[13] Among the *plebs contionalis* the consensus on the existing institutions and political procedures was hardly declining.

One of the factors which accounted for this was inherent in the organizations of the plebs. The *collegia* and other organizations of the *plebs urbana*, in Cicero's words (*Dom.* 74), had committees (*conventicula*) and a kind of popular assemblies (*quasi concilia*). They had been set up after the example of the Republican institutions (*ad exemplum rei publicae*, Gaius *Dig.* 3.4.1.1). Because of their administrators (*magistri*) and their assemblies, in which they elected their leaders and took collective decisions, the colleges in fact were like little republics. Such associations, therefore, could provide their members with an education in civics. In that way the many new citizens, such as the former slaves who originated from the various parts of the empire and beyond, could be integrated into Roman social and political culture. At the same time, the colleges had a compensatory function for those who were too far down on the social ladder to reach the top.[14]

We have seen that a differentiation and disintegration occurred among the Roman substrata. A division developed between urban plebs and rural plebs. Among the urban plebs, moreover, a group broke away which had been detached from ties of patronage with individual members of the élite and which came to form a separate group - the public clientele. Among this group, however, at the same time a reintegration took place. Through the urban organizations and through participation in the political process as public clientele, this group was reintegrated into Roman society. There was also an integration in the ideological sphere, for this group thus assumed traditional values and norms which continued to exist as collective undercurrents. In this way, not a social but a cultural homogeneity was achieved. The public clientele felt itself part of the *populus Romanus*, the rulers of an empire. Thus eventually a symbiosis

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12 A somewhat parallel situation occurred after the death of Caesar. Caesar had designated a number of magistrates for office and had left instructions and plans - the *acta Caesaris*. The spirit of Caesar was still hanging over Roman politics after his death. New leaders had to conform to Caesar's program in order to make themselves credible at least among the veterans and the urban plebs. See Cic. *Att.* 14.5.2, 10.1, and 17.6; DE BLOIS, *Army*, 47-48; YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 59.

13 Cf. VEYNE, *op.cit.*, 92-94 and 411-415.

14 On the organization and functions of the colleges, see: ALFÖLDI, *Caesar*, 31-35; FLAMBARD, *Ktema*, 165-166; WALTZING, *op.cit.*, 357-368. Some examples of elected *magistri* in *collegia* : *ILLRP* 701 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 984 = VI 30888 = DESSAU 6081) and 767 (= *CIL* I$^2$ 1274 = VI 10326 = DESSAU 7878).

between *princeps* and *plebs* could develop in a patron-client relationship at a national level.

Among the *plebs contionalis* the confidence in the existing institutions and political procedures remained in force. The fact that collective behavior mostly sprang from or was connected to institutionalized forms of popular influence and that leadership was furnished by magistrates indicates that the participants in fact trusted the existing system and believed that their demands could be realized through the existing political procedures.[15] Actually they were right, for the goals of collective behavior were set within the traditional patron-client relationships and were realized in that way. All that occurred was a shift in loyalty from collectivity to individuals.

For the relationship between élite and people, the so-called imposters are also interesting; they were persons who professed to be descendants of popular leaders. In 100 there was a certain Equitius who alleged himself to be a son of Tiberius Gracchus. Saturninus had him stand for the tribunate of the plebs. When the censor Metellus proved that he was not Tiberius' son and removed him from the roll of citizens, the people reacted furiously.[16] Around 44 Amatius or Herophilus gained great support among the urban plebs by claiming to be Marius' grandson. After the death of Caesar he was killed.[17] Valerius Maximus (9.15.4), finally, mentions a Trebellius Calca who was very popular after the death of Clodius, because the people took him for Clodius' son.

Such reactions are not surprising. The members of the ruling class, after all, for centuries had pointed the plebs to the great deeds of their ancestors in order to indicate that they themselves were capable of a good administration. The legal and constitutional inaccuracies of the imposters eluded the average citizen of low birth. For him there was little difference from what normal nobles did. Furthermore, the concern of the plebs was not so much with the continuity of a policy as with the continuity of a certain type of behavior. Thus within the oligarchical polity there existed a sense of dynastic loyalty. This was one of the factors which made Octavian's seizure of power successful. As Caesar's adopted son he had a lead over his competitors in becoming accepted by the plebs as its leader.

But this did not go so far that a family relationship with a leader primarily accounted for the bond to a leader. Above all, mutual expectations had to be satisfied.[18] A leader constantly had to prove his

[15] Cf. W. NIPPEL, Die *plebs urbana* und die Rolle der Gewalt in der späten römischen Republik, in: MOMMSEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 70-92, esp. 77; *RPA* 111. Compare also HOBSBAWM, *op.cit.*, 120. On the acceptance of the ideology of the ruling élite by the plebs, see: M.I. FINLEY, *Politics in the Ancient World*, Cambridge 1983, p. 141.

[16] Cic. *Sest.* 101, *Verr.* 2.1.151; Val.Max. 9.7.1.

[17] App. 3.3; Val.Max. 9.15.1; F.J. MEIJER, Marius' Grandson, *Mnemosyne* 39 (1986), pp. 112-121; YAVETZ, *Plebs*, 58-62 and 70-73.

[18] Cf. HOBSBAWM, *op.cit.*, 116.

legitimacy. For that matter, the plebs had an empirical attitude.[19] During the late Republic the loyalty of the *plebs contionalis* could shift from one leader to another or even to the senate, as in the revolt of Catiline. The plebs also realized that loyal behavior was recompensed by leaders. When Octavian, for example, returned to Rome after his victory on Antony at Actium in 31, he was greeted by a man with a crow. Octavian rewarded the man's tribute. The crow had been trained to welcome Octavian as victor. The man, however, had another crow which had been trained to welcome Antony.[20] A similar type of behavior had occurred before. After Caesar's victory at Pharsalus in 48, the statues of Sulla and Pompey were torn down (Dio 42.18.2; Suet. *Iul.* 75.4).

The shift in the patron-client relationships to a relationship between leader and public clientele also follows from rhetorical language. In his Second Speech on the Agrarian Law, held before the people in 63, Cicero says that Pompey possessed the patronage - in the sense of protection/advocacy - over the interests of the plebs: *patrocinium vestrorum commodorum* (*Leg.Agr.* 2.25). Individuals were able to turn a large part of the urban plebs into their clientele, foreshadowing the Empire. But the pattern of the patronage relationship did not change. For that matter, Rome was a typical example of a society in which patron-client relationships were predominant.[21]

In the strategy of the leadership there was no alternative to be found, nor were there alternative social, economic, and political models available in theory; the motives of the participants tended to be conservative within the existing structure. This is why a social movement in the sense of an actual innovation did not develop, let alone a revolution or class

[19] Cf. *ibidem* 121.

[20] Macrob. *Sat.* 2.4.29. See also F. MILLAR, State and Subject: The Impact of Monarchy, in: F. MILLAR, E. SEGAL (eds.), *Caesar Augustus. Seven Aspects,* Oxford 1984, pp. 37-60, esp. 39; YAVETZ, *Plebs,* 91.

[21] On societies with a predominant clientelistic model, see: S.N. EISENSTADT, L. RONIGER, Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange, *CSSH* 22 (1980), pp. 42-77, esp. 75-77.

struggle.[22] Besides that, continuity was absent in goals, leadership, and duration of the action, because of which it is equally impossible to speak of a social movement. Furthermore, despite coalitions such as the first triumvirate, there was no unified leadership; rather there was competition among popular leaders.

What, then, was happening in the late Republic? As the traditional political institutions and structures of social communication in Rome ceased to function and the distance between élite and people increased, room was created for a social movement or popular protest equivalent to those of later periods. This, however, did not happen; the solution was sought retroactively. The *plebs contionalis* was a group whose bonds of clientage had relaxed. They sought new ways to realize their demands. These demands concerned more the realization of abstract and emotional expectations than the satisfaction of material grievances and discontent. To realize those desires, because of a diminished social control by relaxed vertical ties, artisans and shopkeepers took up a more active and more politically independent position than the rest of the urban plebs. Since however no alternative was available in theory or as a model, nor was any suggested by the leadership, the goal of the *plebs contionalis* remained within the old structure. That goal, a responsible patron who met their demands, was finally realized in the institution of the Principate, even if this probably was brought about more by the civil wars than by collective action in Rome. The Principate signified the final stage of a development which had started long before: the replacement of a collective leadership by an individual. That it also implied a reduction of the political influence of the citizens was irrelevant. The political influence of the plebs, after

[22] See also *RPA* xix; cf. 108-115.
A class structure and a class struggle are seen by: I. HAHN, Der Klassenkampf der plebs urbana in den letzten Jahrzehnten der römischen Republik, in: J. HERRMANN, I. SELLNOW (eds.), *Die Rolle der Volksmassen in der Geschichte der vorkapitalistischen Gesellschaftsformationen*, Berlin (Ost) 1975, pp. 121-146. According to HAHN, the urban plebs had social and political conceptions of its own, a concrete program, and its own political organs. As far as politicization existed, however, the conceptions of the plebs were set within the traditional framework. A concrete program did not exist either. The plebs sought satisfaction of the primary necessities of life and satisfaction of its expectations within a traditional patron-client relationship. Its own political organs, by which HAHN means *contiones* and colleges, were pre-existing institutions, which became political through the intervention of leaders and which did not develop spontaneously among the plebs or were spontaneously applied for that purpose.
A class struggle is also seen by: T. STERNBERG, Zur sozialen Struktur der plebs urbana gegen Ende der römischen Republik, *WZ Rostock* 31 (1982), pp. 101-104.
On historical-materialistic lines, and inspired by HAHN, is also H. SCHNEIDER, *Die Entstehung der römischen Militärdiktatur. Krise und Niedergang einer antiken Republik*, Köln 1977, esp. pp. 166-169. According to SCHNEIDER (180), the *Verelendung der Massen* in Italy led to a revolt of have-nots. Strangely enough, SCHNEIDERs views meet with little approval at the other side of the Berlin Wall: H. DIETER, "Soziale Konflikte" in der späten romischen Republik, *Klio* 62 (1980), pp. 229-233. According to DIETER (233), SCHNEIDER is not altogether reliable, for despite a few good insights from a historical-materialistic point of view SCHNEIDER eventually slips back into the *bürgerliche Konflikttheorie*.

all, had never been important, and the reduction basically occurred merely on a theoretical level.

## Chapter 6

# Sources

It is common knowledge that the work of the ancient historian is complicated by the prejudice of the literary sources. The behavior and the expressions of the people are known to us only through the writings of the members of the higher social strata. In a book on popular leadership and collective behavior it is therefore necessary to investigate to what extent these writings have been colored by political and social prejudice. This will be done by means of lexicographic research.[1] In this chapter the view of the literary sources on popular leaders and the crowd will be discussed. The popular leader, who in this chapter will be called demagogue (analogous the Greek *dèmagogos*), has two distinct images in literary sources. The usual image of the demagogue is negative. But in classical Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries the word demagogue did not always have a pejorative connotation. As we will see, it was the same in post-classical Greek literature and in the works of Latin authors. There existed a negative and a positive/neutral image.[2] To be clear, I will also discuss sources outside the period from 80-50 B.C.

### *The Negative Image of the Demagogue*

The negative image emerges particularly clearly in Greek political philosophy of the fourth century.[3] Sometimes (especially in Plato and also in Herodotus and Thucydides) *prostatès* or *rhètor* is used instead of *dèmagogos*.[4] The negative image of the demagogue is clearly defined, and the following three qualities are ascribed to him:

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[1] See C. NICOLET, Lexicographie politique et histoire romaine: problèmes de méthode et directions de recherches, in: *Atti del Convegno sulla Lessicographia politica et giuridica nel campo delle scienze dell'antichità 1978*, Torino 1980, pp. 19-46, esp. 25: "En d'autres termes (...) l'objet d'une lexicographie politique n'est pas de reconstruire une histoire de mots de nature politique (.. ), mais au contraire d'éclairer, par l'usage qu'elle faisait des mots de toute ordre, l'histoire politique."

[2] Cf. CONNOR, *New Politicians*, p. 110 and n.34.

[3] See Appendix C. On Plato's and Aristotle's thought on democracy see: E BARKER, *The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle*, New York 1959[2] (1906), pp. 181, 175-176, 193, 211-213, 311-314, 320, 351-352, 453-455, 459-460, and 487-490.

[4] CONNOR, *op.cit*, 110-115 and 118; M. LOSSAU, Dèmagogos. Fehlen und Gebrauch bei Aristophanes und Thukydides, *Palingenesia* 4 (1969), pp. 83-88, esp. 84. For a survey of the terminology of Isocrates, see: LABRIOLA, *QS*, pp. 154-156 and 165 (*dèmagogos* and *rhètor*).

1. The demagogue flatters the people,
2. The demagogue causes sedition in the state,
3. The demagogue aims at personal power.

The demagogue flatters the people by means of orations or laws which are agreeable to the people. He incites the people against the rich, thereby disturbing social harmony. Often the demagogue is reproached with confiscating the possessions of the rich in order to please the people by redistributing them. The demagogue is only after his personal interest. By flattery and sedition he attempts to enhance his power and, eventually, to attain supreme power in the form of tyranny: an illegitimate type of one-man rule for personal benefit.

Historians in antiquity make use of this model of the demagogue to denote a certain type of politician.[5] In this respect it is possible to speak of a *locus communis*.[6] Often one of the three qualities is sufficient to brand someone as a demagogue. In Polybius there is a fine citation in which all three qualities are ascribed to Molpagoras, a popular leader in 203[7]:

> "There was a certain Molpagoras among the people of Cius, a capable speaker and politician, but in character a demagogue greedy for power. This man, by flattering the populace, by inciting the rabble against men of means, by finally killing some of the latter and banishing others whose property he confiscated and distributed among the multitude, soon attained by these means to supreme power..."[8]

[5] Some typical examples on the early Republic in which all three qualities appear: Dion.Hal. 8.69.3-4 (Spurius Cassius); Plut. *Cam.* 36.2-4 (Marcus Manlius).

[6] Cf. BÉRANGER, *REL*, pp. 85-86; LANG, *CPh*, pp. 163-164.

[7] Polybius also uses the negative image of the demagogue in his constitutional theory. In 6.9.6-9 he describes how members of the élite who are unable to make a political career in a normal way attain sole rule in a radical democracy through flattery and violence. Cf. C. NICOLET, Polybe et la "constitution" de Rome: aristocratie et démocratie, in: NICOLET, *Demokratia*, pp. 15-35, esp. 27-33; F.W. WALBANK, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, Vol. I, Oxford 1957, pp. 656-657. See on demagogy in Polybius in general: WELWEI, *Historia*, 290-296; E. BRAUN, Die extreme Demokratie bei Polybios und bei Aristoteles, *JŒAI* 54 (1983) Beiblatt, sp. 1-40, esp. 33-34.

[8] Pol. 15.21. 1-2: "Ὅτι Μολπαγόρας τις ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Κιανοῖς, ἀνὴρ καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν ἱκανός, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἵρεσιν δημαγωγικὸς καὶ πλεονέκτης. ὅς πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλῶν τῷ πλήθει καὶ τοὺς εὐκαιροῦντας τοῖς βίοις ὑποβάλλων τοῖς ὄχλοις, καὶ τινὰς μὲν εἰς τέλος ἀναιρῶν, τινὰς δὲ φυγαδεύων καὶ τὰς οὐσίας τὰς τούτων δημεύων καὶ διαδιδοὺς τοῖς πολλοῖς, ταχέως τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ περιεποιήσατο μοναρχικὴν ἐξουσίαν."

In modern literature only a few scholars have written on the representation of demagogy in Classical Athens.[9] In an article on the Athenian demagogue Cleophon, RENAUD dwells upon the meaning of the concept "demagogy", but he mentions only the negative sense and one characteristic: flattery.[10] ZOEPFFEL, in an interesting article, treats the image of the demagogue in Aristotle. She shows that, with respect to demagogy, a relationship existed between Aristotle's political models and historical reality, in which Aristotle lets theory prevail over practice. ZOEPFFEL paraphrases the important passage in Aristotle's *Politica* (4.4.3-7) where he defines demagogy; but, in my opinion, she does not sufficiently realize the importance of the three qualities of the demagogue in the negative sense.[11]

BOTTéRI and RASKOLNIKOFF analyse the picture of the *popularis* from the representation of Gaius Gracchus in Diodorus. They juxtapose demagogy and tyranny: Gaius Gracchus was accused of both demagogy and tyranny; the *optimates* reproached the *populares* with flattery and subversion on the one hand and with tyranny on the other.[12] Diodorus' description (34/35.25, 27, 28a and 37.9) of Gaius Gracchus, however, is a negative image of the demagogue in which all three qualities appear. I hope to have shown that these qualities constitute one coherent image and that "aiming at tyranny" was a component of the negative image of the

[9] TURASCIEWICZ' article on this subject is in Polish, and I was therefore unable to establish to what extent the author shares my conclusions. The article, next to the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae,* has been most useful for finding mentions of demagogy: R. TURASCIEWICZ, Quid scriptores Graeci qui V et IV saec. a. Chr. n. Athenis floruerunt de demagogis senserint scripserintque, *Meander* 21 (1966), pp. 397-423.
CONNOR's study is a political approach of demagogues in fifth-century Athens, and he does not pay much attention to the image of the demagogue. He does, however, recognize the presence of two images of the demagogue, see *supra* nn. 2 and 4.
FINLEY discovers in Thucydides a picture of the demagogue who is after the increase of his personal power and for that reason is agreeable to the people. He does not discuss the subject in detail because the establishment of the image of the demagogue is not the purpose of his article: M.I. FINLEY, Athenian Demagogues, *P&P* 21 (1962), pp. 3-24, esp. 4-5.
LOSSAU does not treat the image of the demagogue either. He only records a negative meaning of demagogue (*op.cit.n.4*, 85 and 88).
LABRIOLA recognizes the pursuit of power of the demagogues in Isocrates and mentions that Isocrates has a positive judgment on some popular leaders (*op.cit.*, 154-156 and 165).

[10] R. RENAUD, Cléophon et la guerre du Péloponnèse, *LEC* 38 (1970), pp. 458-477, esp. 458.

[11] ZOEPFFEL, *Chiron*, pp. 71-72.

[12] P. BOTTéRI, M. RASKOLNIKOFF, Diodore, Caius Gracchus et la Démocratie, in: NICOLET, *Demokratia,* pp. 59-101, esp. 67, 74, 77-83. The authors (p. 82) claim that only "subversiveness" is characteristic of the Aristotelian demagogue. However, "flattery" can also be found in Aristotle, see Appendix C.

demagogue. Finally, it is remarkable that the term *dèmagogos* does not appear in PAULY-WISSOWA's *Realencyclopädie* .[13]

*The Positive/Neutral Image of the Demagogue*

In ancient literature, next to the negative, a non-negative image appears. The image is not entirely positive, but neither is it completely without a favorable connotation. Therefore, the term "positive/neutral" has been chosen here. Albeit a linguistic oddity, the term "positive/neutral" best captures the meaning of the non-negative image. For that image is not favorable enough to be called positive and it is too much opposed to the negative image to be called neutral. It can be described as follows: In Greek thought, demagogy always was associated with radical democracy, and radical democracy did not accord at all with the political ideals of most authors and philosophers, nor with those of the higher social strata. When a situation required demagogic action, the demagogue, in the ancient view, should operate in a certain manner. That manner of demagogy was considered positive/neutral. The image was also applied to popular leaders who undeniably had a good influence on society as a whole.[14]

Unlike the negative image, the positive/neutral image of the demagogue has no clear characteristics. It occurs less frequently than the negative image. Such a demagogue is a popular leader who works for the public interest and who leads the crowd to what is good for the crowd.[15] Not until the Principate, positive/neutral demagogy is more clearly defined by Plutarch:

> "For leadership of a people is leadership of those who are persuaded by speech; but enticing the mob by such means as have just been mentioned [bread and circuses] is exactly like catching and herding irrational beasts."[16]

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[13] There is an article on *prostatès*. The treatment of the *prostatès tou dèmou* in the article is limited to the political function of the *prostatès*. The literary representation is not discussed. See *RE* Suppl. 9 (1962) s.v. *prostatès*, esp. 1292-1296.

[14] Perhaps the borderline between negative and positive-neutral demagogy was drawn on the basis of the interference of the popular leader with private property. The most common slogans of Greek demagogues were cancellation of debts and distribution of land. Fear of loss of property was perhaps more important among the ruling classes than fear of loss of political influence. For it seems that private property was more sacrosanct in antiquity than anything else. See e.g. Cicero's ideas about property: BRUNT, *Conflicts*, 125-126; B.W. FRIER, *The Rise of the Roman Jurists: Studies in Cicero's Pro Caecina*, Princeton 1985, pp. 185, 187, 281, and n.25.

[15] Cf. FINLEY, *op.cit.n.9*, 5.

[16] Plut. *Mor.* 802E (= *Praec. Rei Publ. Ger.* ): "δημαγωγία γὰρ ἡ διὰ λόγου πειθομένων ἐστιν, αἱ δὲ τοιαῦται τιθασεύσεις τῶν ὄχλων οὐδὲν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἄγρας καὶ βουκολήσεως διαφέρουσιν." See also 818A-E; *Phoc.* 2.4-5; AALDERS, *Plutarch*, p. 31.

Like the negative image, the positive/neutral image of the demagogue was applied in ancient historiography. LANG describes how Thucydides and Aristophanes contrast Cleon's demagogy with Pericles' demagogy: Pericles was a good demagogue who led the people in a constructive manner, but Cleon was a bad demagogue who led the people in a destructive manner.[17]

Thucydides' picture of Pericles (2.65.8) is an example of a frequent phenomenon. The demagogue in the positive/neutral sense is seen as the antithesis of the demagogue in the negative sense; i.e., the demagogue in the positive/neutral sense is described by denying that he possesses the qualities of the demagogue in the negative sense. According to Thucydides, Pericles gave intelligent and severe leadership to the crowd, and he never resorted to flattery, for that is an improper way to gain power. Pericles is an example of a popular leader whose policy undeniably led to positive results. The image of Pericles as a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense became a *topos* that reappears in Cicero (*De Or.* 3.138 and *Rep.* 4.11) and Plutarch (*Per.* 15.2).

The positive/neutral image also occurs in fourth-century Greece.[18] Here too it was opposed to the negative one: Theopompus contrasts the demagogue Eubulus, who only worked for his personal benefit, with the demagogue Callistratus, who took interest in the common good (*Philippica*, F.97 and 100, JACOBY). In Plato and Aristotle this image does not appear, though Aristotle has a not unfavorable judgment of Pericles.[19]

In Plutarch's historical writings the opposition of negative to positive/neutral demagogy also occurs: Cato the Elder was a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense, in contrast to other popular leaders.[20]

### *The Image of the Demagogue and the Sources of the Late Republic*

It turns out that the persons who were known as *populares* in the last 30 years of the Roman Republic are considered demagogues in the negative sense, exactly like the popular leaders of Greek history.[21] To indicate their negative qualities, Latin authors mostly use terms such as *largitio* (bribery/flattery), *seditio* (sedition), and *regnum* (tyranny). Especially Pompey, Caesar, Catiline, and Clodius are thus accused of demagogy. By

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[17] LANG, *op.cit.*, 162-164.

[18] Dem. *Olynth.* 3.24; Isoc. *Pac.* 122-128. Cf. on the "good" demagogue in fourth-century literature: ZOEPFFEL, *op.cit.*, 80-82; in Isocrates: LABRIOLA, *op.cit.*, 165.

[19] *Ath.Pol.* 28.1. Aristotle's representation of the demagogue is unequivocal and pejorative: ZOEPFFEL, *op.cit.*, 73 n.16 and p. 88.

[20] Plut. *Cat.Maior* 16.6; cf. AALDERS, *op.cit.*, 30.

[21] See Appendix D. On the attribution of the quality "aiming at personal power", see also AALDERS, *op.cit.*, 30; BÉRANGER, *op.cit.*, 86-90; DUNKLE, *TAPhA*, passim; LINTOTT, *op.cit.*, 58; WIRSZUBSKI, *op.cit.*, 78; YAVETZ, *Caesar*, 186-188.

way of illustration, a passage from Florus in which all three characteristics appear:

> "The power of the tribunes was the eventual cause of all seditions; under the pretext of protecting the plebs, for whose aid they were originally established, but in reality aiming at tyranny for themselves, they courted popular support and favor by laws on the distribution of land and corn and on the courts."[22]

The positive/neutral image was also applied in the historiography on the late Republic. It appears in Sallust and Cassius Dio.[23] Plutarch uses it several times[24]; to illustrate, his judgment on Cicero:

> "For this man beyond all others showed the Romans how great a charm eloquence adds to the right, and that justice is invincible if it is correctly put in words, and that it behooves the careful statesman always in his acts to choose the right instead of the agreeable, and in his words to take away all vexatious features from what is advantageous."[25]

The positive/neutral image of the demagogue comes close to the image of the ideal statesman, as appears from this quotation and the passage from Plutarch quoted in the previous section.[26]

Plutarch has a favorable judgment on the Gracchi in his biography of the two brothers. Plutarch's opinion on Gaius is the most interesting, because many authors represent Gaius as a demagogue in the negative sense. For Plutarch, on the contrary, Gaius was a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense. He applies this image to Gaius by denying that he was a demagogue in the negative sense. When Plutarch, in his introduction to the Life of Gaius, treats the deeds and the personality of the tribune in general, he says:

> "And yet a strong opinion prevails that he was a demagogue pure and simple, and far more eager than Tiberius to win the favor of the multitude. But this is

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[22] Florus 2.1.1: "Seditionum omnium causas tribunicia potestas excitavit, quae specie quidem plebis tuendae, cuius in auxilium comparata est, re autem dominationem sibi adquirens, studium populi ac favorem agrariis, frumentariis, iudiciariis legibus aucupabatur."

[23] Dio 37.22.2 (Cato the Younger). In two orations, Sallust shows how two tribunes of the plebs pose as demagogues in the positive/neutral sense: Sall. *Iug.* 31.2, 6, 11-16, and 23 (Memmius), *Hist.* 3.48.1-4, 14-15, and 17M (Macer). Both tribunes repudiate violence as a means and denounce lust for power and greed as political motives. For other examples in Sallust see the next section.

[24] Plut. *Caes.* 35.3 (Metellus), *Luc.* 23.1 (Lucullus), *Pomp.* 2.1 (Pompey) and 10.6 (Sthenis), *Sert.* 14.2 (Sertorius).

[25] Plut. *Cic.* 13.1: "Μάλιστα γὰρ οὗτος ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐπέδειξε Ῥωμαίοις ὅσον ἡδονῆς λόγος τῷ καλῷ προστίθησι, καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον ἀήττητόν ἐστιν ἂν ὀρθῶς λέγεται, καὶ δεῖ τὸν ἐμμελῶς πολιτευόμενον ἀεὶ τῷ μὲν ἔργῳ τὸ καλὸν ἀντὶ τοῦ κολακεύοντος αἱρεῖσθαι, τῷ δὲ λόγῳ τὸ λυποῦν ἀφαιρεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος."

[26] See also e.g. Plut. *Mor.* 800A-B and 815B-C (= *Praec. Rei Publ. Ger.* ). Cf. AALDERS, *op.cit.*, 51-52.

not the truth; it would appear that he was led by necessity rather than by his own choice to engage in public matters."[27]

By contrast, Plutarch says of Livius Drusus the Elder, the tribune of the plebs who by order of the senate tried to undermine Gaius Gracchus' popular support, that Livius proposed laws disregarding the right or the advantageous, and that he pleased the crowd like a demagogue from Greek comedy (*G.Gra.* 9.1). In short, according to Plutarch, Livius Drusus' actions were those of a demagogue in the negative sense.

Another example occurs in the Life of Cato the Younger. In 63, after Catiline's abortive coup in Rome, Cato the Younger proposed a corn law in order to win the plebs for the senate. Plutarch justifies that law by calling it an act of humanity, of *philanthropia* (*Cat.Min.* 26.1). Conversely, he says of Clodius, who passed a corn law in 58, that Clodius proposed laws to win the people for himself (*Cic.* 30.1). Cato's law prevented a danger for the state, whereas Clodius' laws and other deeds are bracketed together as subversive actions. In his Precepts of Statecraft, Plutarch mentions Cato's corn law as an example of the right way to deal with the crowd (*Mor.* 818D).

We can conclude, then, that Plutarch considered Cato a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense and Clodius as a demagogue in the negative sense. Thus we can establish a political prejudice in Plutarch, since he passes a different judgment on the same act of these two politicians.

Cicero makes use of the concept of positive/neutral demagogy in his writings and speeches. He relates it particularly to himself. In his Second Oration on the Agrarian Law, he poses as a *consul popularis*. The right popular leader, according to Cicero, should provide peace, quiet, and harmony. He is supposed to guard the rights of the people and should not resort to flattery or stirring up strife.[28] Partly, this should be seen as propaganda, for the speech - held before the people in 63 - as a whole has a manipulative tenor.[29] But Cicero uses the concept also in earlier and later orations, and in his First Oration on the Agrarian Law which was held before the senate.[30] In Cicero's subsequent rhetorical and philosophic

[27] *G.Gra.* 1.5: "καίτοι κρατεῖ δόξα πολλὴ τοῦτον ἄκρατον γενέσθαι δημαγωγόν, καὶ πολὺ τοῦ Τιβερίου λαμπρότερον πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν ὄχλων δόξαν. οὐκ ἔχει δὲ οὕτω τὸ ἀληθές· ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ὑπ' ἀνάγκης τινὸς μᾶλλον οὗτος ἢ προαιρέσεως ἐμπεσεῖν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν."

[28] *Leg.Agr.* 2.9-10 and 102. See on the good *popularis* in Cicero: SEAGER, *CQ*, 333-338; ACHARD, *Pratique*, 193-197.

[29] MARTIN 46-51.

[30] In 66: *Clu.* 94. In 63: *Cat.* 4.9, *Rab.Perd.* 11, *Leg.Agr.* 1.23. In 56: *Sest.* 109 and 114. In 52: *Mil.* 95.

works the concept recurs.[31] In his orations and writings, Cicero constantly opposes his positive/neutral image of the demagogue to the characteristics of the negative image.[32] Such political or philosophic definitions, of course, are only meant for the ruling élite.[33] His writings, in any case, were only accessible to the educated classes. Another example of the use of the concept of positive/neutral demagogy is the advice to portray himself as a *popularis* in his campaign for the consulate, i.e. to act as a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense.[34]

In this way, Cicero turns a rhetorical commonplace into a political slogan.[35] The concept of the demagogue, therefore, for the most part appears in his orations. By posing as a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense, he attempts to neutralize an important weapon of the propaganda of the popular leaders. Probably Cicero also attempts to undermine the support of the popular leaders within the élite in an ideological way. Thus, he has no need of showing himself entirely anti-popular leadership and he disapproves only of certain aspects of popular policy.[36]

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[31] *Amic.* 95, *Leg.* 3.24, *Off.* 1.85-86, 2.31-36, 48, and 54-60. In *Amic.* 95 and *Off.* 1.85 Cicero uses the concept *popularis* in the negative sense, in *Off.* 2.35 in the positive/neutral sense, and in *De Or.* 3.138 even in both meanings; a clear indication that Cicero constantly employed two concepts of *popularis*. See also HELLEGOUARC'H, *op.cit.*, 535-539. TAYLOR, consequently, is wrong when she maintains that Cicero distinguished between good and bad *populares* only before his exile in 58: TAYLOR, *PP*, 11-12.

[32] See on the opposition good-bad *populares* by Cicero: n.28. SEAGER (*op.cit.n.28* ) lists a number of qualities which Cicero attributed to the bad *popularis* (acting against the interests of the entire people or against *libertas*, aiming at tyranny, irresponsibility, stirring up strife). In my view, these qualities can be summarized in the three qualities of the demagogue in the negative sense.

[33] See J.L. FERRARY, A propos de deux fragments attribués à C. Fannius, cos. 122 (*ORF* [4], fr. 6 et 7), in: NICOLET, *Demokratia*, pp. 51-58. In this connection it is typical that Cicero's Greek comparisons (*infra* n. 48) particularly appear in his letters and philosophic writings. Only in three forensic speeches - *Pro Flacco, Pro Milone* and *Pro Sestio*, held at public trials - do Greek references occur; in the characteristically popular speech *De Lege Agraria 2* they do not.
BÉRANGER, *op.cit.*, 91-92, shows that while for the élite a moral distinction could exist between *rex* and *tyrannus*, the general public was oblivious of the distinction; however, DUNKLE, *TAPhA*, 156, remarks that through the performance of Greek tragedies the Greek concept of the tyrant became known to a large public. YAVETZ, on the contrary, argues that even the average Roman senator was not sufficiently educated to grasp these allusions to Greek philosophy (*HSCP*, 55-58; *Caesar*, 188-189).

[34] *Com.Pet.* 52-53. SEAGER shows that Livy's description of early Roman history was influenced by Cicero's image of the *popularis* : R. SEAGER, "Populares" in Livy and the Livian Tradition, *CQ* 27 (1977), pp. 377-389. SEAGER lists the characteristics of Livy's *populares* : *seditio, largitio, regnum* (pp. 378-380). It is obvious that these are exactly the qualities of the negative image of the demagogue. It is quite possible that Livy adopted his image of the demagogue from Cicero, but it is also possible that Livy, like Cicero, took it directly from Greek tradition.

[35] The same he did with *homo novus* : VANDERBROECK, *op.cit.*, 241-242.

[36] Cf. JONKERS, *op.cit.*, 40 and 59.

Two important sources for the late Republic will now be compared to show how the ancient image of the demagogue was used by ancient authors: Appian's work on the Civil Wars, and Sallust's monographs on Catiline and Iugurtha as late Republican, Latin sources.[37] In Appian, the word *dèmagogos* hardly occurs (but *dèmokopeo* and derivations do occur often). When Sallust employs the evident Latin equivalent *popularis*, it never has the meaning of "demagogue" (*Cat.* 22.1, 24.1, and 52.4).

Appian attributes the qualities of the demagogue in the negative sense to politicians who are known to us as *populares*. But also some of those who, in Cicero's terminology, should be rated among the *optimates* are pejoratively described as demagogues: those who tried to win the people in a demagogic fashion for the senatorial majority (Drusus the Elder, Gaius Gracchus' opponent; Milo after Clodius' death; the tyrannicides after the assassination of Caesar). For Appian, popular policy *per se* was condemnable and the positive/neutral image of the demagogue hardly occurs in his writings.

In Appian's description, demagogy causes an escalation in violence. The problems start after the murder of Tiberius Gracchus, subsequently the situation deteriorates with Saturninus, and after the Social War it gets entirely out of hand (1.2, 33, and 34). At the outbreak of the second civil war, the era of the demagogues is over and the decision of who is to become sole ruler is made on the battlefield. A short-lived revival takes place in Rome during the struggle for power between the tyrannicides, Antony, and Octavian in the period between Caesar's death and the outbreak of the third civil war.

Sallust too uses the image of the demagogue in his monographs to describe his *dramatis personae*. An important passage is the one from the *Catilina*, where he gives a general survey of the issues in the late Republic. There it is the tribunes of the plebs who operate in a demagogic manner. We have already seen in Florus the opinion Sallust expresses on the tribunes of the plebs:

> "For after the tribunician power had been restored in the consulship of Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus, various young men, whose age and disposition made them aggressive, attained that high authority; they thereupon began to excite the plebs by attacks upon the senate and then to inflame their passions still more by doles and promises, thus making themselves conspicuous and powerful."[38]

In contrast with Appian, though both have a similar anti-senatorial attitude, Sallust does not denote any of the *optimates* as a demagogue.

[37] For the passages see Appendix E.

[38] Sall. *Cat.* 38.1: "Nam, postquam Cn. Pompeio et M. Crasso consulibus tribunicia potestas restituta est, homines adulescentes summam potestatem nacti, quibus aetas animusque ferox erat, coepere senatum criminando plebem exagitare, dein largiundo atque pollicitando magis incendere, ita ipsi clari potentesque fieri."

According to Sallust, two factions contend for power: the demagogues and the members of the senatorial majority.[39]

We will now consider the judgment of both authors on some individual politicians. Appian has a favorable judgment of Tiberius Gracchus. It is not clear whether Appian's representation of Tiberius can be called a positive/neutral image of the demagogue. The judgment is notably based on Tiberius' agrarian law, rather than on his political behavior, which is the essence of the image of the demagogue. Appian gives a negative image of the demagogy of Gaius Gracchus: Gaius corrupted the people, menaced the senate, and tried to break its power (1.21-22). Livius Drusus, Gaius' antagonist, was just as much a demagogue in the negative sense.[40]

As opposed to Appian, Sallust is favorably disposed towards both Gracchi, though, in Sallust's view, they lacked self-control in the realization of their political goals. The short description of the Gracchi in the *Iugurtha* (42) is a positive/neutral image of the demagogue. According to Sallust, they wanted to restore the liberty of the plebs and to denounce the crimes of the aristocracy.[41]

It is useful, as a result of the above, to dwell upon the use of the term "positive/neutral". Sallust and Appian can be juxtaposed where they agree, namely on Tiberius Gracchus. Both authors have a favorable judgment on Tiberius, but both also think that he became too radical. This shows that the non-negative image of the demagogue cannot be called entirely positive and that, therefore, the term positive/neutral is preferable.

Except with respect to Gaius Gracchus, Appian and Sallust differ in opinion on yet another politician: Caesar. Appian describes him with the characteristics of the negative image of the demagogue: Caesar spent a tremendous amount of money on his election campaign. Later, during his consulate, he proposed laws to please the people. He passed his agrarian law in the assembly with violence and he ignored the senate and his colleague. Ceaselessly, he worked towards sole rule. (2.1, 10-13, and 149-150.)

But in Sallust the picture of the same person corresponds with the positive/neutral image of the demagogue. In the *Catilina,* Sallust resists the allegation that Caesar was involved in the conspiracy of Catiline. Some want to press charges against Caesar, and Sallust says: "Moreover, the opportunity for an attack seemed favorable, because (Caesar) was heavily

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[39] See EARL,*Sallust,* pp. 41-59.

[40] The same judgment on Livius Drusus appears in Tac. *Ann.* 3.27 and, as was remarked before, in Plut. *G.Gra.* 9.1.

[41] The character of Gaius Gracchus plays an important part in this chapter. Gaius Gracchus was seen by the Romans not only as an excellent orator, but also as the quintessential *popularis.* As *seditiosus,* Gaius Gracchus became an historical *exemplum* which lived on during the Principate: A.J.L. VAN HOOFF, Mala Gracchana. De geschiedenis van een historisch exemplum, *Lampas* 11 (1978), pp. 186-211, esp. 186-190.

in debt on account of his eminent generosity in private life and the greatest munifications when in office."[42] Sallust represents Caesar as someone who had indebted himself from altruistic motives. But he declines to mention that Caesar's munifications consisted of magnificent games for the plebs in order to start up his political career. In short, they are the same *largitiones* on account of which Caesar receives the designation of demagogue in the negative sense from Appian.

In the final part of the *Catilina*, Sallust compares Caesar and Cato the Younger, the two individuals whom he considered the greatest of his time, the persons with the most *virtus* : "Caesar was held great because of his benefactions and munifications, Cato for the integrity of his life."[43] Again we see an euphemistic description of Caesar's actions. For the extravagant shows at the beginning of Caesar's political career represent one of the most successful cases of popular policy in the late Republic.

To conclude, we have been able to ascertain in Appian and Sallust the existence of different judgments on Caesar and Gaius Gracchus. On account of the same actions Caesar and Gracchus are considered demagogues in the negative sense by Appian, and demagogues in the positive/neutral sense by Sallust. Without returning to the old view of Sallust as a *Tendenzschriftsteller*, a pamphleteer, we can still say that Sallust, in any case, does not give a negative representation of Caesar, as has been argued in some recent studies on Sallust. According to EARL and TIFFOU, Cato the Younger clearly wins in the comparison with Caesar.[44]

In describing the fight between *populares* and *optimates*, which he abhorred, Sallust did not want to ascribe the objectionable behavior of the *populares* to his friend Caesar and to Gaius Gracchus. Sallust's political opinions color his account of popular politics. Unlike Sallust, Appian did not consider the late Republic as a party strife between *populares* and *optimates*. Looking back, Appian represented it as a period of civil strife, in which everyone was after everyone's blood and for which there existed only one solution: monarchy[45]. This too results in a colored picture, but

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[42] *Cat.* 49.3: "Res autem opportuna videbatur quod is privatim egregia liberalitate, publice maxumis muneribus, grandem pecuniam debebat."

[43] *Cat.* 54.2: "Caesar beneficiis ac munificentia magnus habebatur, integritate vitae Cato."

[44] EARL, *op.cit.*, 100-101; E. TIFFOU, *Essai sur la pensée morale de Salluste à la lumière de ses prologues*, Paris 1974, pp. 387-395.
R. SYME, *Sallust*, Berkeley 1964, Ch. VIII, concludes that Sallust took a neutral stand and that he saw the qualities of Caesar and Cato the Younger as complementary. BÜCHNER thinks that the *synkrisis* of Cato and Caesar was not disadvantageous for Caesar and that Sallust was favorably disposed towards both of them: K. BÜCHNER, Zur Synkrisis Cato-Caesar in Sallusts Catilina, *Grazer Beiträge* 5 (1976), pp. 37-57. A similar opinion is offered by C. BECKER, Sallust, *ANRW* 1.3 (1973), pp. 720-754, esp. 731-742; J.L. FERRARY, Quelques réflections à propos du Catilina de Salluste, *Vita Latina* 80 (1980), pp. 17-23, esp. 20-21; idem, in: *Storia*, 793.

[45] App. 1.6; T.J. LUCE, Appian's Magisterial Terminology, *CPh* 56 (1961), pp. 21-28, esp. 25-27.

Appian undeniably takes a balanced position. For he shows that certain actions of opponents of demagogues were equally demagogic.[46]

*Dèmagogos and Popularis*

The characteristics of the demagogue in the negative sense as well as in the positive/neutral sense, developed in fourth-century Greece, were applied by Greek historians to Roman popular leaders. Plutarch did not see an essential difference between the political life of Greeks and Romans, which is confirmed by his use of the term *dèmagogos* for Roman *populares*. Furthermore, he was influenced by Plato and Aristotle.[47] From these philosophers he particularly must have adopted the negative image of the demagogue.

The Roman way of thinking about politics was influenced by Greek thought. A marked example is Cicero. Cicero regularly takes examples from Greek history to underscore his arguments regarding demagogy. Also he quotes, albeit not uncritically, Aristotle and Plato as authorities (*Off.* 2.56, *Rep.* 1.65). Cicero's Greek examples concern both the demagogue in the negative sense[48] and in the positive/neutral sense. Just as for Thucydides and Plutarch, so too for Cicero, Pericles was the classic example of the demagogue in the positive/neutral sense and Cicero contrasts Pericles as a good *popularis* with bad Greek *populares* (*Or.* 3.138, *Rep.* 4.11). According to FUHRMANN, Cicero's political ideas were a mixture of Greek philosophy and Roman political practice.[49]

Greek and Roman authors employed the ancient image of the demagogue to describe a certain type of politician, in this case the *popularis* [50], of the late Republic. The negative image especially was suited for this, in view of its three constantly recurring qualities. The mention of one or two characteristics already sufficed to qualify someone as a demagogue. Given the ambiguous meaning of the concepts *dèmagogos* and *popularis*, the authors rather use characteristics instead of the terms themselves. Sallust and Appian, for example, hardly make use

[46] It is regrettable that Appian does not mention Cato's corn law. His opinion on that matter would have been undoubtably interesting.

[47] AALDERS, *op.cit.*, 30 and 63.

[48] *Att.* 1.14.5 (senate as areopagus), 2.17.1 (Pompey as nascent Greek tyrant), and 7.11.1 (accuses Caesar through a quote from Euripides); *Flac.* 16 (*seditiosi* in Athens) and 17 (Greek democracy); *Mil.* 80 (tyrannicides); *Sest.* 141 (anti-democrates in Athens); *Brut.* 224 (Hyperbolus); *Off.* 2.80 (origin Greek tyrants); *Rep.* 4.11 (the *populares* Cleon, Cleophon, and Hyperbolus).

[49] M. FUHRMANN, Cum dignitate otium. Politisches Programm und Staatstheorie bei Cicero, *Gymnasium* 67 (1960), pp. 481-500, esp. 483 and 497. The same goes for Sallust: EARL, *op.cit.*, 5-17; TIFFOU, *op.cit.n.44*, 178-188. See on the influence of Greek philosophy on Roman political thought: FERRARY, in: *Storia* , 731-736.

[50] See on the *Wortgebrauch* of *popularis* : MEIER, *RE*, 568-572. See on the image of Caesar as a demagogue: SYME, *op.cit.n.44*, 62.

of the words *popularis* and *dèmagogos* respectivily, but they do employ the characteristics in their descriptions. Characteristics were also employed in the less frequent positive/neutral image, i.e. by stressing the absence of the characteristics belonging to the negative image.

The term *popularis* became the Latin equivalent of the Greek *dèmagogos*.[51] For every educated Greek or Roman it must have been obvious which type of politician was meant when a person of the late Republic was denoted with certain qualities. This is true above all of the negative image of the demagogue. The inevitable conclusion is that the best translation of *popularis* is "demagogue".[52]

In the political practice of the late Republic the *popularis* was not equal to the *dèmagogos* of Greek democracy. It happens more than once that Romans borrow Greek political concepts to describe contemporary situations, e.g. tyranny.[53] As far as the Greek authors are concerned, it is possible to speak of an *interpretatio Graeca* .[54] For a study of popular leadership and the relationship between the popular leader and his public in particular, it is therefore necessary to distinguish between the actual actions of those who were known as demagogues and the commonplace description of these politicians.

The research on collective behavior has shown that *populares* and *optimates* used the same methods to gain the support of the plebs, although the *optimates* did this in reaction to the behavior of the *populares*. *Populares* were depicted as demagogues in the negative sense, *optimates* such as Cicero and Cato the Younger as demagogues in the positive/neutral sense. This obviously shows a political bias of ancient authors in favor of the senatorial majority. Cicero, partisan of the *optimates*, even poses as a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense.

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[51] Contra BOTTÉRI, et.al., *op.cit.n.12*, 80-81. According to BOTTÉRI and RASKOLNIKOFF, Cicero's use of two meanings of *popularis* shows that *dèmagogos* and *popularis* are not equivalent, because *dèmagogos* has only one, pejorative sense. They are not aware of the existence of two images of the demagogue.

[52] My conclusion is shared, on different grounds, by HELLEGOUARC'H, *op.cit.*, 521; GELZER, *Caesar*, 12; idem, *Kleine Schriften*, Wiesbaden 1962-1964, Band I, pp. 174 and 213; LANG, *op.cit.*, 163.

[53] The charge of tyranny was used as invective against political opponents, but the Roman élite realized the difference between Greek tyrants and contemporary politicians: BÉRANGER, *op.cit.*, 90 and 92; J.R. DUNKLE, The Rhetorical Tyrant in Roman Historiography: Sallust, Livy, and Tacitus, *CW* 65 (1971), pp. 12-20; idem, *TAPhA*, 152 and 158.
On the use of Greek concepts by Latin historians, see: A. MICHEL, Ordres et classes chez les historiens romains, in: *Recherches sur les structures sociales dans l'Antiquité classique*, Paris 1970, pp. 243-257.

[54] BÉRANGER, *op.cit.*, 86; A. WEISCHE, *Studien zur politischen Sprache der römischen Republik*, Münster 1966, pp. 11-23; C. NICOLET, La Polémique politique au IIe siècle av. J.C., in: NICOLET, *Demokratia*, pp. 37-50.

Did a difference of opinion exist on the behavior of the crowd, similar to the case of the demagogues? Many studies have already appeared on this subject, the most important conclusions of which will be summarized here.

It is impossible to draw conclusions from the difference in the use of words. The terms for "crowd" and "people" are used interchangeably and synonymously. The diversity in vocabulary is mostly a mere matter of style; an author thus tries to avoid repetitions. This is true of both Greek and Latin authors.[55]

The judgment of ancient authors on the behavior of the crowd is always a moral one. The approval or disapproval of the behavior can be ascertained from the adjectives.[56] Words such as *populus, plebs, multitudo,* or their Greek equivalents alone or combined with moralistic adjectives, therefore, hardly provide any details on the participants in collective behavior.

Though the people have a right to express their opinion and their grievances, on the whole they are denied an independent judgment. If the people adopt an attitude in opposition to the ruling class, it is usually considered as having been caused by their leaders. This outlook was widely accepted among the higher social strata in antiquity.[57] A typical example is the frequent metaphor of the sea:

> "That as the sea, though naturally calm, becomes rough and stormy beneath a strong wind, so is it with the Roman people; peaceable enough when left to themselves, the speech of demagogues can rouse them like a furious gale."[58]

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[55] YAVETZ, *Plebs,* Appendix; U. PAANANEN, *Sallust's Politico-Social Terminology. Its Use and Biographical Significance,* Helsinki 1972, pp. 24-41; R.F. NEWBOLD, The Vulgus in Tacitus, *RhM* 119 (1976), pp. 85-92; J. DEININGER, Brot und Spiele. Tacitus und die Entpolitisierung der plebs urbana, *Gymnasium* 86 (1979), pp. 278-303, esp. 279-282; ACHARD, *Pratique,* 41-44; FAVORY, *op.cit.,* 152-169; MACMULLEN, *RSR,* Appendix B. It remained that way until the late Empire: KNEPPE, *op.cit.,* 12-19. The same happened e.g. with *existimatio* and *fama* : YAVETZ, *HSCP,* 49-50.
See on the use of words in Attic orators: S. CAGNAZZI, *dèmos, QS* 6 (1980) 11, pp. 297-314; R. RONCALI, C. ZAGARI, *plèthos, QS* 6 (1980) 12, pp. 213-221.
A couple of nice examples from the Empire are Hdn. 7.7.1 who in one sentence uses the words *ochlos, dèmos,* and *plèthos* for the same group of people, and Amm.Marc. 19.10.2-3 who does the same with *plebs, populus,* and *vulgus.*

[56] YAVETZ, *Plebs,* Appendix.

[57] WELWEI, *Historia,* 295-301. Cf. BRAUN, *op.cit.n.7.*

[58] Cic. *Clu.* 138: "Ut mare, quod sua natura tranquillum sit, ventorum vi agitari atque turbari, sic populum Romanum sua sponte esse placatum, hominum seditiosorum vocibus ut violentissimis tempestatibus concitari."
The same metaphor in Cic. *Planc.* 15 and *Mur.* 35-36; Verg. *Aen.* 1.142-153. The metaphor was a commonplace in antiquity: WELWEI, *Historia,* 296 and n.63.

We have seen that differences can be ascertained between authors in their judgment on the same popular leaders. Also differences can be established in their judgment on similar actions of different politicians. Unlike with the demagogues, ancient authors remarkably agree in their attitude towards the people. The crowd is good when it conforms to the élite, the crowd is bad when it acts violently. This can be explained by the fact that the literary sources on the late Republic were produced by members of the élite among whom no real democrats were anymore to be found.[59] With regard to demagogues divergent opinions could exist, since they belonged to the same status group. The different political views within the élite concerning popular policy led to different judgments of popular leaders.

*The Problem of Perception*

How far did the ancient image of the demagogue correspond to reality? Generalizing, one could state that Caesar's popular leadership led directly to one-man rule. However, it should never be forgotten that the ultimate decision of the struggle for power was made on the battlefield. Demagogy alone was not sufficient to attain supreme power in Rome.

What exactly was the perception of popular leaders and collective behavior by the contemporaries in the late Republic? Sallust blames the problems of the late Republic on the absence of an external enemy after the Third Punic War, as a result of which the élite and the people only pursued their own interests and increasingly drifted apart. The ruling class reserved the honorific and lucrative positions to itself and did not allow the people to share in the fruits of empire. (*Iug.* 41.) Sallust attributes major political conflicts to the dissension among the élite (*Cat.* 38.3-4).

Cicero points out the custom of acquiring political allies by promising career opportunities.[60] He further proposes some practical improvements within the existing system, such as enlargement of the number of lower magistrates, a better training of senators, and a closer tie between provinces and senate.[61]

[59] Even Plutarch, who was not an opponent of a certain amount of popular influence, rejected radical democracy and popular sovereignty that went with it: AALDERS, *op.cit.*, 28-30.

[60] *Att.* 10.8.2, *Dom.* 129; NISBET, *op.cit.*, 89-90, 119, and 177.

[61] L. DE BLOIS, De perceptie van schaalvergroting in de werken van Sallustius, *Lampas* 17 (1984), pp. 318-334, esp. 327; LEHMANN, *op.cit.*, 15-29 and 49-51. See also Chapter 1.

The extraordinary commands were not unconstitutional and not in themselves a cause for the fall of the Republic.[62] Nonetheless, there was a growing awareness among the élite that such a source of power counteracted the principles of equality within the oligarchy. For that reason the senate resisted Pompey's command against the pirates.[63] The endorsement of or the resistance to such commands, however, was mostly determined by political alignments. For example, in 66 Cicero was friendly with Pompey. Therefore, in his *Pro Lege Manilia,* he strongly supported the proposal to grant Pompey a great command in the East. After his consulate, Cicero became a stout advocate of the oligarchy. But after Pompey had arranged Cicero's recall from exile in 57, Cicero himself proposed to entrust Pompey with the *cura annonae,* whereas a part of the senate disagreed (Cic. *Dom.* 16). In February of 56, Cicero again felt free to denounce the extraordinary commands by referring to Cato the Younger (*Sest.* 60). After the conference of Luca in the same year and his reconciliation with Caesar, Cicero once more became careful in his critiques of these commands (*Prov.Cons.* 38). In short, there was a perception that the extraordinary commands produced a danger for the existing order, but the majority of the Roman élite did not always realize that the extraordinary commands also provided solutions to real problems which called for action.

The perception of political violence was thus that, while violence by political opponents was denounced, violence as a political means for one's own purposes was approved.[64] An important reason why during the late Republic effective measures against the increasing use of violence in politics were never taken is the lack of consensus in the élite on the legitimacy of violence. Even on a particular form of violence such as the *senatus consultum ultimum* there was disagreement, and therefore Clodius in 58 was able to drive Cicero into exile without much opposition.

The same can be said about *largitiones.* As such they were not bad and fit into the political tradition. But approval or disapproval depended on who gave them and in what way.[65]

Are the problems of the people recognized? A characteristic conception is the one in Cicero's *De Legibus* (3.24 and 31-32) that in every polity the moral changes among the élite have their repercussions on the people. As the popular assemblies time and again took decisions which did not comply with the wishes of the oligarchy, Cicero lost confidence in them. He blamed it on the lack of representativity of the participants and preferred the popular expressions in the theater, which

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[62] As has been stressed by *LGRR* App. III; R.T. RIDLEY, The Extraordinary Commands of the Late Republic. A Matter of Definition, *Historia* 30 (1981), pp. 280-297.

[63] See also *RPA* 291.

[64] Cic. *Q.Fr.* 1.2.16 and 2.3.4; LINTOTT Ch. IV.

[65] *Com.Pet.* 42; Cic. *Mur.* 77, *Off.* 2.54-64.

were favorable to the oligarchy.[66] The growing dissension within the élite was indeed an important cause for the arising of political conflicts. It alone, however, was insufficient; the conflicts were related to the specific problems of the people itself, a fact that was not realized. Distributions of corn and money or public works were not meant as poor relief, but issued from the liberality of the rich, who demonstrated their social standing by ostentatious expenditure, and from the idea among the élite that it was the responsibility of the ruling class to provide for a sufficient food supply and an efficient city government.[67] Peace and quiet, that was what the plebs needed to be satisfied, so thought the Roman upper class.[68] Furthermore, the vertical organization of Roman social structure impeded the perception of the poor as a distinct social group. Welfare was a private affair and belonged to the sphere of patron-client relations.[69] Few, with the possible exception of Clodius, had an eye for the interests of the lower social strata. And if they had, the interests were interpreted in the wrong way, as is shown by Rullus' agrarian law.[70] If the problems were perceived, they were used only to mobilize the crowd for the advancement of one's own political career.

Was the stereotype description of popular leaders and collective behavior only a way to grasp these phenomena in familiar phraseologies, or was it considered to be consistent with reality? First of all, it is remarkable that only non-contemporary ancient authors apply the negative image of the demagogue to *optimates*, i.e. those who were not known as popular leaders during the late Republic. Cicero and Sallust were too much entangled in the political controversies of their era to make that subtle distinction. Only later authors, whose writings no longer participated in the political discussion of the late Republic, could judge the behavior of late Republican politicians with some objectivity. A positive/neutral image of the demagogues Caesar and Gaius Gracchus can only be seen in Sallust, an author who belonged to the political tradition of both *populares*. Cicero's posture as a demagogue in the positive/neutral sense is a component of his propaganda. He also describes the *populares* of the past in favorable terms, but that is only to indicate the wickedness of the contemporary popular leaders.[71]

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66 Cic. *Leg.* 3.34; BLEICKEN, *op.cit.*, 284-285.

67 See H. BRUHNS, Armut und Gesellschaft in Rom, in: MOMMSEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 27-49, esp. 34-37.

68 See also Cic. *Sest.* 104, *Cat.* 4.17; Sall. *Ep.Caes.* 2.7.2.

69 BRUHNS, *op.cit.n.67*, 37-38.

70 Cicero did realize that Flavius' agrarian law of 60 and Caesar's agrarian law of 59 would provide few advantages for the *plebs urbana* and he expected that the laws would not be passed (Chapter 2 n.114). He, however, had not reckoned with Caesar's popularity and the use of veterans in the popular assembly.

71 See J. GAILLARD, Que répresentent les Gracques pour Cicéron?, *BAGB* (1975), pp. 499-529, esp. 509. Cf. R.J. MURRAY, Cicero and the Gracchi, *TAPhA* 97 (1966), pp. 291-298. Contra J. BéRANGER, Les jugements de Cicéron sur les Gracques, *ANRW* I.1 (1972), pp. 732-763.

Typical of popular politics in the late Republic is that in itself it did not bring any innovations. The methods used were merely a more sophisticated and perfected version of the traditional élitist ways of dealing with the plebs. Consequently, it is natural that popular politics as such was not considered a problem. The persons are attacked, not the political method.[72] The censure of the popular leaders has moral grounds; they are reproached with an improper and blameworthy use of the prevailing political methods. Popular action too could be seen by the contemporaries within a traditional, and therefore acceptable, framework. It was not realized that popular policy was made possible by structural dysfunctions in the existing Roman political and social order.

Only in case of political conflicts were the Greek stereotypes dug up to accuse opponents. Cicero appears to be a stout opponent of popular politics, but that is merely on the surface. Everything depends on the political situation. When the political purist Cato accused Murena in 63 of aiming at personal power by means of pleasing the people, Cicero answered in defence of Murena that he did nothing which counteracted Roman tradition (Cic. *Mur.* 74).

All this is not to say that the Romans were blind. Sallust, as is shown by DE BLOIS[73], had an awareness of the consequences of the Roman expansion. But his perception was influenced by the strong moralistic tradition in Roman historiography, a lack of a quantifying abstract approach, and a not empirically founded explanation for the phenomena and developments he observed. Cicero was a shrewd observer. He knew exactly the purpose of certain political methods, how a crowd should be mobilized, and which groups were politically active. He also understood the importance of leadership. Cicero, like most of his contemporaries, was aware of the difference between the Roman and the Greek situation, but the causes behind them were not recognized; improvements were merely sought within the frame of the restoration of the old morals from the past. Even in plans for reform, such as Cicero's *De Legibus* 3 and Sallust's *Epistula ad Caesarem,* both authors thought in terms of the existing Republican institutions.[74] Possibly the Roman élite did not want to perceive the true causes; everyone, at least formally, was satisfied with the existing system, and no one needed an alternative. At the end of the year 50, as the great conflict with Caesar was imminent, Cicero realized that Caesar had been overindulged and that the élite should have taken action against him when he was not so powerful; but then it was too late. (*Att.* 7.7.6.)

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[72] WEISCHE, *op.cit.n.54,* 57-67. See also *Rhet.Her.* 1.8.

[73] *Latomus.*

[74] On the perception of Sallust, see: *ibidem* and DE BLOIS, *op.cit.n.61,* passim. On the perception of Cicero: idem, *op.cit.n.61,* 321 with further references; A.B. BREEBAART, De Romeinse Revolutie (50-31 v.Chr.). Grepen uit een ervaringswereld, *Lampas* 11 (1978), pp. 128-142, esp. 134-137. Cf. *RPA* Ch. V.

The most striking case of misperception in the late Republic is the expectations of the conspirators against Caesar in 44. Brutus, Cassius, and the other tyrannicides wanted by their assassination of Caesar to restore the Republic. Even more, they wanted to restore the Republic as it had been centuries before, with a virtuous oligarchy. They expected the plebs to welcome their act, but, as Appian neatly remarks, the people they had before them were no longer the inhabitants of the Rome of their forefathers.[75]

This brings us to the final aspect of perception. As was remarked in the introduction, most modern scholars agree that the main cause for the fall of the Republic lay in governing an empire with the institutions of a city-state. Perhaps we can go even further by arguing that it was also governing an empire with the conceptual framework of a city-state. Rome was the center of political activity. The institutions and the political thought were still those of a city-state. The ideology of the élite was based on Greek education and the traditions of early Rome. Both came from a political culture in city-states. The Romans tried to find solutions for current problems in Greek political theory and their own history. Greek philosophy offered useful concepts to describe Roman politics in terms of a city-state. Greek political philosophy even nowadays provides us with a most useful frame of reference, but twentieth-century politics are not the politics of a city-state anymore. That was already the case in late Republican Rome. But this perception had not yet entered the Roman mind. The Roman polity had expanded far beyond a city-state. It had a huge empire filled with different nations, a professionalized army of Italians quite different from the earlier citizen-soldiers, and resources of a magnitude that, when put to use in politics, far surpassed the resources of a city-state. Despite the fact that an awareness of the growth of the empire existed, it seems that the consequences were not perceived by Roman thought, which still was on the scale of a city-state. It took several civil wars and the genius of Augustus to realize what was really happening.

[75] App. 2.120. On the tyrannicides' misperception of Caesar's popularity in 44, see YAVETZ, *HSCP*, 54-64; idem, *Caesar*, Ch. 6.

# Epilogue

Popular leadership and collective behavior were frequent phenomena during the late Republic and were not insignificant in the political process. The Roman Republic perished in a series of civil wars, which started with the crossing of the Rubicon by Caesar in 49 and ended with Octavian's victory at Actium in 31. Octavian soon received a new name - Augustus - and founded a new political system, the Principate, which would govern the Roman empire in the subsequent three centuries. The achievement of Augustus with his new regime and the reorganization of society offer a good opportunity for a review of the most important aspects of popular leadership and collective behavior during the late Republic.[1] We have to keep in mind, incidentally, that Augustus did not begin with a clear-cut plan, but introduced his reforms during his long reign (until A.D. 14) by trial and error. Nonetheless, Augustus showed that he had a good perception of the problems of the late Republic and a sense of *Realpolitik.*

*The Achievement of Augustus*

A number of factors caused the outbreak of the civil wars and the downfall of the Republic. Augustus found remedies for the Republican problems and his power was founded on four pillars.

The late Republic finally had succumbed to civil wars which were fought with professionalized armies. The soldiers and the officers were more closely tied to their general, who could provide for income and pension, than to the state for which they nominally fought. Augustus adapted the existing practice by creating a standing professional army. He took care that the majority of the army units fell under his command by his control of the most important provinces from a military viewpoint. He also provided for regular pay and a thorough pension scheme by land distributions and discharge bounties for veterans. He clearly demonstrated to the soldiers that their economic welfare depended on the emperor.

The second pillar of Augustus' power consisted of his control of the upper strata. First of all, of course, Augustus had carried out a bloody purge of the Roman élite during the civil wars, so that few possible rivals were left, but, besides that, he also undertook a number of structural measures. One of the most important reasons for the political conflicts

[1] On Augustus, among many other publications, see: L. DE BLOIS, De erfenis van de Romeinse burgeroorlogen en de opbouw van de monarchie van Augustus, *Lampas* 13 (1980), pp. 23-39; A.H.M. JONES, *Augustus,* London 1977[2] (1970); F. MILLAR, E. SEGAL (eds.), *Caesar Augustus. Seven Aspects,* Oxford 1984.

and the rise of popular leadership in the late Republic was the fierce competition among the élite for a limited number of magistracies and the prizes to be gained after occupying an office with *imperium*. Augustus regulated the senatorial careers, made the career success of the élite dependent on their loyalty to the *princeps*, and made sure that the senators' ambitions were sufficiently satisfied by increasing the number of magistracies. He introduced a clear separation among the upper strata by the institution of marked-off status groups: senators (with a division between patricians and plebeians), *equites*, and *decuriones*. The *equites* were drawn into the imperial administration by the institution of a number of equestrian offices in the army and the imperial administration. The status groups were clearly separated, but for ambitious and capable individuals there existed opportunities for upward mobility. By increasing the number of offices and by improving the provincial government, Augustus moreover was able to provide a solution for the Republican dysfunctions in the imperial administration. For during the Republic the city-state based polity had proven inadequate for an efficient government of the empire.

As far as the imperial administration as well as the army were concerned, Augustus integrated into the new political system the increasing professionalization and specialization resulting from structural differentiation. Furthermore, Augustus surrounded himself with a number of loyal and capable assistants, like Maecenas and Agrippa, who advised him and performed tasks for him.

The third pillar of Augustus' power was his personal wealth. Because he had inherited Caesar's estate and increased it by confiscations during the civil wars, Augustus acquired a fortune which no one in the upper class could match. This fortune was furthermore supplemented by the institution of imperial domains, such as the rich province of Egypt, the revenues of which fell entirely to the emperor. Augustus' financial resources enabled him to make his influence everywhere felt in Roman state and society: in the army, in the upper strata, and in his liberality towards the plebs. Furthermore, the imperial domains were administered by a loyal staff, which could serve as the eyes and ears of the emperor.

The final, and for our subject the most important, pillar was the fact that Augustus manifested himself as the foremost popular leader. This meant that, along the lines of the relationship between popular leadership and collective behavior, he developed into the superpatron of the public clientele.[2] Augustus' goal, as in other parts of his policy, was to restore order in politics and society by on the one hand asserting control and on the other hand removing the causes of late Republican problems.

First, Augustus implemented a number of restrictive and structural measures whose purpose was to reduce the opportunity for collective behavior and to channel and institutionalize certain aspects of it. Augustus

[2] See MARTIN 225-226; TAYLOR, *PP*, 176-178.

established a police force. The urban cohorts were permanently stationed in the city to preserve law and order. They could receive assistance from the praetorian guard. Next to these, the *vigiles* were established to serve as a fire brigade and night watch. With these measures Augustus increased social control and at the same time provided for a more orderly city administration.

Additionally, Augustus took measures to preserve the existing reality of organizations of the plebs, such as colleges and neighborhoods. The organizations were institutionalized and regulated, with the result that these important factors in the process of mobilization became a binding force of the imperial regime.

The popular assemblies kept functioning, but only nominally. The decisions that were taken depended on the judgment of the *princeps*. The members of the plebs seemed to be increasingly less interested in participating. Not surprisingly, for their desires were realized by the emperor, and if the plebs had grievances they addressed him directly. The plebs very soon realized who was in charge. After Augustus, probably during the reign of his successor Tiberius, the popular assemblies were abolished without protest.

As has been remarked before, the theater and the circus during the Principate partly took over the function of the popular assemblies in expressing the will of the people. On such occasions the plebs could enter into direct contact with the emperor to show its approval or disapproval. This brings us again to the question of who the spectators at the games were. During the late Republic the audience mainly was composed of personal clients of nobles and country folk, while artisans and shopkeepers participated in other types of collective behavior.

The target group of the emperor was the urban plebs; this group formed the major part of his public clientele. We may therefore assume that now especially this group was admitted to the games. Augustus issued regulations for the *munera* to reduce the number and quality of private munifications and to keep them under state control. He thus avoided the risk that popular favor fell to a rival. In addition, Augustus himself gave vast *munera*, so that he would receive the credit. He therefore could also determine who was admitted to the games. Moreover, the rural plebs had increasingly less reason to travel to Rome to attend the games. The number of games in the Italian municipalities increased and local magistrates were stimulated to organize these after the example of Rome.[3]

Second, Augustus took a number of measures which limited the opportunities for competing popular leaders. His regulations with regard to the games have just been mentioned. His enormous financial means further gave him a financial advantage over possible competitors. For example, when the elections still officially occurred through the popular assemblies, Augustus took some legal measures against electoral

[3] See VILLE, *op.cit.*, 122-123 and 175-188.

corruption. Besides that, however, he distributed 1000 HS per person in a few tribes, so that the voters had little to expect from other candidates (Suet. *Aug.* 40). One of the main reasons why Augustus maintained the grain distributions, so he said, was to frustrate the opportunities of possible rivals (Suet. *Aug.* 42.3).

Third, he turned the plebs into his personal clientele by acting as its patron, by concrete and symbolic gestures. He thereby became a trendsetter for his successors[4]. Augustus maintained the corn distributions. The number of corn recipients was fixed, which resulted in the creation of a privileged group among the lower strata, the *plebs frumentaria,* which had a vested interest in the preservation of the new regime. Augustus took measures to secure a regular corn supply and eventually established an important magistracy, the *praefectus annonae,* specially responsible for it. The province of Egypt, annexed by Augustus, was his private domain and soon became one of Rome's main granaries. At times of extreme shortage the emperor contributed from his private means to alleviate the need. He regularly distributed money to the people in the theater. Furthermore, a vast building program was executed in Rome by Augustus himself and his loyal followers, which provided much employment for city-dwellers. Finally, Augustus secured peace and order after the civil wars and he played along with the imperialist sentiments of the plebs by making the most of the military successes of his regime.

Augustus' symbolic behavior was aimed at guarding himself against arrogance. He did not pose as sole ruler, but as first citizen - *princeps civitatis*. His display of power was modest. He had himself pictured among and not above the people, and showed his respect for the people by his obvious and interested presence at the games.

Fourth, a factor which contributed to the acceptance of Augustus as leader was his maintenance of the Republican institutions. Augustus invested himself with Republican regalia to legitimize his leadership. He held *tribunicia potestas* not only because of its legislative powers and the right of veto, but also to demonstrate his responsibility towards the plebs.[5]

After a period of political conflict and a series of civil wars, Augustus established a stable and lasting regime. Collective behavior still occurred during Augustus and afterwards. But because of the reduction of political conflicts, the absence of rivals who could act as leaders, and the Augustan settlement, collective behavior lost the importance it had had in the political process of the late Republic. To the extent it occurred, it was part of the normal behavioral pattern within the relationship between patron and client, between *princeps* and plebs; in short, the function it had received during the late Republic.

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[4] See A. CAMERON, *Bread and Circuses: The Roman Emperor and his People,* London 1973, esp. pp. 10-11; YAVETZ, *Plebs,* Ch. 6.

[5] On the *tribunicia potestas,* cf. YAVETZ, *Plebs,* 55-57 and Ch. 5; R. GILBERT, *Die Beziehungen zwischen Princeps und stadtrömischer Plebs im frühen Principat,* Bochum 1976, pp. 233-238.

In his person Augustus accumulated the pillars of power: armed forces, control of the élite, wealth, and patronage of the public clientele. That is why Augustus, perhaps more than Louis XIV, would have been entitled to say: "L'État, c'est moi".

## Appendix A

# Prosopography of Assistant Leaders

Appendix A provides a survey of assistant leaders, divided into two categories. The assistants of the popular leaders, for reasons of convenience, are called *populares*, their opponents *optimates*. The qualification as assistant leader of either group has been made on the basis of political allegiance and political behavior. In reality, the distinctions between the two groups perhaps were not so sharp as they are made here. Coalitions changed rapidly over the issues and some persons supported two opposing politicians at the same time. For some assistant leaders the allegiance was uncertain and the political behavior ambiguous. The names of these assistant leaders are listed in plain font; the other assistants, whose positioning is certain, are listed in boldface.

The first line for each assistant leader provides the number and name. The order is alphabetical. The second line gives the references to prosopographical works from which most of the information is derived. References to *MRR* are to the pages in Volume 2. References to *RE, OÉ, NMRS,* and *SWRP* are to the numbers in their respective prosopographies.

Next follows the year of the tribunate when the person was ACTIVE as an assistant leader, the highest magistracy (HIGH.MAG.) attained, and, if applicable, the legation(s) held (LEG.).

On the following line the political ALLEGIANCE of the assistant during his tribunate is indicated, and also whether he changed his allegiance afterwards, with the date of the CHANGE. Changes of allegiance before the tribunate are not taken into account (e.g. Ap-5). Pompey's assistant leaders who remained with him in the civil war are considered not to have changed their allegiance. These persons did not have make a choice in favor of the *optimates* ; they simply remained faithful to their leader. The *optimates* who changed their allegiance to Caesar immediately after the battle of Pharsalus in 48 are considered among the changers, because, despite Pompey's defeat, the odds in the civil war were still equal. Those who went over to Caesar at a later date (for example after the battle of Thapsus in 46) are considered not to have changed, because at that time the war was decided and there was no question any more of a choice between two equal political groups.

Then follows TYPE of change: within the group or to the other group. In 49 Pompey represented the *optimates*. Therefore, the *populares* -assistants who chose Pompey in 49 changed to the *optimates*. The *optimates* -assistants who made the same choice in 49 are considered to have changed their allegiance within their own group.

If the assistant leader has changed his allegiance, the next line specifies to which leader(s) he has changed his allegiance (SPECIFICATION).

Finally, the involvement, if any, of the assistant leader in collective behavior is listed (INV.COLL.BEH.). Reference is made to the list of cases of collective behavior in Appendix B. References between brackets refer to cases where the assistant leader did not provide leadership but was involved in another way, for example in a repressive role or as a victim of violence.

## Ap-1. **Aelius Ligus**

*MRR* 195; *RE* 83
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Vetoed the proposal in the senate for Cicero's recall from exile. Cicero (*Sest.* 94) calls him and the tribunes of the next year Serranus (Ap-6) and Numerius (Ap-33) *quisquilias seditionis Clodianae* : "the riffraff of Clodius' seditions".

## Ap-2. **C. Alfius Flavus**

*MRR* 189; *RE* 7
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 59
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
COMMENT: In 63 on Cicero's side; as tribune a Caesarian. Cicero keeps speaking of him in an amiable tone: *Sest.* 113- 114.

## Ap-3. **A. Allienus**

*MRR* 217; *RE* 1; *NMRS* 21
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49 LEG.: 61-59, 44-43
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74)
COMMENT: Co-author of the *lex Mamilia Roscia Alliena Peducaea Fabia* together with Fabius (Ap-15), Mamilius (Ap-25), Peducaeus (Ap-35), and Roscius (Ap-42). The law dealt with the extension of municipal organization in connection with Caesar's agrarian law and the activities of the land commissioners. On the law see *LGRR* 401-403. In 49 a Caesarian (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 45).

## Ap-4. **T. Ampius T.f. Balbus**

*MRR* 167; *RE* 1; *NMRS* 23
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 59 LEG.: 49-48
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
COMMENT: From Aricia? Passed a law with his colleague Labienus (Ap-20) permitting Pompey to wear the dress of a triumphator at the games. Also a close friend of Cicero.

## Ap-5. **M. Antonius M.f.M.n.**

*MRR* 258; *RE* 30; *SWRP* 91
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: cos.44, 34 LEG.: 52-51, 48
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-91)
COMMENT: Marc Antony. His career and allegiance before the tribunate are interesting: in 58 a friend of Clodius and the "torch of Clodius' incendiations" (*incendiorum fax*, Cic. *Phil.* 2.48). Then *praefectus equitum* with Gabinius (Ap-18) in Syria (57-55). Quaestor and legate with Caesar in Gaul (52), where he remained until his tribunate. Defeated Domitius (Ao-37) in the election for the augurate in 50. Was elected to the tribunate with the support of Caesar. As tribune, together with his colleague Cassius (Ap-11), tried to protect Caesar's interests in the preamble to the civil war by interceding against an anti-Caesarian decree (Caes. *BC* 1.1-8). Subsequently, both tribunes were forced to seek refuge with Caesar. From then on, Antony remained loyal to Caesar till the end.
In his youth inherited the heavy debts of his father, but was able to repay them with the help of Curio (Ap-46). Married a rich wife. His military exploits probably brought him profits. Financial needs alone will not have been a motive to join Caesar. Antony was an ambitious politician. As a young man already he chose the *via popularis*. His subsequent choices for Clodius, Gabinius (with Pompey on the

background), and Caesar seem to indicate that he chose the leader, from whom he expected the best career opportunities.

### Ap-6. Sex. Atilius Serranus Gavianus

*MRR* 201-202; *RE* 70
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Unsuccessfully opposed a proposal in the senate to recall Cicero from exile. Cooperated with his colleague Numerius (Ap-33) to prevent Cicero's recall. See Ap-1. Cic. *Sest.* 72 suggests a lower (provincial) background.

### Ap-7. Q. Caecilius Q.f.Q.n. Metellus Nepos

*MRR* 174; *RE* 96
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 57 LEG.: 67-63
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-25, 51.
COMMENT: Legate of Pompey against the pirates and in the East. As tribune attacked Cicero for the execution of the Catilinarian conspirators. Vetoed Cicero's final speech at the end of 63. Was supported by his colleague Calpurnius (Ap-9). In January, 62 he proposed to summon Pompey to Italy to crush the revolt of Catiline. He also tried to enable Pompey to stand for the consulate *in absentia*. His proposals brought him into violent conflict with his colleague Cato (Ao-27; see also Ao-23). Martial law was declared and Metellus left Rome to join Pompey.

### Ap-8. C. Caelius C.f. Rufus

*MRR* 241; *RE* 7; *NMRS* 77
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 51 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 51
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
COMMENT: From Tusculum. Vetoed several anti-Caesarian resolutions of the senate, among them the proposal to depose Caesar from his command in Gaul (Cic. *Fam.* 8.8.6-8). Cooperated with his colleagues Cornelius (Ap-14), Pansa (Ap-51), and Vinicius (Ap-52).

### Ap-9. L. Calpurnius Bestia

*MRR* 174; *RE* 24
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: aed. 59
ALLEGIANCE: Catiline CHANGE: yes (61?)
TYPE: to *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Cicero and Sestius
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-23
COMMENT: See Ap-7. Sympathizer of Catiline, but did not take part in the conspiracy. He should be identified with *RE* 25 (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 50 and 65). Provided shelter for Sestius (Ao-31) during an attack by Clodius. Charged *de ambitu* in 56, defended by Cicero, and exiled. Bestia appears as a friend of Cicero, Caelius (Ao-10), and Sestius (Ao-31). Perhaps sometime during the civil war with Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 51 n.20). In 43 he joined Antony in the hope of becoming consul.

### Ap-10. L. Caninius Gallus

*MRR* 209; *RE* 3
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 56
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-69; (B-67)

COMMENT: Tried to give Pompey the duty of restoring King Ptolemaeus to the Egyptian throne. From 49, probably a moderate Caesarian (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 51 n.5). Friendly with Cicero.

### Ap-11. Q. Cassius Longinus

*MRR* 259; *RE* 70;*SWRP* 111
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 49
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Quaestor under Pompey in Spain ca. 52. Already before his tribunate a political ally of Caesar (Cic. *Att.* 6.8.2 and 7.3.5). On his tribunate see Ap-5. During the civil war he went with Caesar to Spain. He ruthlessly acquired money by corruption and plundering the Spanish provinces. His allegiance to Caesar might have been for motives of gain.

### Ap-12. M. Coelius M.f. Vinicianus

*MRR* 228; *RE* 27
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 53 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 48?
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
COMMENT: With his colleague Hirrus (Ap-24) proposed to make Pompey dictator. Cicero withheld him from carrying the bill on Pompey's wish (Cic. *Q.Fr.* 3.8.4, *Fam.* 8.4.3). On Caesar's side in the civil war (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 50).

### Ap-13. C. Cornelius

*MRR* 144; *RE* 18
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 67
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-11, 12, 16; (B-13)
COMMENT: Proposed several typical *popularis* laws: ban on loans to foreign states, exemption from the laws could only be decided on by the *comitia*, the praetors should follow their own edicts, a severe bribery law. He succeeded in carrying the law on the praetors. His bribery law failed, but it forced the consul Calpurnius Piso (*MRR* 142) to carry a milder one. See on Cornelius' tribunate and his allegiance to Pompey: M. GRIFFIN, The Tribune C. Cornelius, *JRS* 63 (1973), pp. 196-213. He later became an electioneering expert (*Com.Pet.* 19).

### Ap-14. P. Cornelius

*MRR* 241; *RE* 44
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 51 HIGH.MAG.: tr. pl. 51
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
COMMENT: See Ap-8.

### Ap-15. C. Fabius

*MRR* 217; *RE* 17
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55? LEG.: 54-49
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74)
COMMENT: See Ap-3. Legate of Caesar.

### Ap-16. L. Flavius

*MRR* 184; *RE* 17
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 60 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 58
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49 or earlier)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar

COMMENT: Failed to carry an agrarian law for Pompey's veterans. As praetor, he guarded the Armenian prince Tigranes, a hostage of Pompey who managed to escape with the help of Clodius. In 49 with Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar,* 45).

## Ap-17. **Q. Fufius Q.f.C.n. Calenus**

*MRR* 180; *RE* 10; *NMRS* 185
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 61 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 47 LEG.: 51-49, 48-47, 43
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: yes (51)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-29; (B-30, 36)
COMMENT: From Cales? Started his political career under Cinna; blocked after 70 during the aristocratic reaction. As tribune, supported Clodius in the Bona Dea trial. In 51 became legate of Caesar in Gaul, which enabled him to become consul in 47.

## Ap-18. **A. Gabinius A.f.n.**

*MRR* 144-145; *RE* 11; *SWRP* 147
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 58 LEG.: 66-63, 48-47
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-8, 9, 10, 12, 37; (B-35, 39, 43, 45, 48, 79, 80)
COMMENT: Carried a law to grant unlimited powers and major resources to Pompey to fight the pirates (*lex Gabinia de piratis,* B-8, 9, 10). See Ao-29, 30, and 35. Perhaps in debt during his tribunate. Financially he profited substantially from his legations under Pompey and also from his provincial command. As consul, he cooperated with Clodius, but later withdrew his support at the instigation of Pompey (see B-48). See Ap-55. During his trial in 54 he was insufficiently helped by Pompey and exiled (see Ao-22). In 49, he joined Caesar as revenge. See Ap-23.

## Ap-19. **C. Herennius S.f.**

*MRR* 184; *RE* 8; *OÉ* 180; *NMRS* 204
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 60 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 60
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Son of a *divisor* from an equestrian family. As tribune, failed to carry a bill to transfer Clodius to the plebs. Seems to have been impoverished.

## Ap-20. **T. Labienus**

*MRR* 167-168; *RE* 6; *NMRS* 220; *SWRP* 158
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: pr.? 59 LEG.: 58-49, 49-45
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: to *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-21
COMMENT: From Cingulum (Picenum), and, therefore, likely to have been originally a client of Pompey. Charged Rabirius with treason. It was a popular action, because Rabirius had been involved in the murder of the popular leader Saturninus in 100. He also carried a law to restore the election of the pontifs to the people. See Ap-4. He made a fortune as legate in Gaul.
Despite his long-standing political allegiance with Caesar he chose Pompey's side at the outbreak of the civil war. His motives have been much discussed. It does not seem likely that patronage of Pompey has been the reason for the change (contra R. SYME, The Allegiance of Labienus, *JRS* 28 (1938), pp. 113-125). Labienus thanked most of his career and his fortune to Caesar. It is possible that Labienus' success made him feel equal to Caesar and that he refused to be treated as a subordinate (Dio 41.4.3-4; on his motives see W.B. TYRRELL, Labienus' Departure from Caesar in January 49 B.C., *Historia* 21 (1972), pp. 424-440, esp.

437-440). Furthermore, he distrusted the strength of Caesar's forces (Cic. *Att.* 7.16.2). TYRRELL (435) thinks Labienus' knew better and supposes that his remarks on Caesar's troops were only meant to mislead his new partisans. TYRRELL's supposition seems to be influenced by the success of Caesar's army in the civil war. It is very possible, however, that Labienus, the most prominent member on Caesar's staff, had more confidence in the Pompeians. And before Pharsalus, and even after that, the outcome of the civil war was not at all decided. It seems that Labienus calculated that chances of promotion would be better with the Pompeians. Also, the Pompeians possibly offered him career opportunities, for example an army of his own, in order to draw him away from Caesar (TYRRELL 438). Labienus joined what he believed to be the winning side (F.E. ADCOCK, *CAH* vol. IX, 1962[2] (1932), p. 638).

Ap-21. D. Laelius
*MRR* 223; *RE* 6
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 54 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 54 LEG.: 49
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-82
COMMENT: Son of *RE* 5, a legate of Pompey in Spain in 77. As tribune, he protected Gabinius when the latter was attacked after his conviction.

Ap-22. **C. Licinius L.f. Macer**
*MRR* 110; *RE* 112; *SWRP* 161
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 73 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 68?
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Agitated for the restoration of the *tribunicia potestas*. Promised the people that Pompey would restore the powers of the tribunate when returning from Spain (Sall. *Hist.* 3.48M). Accused Rabirius, involved in the assassination of Saturninus in 100, of sacrilege (Cf. Ap-20).

Ap-23. **M. Lollius Palicanus**
*MRR* 122; *RE* 21; *NMRS* 231
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 71 HIGH.MAG.: pr. ca. 69
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-4
COMMENT: From Picenum, the recruiting ground of Pompey's clientele. Actively sought the support of Pompey for the restoration of the *tribunicia potestas*. Had a marital relationship with Gabinius (Ap-18).

Ap-24. **C. Lucilius Hirrus**
*MRR* 229; *RE* 25; *SWRP* 166
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 53 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 53 LEG.: 49-48
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
COMMENT: See Ap-12.

Ap-25. **Mamilius**
*MRR* 217
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55?
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74)
COMMENT: See Ap-3.

Ap-26. **C. Manilius (Crispus?)**
*MRR* 153; *RE* 10
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 66 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 66
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no

INV.COLL.BEH.: B-14, 18; (B-17)
COMMENT: First, he carried a law to distribute the votes of the freedmen in all the tribes (*lex Manilia de libertinorum suffragiis*). The law was immediately annulled. See Ao-37. He then carried a bill to grant Pompey a great command in the East supplementary to his command against the pirates. In 65 he was convicted for *maiestas* and exiled.

### Ap-27. **L. Marcius L.f.L.n. Philippus**

*MRR* 259; *RE* 77
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 38
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Vetoed the proposal to send Faustus Sulla to Mauretania to secure support for Pompey.

### Ap-28. C. Memmius

*MRR* 153; *RE* 8; *SWRP* 173
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 66 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 58
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-17
COMMENT: Delayed the permission for Lucullus' triumph in the interest of Lucullus' rival Pompey. As praetor, against Caesar and Vatinius. See Ao-32.

### Ap-29. **C. Messius**

*MRR* 202; *RE* 2; *NMRS* 252; *SWRP* 175
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: aed. pl. 55 LEG.: 54, 46
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey, Cicero CHANGE: yes (54, 49, 48)
TYPE: first within *populares* then to *optimates* then back to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar to Pompey to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-72; (B-51)
COMMENT: From Teanum Sidicinum? Supported Pompey in proposing Cicero's recall (see Ao-16). Added financial powers and *maius imperium* to the *cura annonae,* which the consuls had granted Pompey. Legate of Caesar in 54. In the civil war first with Pompey and after Pharsalus with Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar,* 49 n.2 and 61 n. 49). In 46 legate of Caesar.

### Ap-30. **Q. Mucius Orestinus**

*MRR* 162; *RE* 12
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 64 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 64
ALLEGIANCE: Catiline CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-23
COMMENT: Attacked Cicero during his campaign for the consulate.

### Ap-31. **T. Munatius L.f.L.n. Plancus Byrsa**

*MRR* 235; *RE* 32; *NMRS* 263
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 52 LEG.: 43
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, Pompey CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-86, 87, 88
COMMENT: From Tibur. Supported the Pompeian candidates for the consulate Hypsaeus (Ap-56) and Scipio (Ao-8). After Clodius' death, provided leadership to the people in rioting and promoting Milo's (Ao-2) conviction. He was helped by his colleagues Pompeius (Ap-38) and Sallustius (Ap-45).
All ten tribunes of 52 proposed a law to permit Caesar to stand for the consulate *in absentia*. Besides Plancus, four others are known: Caelius (Ao-10), Cumanus (Ao-20), Pompeius (Ap-38), and Sallust (Ap-45).

Plancus was prosecuted by Cicero for his involvement in the rioting and exiled. Caesar supported him financially during his exile. In 49, Caesar recalled him from exile, and he remained on Caesar's side. (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 50 and 65 n.16.)

### Ap-32. **M. Nonius Sufenas**

*MRR* 209; *RE* 52
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55?
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey? CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67)
COMMENT: Delayed the elections on behalf of the triumvirate with his colleagues Cato (Ap-39) and Procilius (Ap-40). In the civil war with Pompey (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 43).

### Ap-33. **Q. Numerius Q.f. Rufus**

*MRR* 202; *RE* 5; *NMRS* 282
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57 LEG.: 55
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, (Caesar?) CHANGE: no
COMMENT: From Picenum? See Ap-1 and 6. Cic. *Sest.* 82 suggests a lower (provincial) background. About 55 legate of Caesar in Dalmatia.

### Ap-34. **Q. Opimius**

*MRR* 97; *RE* 11
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 75 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 75
ALLEGIANCE: Cotta cos. 75 CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Supported Cotta's law to reopen the *cursus* for former tribunes of the plebs.

### Ap-35. **Sex. Peducaeus**

*MRR* 217; *RE* 6
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: pr.? 49? LEG.: 40
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73, (B-74)
COMMENT: See Ap-3. In the civil war with Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 50).

### Ap-36. A? Plautius (Plotius?)

*MRR* 128; *RE* 3; *NMRS* 322
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 70? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 70?
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar, Pompey CHANGE: no
COMMENT: From Trebula Suffenas? With the support of Caesar carried a law to restore the citizenship to former followers of Lepidus. Possibly proposed a *lex Plotia agraria*, distributing land to Pompey's veterans of the Sertorian war (Cic. *Att.* 1.18.6), and the *lex Plotia de vi*.

### Ap-37. **A. Plautius (Plotius)**

*MRR* 209; *RE* 8; *NMRS* 324
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr.urb. 51 LEG.: 67-62
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67)
COMMENT: From Trebula Suffenas? Legate of Pompey. As tribune, he tried to charge Pompey with the restoration of King Ptolemaeus to the Egyptian throne. As tribune and aedile, aligned with his colleague Cn. Plancius (Ao-26). Fought with Pompey in the civil war.

### Ap-38. **Q. Pompeius Rufus**

*MRR* 236; *RE* 41; *SWRP* 187
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 52

ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, Pompey CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-86, 87, 88
COMMENT: Sulla's grandson. See Ap-31. Dropped by Pompey, he was convicted and exiled. Caesar probably got him back, which brought him on Caesar's side in the civil war. (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 51 n. 22.)

## Ap-39. C. Porcius Cato

*MRR* 209; *RE* 6
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius CHANGE: yes (56)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-67, 83; (B-37)
COMMENT: See Ap-32. Supported Clodius in pressing for the holding of the aedilician elections. Attacked the proposals for the restoration of the Egyptian King by Pompey or Lentulus Spinther. Proposed to prosecute Milo (Ao-2). After the conference of Luca worked in support of the triumvirate. Possessed an armed gang of gladiators, which he was unable to support and was forced to sell. Milo (Ao-2) bought them through an intermediary. Helped by Pompey during his trial in 54 and acquitted.

## Ap-40. L. Procilius

*MRR* 209; *RE* 1; *NMRS* 343
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 56
ALLEGIANCE: triumvirate CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67)
COMMENT: From Lanuvium. Perhaps the son of a senator. See Ap-32.

## Ap-41. L. Quinctius

*MRR* 103; *RE* 12; *NMRS* 351
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 74 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 68 LEG.: 71
ALLEGIANCE: Crassus? CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-3
COMMENT: Agitated for the restoration of the *tribunicia potestas* and thereby encountered the opposition of the consul Lucullus. Fought with Crassus against Spartacus. As praetor tried to depose Lucullus of the command in the East.

## Ap-42. L. Roscius Fabatus

*MRR* 217; *RE* 15; *NMRS* 358
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55? HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49 LEG.: 54, 46
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74)
COMMENT: From Lanuvium. See Ap-3. Legate of Caesar in 54 and 46. In the civil war with Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 45).

## Ap-43. L.? Rubrius

*MRR* 259; *RE* 5; *NMRS* 363
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49? HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 49?
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar? CHANGE: no
COMMENT: From Casinum? Carried a law concerning Cisalpine Gaul, which is cited in the Caesarian law on this province.

Ap-44. **P. Rutilius Lupus**
*MRR* 209; *RE* 27
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49 LEG.: 48
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67)
COMMENT: Attacked Caesar's agrarian law and supported Pompey's claim to restore King Ptolemaeus to the Egyptian throne. As praetor, in the service of Pompey (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 44).

Ap-45. **C. Sallustius Crispus**
*MRR* 236; *RE* 10; *NMRS* 372; *SWRP* 193
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 46 LEG.: 49, 47
ALLEGIANCE: Clodius, Caesar CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-86, 87, 88
COMMENT: The historian. From Amiternum. See Ap-31 and 38. Ousted from the senate, but reinstated by the dictator Caesar. Indebted in his youth; made a fortune as governor of Africa 46-45.

Ap-46. C. Scribonius Curio
*MRR* 249; *RE* 11; *SWRP* 194
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 50 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 50 LEG.: 49
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (50)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-30, 91, 92; (B-36)
COMMENT: In his youth a supporter of Catiline, in 61 of Clodius. As tribune, started as an anti-Caesarian. Proposed laws on public works and the corn supply. After Caesar paid his debts, which he had incurred from his costly games, went over to Caesar. He proposed that Caesar and Pompey should lay down their commands simultaneously. He joined Caesar in Gaul and fought with him in the civil war. See Ap-5.

Ap-47. P. Servilius M.f. Rullus
*MRR* 168; *RE* 80
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 63
ALLEGIANCE: Caesar CHANGE: no
COMMENT: As tribune, possibly pushed forward by Caesar. Proposed an agrarian law, which was successfully opposed by Cicero.

Ap-48. Cn. Sicinius
*MRR* 93; *RE* 9
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 76 HIGH.MAG: tr.pl. 76
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Attempted to restore the powers of the tribunate.

Ap-49. **C. Trebonius C.f.**
*MRR* 217; *RE* 6; *NMRS* 444
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 45 LEG.: 54-49, 46-45
ALLEGIANCE: triumvirate CHANGE: yes (54)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-73; (B-74)
COMMENT: Carried the law to grant Pompey and Crassus a five year command in Spain and Syria respectivily. Subsequently legate of Caesar.

Ap-50. **P. Vatinius P.f.Ser.**
*MRR* 190, *RE* 3, *NMRS* 467, *SWRP* 216
ACTIVE tr pl 59 HIGH MAG cos 47 LEG 62, 58 56, 51 47
ALLEGIANCE Caesar, triumvirate CHANGE no
INV COLL BEH B-34, 38, 49, 71
COMMENT Helped Caesar in passing the *lex Iulia agraria* and the *lex Iulia de agro Campano* Was opposed by Ancharius (Ao 1), Calvinus (Ao 15), and Fannius (Ao-18) Passed the *lex Vatinia de imperio C Caesaris*, granting Caesar his command in Gaul for the duration of five years He also ratified Pompey s enactments in the East Followed Caesar as legate to Gaul and probably profited financially from it

Ap-51. **C. Vibius C.f.Cn.n. Pansa Caetronianus**
*MRR* 241, *RE* 16, *SWRP* 219
ACTIVE tr pl 51 HIGH MAG cos 43
ALLEGIANCE Caesar CHANGE no
COMMENT From Perusia? His father, a Marian, had been put on the Sullan proscription list See Ap-8

Ap-52. **L. Vinicius (M.f.)**
*MRR* 241, *RE* 1, *NMRS* 494
ACTIVE tr pl 51 HIGH MAG cos 33
ALLEGIANCE Caesar CHANGE no
COMMENT From Cales? See Ap-8

The following four persons were not tribunes of the plebs, and, therefore have not been taken into account in the quantitative analyses of Chapter 1 They are listed here because they acted as assistant leaders during their consulate

Ap-53. L. Aemilius M f.Q.n. Lepidus Paullus
*MRR* 247, *RE* 81, *SWRP* 80
ACTIVE cos 50 HIGH MAG cos 50 LEG 43
ALLEGIANCE Caesar? CHANGE no
COMMENT Became a supporter of Caesar after Caesar had provided him with the financial means to restore the Basilica Aemilia Supported Caesar by keeping his colleague Claudius Marcellus in check Did not participate actively in the civil war (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 40) In 43 legate of Sex Pompey

Ap-54. **L. Afranius A.f.**
*MRR* 182-183, *RE* 6, *OE* 13, *NMRS* 9, *SWRP* 82
ACTIVE cos 60 HIGH MAG cos 60 LEG 75-72, 66-61, 55-49, 48-46
ALLEGIANCE Pompey CHANGE no
COMMENT From Cupra Maritima (Picenum) and, therefore, belonging to Pompey's clientele A typical *vir militaris* Held many lucrative legations under Pompey
Pompey rewarded his services and loyalty by providing the money for large-scale bribery during the election campaign for the consulate See Ao-37

Ap-55. L. Calpurnius L.f.L.n. Piso Caesonius
*MRR* 193, *RE* 90, *SWRP* 107
ACTIVE cos 58 HIGH MAG cos 58 LEG 49, 43
ALLEGIANCE Clodius? Caesar? CHANGE no
COMMENT His daughter Calpurnia married Caesar, who supported him in the consular elections Together with his colleague Gabinius (Ap-18) actively supported Clodius Both received a provincial command (Macedonia and Syria) through a law which Clodius passed in the assembly Financial needs do not seem to have been a

motive to seek the allegiance to Clodius. After his consulate took a neutral and conciliatory stand (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 40).

## Ap-56. **P. Plautius Hypsaeus**

*MRR* 216; *RE* 23; *SWRP* 183
ACTIVE: cos.cand. 53 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey, Clodius CHANGE: yes (49?)
TYPE: within *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar?
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-84, 86; (B-85)
COMMENT: Held a lucrative proquaestorship under Pompey in the East as from 65. Supported by Pompey and Clodius during the consular campaign in 53. Dropped by Pompey and convicted *de ambitu*. See Ap-31 and Ao-8. In the civil war with Caesar. The date of the change is unknown. (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 46).

## Ao-1. Q. Ancharius Q.f.

*MRR* 189; *RE* 3
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 56 LEG.: 73-72
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-34)
COMMENT: His father (*RE* 2) was killed by Marius in 87. The family had been senatorial for one or two generations. As tribune, he opposed the triumvirate with his colleagues Domitius (Ao-15) and Fannius (Ao-18). See Ap-50.

## Ao-2. T. Annius Milo (Papianus)

*MRR* 201; *RE* 67; *NMRS* 30; *SWRP* 86
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 55
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero and others CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-57, 58, 67, 87; (B-51, 63, 65, 77, 84, 86, 88)
COMMENT: From Lanuvium. In close cooperation with his colleague Sestius (Ao-31), opposed Clodius in every way, through violence and politically. They organized *operae* and tried to fight Clodius with his own methods. They worked for Cicero's recall. See Ao-16. Bought the gladiatorial gang of C. Cato (Ap-39) in 56.
In 52 he killed Clodius, was convicted, and exiled to Masillia.
His political expenditures (armed gangs, games, distribution of money) caused him severe debts.

## Ao-3. L. Antistius Vetus

*MRR* 209; *RE* 47
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: cos.suff. 30
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-69; (B-67)
COMMENT: Attempted to prosecute Caesar for his acts as consul in 59, but checked by his colleagues. L. Antistius, *RE* 13 and Antistius Vetus, *RE* 47 should be considered the same person: D.R. SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Two Studies in Roman Nomenclature*, s.l. 1976 (= APA-Am. Class. Studies 3), pp. 11-13.
BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 50 lists him as a Caesarian at the outbreak of the civil war. BRUHNS' conjecture is based on Cic. *Att.* 14.9.3, where Vetus is mentioned as fighting the Pompeians in Asia in 44. It is quite possible, also in view of his behavior during his tribunate, that he changed his allegiance shortly before 44 or at the earliest after Thapsus. Therefore, he should be considered a nonchanger.

## Ao-4. P. Aquillius Gallus

*MRR* 216; *RE* 25
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-71; (B-73)
COMMENT: With his colleague Ateius (Ao-5) in opposition to the consuls Pompey and Crassus; tried to prevent the passage of the *lex Trebonia* (Ap-49).

## Ao-5. C. Ateius (L.f.Ani.) Capito

*MRR* 216; *RE* 7; *NMRS* 52; *SWRP* 94
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 55 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 55
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-71, 74; (B-73)

COMMENT: From Castrum Novum? See Ao-4. A friend of Cicero (Cic. *Fam.* 13.29.2). In 49, a partisan of Pompey. After Thapsus to Caesar. (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 49 n.7.)

### Ao-6. C. Caecilius Cornutus

*MRR* 179; *RE* 43
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 61 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 57
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero? CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Cic. *Att.* 1.14.6 calls him an adherent of the senatorial party. As praetor, worked for the recall of Cicero.

### Ao-7. **L. Caecilius Metellus**

*MRR* 259; *RE* 75
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 49
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Attempted to forbid Caesar access to the treasury in the Aerarium Saturni, which Caesar wanted to use for his war funds. Seems to have followed Pompey in 49 (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 49 and 50 n.11). In 48, he was denied access to Italy (Cic. *Att.* 11.7.2).

### Ao-8. Q. Caecilius Q.f.Q.n. Metellus Pius Scipio Nasica

*MRR* 189; *RE* 99; *SWRP* 103
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 52
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (53)
TYPE: to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-54, 86; (B-85)
COMMENT: In 53 with Hypsaeus (Ap-56) a consular candidate for the *populares* against Milo. See Ap-31. His consular campaign involved him in debts (distribution of money; armed gangs). He was prosecuted, but acquitted with the help of Pompey who had married his daughter in 53. He helped to precipitate the civil war in order to enrich himself.

### Ao-9. **L. Caecilius L.f. Rufus**

*MRR* 167; *RE* 110; *SWRP* 104
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 63 HIGH.MAG.: pr.urb. 57
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-55, 56)
COMMENT: As tribune, proposed to restore civil rights to P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla, but was forced to withdraw the bill. Promised to veto the *lex Servilia agraria* (Ap-47). As praetor, helped to recall Cicero. In 49 on Pompey's side (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 43).

### Ao-10. **M. Caelius M.f.Vel. Rufus**

*MRR* 235; *RE* 35; *OE* 68; *NMRS* 78; *SWRP* 105
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: pr.per. 48
ALLEGIANCE: Milo (and Caesar?) CHANGE: yes (50, 48)
TYPE: first to *populares* then back to *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: first to Caesar then back to Milo
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-87
COMMENT: From Interamnia Praetuttiorum. Son of an *eques*. Supported Milo (Ao-2) from personal enmity with Clodius (Cic. *Mil.* 91; Asc. 33-37C). See Ap-31. Despite his support for the proposal to grant Caesar the possibility to stand for the

consulate *in absentia*, he is considered an assistant of the *optimates* during his tribunate because of his support for Milo.
Indebted because of political expenditures. Changed his allegiance to Caesar in the hope of financial aid. As Caesar did not fulfill his expectations for financial gain and career opportunities, he mobilized the crowd in 48 by promising cancellation of debts. On his agitations in 48 and the reasons for his breach with Caesar, see: BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 123-137. After this he went back to Milo.

Ao-11. C. Cassius Longinus
*MRR* 259; *RE* 59; *SWRP* 110
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 49 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 44 LEG.: 47-46
ALLEGIANCE: Pompey? CHANGE: yes (48)
TYPE: to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
COMMENT: The tyrannicide. Anti-Caesarian. Until Pharsalus in the service of Pompey, then to Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 49, 50 n.12, and 120). His brother and colleague Q. Cassius (Ap-11) was a pro-Caesarian from the start.

Ao-12. **C. Cestilius**
*MRR* 202; *RE* 1; *NMRS* 115
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51)
COMMENT: Active in the recall of Cicero from exile. See Ao-16.

Ao-13. **M. Cispius L.f.**
*MRR* 202; *RE* 4; *NMRS* 120
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. after 49?
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51)
COMMENT: Active in the recall of Cicero. See Ao-16.
Prosecuted *de ambitu*, defended by Cicero, and exiled. Recalled by Caesar. (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 51 n.21.)

Ao-14. M. Curtius Peducaeanus
*MRR* 202; *RE* 23
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 50
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero? CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51)
COMMENT: In favor of the recall of Cicero. See Ao-16.

Ao-15. **Cn. Domitius Calvinus**
*MRR* 189; *RE* 43; *SWRP* 140
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 53, 40 LEG.: 62
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (53)
TYPE: to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-81; (B-34)
COMMENT: See Ao-1 and 32. In 53, he was elected consul against the will of Pompey with the support of Caesar (GELZER, *Caesar*, 132; BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 39). In 49, the only nonexiled consular on the side of Caesar.

Ao-16. **Q. Fabricius**
*MRR* 202; *RE* 7
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51)
COMMENT: Leader of the eight tribunes who in January proposed to recall Cicero.

Ao-17. **T. Fadius (Gallus)**
*MRR* 202; *RE* 9; *NMRS* 169
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 57
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-51)
COMMENT: From Arpinum? or Bononia? If from Arpinum (Cicero's birthplace) probably under the patronage of Cicero. Quaestor in the service of Cicero in 63. As tribune active in the recall of Cicero. See Ao-16.

Ao-18. **C. Fannius C.f.**
*MRR* 189; *RE* 9
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 59 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 54? 50? LEG.: 43-42?
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-34)
COMMENT: See Ao-1. In 49 he chose Pompey.

Ao-19. **C. Furnius**
*MRR* 249; *RE* 3; *NMRS* 190
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 50 HIGH.MAG.: cos. 29 LEG.: 44-43, 41-39
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
COMMENT: Cicero relied on him to prevent the prorogation of his provincial command. In 49 changed his allegiance to Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 50).

Ao-20. **? Manilius Cumanus**
*MRR* 235; *RE* 24; *NMRS* 244
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 52 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 52
ALLEGIANCE: Milo CHANGE: no
COMMENT: From Cumae? Helped Milo (Ao-2) in the aftermath of the murder on Clodius. See Ap-31. Despite his support for the proposal to grant Caesar the possibility to stand for the consulate *in absentia*, he is considered an assistant of the *optimates* during his tribunate because of his support for Milo.

Ao-21. L. Marius
*MRR* 174; *RE* 19
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 62 LEG.: 62-60
ALLEGIANCE: Cato CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Supported his colleague Cato (Ao-27) in passing a law to compel triumphators to report the number of enemies killed and their own losses.

Ao-22. **C. Memmius**
*MRR* 223; *RE* 9
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 54 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 54
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Prosecuted Gabinius (Ap-18) for extortion.

Ao-23. Q. Minucius Q.f. Thermus
*MRR* 174; *RE* 67
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 58? 53? LEG.: 43
ALLEGIANCE: Cato CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-25)
COMMENT: Helped his colleague Cato (Ao-27) to oppose the tribune Metellus (Ap-7), who wanted to summon Pompey for the repression of Catiline. In 49, he fought as propraetor with the Pompeians against Caesar. In 47 or later to Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 117 n.7).

Ao-24. L. Ninnius Quadratus
*MRR* 196; *RE* 3; *NMRS* 272
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-73, 48)
COMMENT: From Pompeii? Supported Cicero, but declined to act against Clodius' bills. Began to formulate a bill to recall Cicero. In 49, probably an ally of Pompey (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 49). MEIER, *RE*, 589 calls him a *popularis* because of his allegiance with Pompey. But it is more likely that he aligned himself to Pompey, after Pompey had become the defender of the senatorial cause. Cf. *LGRR* 109.

Ao-25. L. Novius (Niger?)
*MRR* 196; *RE* 7; *NMRS* 280
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58
ALLEGIANCE: independent? Pompey? CHANGE: no
COMMENT: Accused Clodius of planning an attempt on Pompey 's life. He should be considered an optimate for his action against Clodius in 58. Cf. *LGRR* 109.

Ao-26. **Cn. Plancius Cn.f.**
*MRR* 209; *RE* 4; *OE* 274; *NMRS* 321; *SWRP* 182
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: aed. 54
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67, 69)
COMMENT: From Atina. His father was a *princeps equestris ordinis* and head of the *societas publicanorum* of Asia. As tribune on Cicero's side, but did nothing in particular. Chose the side of Pompey in the civil war.

Ao-27. **M. Porcius Cato Uticensis**
*MRR* 174-175; *RE* 16; *SWRP* 189
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 62 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 54 LEG.: 67
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-22; (B-25, 30, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75)
COMMENT: Cato the Younger. See Ao-21 and 23. Became tribune to oppose Metellus (Ap-7), which he did successfully. Convinced the senate to take a hard stand and execute the Catilinarian conspirators. On his initiative the senate took the decision to augment the number of grain recipients in order to undermine popular support for Catiline (Plut. *Cat.Min.* 26.1, *Caes.* 8.4). He was an independent and obstinate defender of the traditional values of the Republic and the senatorial oligarchy.

Ao-28. **L. Racilius**
*MRR* 209; *RE* 1; *NMRS* 354
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 56 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 56
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero, Spinther, Milo CHANGE: yes (49?)
TYPE: to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-67, 69)
COMMENT: A staunch supporter of the *optimates* against Clodius and the triumvirate. In 48 a Caesarian in Spain (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 51 n.4).

Ao-29. L. Roscius Otho
*MRR* 145; *RE* 22; *NMRS* 359
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 63?
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-8, 9, 20)
COMMENT: From Lanuvium? Known for the *lex Roscia* to reserve fourteen rows in the theater for the *equites*. Supported his colleague Trebellius (Ao-35) against de *lex Gabinia de piratis* (Ap-18).

Ao-30. P. Servilius Globulus
*MRR* 145; *RE* 66
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 67 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 64
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: no
INV.COLL.BEH.: (B-11)
COMMENT: Opposed the legislation of Cornelius (Ap-13; Asc. 58, 61C), and not Gabinius (*MRR* ).

Ao-31. **P. Sestius L.f.**
*MRR* 202; *RE* 6; *SWRP* 198
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 57 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 54? 50?
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero, Milo CHANGE: yes (48)
TYPE: to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-57; (B-51, 52, 54)
COMMENT: See Ao-2 and 16. Indebted because of his political expenditures. Answered Clodius' violence with a gladiatorial gang of his own.
In 56 defended by Cicero when accused for breach of the peace (*de vi* ). In the civil war with Pompey, after Pharsalus with Caesar.

Ao-32. ? Terentius
*MRR* 223; *RE* 2
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 54 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 54
ALLEGIANCE: independent? CHANGE: yes (49?)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL.BEH.: B-82
COMMENT: Interceded on behalf of the consular candidates Domitius (Ao-15) and Memmius (Ap-28), who were involved in a bribery scandal. In 48 in Pompey's army (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 49 n.9).

Ao-33. **Q. Terentius Culeo**
*MRR* 197; *RE* 44
ACTIVE: tr.pl. 58 HIGH.MAG.: tr.pl. 58 LEG.: 43
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero, (Pompey) CHANGE: no

COMMENT Proposed to annul the law exiling Cicero Tried to draw Pompey away from his alliance with Caesar back to the senatorial side His actions in 58 put him in the optimate camp Cf *LGRR* 108.

### Ao-34. M. Terentius Varro

*MRR* 473, *RE* 84, *OE* 336, *SWRP* 204
ACTIVE tr pl 8?, 6? HIGH.MAG.: pr before 67 LEG.: 78-77, 76-71, 67, 50-49
ALLEGIANCE Pompey CHANGE: yes (48)
TYPE to *populares*
SPECIFICATION: to Caesar
COMMENT The author and poet. From Reate. Probably an *eques* Quiet during his tribunate, known as a great friend of Pompey and Cicero Held many legations under Pompey After Pharsalus went over to Caesar (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 44 and 45 n 31) He wanted to conserve the old *res publica* and had in fact an apolitical character (*RE* col. 1175-1177). Because of these opinions and because he did not participate in popular policy, he has been listed with the *optimates*, despite his long-standing relationship with Pompey.

### Ao-35. L. Trebellius

*MRR* 145, *RE* 3, *NMRS* 443
ACTIVE tr pl 67 HIGH.MAG.: tr pl. 67
ALLEGIANCE: independent CHANGE: no
INV COLL BEH.: (B-8, 9)
COMMENT: From Southern Italy? See Ao-29 Vetoed Gabinius' (Ap-18) pirate law, but withdrew when Gabinius attempted to have him deposed of the tribunate by the assembly.

The list of the *optimates* closes with the following three persons, who acted as assistant leaders while holding a different magistracy than tribune of the plebs They, like Ap-53-56, have been excluded from the statistics in Chapter 1.

### Ao-36. P. Cornelius P.f.L.? n. Lentulus Spinther

*MRR* 167, *RE* 238, *SWRP* 129
ACTIVE aed cur 63 HIGH MAG . cos 57
ALLEGIANCE: Cicero CHANGE. yes (50)
TYPE within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV COLL BEH. B-58, (B-23, 53)
COMMENT Supported Cicero in the repression of the Catilinarian conspiracy (Cic *Red Pop* 15, Sall *Cat* 47 4) During his consulate carried the law to recall Cicero Despite drawing up the bill to give Pompey the *cura annonae,* he remained opposed to the triumvirate Cf. *LGRR* 144-145. Eventually, about 50, he chose Pompey s side (BRUHNS, *Caesar,* 38 and 39 n 4)

### Ao-37. L. Domitius Cn.f.Cn.n. Ahenobarbus

*MRR* 153, *RE* 27, *OE* 133, *SWRP* 139
ACTIVE q 66 HIGH MAG : cos. 54
ALLEGIANCE: independent, (Cicero?) CHANGE: yes (49?)
TYPE within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION. to Pompey
INV COLL BEH . B-79, 80, (B-14, 70, 78, 91)
COMMENT Follower of Sulla (Dio 41.11 1-2) Secured votes for Cicero during Cicero's campaign in 67 for the praetorship (*Com Pet* 33). As quaestor, violently opposed Manilius' (Ap-26) law on the votes of the freedmen Cicero counted on his support during the consular campaign of 64 (Cic *Att* 1.1.3) As aedile in 61, opposed the election of Afranius (Ap-54; Cic. *Att* 1.16 12). Acquired large tracks

of land in the Sullan proscriptions. His landed property enabled him to use his tenants and slaves in politics and to offer a personal land distribution to his soldiers in the civil war He had important connections in Gaul and with the publicans

## Ao-38. **M. Favonius**

*MRR* 235, *RE* 1
ACTIVE: aed. 52 HIGH.MAG.: pr. 49
ALLEGIANCE: independent, Cicero CHANGE: yes (49)
TYPE: within *optimates*
SPECIFICATION: to Pompey
INV.COLL BEH.: (B-30, 73)
COMMENT: As senator in 59, refused to take the oath on the *lex Iulia agraria,* but succumbed (Plut *Cat Min* 32.3; Dio 38.7.1). During the years 59-53 constantly opposed the interests of the triumvirate. As aedile let Cato (Ao-27) organize the games, which made Cato popular (Plut. *Cat Min.* 46; Dio 40.45.3). Joined Pompey in the civil war.

## Appendix B

# Collective Behavior 78-49 B.C.

Appendix B provides a chronological survey and a detailed analysis of cases of collective behavior between 78 and 49 B.C. The following definition of collective behavior has been used for the selection of cases: every larger gathering of people in which some action or reaction of the crowd is discernible. This is a deliberately broad and rather vague definition in order to include as many cases as possible. The details of some of the cases do not go beyond one short sentence in the sources. For the same reason "action/reaction" has been taken broadly as well. Therefore, some cases have been included where a crowd gathered with a specific purpose but where no real action or expression of an opinion could be discerned (e.g. B-29, 33). In case of doubt the decision of inclusion or exclusion of the case has been taken on the ground of political value, since I am specifically interested in cases of collective behavior with a political overtone (excluded are e.g. Plin. *NH* 8.7.21; Val.Max. 2.10.8).

LINTOTT (212-215) provides a list with occurrences of violence in the late Republic. Most of his cases have been included in my list; some have not, because there did not seem to have been a larger group involved or because no disturbances are mentioned in the sources (*lex Lutatia de vi*, in 78, LINTOTT 212). When this book went to press, I had not yet received: C. VIRLOUVET, *Famines et émeutes à Rome des origines de la République à la mort de Néron*, Paris 1985. I hope to come back to it in a review.

Of course there have been many more cases of collective behavior than the 92 cases listed below. Many laws were passed in the assembly; each year magistrates were elected. For this the people gathered in great numbers to vote. Also many shows were performed, during which many flocked to the theater and the circus. When a general held a triumph, Rome was filled with spectators. All these cases have not been listed, except when an actual action or expression of the crowd has been recorded in the sources: i.e. when the participants acted as a group instead of a number of individuals casting a vote or attending the games.

The list has been made in order to analyze the individual cases systematically and in detail, and to compare them in order to find similarities and differences in the different types of collective behavior which occurred during the late Republic. In light of the above and in view of the lacunose source material, the list cannot be considered a representative sample of collective behavior in the late Republic in general. But, as has been stated in the Preface, at least the successful and spectacular cases will have been recorded. Therefore, the list should not be considered complete, but it can be considered representative of politically significant collective behavior during the late Republic. The list has the pretension of being exhaustive regarding the records in the sources.

The list is chronological; the cases for which only the year, but not the month or day is known have been listed in the order as they appear in the sources. Each case has been given a number and a short title. On the second line the DATE (year, month, day) is given (the dates are pre-Julian) and the DURATION. A distinction is made between cases which lasted one day or less (< 1 day), 2 days, or more than 2 days (> 2 days). A smaller subdivision is impossible for lack of data.

The third line gives the TYPE of collective behavior and a SPECIFICATION. The different types are: assembly, riot, demonstration, and public manifestation. Of course riots and demonstrations occurred during assemblies as well, but the distinction is made in order to establish a difference between cases occurring within the traditional political framework of the assemblies and those occurring outside. The assembly-type consists of *contiones* and centuriate and tribal assemblies. Although a *contio* is not an assembly in the formal sense, because no political decisions were taken in such a meeting, and should be translated as "meeting" (TAYLOR, *RVA*, Ch. II), *contiones* have been grouped as assemblies. The reason is that they were an institutionalized form of collective behavior which belonged to the various types of Roman political gatherings.

Furthermore, *contiones*, just like the tribal and centuriate assemblies, could only be called by a magistrate. In the specification, I have distinguished between *contiones*, tribal assemblies (legislative and elective), and centuriate assemblies (legislative and elective). No distinction has been made between the *comitia tributa* in the strict sense and the *concilium plebis*. The distinction between the two remained intact during the late Republic (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 60-64). In the *concilium plebis* the patricians were excluded and the assembly could only be presided by a tribune of the plebs. Nevertheless, since the involvement of a magistrate becomes clear from the mobilization-factor, since the exclusion of the patricians only concerned a minor part of the élite, and since the procedures in both assemblies were the same, the *concilium plebis* is considered a tribal assembly in the case-studies.

The fourth line gives topographical details (LOCATION). The fifth line gives information on the involvement of LEADERSHIP and on the leadership TYPE. A distinction has been made between top, assistant, and intermediate leadership along the lines set out in Chapter 1.

The sixth line gives the PARTICIPATION. The number of participants in any case is impossible to establish. The seventh line lists the terms used by the sources (TERMINOLOGY) to describe the participants.

The eighth line lists the factor(s) of MOBILIZATION used: organization (ORG.), SYMBOLS, precipitating incident (PREC.INCID.), opportunity (OPP.), and the authority and the powers of a magistrate (MAG.), e.g. to call an assembly. In Chapter 3 I have discussed more factors of mobilization, e.g. communication and propaganda. Some of these did not result directly in collective behavior, but were responsible for the creation of an atmosphere which was conducive to collective behavior. In the case-studies only those factors of mobilization have been listed which led directly to the individual cases of collective behavior.

The ninth line states whether VIOLENCE was used and, if so, what TYPE. When possible, details on victims are given as an indication of the intensity of the violence. I have also considered as violent those cases in which the behavior constituted a mere threat, without resulting in the actual seizure or damaging of persons and objects. A threat shows the hostility of the crowd towards someone or something and should be considered an act of violence, for the crowd uses coercion to achieve its goal. Whether the intensity of the violence goes beyond threat depends on the reactions of the persons threatened or on repression.

The tenth line tells whether there was any REPRESSION. The eleventh line gives the CAUSE and/or GOAL of the action, and whether the goal was reached (SUCCESS).

The twelfth line provides the SOURCES. The thirteenth line refers to MODERN WORKS which have treated the case or which provide background information.

The fourteenth line describes the events (DESCRIPTION), and the fifteenth line, finally, provides any further information (COMMENT).

1. Sulla's funeral
DATE: 78-?-? DURATION: < 1 day.
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: funeral procession
LOCATION: throughout Rome; via Forum to Campus Martius.
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (Top [Catulus, Sullani, Pompey])
PARTICIPATION: soldiers, veterans, rural plebs.
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: army?
SYMBOLS: *fasces*, standards, crowns, gifts
PREC.INCID.: Sulla's death
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat by soldiers
REPRESSION: unsuccessful attempt by Lepidus et al.
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Sulla after he died SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 1.105-106; Plut. *Pomp.* 15.3, *Sulla* 38.
MODERN WORKS: NICOLET, *Métier*, 463-464.
DESCRIPTION: After Sulla died in 78 a cortege was organized. From outside Rome, a great number of soldiers, veterans, and common people came to Rome. Sulla's *fasces* and standards were borne in front of the procession. Also golden crowns and the presents Sulla had received from cities, friends, and his legions were carried. A great procession was held through the city. All the priests and priestesses, the senate, and the magistrates in their official attire joined the cortege from fear of the soldiers. The *equites* went along as well. Everyone - upper class, soldiers, and plebs - loudly cried farewell to the corpse. A stop was made at the Forum, where orators held funeral speeches. The corpse was then carried to the Campus Martius where it was committed to the flames.
COMMENT: The rural plebs probably consisted of veterans who had been settled by Sulla in colonies on land confiscated from the Marians and Italian towns and on public land. On Sulla's allotments see: BRUNT, *Manpower*, 300-312.
Lepidus, cos. 78, and his adherents had unsuccessfully tried to prevent the official funeral. Pompey had foiled their plans and made sure everything passed off in an orderly and honorable fashion (Plut. *Pomp., Sulla* 38.1). According to Appian, Catulus, Lepidus' colleague in the consulate, and the Sullan party, which probably included Pompey, had resisted Lepidus.

2. Food riot
DATE: 75-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: food riot
LOCATION: Via sacra (Forum)
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: plebs
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: corn shortage, appearance of the consuls in public?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded?
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: corn shortage SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Sall. *Hist.* fr. 2.45M.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 435; LINTOTT 212; RICKMAN, *op.cit.*, 45 and 166-168.
DESCRIPTION: There was a severe corn shortage. The consuls accompanied Q. Metellus, candidate for the praetorship, on the via sacra. They were attacked by the plebs and were forced to run.
COMMENT: The riot took place in the year of Metellus' candidature for the praetorship. Metellus, later called Creticus, was praetor in 74.
The corn shortage was caused by piratical activity. In 74, the praetor M. Antonius was sent to Crete to fight the pirates, but he was not very successful. (RICKMAN.)
The riot is considered successful, because in this and the following years measures were taken to reduce the problems in the food supply: one of the aediles of 75, Q. Hortensius Hortalus, made himself popular by distributing free corn rations to the

people. It is unkown whether he was in any way involved in the riot. M. Seius beat the *nobilis* M. Pupius Piso in the aedilician elections of 75. As aedile in 74, Seius sold the people cheap corn and oil during the whole year. (Cic. *Planc.* 12, *Off.* 2.58, *Verr.* 2.3.215; Plin. *NH* 15.2 and 18.16.) In 73, the *lex Terentia Cassia* re-established the corn subsidies, which had been abolished by Sulla, and introduced a second yearly corn tithe from Sicily (RICKMAN).

## 3. Trial of Oppianicus

DATE: 74-12-? DURATION: > 2 days
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio* + public trial
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Quinctius Ap-41
PARTICIPATION: *plebs contionalis*
TERMINOLOGY: *quiddam hominum genus*
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: Quinctius' garb
PREC.INCID.: condemnation of Oppianicus
MAG.: tr.pl. Quinctius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat against jury
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: redress of senatorial corruption SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Cluent.* 77-79, 90, 93, 103, 108, 110-112.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 213.
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Quinctius protested against the conviction of Oppianicus. There were indications that the jury had been bought. Quinctius held daily riotous *contiones*. He wore a purple garb which reached to his heels. The result was the prosecution of C. Junius, the president of the court in Oppianicus' trial. The speakers at Junius' trial were threatened by the crowd. Junius was convicted.
COMMENT: The date is derived from *Cluent.* 108, where Cicero states that Quinctius left office a few days after the conviction of Junius. Therefore it happened in December. The participants were those with whom Quinctius was popular, "a certain type of people", *Cluent.* 110.
If a tribune of the plebs presided a tribal assembly, he was dressed in the undecorated toga of the ordinary citizen, while other magistrates wore a purple-bordered toga (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 63-64). Quinctius' clothing was purple (*Cluent.* 111). Probably Quinctius wanted to show himself with the authority of other magistrates, especially because at that time the tribunate of the plebs still suffered from the Sullan restrictions. Oppianicus was prosecuted for murder. Quinctius acted as his defendant. Quinctius used Oppianicus' conviction and the rumors of corruption to expose senatorial justice.

## 4. Pompey's contio

DATE: 71-12-10 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Circus Flaminius? (Campus Martius)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
assistant = Lollius Ap-23
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *populus Romanus* (Cic.)
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: Circus Flaminius?
MAG.: tr.pl. Lollius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: (support for Pompey's program) SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Verr.* 1.45; Sall. *Hist.* 4.43M.
MODERN WORKS: VAN OOTEGHEM, *Pompée*, 140.
DESCRIPTION: Pompey as consul designate held his first *contio* outside the city. The tribune M. Lollius Palicanus had called the *contio*. As everyone expected, Pompey announced his intention to re-establish the *tribunicia potestas*. The *contio* reacted with a

murmer of approval (*admurmuratio*, Cic.). Next, Pompey said that the provinces had been plundered, that the courts acted outrageously, and that he wanted to take action against it. Loudly cheering, the *populus Romanus* showed their approval.
COMMENT: For the date see VAN OOTEGHEM.
Perhaps the *contio* was held in the Circus Flaminius, see B-29.

## 5. Acclamation of Pompey

DATE: 70-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: *recognitio equitum*
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos, politai*
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: censors
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: Pompey's popularity as general and consul SUCCESS: (yes)
SOURCES: Plut. *Pomp.* 22.3-6.
DESCRIPTION: During his consulate, after having restored the tribunate and given back the court juries to the *equites*, Pompey officially asked to be dismissed from military service as *eques*. As was the custom, he and other *equites* led their horses before the censors in the Forum and Pompey gave an account of his campaigns. Next, he was loudly acclaimed by the people.
COMMENT: Pompey thanked his popularity to his successes as a military commander and to the restoration of the tribunate. The *recognitio equitum* was the official dismissal from military service which was granted to the *equites* after a minimum of ten years military service. During the ceremony the *eques* returned the public horse to the state.

## 6. Reconciliation of Pompey and Crassus

DATE: 70-12?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly? SPECIFICATION: *contio* ?
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: intermediate = Onatius Aurelius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos*
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: consuls
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of civil strife SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 1.121; Plut. *Crass.* 12.3-4, *Pomp.* 23.1-2.
DESCRIPTION: When the consuls Pompey and Crassus sat in the Forum on the curule chairs, the people asked them to be reconciled to each other, because they feared that the dissensions between the two and their armies, who were still under arms, would lead to civil war. First Pompey and Crassus refused. Then soothsayers (App.) or Onatius Aurelius, an *eques* from the country, from divine inspiration (Plut.) spoke to the people. The people again besought the consuls and reminded them of the civil war between Marius and Sulla. Pompey and Crassus then publicly settled their dispute.
COMMENT: For the date: see Plutarch, according to whom it happened at the end of Pompey's and Crassus' consulate.
Nothing further is known of Aurelius. Nor is it possible to establish whether he acted on his own account or on someone else's.

## 7. Julia's funeral

DATE: 68-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: funeral procession
LOCATION: Rome (Forum)

LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos*
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: images of Marius
PREC.INCID.: Julia's death
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: unsuccessful
CAUSE/GOAL: increase of Caesar's popularity SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Plut. *Caes.* 5.1-2.
MODERN WORKS: NICOLET, *Métier,* 464.
DESCRIPTION: Julia, Marius' widow and Caesar's aunt, died. Caesar held a funeral oration in the Forum. In her cortege he showed images of Marius (*eikonai,* statues or portraits). It was the first time since Sulla that these were shown to the public. Some persons therefore shouted reproaches at Caesar, but the people reacted with loud approval for Caesar. The result of the procession was an increase of Caesar's popularity. See also B-19.
COMMENT: In the same year, Caesar made himself popular by showing his feelings in a funeral oration for his deceased wife Cornelia (a daughter of Cinna, Marius' partner). It was unusual to hold a funeral oration for women who died young. (Plut. *Caes.* 5.2; Suet. *Iul.* 6.1.)

## 8. Lex Gabinia de piratis 1

DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey (+ Caesar)
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *homiloi, polloi* (Dio), *dèmos, plèthos* (Plut.), *universus populus Romanus* (Cic.)
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: corn shortage
MAG.: tr.pl. Gabinius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat of the public; wounded (consul Piso)
REPRESSION: unsuccessful attempt by Trebellius (Ao-35) and Roscius (Ao-29)
CAUSE/GOAL: corn shortage SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 36.23.1-24.4; Plut. *Pomp.* 25.1-4; Cic. *Imp.Pomp.* 44.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 435; LINTOTT 212; OOTEGHEM, *Pompée,* 159-181; RICKMAN, *op.cit.,* 51-52; SEAGER, *Pompey,* 28-39.
DESCRIPTION: The pirates had cut off the corn supply. The tribune Gabinius, on account of Pompey or to do him a favor, proposed to charge one ex-consul with the war against the pirates for three years, with full power throughout the Mediterranean and a large force. Gabinius did not put Pompey's name in his proposal, but the plebs would obviously think of Pompey. The plebs reacted enthusiastically to Gabinius' proposal. Caesar supported the bill in order to gain popularity. The majority of the senate, however, refused to give Pompey such an extraordinary command and resisted Gabinius' proposal. The people then attacked the senate when it was in session in the Curia, and the senators had to run. The consul Cn. Calpurnius Piso would have been lynched, if Gabinius had not saved him. Trebellius and Roscius unsuccessfully spoke in opposition of the proposal.
COMMENT: Gabinius probably first put his proposal to the senate and then told the people the proposal and the senate's reaction in a *contio*. Next, the plebs attacked the senate.
Plutarch (25.5-7) has Catulus speak at this occasion and also mentions Roscius' raising of his fingers during this *contio* (see B-9). However, since Dio's account is the most detailed and probably based on Sallust (*Hist.* 5.17-27M), his sequence of events is followed for the most part.

9. Lex Gabinia de piratis 2
DATE: 67-?-?
DURATION: < 1day
TYPE: assembly
SPECIFICATION: *contio* and tribal legislative
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes
TYPE: top = Pompey
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos, homiloi* (Dio), *dèmos, ochlos* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: corn shortage
MAG.: tr.pl. Gabinius
VIOLENCE: yes
TYPE: threat against Roscius
REPRESSION: unsuccessful veto by Trebellius (Ao-35) and opposition of Roscius (Ao-29)
CAUSE/GOAL: corn shortage
SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 36.24.5-37.1; Plut. *Pomp.* 25.5-26.2; Asc. 72C; Liv. 99; Vell.Pat. 2.32.1-2.
MODERN WORKS: See B-8.
DESCRIPTION: Gabinius called a *contio* for discussion on his pirate law. Pompey held a speech in which he stressed his attentiveness to the community. Next, Gabinius spoke to the people. Finally, Gabinius let Catulus hold a speech. Catulus spoke against the bill and pointed to the danger of one-man rule in the law. When he asked the people who else should get a major command if Pompey would die, the crowd responded "You, Catulus". The *contio* was dismissed and a *concilium plebis* assembled to vote on Gabinius' proposal. The tribune Trebellius vetoed the bill. Gabinius had the assembly vote on the deposition of Trebellius. Trebellius withdrew his veto as soon as the first seventeen tribes had voted in favor of his deposition. Now the voting on the *lex Gabinia* could start. The tribune Roscius did not dare to speak, but raised two fingers to indicate that two persons should receive the command against the pirates. He was met with a threatening uproar of the crowd. Gabinius' law was passed.
COMMENT: This case happened at least three weeks after the former. B-8 describes the promulgation of the law and the reactions to it. It was obligatory to have a three week interval between a proposal and the actual vote in order to have time for thought and discussion (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 16).
The sequence of events of this case in Dio and Plutarch do not agree. A part of Dio's account is lost. His account is probably based on Sall. *Hist.* 17-27M. The sequence of events in Dio is as follows: *contio* on the voting-day, Pompey's speech (36.24.5-26), Gabinius' speech (36.27-29), *concilium plebis*, Trebellius' veto (36.30.1), vote on Trebellius (36.30.2), Roscius' raising of two fingers (36.30.3), speech of Catulus (36.30.4-36a), actual vote on *lex Gabinia* (36.37.1). Of these events Plutarch (25) only mentions Catulus' speech, Roscius' finger sign, and the reaction of the crowd; he puts it all before the day of the actual vote.
What usually happened in Rome was that at least one *contio* was held in the period between the promulgation of a law and the *comitia* during which the voting took place. Often a *contio* was held on the day of the voting. The *contio* was then dismissed to separate the nonvoters (e.g. the patricians in case of a *concilium plebis* presided by a tribune of the plebs) and to let the voters divide themselves in the tribal order to vote (the actual *comitia*). During *contiones* speeches and discussions were held, at the assembly only voting took place. (TAYLOR, *RVA*, Ch. II, pp. 75 and 111.) Catulus' speech will have taken place during a *contio*.
In light of the above, the sequence was as follows: a *contio* on the day of the voting with all the speeches including the one of Catulus (despite Plut.), a *concilium plebis* to vote on the lex Gabinia, Trebellius' veto, vote on Trebellius, Roscius' fingers (despite Plut.), vote on the *lex Gabinia*.
As Asconius (72C) already noticed, the vote on the deposition of the tribune Trebellius provides a parallel with Tiberius Gracchus, who had used the same method against the tribune Octavius in 133.

10. Lex Gabinia de piratis 3
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: (assembly) SPECIFICATION: (*contio*)
LOCATION: ?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Pompey)
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *homilos* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: corn shortage
MAG.: tr.pl. Gabinius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: (by Pompey)
CAUSE/GOAL: deposition of consul Piso SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Dio 36.37.2; Plut. *Pomp.* 27.1-2.
DESCRIPTION: The people were delighted that the corn prices had fallen as a direct result of the passing of the *lex Gabinia*. When the consul Piso tried to sabotage the organization of Pompey's campaign, Pompey came back to Rome. He was met by a great throng. The people wanted to depose Piso from his office. Gabinius had already drawn up a bill for that purpose. Pompey prevented it and made the people calm down.
COMMENT: The type of the collective behavior is not certain. It might have been a spontaneous gathering. Since Plutarch, however, mentions the involvement of Gabinius, it is likely that it was organized by him. Perhaps Gabinius acted on his own account. Pompey wanted to stop Piso's manipulations, and after that had happened, there was no need of antagonizing the senate further by deposing Piso.
The fact that the corn prices fell immediately after the passing of the *lex Gabinia* (Plut. *Pomp.* 26.2 and 27.2; Cic. *Imp.Pomp.* 44), shows that the corn shortage was not only due to piracy, but also to speculation by merchants.

11. Lex Cornelia de legum solutionibus
DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Pompey)
assistant = Cornelius Ap-14
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *ochlos* (Dio), *populus, ex ultima contione* (Asc.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?
MAG.: tr.pl. Cornelius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (consul Piso, stoning)
symbolic (breaking of the *fasces*)
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Globulus (Ao-30) and the consul Piso
CAUSE/GOAL: political reform SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 36.39.2-40.1; Asc. 58C.
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, *Asconius II*, 144-157; *LGRR* 214 and 437; LINTOTT 212.
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Cornelius had proposed a bill that only the people could grant dispensation of the laws. The bill reduced the power of the senate. The tribune Servilius Globulus, at the instigation of the senate, vetoed the law and made the herald stop reading the bill. Cornelius now read the bill himself. The consul Piso protested. The people threatened him. Piso ordered his lictor to arrest those who tried to hit him. The crowd reacted by breaking the lictor's *fasces*. From the back of the assembly stones were thrown at the consul. Cornelius dismissed the assembly. Later the senate accepted the bill in a moderate form.
COMMENT: The type of the assembly is difficult to assess. Asconius says that it happened on the *legis ferundae dies*, which can mean the "day for the proposal of the law" (= *contio*) or the "day to pass the law" (= tribal assembly). Then he says that stones were thrown from the back of the *contio* and that Cornelius dismissed the

*concilium*. The solution is probably to be found in Dio. He says that Cornelius dismissed the assembly (*sullogos*) before the vote (*prin epipsèphisai* ). Therefore, the events took place during the *contio* which preceded the *concilium plebis* for the voting of the law.
It is possible that an organized small group was responsible for the escalation of violence, since Asconius mentions that not the entire assembly threw stones at Piso, but that the stones came from the back of the assembly.

## 12. Consular elections

DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey?
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18?, Cornelius Ap-14?
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *populus, multitudo*
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl.
VIOLENCE: yes? TYPE: threat?
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Lollius SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Val.Max. 3.8.3; Dio 36.39.1.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 132 and 442; LINTOTT 212.
DESCRIPTION: M. Lollius Palicanus (Ap-23) was a candidate in the consular elections. He was strongly supported by the people. In his campaign he received the backing of some tribunes of the plebs. They incited the people and forced the consul Piso to appear on the rostra. The tribunes asked Piso if he wanted to accept Lollius' candidacy for the consulate. Piso refused.
COMMENT: Lollius was not elected.
Since Lollius was a Pompeian and since he was connected to Gabinius' family by marriage, the tribunes who supported him probably were Gabinius and Cornelius. There are no other *populares* assistant leaders known in this year.
Dio only mentions that some violence occurred during the consular elections.

## 13. Lex Calpurnia de ambitu

DATE: 67-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: intermediate = *divisores*
PARTICIPATION: *divisores*
TERMINOLOGY: *multitudo*
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: cos. Piso
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded? (Piso)
REPRESSION: by Piso and a *manus*
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of the law SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Asc. 75-76C.
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, *Asconius II*, 144-157; *LGRR* 213-215 and 437; LINTOTT 212.
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Cornelius (Ap-14) had proposed a severe anti-corruption law, which he failed to carry. The senate then adopted the matter in a mitigated form. Cornelius and the people refused to accept it, because the *divisores* had been excluded. The consul Piso subsequently proposed a more severe bribery law. The assembly which was to vote on the bill was disrupted by a crowd of *divisores*. The bribery agents drove Piso from the Forum. Piso came back with a larger armed gang and made the law pass.
COMMENT: The content of the several bribery laws is unknown. It is strange that Cornelius proposed measures against the *divisores*, since he later became an

electioneering expert. He could not have become successful in that profession without good contacts with the *divisores*. Yet Asconius (75C), quoting Cicero, specifically states that Cornelius resisted the exclusion of the *divisores*. Piso must have included them again in his bill and, therefore, they reacted. Perhaps the *divisores* were able to mobilize other people in addition to themselves for the riot.

## 14. Lex Manilia de libertinorum suffragiis

DATE: 67-12-29/66-1-1 DURATION: 2 days
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative
LOCATION: Capitol
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Pompey, Caesar, Cicero)
assistant = Manilius Ap-26
intermediate = *magistri vicorum* ?
PARTICIPATION: freedmen (= *tabernarii* ) and slaves
TERMINOLOGY: *tines ek tou homilou* (Dio); *libertinorum et servorum manus* (Asc.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *collegia compitalicia*
OPP.: *Compitalia*
MAG.: tr.pl. Manilius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead
REPRESSION: by quaestor Domitius (Ao-37)
CAUSE/GOAL: political reform SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Asc. 45 and 65C; Dio 36.42.1-43.2; Liv. 100.
MODERN WORKS: ALFÖLDI, *Caesar*, 76; FLAMBARD, *Asconius II*, 269-294; idem, *Ktema*, 162-163; LINTOTT 212; MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 195 and 233-234; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 51-53.
DESCRIPTION: Dio: The tribune Manilius proposed to distribute the votes of the freedmen over all the tribes, thus increasing the weight of their votes. He called an assembly on the last day of 67 towards evening. He had persuaded some of the plebs. The law was annulled the next day by the senate. The plebs (*plèthos*) was against Manilius' bill. To regain his popularity Manilius proposed to charge Pompey with the war in the East. Caesar and Cicero strongly urged the people to support this proposal.
Asc.: During the *Compitalia* Manilius proposed the bill with the support of a gang of freedmen and slaves. Manilius used violence and put the Capitol under siege. The quaestor Domitius violently repressed the uprising. Many adherents of Manilius were killed, with which Domitius offended the plebs (*plebs infima*) and ingratiated himself with the senate. Manilius later proposed to grant Pompey the command against Mithridates.
COMMENT: It is not certain whether Pompey, Caesar, and Cicero also supported Manilius' freedmen law.
The *Compitalia* were a religious festival organized in the city by the *collegia compitalicia* presided by *magistri vicorum*. Freedmen and also slaves participated. Therefore, a large part of the plebs, and especially the people who would profit from Manilius' proposal, were already on the streets. It is very likely that Manilius used the organization of the *collegia* to mobilize a following for the assembly and to organize streetgangs.
Dio and Asconius both state that Manilius passed the law with only a part of the urban plebs, but they seem to differ on the reaction of the plebs. According to Dio the plebs (i.e. the freeborn) were opposed to Manilius' law, while in Asconius' version they are angry with Domitius for killing Manilius' adherents. Perhaps the two authors refer to different groups among the plebs or Domitius used excessive violence in the eyes of the plebs. The question remains open.

## 15. Trial of Autronius

DATE: 66-?-? DURATION: < 1 day?
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Autronius

PARTICIPATION: gladiators, slaves
TERMINOLOGY: *gladiatorii, fugitivi*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: gladiatorial gang
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, physical violence)
REPRESSION: ?
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Autronius SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Sulla* 15.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 441; LINTOTT 212.
DESCRIPTION: P. Autronius Paetus cos.des. was charged with electoral corruption. He wanted to disrupt his trial, first with gladiators and runaway slaves, next through stoning and rioting. Autronius was convicted.
COMMENT: Autronius and P. Sulla, elected for the consulate of 65, were removed from office for corruption. Autronius later was involved in the conspiracy of Catiline and convicted in 62.

## 16. Trial of Cornelius

DATE: 66-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Cornelius Ap-14?
intermediate = *operarum duces*
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *collegia* ?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: prosecutors threatened
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Cornelius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Asc. 59-60 and 75C.
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, *Asconius I*, 63 and 69; *LGRR* 438; LINTOTT 212.
DESCRIPTION: The Cominius-brothers charged Cornelius with treason (*maiestas*). At the tribunal they were threatened by known gang leaders (*noti operarum duces*, Asc. 60C). The Cominii had to run for their lives; the next day the charge against Cornelius was withdrawn.
COMMENT: The leadership of Cornelius in this case is uncertain. FLAMBARD's translation of Asc. 60C gives Manilius (Ap-26) as the organizer of the riot. However Asconius does not mention Manilius at this point. FLAMBARD's addition of Manilius is probably based on a misreading of Asc. 66C: *de disturbato iudicio Maniliano*. FLAMBARD reads *Manilio*, meaning "the trial disturbed by Manilius". But the most recent editions (66C, 49St, 71G) all read *Maniliano*, "Manilius' disturbed trial". This means that Manilius disrupted his own trial (B-17) and not Cornelius'. See also PHILLIPS, *Latomus*, 597 n.6 and pp. 603-605; WARD, *TAPhA*, 549 and n.16.
Perhaps the mobilization of a crowd was facilitated by using *collegia*. Asconius (75C) mentions that the adherents of Cornelius were organized in *collegia* and that it was one of the reasons for the senate to abolish these organizations in 64. The *Cornelii* Asconius mentions might also be Sulla's freedmen (App. 1.100 and 104; FLAMBARD, II, 197; TREGGIARI, *Freedmen*, 171).

## 17. Demonstration pro-Manilius

DATE: 66-12-27 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Memmius Ap-28?, tribune
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos* (Plut.); *homilos* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl.
VIOLENCE: yes? TYPE: Cicero threatened?
REPRESSION: no

CAUSE/GOAL: due process for Manilius SUCCESS: (yes)
SOURCES: Plut. *Cic.* 9.4-6; Dio 36.44.1-2.
MODERN WORKS: PHILLIPS, *Latomus*, 596; WARD, *TAPhA*, 545-548; MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 223-224.
DESCRIPTION: At the end of Cicero's praetorship, Manilius (Ap-26) was brought before him as accused. Being a friend of Pompey, Manilius was popular. The people were angry because Cicero did not grant Manilius the statutory ten days to prepare his defense. Two tribunes of the plebs brought Cicero before the rostra and denounced him in front of the people. Cicero explained his behavior by saying that he had acted thus in order to let Manilius appear before him, before he would leave office and a praetor who would perhaps be less favorably disposed towards Manilius would take over. Manilius eventually was convicted.
COMMENT: For the date see PHILLIPS.
One of the tribunes that called the *contio* might have been Memmius, since he is the only known *popularis* assistant leader of this year.
The action can hardly be called successful, since the only thing achieved was that Cicero was forced to account for his behavior.

## 18. Trial of Manilius

DATE: 65-1-? DURATION: < 1day?
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: (Forum?)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Crassus or Catiline and Piso)
assistant = Manilius Ap-26
intermediate = *operarum duces*
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: --
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded?
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Manilius SUCCESS: (yes)
SOURCES: Asc. 60 and 66C; Dio 36.44.2.
MODERN WORKS: PHILLIPS, *Latomus*, passim; WARD, *TAPhA*, 548-554; *LGRR* 262 and 441; LINTOTT 212; MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 224-226.
DESCRIPTION: Manilius was prosecuted for treason (*maiestas*). He disrupted the trial by a riot which was staged by gang leaders. The trial was later reconvened. By that time, Manilius had already fled the city and was automatically convicted.
COMMENT: WARD argues that Manilius received support from Crassus. Asconius (66C) mentions Catiline and Cn. Piso.
It is likely that the gangleaders were not alone, but brought their gangs (*operae*) with them.
GRUEN (*LGRR* 262 and n.6) holds that Domitius Ahenobarbus repressed Manilius' disruption. GRUEN bases his statement on Schol.Bob. 119St. The Scholia Bobbiensia, however, are a very late source, and therefore on itself insufficient as proof. The scholiast probably mixed this case up with the repression by Domitius of Manilius' freedmen law (B-14).

## 19. Demonstration pro-Caesar

DATE: 65-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering
LOCATION: Capitol
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos*
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: monuments of Marius
MAG.: aed. Caesar
VIOLENCE: no

REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: Caesarian propaganda SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Plut. *Caes.* 6; Vell.Pat. 2.43.4; (Suet. *Iul.* 11).
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 76.
DESCRIPTION: As aedile, Caesar erected during the night statues in commemoration of Marius' victories on the Germans, which he had ordered to construct in secret. Many people reunited on the spot in the morning. Suddenly the adherents of Marius appeared in astounding numbers and applauded.
COMMENT: It is likely that Caesar somehow was responsible for the gathering of the crowd in the morning. Caesar increased his popularity greatly. See also B-7.
According to Suetonius, this popular act by Caesar was a reaction to the oligarchy (*factio optimatium*) which had foiled Caesar's plans to get a command in Egypt.

## 20. Roscius in the theater

DATE: 63-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: theater-Bellona temple-theater
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: *polloi, dèmos, politai*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: claque (*equites*)
PREC.INCID.: entrance of Roscius in the theater
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: by cos. Cicero
CAUSE/GOAL: special seats for the *equites* SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Plut. *Cic.* 13.2-4.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 438.
DESCRIPTION: L. Roscius Otho (Ao-29) as tribune in 67 had passed a law to grant the *equites* separate seats in the theater. The law was first applied during Otho's praetorship in 63. The people considered it an insult, and, as Otho entered the theater, he was hissed, while the *equites* applauded him. Both groups of spectators shouted ever louder and started insulting each other. It came to physical violence. The consul Cicero called the people to the temple of Bellona and reprimanded them. The people returned to the theater and applauded Otho.
COMMENT: Roscius is known as an *optimates* assistant leader. Therefore one might surmise that the demonstration in the theater was pro-*populares*. But it need not necessarily be the case. Measures concerning the *equites*, e.g. the question of the jury courts, were an important part of the program of the *populares*. Popular leaders tried to curry the favor of the *equites* in order to have their support against the senatorial majority. Roscius granted the equestrian order the same rights as the senators had received in the second century: separate seats in the theater. By his popular law Roscius probably tried to draw the *equites* into the senatorial camp, which was weakened by the successes of Pompey's popular policy. The spectators in the theater must have seen Roscius' measure as a degradation of themselves. The senators among the spectators perhaps considered it an unjustified benefit for the *equites*. Therefore the reaction of the public should be seen as anti-*populares* rather than anti-*optimates*.

## 21. Trial of Rabirius

DATE: 63-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
assistant = Labienus Ap-20
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *cives imperiti*
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: portrait of Saturninus
PREC.INCID.: remark of Cicero

MAG.: tr.pl. Labienus
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: murder of Saturninus/*scu* SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Rab.Perd.* 18 and 25; (Dio 37.26-27).
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 277-279 and 438; TAYLOR, *PP*, 123.
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Labienus, with the support of Caesar, prosecuted C. Rabirius for his involvement in the assassination of the popular leader Saturninus in 100. Cicero defended Rabirius. During his speech, Cicero was forced to react to shouts from the public. Cicero called Saturninus an enemy of the Roman people (*hostis populi Romani*, Cic. 18) and the public protested. Cicero said that only a small number of imperitous citizens shouted, while the great majority (*populus Romanus*) remained silent. Labienus carried a portrait of Saturninus with him at the trial (Cic. 25).
COMMENT: Cicero's speech was pronounced during a preliminary *contio* before the voting in the trial (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 103).
Cicero's distinction between a small group and the majority was a rhetorical device to minimize the importance of the reaction.
The trial ended without a judgment, because the procedures were stopped after the praetor Q. Metellus Celer waved a red flag on the Janiculus, an ancient sign of emergency (*LGRR* 279). Nevertheless the case is considered successful because Caesar's and Labienus' publicity goal was reached, namely to denounce senatorial repression of a popular leader and to dispute the validity of the *senatus consultum ultimum* (*scu*).
It is the only case in which direct reaction of the public during a speech is recorded in the speech itself.

## 22. Cato the Younger's election to the tribunate

DATE: 63-7-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal elective
LOCATION: Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Cato the Younger Ao-27
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *polloi, plèthos*
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: (Cato)
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Cato SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Plut. *Cat.Min.* 21.2.
DESCRIPTION: As Cato the Younger decided to stand for the tribunate of 62, the Campus filled up with people to support him and Cato was elected.
COMMENT: The tribunician elections were normally held in July (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 63 and n.12).
Plutarch says it happened in the Forum (*agora*), but it must have been the Campus Martius where all the elections took place (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 47).
Perhaps Cato had already made public his plans to increase the number of grain recipients, which he would do at the end of the year. On Cato's corn law: Plut. *Caes.* 8.3-4, *Cat.Min.* 26.1, *Mor.* 818D (*Praec. Ger. Rei Publ.*); RICKMAN, *op.cit.*, 168-172.

## 23. The conspiracy of Catiline

DATE: 63-12-17 DURATION: > 2 days
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Rome
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Catiline + fellow conspirators
assistant = L. Bestia Ap-9, Q. Mucius Ap-30

intermediate = *leno* (Cic. 4.17), *duces multitudinum* (Sall. 50.1)
PARTICIPATION: artisans, shopkeepers, slaves
TERMINOLOGY: *cheirotechnai* (App.), *falcarii* (Cic. 1.8), *tabernarii* (Cic. 4.17, *opifices, servitia, cuncta plebs* (Sall. 50.1, 37.1)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: Lentulus' and Cethegus' slaves and freedmen
PREC.INCID.: incendies and assassinations
OPP.: *Saturnalia*, indebtedness
MAG.: tr.pl. Bestia; closing of the shops
VIOLENCE: planned
REPRESSION: by police action, *senatus consultum ultimum*, and corn law
CAUSE/GOAL: coup SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: App. 2.2-6; Cic. *Cat.* passim, esp. 1.8, 10, 2.26, 3.5, 10, and 4.17; Diod. 40.5; Sall. *Cat.* passim, esp. 24.4, 26.4, 29.2, 30.7, 37.1, and 50; Plut. *Cic.* 10.2-11, 14-22; Dio 37.29-36 (Liv. 102; Flor. 2.12).
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 416-433; LINTOTT 213; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 58-70.
DESCRIPTION: Catiline, an impoverished scion of an obscure patrician family, planned a coup in Rome together with some other senators and *equites*, many of whom were indebted. Catiline several times had failed to reach the consulate, and now tried his luck with a conspiracy. Incendies and assassinations of important persons in Rome were planned. Cancellation of debts and land distribution were promised (Dio 37.30). The night of the *Saturnalia* had been chosen for the action (Cic. 3.10; Diod.; Plut. 18). The conspirators convened in the street of the scythemakers (*falcarii* ). Catiline went to the countryside to mobilize support. Lentulus and Cethegus were the leaders in Rome. Through a pimp (*leno*) they tried to mobilize the shopkeepers. They also contacted plebeian leaders (*duces multitudinum*) The tribunes in the conspiracy probably were to order the closing of the shops (Cic. 4.17). The tribune Bestia was to call an assembly after the murder of Cicero, but he eventually stayed out. The consul Cicero found the conspirators out and put guards throughout the city. He also provided himself with a bodyguard. The senate passed the *senatus consultum ultimum* (the emergency decree). Lentulus and Cethegus were arrested. Their slaves and freedmen tried to free them from the prison with artisans (App., Sall.). Cicero had the two leaders killed, which calmed the crowd. Cato the Younger proposed to increase the number of grain recipients to quell the rebellion (B-22).
COMMENT: In this case collective behavior hardly arose, but the case has been included because of the detailed account in the sources, which provides us with important information on participation, methods of mobilization, and repression. The conspiracy had most success in the countryside, where Sullan veterans and slaves participated.
During the consular elections, which Catiline lost, Cicero had already worn a breastplate to show his determination to keep order (Plut. 14; Cic. *Mur.* 52; Dio 37.29).
The *Saturnalia* (held December 17) were a kind of Carnival. During the festival the roles between masters and slaves were temporarily reversed. The timing was well-chosen, because during the festival the city would already be in a chaotic atmosphere with many people feasting on the streets and more than usual freedom for the slaves.
One of the main causes for the failure of the conspiracy was the effective repression as from the start. The élite for the major part was united and took effective measures to quell the rebellion. Another important factor was that mobilization was hampered by lack of legitimacy of the conspiracy. Catiline did not hold any magistracy. Catiline's fellow conspirator Lentulus was praetor, but was discharged from office and imprisoned. Of the tribunes involved, Bestia, who had entered office in December, probably withdrew at some point. Mucius had been tribune in 64 and therefore did not have any magisterial authority at the time of the revolt. Furthermore, the distress of the plebs was relieved by Cato's grain measure.

24. Demonstration pro-Caesar
DATE: 63-12-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: riot
LOCATION: Forum (outside the Curia)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: (top = Caesar)
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos*
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Caesar in the senate
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: senate threatened
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: protection of Caesar SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Plut. *Caes.* 8.3-4, *Cat.Min.* 26.1, *Mor.* 818D (*Praec. Ger. Rei Publ.*).
DESCRIPTION: Several days after the discussion in the senate on the fate of the Catilinarian conspirators, Caesar went to the senate to account for his alleged involvement in the conspiracy. As the people noticed that the meeting lasted longer than usual, they surrounded the senate building and with loud cries demanded the release of Caesar. The action prompted Cato the Younger to propose his corn bill.

25. Pompey's recall
DATE: 62-1-3 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum, temple of Castor
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey, Caesar
assistant = Metellus Ap-7
PARTICIPATION: plebs, foreigners, gladiators, slaves
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos, xenoi, monomachoi, therapontes* (Plut.), *homines, improbi* (Cic.).
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: gladiators, slaves
MAG.: tr.pl. Metellus
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence, stoning)
REPRESSION: by Cato (Ao-27) and Minucius (Ao-23)
CAUSE/GOAL: recall of Pompey SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Plut. *Cat.Min.* 26.2-29.2; Cic. *Sest.* 62; Dio 37.43; Suet. *Iul.* 16.1.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 440; LINTOTT 213; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 87-89; TAYLOR, *PP*, 127-128.
DESCRIPTION: Metellus Nepos proposed to recall Pompey with his army from the East to repress the Catilinarian conspiracy. The senate did not support Metellus' proposal. Metellus then called an assembly to have the people vote on his bill. Metellus presided the assembly in the presence of Caesar. They sat at the entrance of the temple of Castor surrounded by gladiators and armed servants. Many plebeians in favor of the bill were present. The tribunes Cato the Younger and Minucius Thermus forbade the reading of the bill. Metellus ordered his armed retainers to disperse the crowd. Cato was pelted with sticks and stones, and took refuge in the temple. Metellus tried to resume the procedures of the assembly. But he and his adherents were dispersed by Cato and supporters. Cato regained the confidence of the plebs. Metellus subsequently joined Pompey in the East.
COMMENT: For the date see the BUDé edition of Plut. *Cat.Min.* p. 99 n.2 (R. FLACELIÈRE, E. CHAMBRY, 1976).
The meeting was the final *contio* before the voters had been ordered to divide into their tribes (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 62).
Dio (37.43.3) says that the senate passed the *senatus consultum ultimum* to restore order, but Plutarch (29.2) mentions that Cato resisted severe measures against Metellus.

26. Demonstration pro-Caesar
DATE: 62-1-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: riot

LOCATION: outside Caesar's house
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *multitudo*
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Caesar's resignation
MAG.: pr. Caesar
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat?
REPRESSION: by Caesar
CAUSE/GOAL: to restore Caesar in office SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Suet. *Iul.* 16.
MODERN WORKS: GELZER, *Caesar*, 51-52.
DESCRIPTION: The senate deposed Caesar from the praetorship for his support for Metellus (B-25). When Caesar resigned his office, the people gathered at his house and tumultuously offered their support. Caesar kept the crowd in check and thereby regained the respect of the senate and was restored in office.

## 27. Attack on Vettius

DATE: 62-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: pr. Caesar
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Vettius)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to support Caesar SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Suet. *Iul.* 17.
DESCRIPTION: Vettius had accused Caesar of complicity in the Catilinarian conspiracy. In a *contio* in front of the rostra the people almost tore Vettius apart. Caesar had him imprisoned.

## 28. Pompey's return from the East

DATE: 62-?-? DURATION: > 2 days
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering/procession
LOCATION: On the road from Brindisi to Rome
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
PARTICIPATION: Italians/rural plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Pompey's return
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Pompey SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Plut. *Pomp.* 43.3.
DESCRIPTION: After debarking in Brundisium, Pompey dismissed his army. He travelled to Rome. When they saw that he was travelling in a sober and peaceful way, the people poured out of the cities in Italy and escorted him to Rome.

## 29. Contio in Circus Flaminius

DATE: 61-1-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Circus Flaminius (Campus Martius)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius, (Caesar)
assistant = Fufius Calenus Ap-17
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: contemporary popular leader (Pompey), Circus

Flaminius
OPP.: market day
MAG.: tr.pl. Fufius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: support for Clodius SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 1.14.1-2.
MODERN WORKS: MOREAU, *Clodiana*, 100, 105, and 109-110; SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Atticus I*, 307.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius had entered the house of Caesar during the Bona Dea worship, a religious ceremony exclusively for women. Clodius was accused of adultery with Caesar's wife and was to stand trial for blasphemy in the Bona Dea affair. The people were assembled in the Circus Flaminius on a market day. The tribune Fufius used the opportunity to hold a *contio*. He let Pompey appear before the people to express his opinion on the procedures in the planned trial (see B-30). Pompey declined to support Clodius and aligned himself to the senate.
COMMENT: On the date: MOREAU 110.
The Circus Flaminius was built by the popular leader C. Flaminius, who fell at Lake Trasimene in 217. It was built on the spot where the tribal assembly in 449 had ended the tyranny of the decemvirate. (TAYLOR, *RVA*, 20.) Possibly the Circus Flaminius, built on a popular spot by a popular leader, still had a symbolic value in the late Republic. The location of the assembly was also determined by the fact that Pompey as a military commander was not allowed to enter the *Pomerium* (MOREAU, SHACKLETON).
According to MOREAU (100), the involvement of Fufius, a partisan of Caesar, and Caesar's friendly attitude towards Clodius despite the scandal in Caesar's house shows that Caesar backed Clodius.

## 30. Lex Pupia Valeria de incestu

DATE: 61-1-28 or 29 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius, Piso
intermediate = Curio Ap-46, *duces* ?
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *totus ille grex Catilinae*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae, iuvenes*
MAG.: cos. Piso
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat by *operae*
REPRESSION: by Cato (Ao-27), Hortensius, and Favonius (Ao-38)
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 1.14.5.
MODERN WORKS: MOREAU, *Clodiana*, 92-98, 111-115, 120-121, and 125-129; LINTOTT 213; TAYLOR, *RVA*, 77.
DESCRIPTION: The senate had ordered the consuls to propose a law to the assembly with special judiciary procedures for Clodius' trial. The jury was to be picked by the praetor instead of the usual designation by lot. Clodius' friends resisted the bill, because it was disadvantageous to him. The consul M. Pupius Piso disapproved of the law, but was forced to draw up the bill. At the assembly he urged the people to vote against the law. Young aristocrats and Catiline's adherents under the leadership of Curio the Younger agitated against the law as well. The voting-bridges (*pontes*) were occupied by Clodius' gangs (*operae*). They manipulated the voting by distributing only tablets with an "A" (= *Antiquo*, Nay). The assembly was dismissed by Clodius' opponents Cato the Younger, Hortensius, and Favonius.
Later a compromise was reached by the two parties. The tribune Fufius (Ap-17) drew up a new bill in which the passage on the designation of the juries was altered. The bill was passed.

COMMENT: On the date: MOREAU 112.
Curio is listed as an intermediate leader, because he did not hold a magistracy in 61. The *operae* possibly stood under the leadership of gang leaders.

## 31. Bona Dea trial

DATE: 61-4/5-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Clodius)
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: jury threatened
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Clodius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 1.16; Dio 37.46; Plut. *Cic.* 29.5-6.
MODERN WORKS: MOREAU, *Clodiana*, 151-157, 207-209, 220, and 222-225; LINTOTT 213.
DESCRIPTION: At Clodius' trial for the Bona Dea affair, the people supported him. The members of the jury were threatened and surrounded themselves with a bodyguard. Clodius was acquitted. The jury was suspected of being bribed (probably by Crassus).
COMMENT: On the date: MOREAU 152-157.
The *operae* used in the previous case (B-29) were likely to be present at the trial as well.

## 32. Pompey's triumph

DATE: 61-9-28/29 DURATION: 2 days
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: triumph
LOCATION: throughout Rome
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: inscriptions with the names of the conquered territories and the amount of booty; trophies
MAG.: (general Pompey)
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Pompey SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Flor. 2.13.9; Liv. 103; Plut. *Pomp.* 45; Vell.Pat. 2.40.3 and 5.
DESCRIPTION: For his victories against the pirates and in the East Pompey held a magnificent triumph, which lasted two days. At the end of the triumph the people in a *contio* acclaimed him as Magnus (Liv.).
COMMENT: Pompey enhanced his prestige by showing the leaders of the Cretan pirates, who were the prisoners of Metellus Creticus, in his own triumph (Flor.; Vell.Pat.).
This is one of the triumphs during which reactions of the public are recorded. There have been, of course, more triumphs, but I have only listed the ones with attested collective behavior.

## 33. Caesar's contio with Pompey and Crassus

DATE: 59-1-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *homilos* (Dio); *dèmos* (Plut.)

MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: contemporary popular leader (Pompey, Crassus)
MAG.: cos. Caesar
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: Caesar's legislative plans SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.10; Plut. *Pomp.* 47.4-5, *Caes.* 14.2-3; Dio 38.4.4-5.5.
MODERN WORKS: GELZER, *Caesar*, 66.
DESCRIPTION: Caesar brought Pompey and Crassus on the rostra before the people. Caesar asked them if they supported his bills. They answered affirmatively. Pompey expressed his willingness to defend the people against opposition.
COMMENT: Since this case happened shortly before the next, which most probably took place in January, the events should be set in January as well.

## 34. Lex Iulia agraria

DATE: 59-1-? (second half) DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar, Pompey
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50
intermediate = Fibulus
PARTICIPATION: plebs, veterans
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos* (Dio), *dèmos, stratiotai, hopla* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *cheira* (App.), army
MAG.: cos. Caesar
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: armed men; wounded (Bibulus, Cato, tribunes); symbolic (breaking of the *fasces*)
REPRESSION: by Bibulus, Ancharius (Ao-1), Calvinus (Ao-15), Fannius (Ao-18), and Cato (Ao-27)
CAUSE/GOAL: agrarian law SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.10-11; Cic. *Vat.* 22 and 31; Dio 38.6.1-4; Liv. 103; Plut. *Caes.* 14.6, *Cat.Min.* 32.2-3, *Luc.* 42.6, *Pomp.* 48.1-3; Suet. *Iul.* 20.1.
MODERN WORKS: GELZER, *Caesar*, 66; *LGRR* 437; LINTOTT 213; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 89-90.
DESCRIPTION: Caesar proposed a law for the distribution of lands to the poor and to the veterans of Pompey's campaigns in the East. The senate opposed the bill. Caesar took the measure before the people. He had already organized a gang (*cheira*) and people flocked to the assembly with concealed daggers (App.). Pompey had soldiers enter the city to participate in the voting (Plut.) The plebs occupied the Forum on the night before the assembly (Dio). The consul Bibulus with two (Plut.) or three (Dio) tribunes came to the Forum to stop the procedures. They were attacked by the armed men under the leadership of Vatinius and probably C. Fibulus (Cic.). Bibulus' *fasces* were broken. He received a basket of ordure on his head (Plut.). Cato the Younger (Ao-27) also tried to stop the assembly, but he was twice ejected from the Forum by the Caesarians (App.). Caesar's law was passed.
COMMENT: On the date see SEAGER, *Pompey*, App. I. Subsequent legislation was passed by Caesar and Vatinius on the ratification of Pompey's enactments in the East and the rebate for the publicans (March), the division of the Campanian lands (April) and Caesar's provincial command (Gaul and Illyricum; May).
The opposing tribunes were Ancharius, Calvinius, and Fannius, according to Cic. *Sest.* 113, *Vat.* 16.
The clause that land should be distributed to fathers with at least three children, which made Caesar popular with a multitude of men (App.), probably belonged to the agrarian law on Campania (*LGRR* 399-400). On the *lex Campana* see further BRUNT, *Manpower*, 314-318.

35. Gabinius at the shows
DATE: 59-7-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: theater
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: entrance of Gabinius?
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: unpopularity of Gabinius SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 2.19.3 and 24.3.
MODERN WORKS: SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Atticus I*, 389; VILLE, *op.cit.*, 61-62 (no. 11).
DESCRIPTION: Gabinius (Ap-18) had organized gladiatorial shows before the consular elections in July, in which he was a candidate. During the shows Gabinius and his supporters were hissed.
COMMENT: Gabinius was nevertheless elected consul for 58.
From this case we must conclude that an organizer of shows could not entirely manipulate the composition of the spectators. Probably other people had furnished tickets to spectators as well.

36. Caesar and Curio at the shows
DATE: 59-7-? (*between July 6-13*) DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: theater
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *equites*
PREC.INCID.: lines of the actor, entrance of Caesar and Curio
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: unpopularity of the triumvirs SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 2.19.3; Val.Max. 6.2.9.
DESCRIPTION: During the *ludi Apollinares* (July 6-13), the actor Diphilus said a few lines which could be conceived as a criticism of Pompey and the increase of his power. The public applauded. When Caesar entered the theater, the spectators remained silent, which was seen as a hostile attitude. Next, Curio the Younger (Ap-46) entered, at that time an opponent of the triumvirs. He was loudly applauded. The ovation was started by the *equites*, who stood up (Cic.).
COMMENT: Cic. *Att.* 2.18.1 (written in June): Curio is everywhere applauded by the *boni* ; the pro-Caesarian praetor Q. Fufius Calenus is hissed. *Att.* 2.20.4 (written in July): hatred of the *populares* is very popular. *Att.* 2.21.1 (written after July 25): the triumvirate has encountered the wistles of the crowd (*sibili vulgi* ).
Since the *lex Roscia*, the *equites* had separate seats in the theater and could act as a claque (see B-20).
The applause for Curio was started by the *equites*. Furthermore, Cicero says that Curio elsewhere received applause from the *boni* for his opposition to the triumvirs, while Fufius (Ap-17) was hissed. *Boni* is a vague term to indicate the conservative members of the Roman élite and all those who supported them (HELLEGOUARC'H, *op.cit.*, 484-493). The participants in this case obviously did not belong to the *plebs contionalis*.
The games should have been presided by the urban praetor; it is unknown who he was.

37. Attack against C. Cato
DATE: 59-?-? (second half) DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*

LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Pompey)
assistant = Gabinius Ap-18
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae*
MAG.: unknown
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Cato)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to support Pompey SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Q.Fr.* 1.2.15, *Sest.* 18.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 442; LINTOTT 213.
DESCRIPTION: C. Porcius Cato wanted to prosecute Gabinius for corruption. In a *contio* he called Pompey a tyrant. The people almost lynched Cato and he had to run.
COMMENT: According to Cic. *Sest.*, Gabinius prided on having *operae* which had helped him to prevent a prosecution *de ambitu*. The gangs probably were used in this case.
Cato later changed his allegiance and became an assistant leader (Ap-39) of Clodius.

## 38. Contio with Vettius

DATE: 59-8-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos* (App.)
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. Vatinius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: popularity of Caesar SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.12 and 17; Cic. *Att.* 2.24.3, *Vat.* 24; Dio 38.9.2-4; Plut. *Luc.* 42.7-8; Suet. *Iul.* 20.5.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 213.
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Vatinius (Cic. *Vat.*) let Vettius appear in a *contio* to admit that he was ordered by Bibulus, Cicero, and Cato to assassinate Caesar and Pompey. The people were furious and surrounded Caesar to protect him against conspiracies.
COMMENT: On the date see C. MEIER, Zur Chronologie und Politik in Caesars erstem Konsulat, *Historia* 10 (1961), pp. 68-98, esp. 88-93.
Vettius was perhaps bought by Caesar and Pompey (Plut., Suet.) or by Clodius (SEAGER, *Pompey*, 99-100). Vettius was later murdered in prison.
See B-27.

## 39. Isis riot

DATE: 58-1-1 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: religious
LOCATION: Capitol?
LEADERSHIP: no
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: *vulgus*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *collegia* ?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Gabinius threatened
REPRESSION: by cos. Gabinius (Ap-18)
CAUSE/GOAL: reinstatement of popular cult SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Tertul. *Ad Nat.*, 1.10.17-18, *Apol.* 6.8.
MODERN WORKS: ALFÖLDI, *Caesar*, 63-66.

DESCRIPTION: The senate had forbidden the cult of the Egyptian gods Isis, Serapis, Harpocrates, and Anubis because it was considered subversive to the state. Their sanctuaries were destroyed. A crowd beleaguered the consul Gabinius to hear his opinion on the affair. Gabinius supported the senatorial measure and prevented the erection of altars.
COMMENT: It is one of the few spontaneous cases of collective behavior between 78-49 B.C. that we know of. The absence of élite leadership explains the lack of success of the action.
Organization was possibly provided by *collegia* which were established for the cult. The cult of the Egyptian goddess Isis was popular with the plebs during the late Republic. The Roman government tried to reduce the cult several times until it was definitely banned in the early Empire. (ALFÖLDI, *Caesar*, 52-74.)

## 40. Compitalia

DATE: 58-1-1 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: religious games
LOCATION: throughout Rome (at the crossroads)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
intermediate = Sextus Clodius, *magistri vicorum*
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *collegia compitalicia, vici*
SYMBOLS: lictors, *toga praetexta*
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: games for the *plebs urbana* SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Asc. 7C; Cic. *Pis.* 8 and 23.
MODERN WORKS: MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 94-95.
DESCRIPTION: The *Compitalia* were celebrated under the leadership of Sextus Clodius, one of Clodius' intermediate leaders (*operarum Clodianarum dux*, Asc.). Sextus had imbued himself with the insignia of the Roman magistrate: lictors and the *toga praetexta*.
COMMENT: The *ludi compitales* were religious games for the urban plebs. They were organized at the crossroads of the neighborhoods by the principals (*magistri vicorum*) through the *collegia compitalicia*.
At this moment the celebration of the *Compitalia* was still forbidden. In 64, the senate had prohibited the *collegia* and thereby the games. Three days after the celebration of the games in 58, Clodius would pass a law in the assembly by which the *collegia* were reinstated (Cic. *Pis.* 9).

## 41. Recruitment of collegia

DATE: 58-1-7/9 DURATION: > 2 days
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio* ?
LOCATION: Forum (tribunal of Aurelianus and temple of Castor)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: freeborn, freedmen, artisans and shopkeepers
TERMINOLOGY: *liberi, servi*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *collegia, decuriae, vici*
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius, closing of the shops
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: reinstatement of the *collegia* SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Dom.* 54, 129, *Sest.* 34, *Pis.* 11 and 23, *Red.Pop.* 13, *Red.Sen.* 32-33.

DESCRIPTION: Soon after passing his *lex de collegiis*, Clodius recruited (*dilectus*) "slaves" into *collegia* at the tribunal of Aurelian. The people were brought together by an edict of Clodius to close the shops (*Dom.*). The people were inscribed in neighborhoods (*vicatim*) and divided into squads of ten (*decuriae*). The temple of Castor was occupied, its steps demolished, and used as an armory.
COMMENT: For the date see GRIMAL, *Études*, p. 145.
Cicero mentions slaves, which is probably exaggerated. More likely they were freedmen, specifically artisans and shopkeepers who formed the majority of the members of the *collegia*. In the *De Domo* 54 Cicero mentions that also freeborn (*liberi*) participated. In that passage, Cicero also mentions the closing of the shops in the description of the events (*cum edictis tuis tabernas claudi iubebas* ). This implies the participation of *tabernarii* and *opifices*.
The temple of Castor was an important spot in the Forum. It was the scene of meetings and assemblies. Its steps were used for voting. Clodius occupied this strategic spot in order to be able to rule the assemblies. (See TAYLOR, *RVA*, 27-28 and 41-44.)

## 42. Riot against Ciceronians

DATE: 58-Int-19 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Capitol
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stones, swords, physical violence)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: exile of Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Dom.* 54, *Sest.* 26, *Pis.* 23.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius had deposed his *rogatio de capite civis*, which was to prohibit the execution of a Roman citizen without a trial. The bill obviously was directed against Cicero, who had ordered to kill the imprisoned Catilinarian conspirators in 63 without granting them a trial. While the senate was in session over this matter, a huge crowd from the city and the Italian countryside assembled on the Capitol to support Cicero. With stones, swords, and fists Clodius had them driven away.
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 147.
Clodius' bill was passed shortly afterwards, and Cicero went into exile before he was forced to it by law (B-47).

## 43. Demonstration of equites

DATE: 58-Int-19 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Cicero, Q. Hortensius, C. Curio)
PARTICIPATION: *equites*
TERMINOLOGY: *equites, hippeis*
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: senate meeting
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: by cos. Gabinius (Ap-18)
CAUSE/GOAL: support Cicero SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Dom.* 55, *Pis.* 23 and 64, *Red.Sen.* 12; Dio 38.16.2-4.
MODERN WORKS: NICOLET, *Métier*, 475.
DESCRIPTION: When the senate was deliberating on the Ciceronian question, the *equites* came together to express their support for Cicero. The senators Hortensius and Curio (the Elder probably) were their spokesmen (Dio). The consul Gabinius (Ap-18) refused them access to the senate. He even drove one of them, L. Aelius Lamia, from the city.

COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 147.

## 44. Accusation of Hortensius and Curio

DATE: 58-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
intermediate = claqueurs
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos*
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat by plebs?
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 38.16.5.
DESCRIPTION: Hortensius and Curio had participated in the demonstration of the *equites* (B-43). Clodius brought them before the people, where they were rebuked by claqueurs (*tinôn propareskeuasmenôn*, "some who were prepared for it"). The claqueurs abused them by means of slogans (*sunenekopse*).

## 45. Contio in the Circus Flaminius

DATE: 58-Int-23 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Circus Flaminius (Campus Martius)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: Circus Flaminius
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Red.Sen.* 13 and 17, *Sest.* 33; Dio 38.16.6.
DESCRIPTION: In a *contio*, held in the Circus Flaminius, Clodius asked the consul Gabinius (Ap-18) to express his opinion on Cicero's exile. Gabinius told the people he approved Clodius' policy and, additionally (Dio), accused the *equites* and the senate.
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 147.
For the symbolic value of the Circus Flaminius see B-29.
By the approval of the consul Clodius probably sought an extra legitimization of his actions against Cicero.

## 46. Contio with Caesar

DATE: 58-2?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Circus Flaminius?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *homilos* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: contemporary popular leader (Caesar), Circus Flaminius?
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 38.17.1-2; Plut. *Cic.* 30.4.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius produced Caesar in a *contio* to express his opinion on the Ciceronian question. Caesar told the people that he considered the execution of the

Catilinarian conspirators illegal. Clodius had to assemble the people outside the walls, for Caesar was already in command for his Gallic campaign and was not allowed to enter the city boundary.
COMMENT: The *contio* was likely to have taken place in the Circus Flaminius, located on the Campus Martius outside the *pomerium* (cf. B-29 and 45). For its symbolic value see B-29.
Caesar obviously was still popular at this time. The plebs will also have remembered his position during the Catilinarian conspiracy (see B-24 and 26).

## 47. Lex Clodia de exsilio Ciceronis

DATE: 58-4-25 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
intermediate = Fidulius
PARTICIPATION: plebs (freedmen?)
TERMINOLOGY: *egentes, servi*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae, centum*
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: exile Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Dom.* 79-80, *Sest.* 65.
MODERN WORKS: BUDé edition of Cic. *Red.Sen.*, pp. 12-14 (P. WUILLEUMIER, 1952); LINTOTT 214; TAYLOR, *PP*, 60-62.
DESCRIPTION: In March, Clodius had passed his *lex de capite civis*, with which he had rendered the killing of the Catilinarian conspirators illegal. Now, Clodius had the assembly vote on a *lex de exsilio Ciceronis* by which the clauses of the former law were specifically applied to Cicero. Gangs (*operae*) were at the assembly to influence the voting. They consisted of poor (*egentes*) and slaves (*servi*, more likely freedmen). The gangs were led by Fidulius, who was there with a group of 100 men (*centum*) to shout in favor of the law. Fidulius had passed the night in the Forum and was the first to vote.
COMMENT: For the date: BUDé 12.
No real violence seems to have occurred.
Fidulius' role is interesting. He was the first to vote. The first voter, and especially the first group to vote were very important in Roman voting. E.g. in the centuriate assembly the vote of the first century (*centuria praerogativa*) usually was followed by the subsequent groups. In the tribal assembly the voting order of the tribes was determined by lot. The name of the first voter in the first tribe to vote was recorded. Perhaps the presiding magistrate could designate the first voter. (NICOLET, *Métier*, 383-385; TAYLOR, *RVA*, 70-74 and 76.) Compare also B-71, where Pompey dissolved the assembly after an unfavorable vote by the first tribe.

## 48. Attacks against Pompey and Gabinius

DATE: 58-?-? DURATION: > 2 days
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Rome
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded; symbolic (breaking of the *fasces*)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Red.Sen.* 7, *Red.Pop.* 14, *Pis.* 28; Dio 38.30.2; Plut. *Pomp.* 49.2.

MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 214.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius had violently helped to escape Tigranes, son of the King of Armenia, who was a hostage of Pompey. It led to a breach between Clodius and Pompey and Gabinius (Ap-18). After this, Clodius attacked Pompey, Gabinius, and their followers several times during which the *fasces* of the consul were broken. Pompey was forced to remain inside his house.
COMMENT: The tribune Ninnius (Ao-24) had consecrated Clodius' goods (Cic. *Dom.* 125), but it does not seem to have affected Clodius' popularity. Clodius did the same thing to Gabinius' goods in a *contio* (Cic. *Dom.* 124-127; Dio 38.30.2). It was meant to reduce Gabinius' legitimacy in office.

## 49. Trial of Vatinius

DATE: 58-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50
PARTICIPATION: plebs, soldiers?
TERMINOLOGY: *milites*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?, *army* ?
MAG.: tr.pl. Clodius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: physical violence,
reversement of the voting urns
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Vatinius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Vat.* 33-34, *Sest.* 135.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 292 and 442; LINTOTT 214.
DESCRIPTION: Vatinius had to stand trial for the machinations during his tribunate in 59. He had already left Rome to join Caesar as a legate, but returned for the trial. Clodius and Vatinius violently disrupted the trial. Clodius took the lead of a group of armed men. The judges and the prosecuters had to run. The voting urns and the seats of the judges were destroyed. The trial was not reconvened.
COMMENT: Since Vatinius had already joined Caesar as a legate before the trial, it is possible that he brought some soldiers with him for support. Cicero calls the armed men under the leadership of Clodius "soldiers" (*milites, Vat.* 33).

## 50. Lucullus' funeral

DATE: 57-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: funeral procession
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: no
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos*
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: entrance of the funeral procession in the Forum
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: by M. Licinius Lucullus
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Lucullus SUCCESS: (no)
SOURCES: Plut. *Luc.* 43.2-3.
DESCRIPTION: L. Licinius Lucullus, the great general of the early 60s, died. Young aristocrats carried his corpse to the Forum. Unexpectedly the people assembled and asked for a funeral on the Campus Martius. Because no preparations had been made, Lucullus' brother Marcus was able to convince the people that it was best to bury Lucullus on his estate in Tusculum.
COMMENT: The date is uncertain.
Probably a spontaneous action of the plebs.

## 51. Lex Fabricia

DATE: 57-1-23 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
assistant = Ap. Claudius pr., Metellus Nepos Ap-7
PARTICIPATION: (slaves) and freedmen
TERMINOLOGY: *servi*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: gladiators
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: dead, wounded
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by tribunes
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of Cicero's recall SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Sest.* 75-78, *Mil.* 38; Dio 39.7.2-3.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 440-441; LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 129-131.
DESCRIPTION: Q. Fabricius (Ao-16) and seven other tribunes proposed the recall of Cicero from exile. They had the backing of Pompey. They put the bill before the assembly. During the night before the voting, Fabricius and adherents occupied the rostra. Clodius and his men (mainly slaves, Cic.) occupied the Forum. Clodius had the support of the consul Metellus Nepos and of his brother Appius Claudius the praetor. Appius had bought gladiators for the games he was to give. He put the gladiators at the disposition of Clodius. In the morning Clodius and his men attacked Fabricius and killed some of his group. The tribune Cispius (Ao-13) was also forcibly evicted. Cicero's brother Quintus had to hide himself behind the corpses of slaves and freedmen. The Forum was filled with blood and the Tiber with corpses (Cic.). The bill was not passed.
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 158.
The tribunes who assisted Fabricius were Milo (Ao-2), Cestilius (Ao-12), Cispius (Ao-13), Curtius (Ao-14), Fadius (Ao-17), Sestius (Ao-31), and Messius (Ap-29).
Cicero's description of the carnage created by Clodius is a rhetorical exaggeration. Cicero (*Sest.* 75) also says that Fabricius and his men occupied the rostra shortly before sunrise (*aliquanto ante lucem*), while Clodius took possession of the Forum in the middle of the night (*multa de nocte*), indicating that Clodius was first to take illegal action. Cicero obviously wants to play down any manipulation by Fabricius. What probably happened was that both parties went down to the Forum at night in order to take up positions to influence the voting at dawn.
Since Cicero mentions slaves and freedmen among the victims, Fabricius probably took a band of personal clients and slaves with him to the assembly.
Dio's contention that the plebs (*plèthos*) was in favor of Cicero's recall is difficult to believe, since the law on the recall eventually had to be proposed in the centuriate assembly for it to be passed (B-58).

## 52. Attack on Sestius

DATE: 57-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal legislative?
LOCATION: Forum, temple of Castor
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
intermediate = Lentidius, Titius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *manus, collegia* ?
PREC.INCID.: *obnuntiatio*
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: Sestius' obstruction SUCCESS: (yes)
SOURCES: Cic. *Sest.* 79-80, *Mil.* 38, *Red.Sen.* 7, *Red.Pop.* 14.

DESCRIPTION: The tribune Sestius (Ao-31) went to the temple of Castor to tell the consul that the auspices were unfavorable. He was attacked by a gang (*manus*) of Clodius led by Lentidius and Titius. Sestius was severely wounded.
COMMENT: It took place shortly after B-51.
It happened probably during a tribal assembly. The purpose of the assembly is unknown. Sestius did an *obnuntiatio* by which assemblies could be stopped in case of unfavorable omens. However, one of the four laws Clodius had passed in January 58 dealt with the repeal of the *Leges Aelia et Fufia*, which had established the practice of *obnuntiatio*. Sestius' act therefore was illegal.

## 53. Demonstration pro-Cicero

DATE: 57-5-1, 2, or 3 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: theater
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: intermediate = claqueur
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: *populus Romanus*
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: announcement of senatorial standpoint, entrance of senators, entrance of Clodius, lines of the actor
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Clodius threatened
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: support Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Sest.* 116-123.
DESCRIPTION: After a meeting in the temple of Virtus, the senate expressed itself in favor of Cicero's recall. When the senatorial decision was announced in the theater, the public applauded. The senators entered the theater and were individually applauded. The consul Lentulus Spinther (Ao-36) was loudly cheered. When Clodius entered, he was hissed and threatened. The actor on the scene made allusions to Cicero. The spectators cheered him loudly.
COMMENT: It took place during the *ludi Florales* (May 1-3): GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 127-128.
Cicero, in his description of the events, grants a large role to the actor in directing the enthusiasm of the public towards Cicero and the senate and the unfavorable reaction towards Clodius. In this case, therefore, the actor acted as a claqueur.
In August, the centuriate assembly recalled Cicero. It is likely that the public in the theater was composed of the people whose votes counted in that assembly.

## 54. Sestius at the shows

DATE: 57-5-9/13 DURATION: 2 days?
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (assistant = Metellus Scipio Ao-8?)
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: *omnes genus hominum, universus populus Romanus*
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: entrance Sestius, App. Claudius
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: support Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Sest.* 124-126.
MODERN WORKS: VILLE, *op.cit.*, 62 no.13.
DESCRIPTION: Gladiatorial shows were organized in the Forum by Q. Caecilius Metellus Scipio (Ao-8). All kinds of people (*omnes genus hominum* ) were present and the Forum was crowded. People were even standing on the Capitol. When P. Sestius (Ao-31) showed himself to the public, he was loudly applauded. When Ap. Claudius, Clodius' brother, showed himself, he was hissed.
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 162.

At this time Caecilius Metellus (Ao-8) still was on the side of the *optimates*, which might explain the composition and the reaction of the public.

## 55. Food riot during the ludi Apollinares

DATE: 57-7-? (first half) DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: food riot
LOCATION: theater
LEADERSHIP: (yes) TYPE: (top = Clodius)
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *infima coacta multitudo*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *collegia* ?
PREC.INCID.: corn shortage
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: corn shortage SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Asc. 48C.
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, *op.cit.*, 98 and 111-113; LINTOTT 214; MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 72 and 200; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 131-132; NICOLET, *Métier*, 485.
DESCRIPTION: The urban praetor L. Caecilius Rufus (Ao-9) presided the *ludi Apollinares* (July 5-13). Because of a corn shortage a crowd was brought together and entered the theater. The spectators were forcibly ejected.
COMMENT: MARSHALL argues that Asconius has made a mistake over the name of the games and that his story should be identified with the food riot during the *ludi Romani* (B-60). Asconius, however, specifically states that the urban praetor presided the games. In fact, the *ludi Apollinares* were always presided by the urban praetor; the *ludi Romani* were the responsibility of the aediles (BALSDON, *Leisure*, 261). There have therefore occurred two distinct food riots in 57.
It was not a spontaneous riot. Asconius calls the crowd *infima coacta multitudo* ("a collected crowd of the lower classes"). His use of *coacta* (from *cogo*) implies that the crowd did not assemble by itself, but was mobilized by someone. That person most probably was Clodius, in view of the parallelism with B-60 (thus also BENNER 111-113 and n.429).
In BENNER's representation (98 and 111), the adherents of Clodius were already seated in the theater and next ejected the other spectators. This, however, does not comply with Asconius, who indicates that a crowd from outside forced all spectators out of the theater (... *multitudo... tumultuata est ut omnes qui in theatro spectandi causa consederant pellerentur*).
The riot is considered successful, because the prices seem to have fallen shortly afterwards and because in September the senate took measures to improve the corn supply.
Shortly after the riot, the senate passed a decree that a bill should be proposed to the centuriate assembly to recall Cicero (Cic. *Sest.* 129; GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 129 and 164). Cicero has it, that right after the decree the corn prices suddenly fell because there was a general feeling that law and order would be re-established (*Dom.* 14, *Red.Pop.* 18). If this is true, it is likely that the price fall was not due to a reduced fear of disorder but to measures taken by the upper strata, e.g. pressure on the grain traders, to alleviate the corn situation in order to calm down Clodius' supporters before the voting on the recall of Cicero.

## 56. Attack on the house of Caecilius Rufus

DATE: 57-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: house of Caecilius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *collegia* ?

VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: Caecilius' support for Cicero SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Mil.* 38.
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, *op.cit.*, 112.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius attacked the house of the urban praetor Caecilius Rufus (Ao-9).
COMMENT: For the date see Asc. 48C.
It is possible that Clodius used his contacts in the *collegia* to bring together an armed gang, as he usually did.
Since Asconius comments the passage of Cicero with the description of B-55, the two cases must have been connected and probably followed one another (see also BENNER).

## 57. Clodius evicted from the Forum

DATE: 57-8-4 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly? SPECIFICATION: *contio* ?
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
assistant = Milo Ao-2?, Sestius Ao-31?
PARTICIPATION: Italians, rural plebs,
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos, ek tôn perix poleôn* (Plut.),
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *cheira*
MAG.: tr.pl.?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Clodius
CAUSE/GOAL: recall Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Plut. *Cic.* 33.3; *Pomp.* 49.3.
DESCRIPTION: Before the voting on the recall of Cicero, a fight took place in the Forum between the adherents of Pompey and Clodius. Pompey escorted Cicero's brother Quintus to the Forum with a band of armed men (*cheira*). Pompey's group was composed of members of the plebs and people from the Italian cities who had been brought to Rome to vote for the recall of Cicero. It came to a fight with the Clodians, who were evicted from the Forum. After this the voting took place.
COMMENT: The events took place right before the subsequent centuriate assembly which recalled Cicero (B-58), perhaps during a preliminary *contio*. The two cases are considered distinct, because Plutarch says that the fight took place in the Forum (*agora*), while the centuriate assembly was situated on the Campus Martius.
The involvement of Milo and Sestius is not attested, but likely because they were Clodius' fiercest opponents and at least Milo was involved in the next case.

## 58. Lex Cornelia

DATE: 57-8-4 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate legislative
LOCATION: Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
assistant = Milo Ao-2, cos. Lentulus Spinther Ao-36
PARTICIPATION: Italians, rural plebs, élite
TERMINOLOGY: *municipiis clausis, populus, concursus totius Italiae, tota Italia , omnes ordines* (Cic.), *dèmos* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: Pompey's Italian clientele
MAG.: cos. Lentulus Spinther
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: recall of Cicero SUCCESS: yes

SOURCES: App. 2.16; Cic. *Att.* 4.1.4, *Dom.* 75 and 90, *Mil.* 38-39, *Pis.* 80; Dio 39.8.2-3; Liv. 104.
MODERN WORKS: NICOLET, *Métier*, 398-400; TAYLOR, *PP*, 60-62.
DESCRIPTION: On the Campus Martius a centuriate assembly was convened to vote on the bill proposed by the consul Cornelius Lentulus Spinther on the recall of Cicero. Pompey had done his best to mobilize support from the Italian countryside. He was helped by Milo (App., Liv.). The assembly passed the law and Cicero could return to Rome.
COMMENT: For the date: GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 165.
It was obviously not the *plebs contionalis* which voted in favor of the recall of Cicero. As Cicero himself says (*Dom.*), the people in this case were mobilized not by closing the shops, but by closing the Italian cities (*non tabernis, sed municipiis clausis*). Furthermore, the law was passed in the centuriate assembly in which the votes of the rich citizens were more important than those of the plebs.

## 59. Return of Cicero

DATE: 57-9-4 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering
LOCATION: suburbs - porta Capena - Capitol/Forum - Cicero's house
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Cicero
intermediate = *nomenclator*
PARTICIPATION: plebs, Italians, rural plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *infima plebs, populus Romanus, multitudo*
MOBILIZATION: OPP.: *ludi Romani*
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.16; Cic. *Att.* 4.1.5; *Dom.* 75-76, *Sest.* 131; Plut. *Cic.* 33.5.
MODERN WORKS: GRIMAL, *op.cit.*, 136 and 166.
DESCRIPTION: When Cicero returned from exile, he was greeted by the people known to his *nomenclator* (*Att.*) and hailed by loudly cheering crowds all the way to his house.
COMMENT: The date was well-chosen. On that day, the *ludi Romani* started and Rome was filled with people from the rural districts who had travelled to the city to attend the games (GRIMAL 136).

## 60. Food riot during the ludi Romani

DATE: 57-9-7 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: food riot
LOCATION: theater - Capitol
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
intermediate = Sergius, Lollius, *armati duces*
PARTICIPATION: *tabernarii*, freedmen
TERMINOLOGY: *servi, multitudo, gladiatores* (Cic.), *homilos* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *manus, operae*, claque
PREC.INCID.: corn shortage
OPP.: corn shortage
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, cos. Q. Metellus)
REPRESSION: ?
CAUSE/GOAL: corn shortage SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 4.1.6-7, *Dom.* 6-7, 10-16, *Fam.* 5.17.2; Dio 39.9.2-3.
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, *op.cit.*, 98; GARNSEY, in: GARNSEY, *Trade*, 59; *LGRR* 436; LINTOTT 214; NICOLET, *Métier*, 274-276; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 133-134; RICKMAN, *op.cit.*, 173-174; SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Atticus II*, 167.
DESCRIPTION: Immediately after Cicero's return, the price of grain had risen high. Clodius made his gangs run through the city at night to mobilize the plebs and to

suggest Cicero as a scapegoat for the dearth (*operarum illa concursatio nocturna non a te ipso instituta me frumentum flagitabat?, Dom.* 14). The next day, a crowd rushed into the theater, where the *ludi Romani* were being held. From there the crowd went to the Capitol where the senate was meeting in the temple of Concord. (*Att., Dom.* 11, Dio.) The senate was discussing the corn situation (*Att.*). Clodius had brought a gang of slaves and armed men to the Capitol (*manus, Dom.* 6). The senate was threatened (Dio). Stones were thrown, started by Sergius, Lollius, and other *duces* of Clodius; the consul Q. Metellus was wounded (*Dom.* 12-14). At the instigation of Clodius and Sergius, Lollius, and other intermediate leaders, and with the help of Clodius' gangs (*operae*) the crowd shouted that Cicero had caused the dearth (*Att., Dom.* 14-15). The *boni* suggested that Pompey should provide a solution. The *multitudo* agreed and called on Cicero to make such a proposal (*Att., Dom.* 16). Cicero did, and the senate passed a decree to put Pompey in charge of the corn supply (*cura annonae* ; *Att., Dom.* 16, Dio). Cicero was applauded after the new fashion (*more hoc insulso et novo plausum dedisset, Att.*).

COMMENT: It is one of the best documented riots of the late Republic.

The methods of mobilization and the role of the leadership are interesting. Through the organization Clodius had built up he was able to turn the feelings of distress among the plebs into collective action. During the night, he had his gangs run through the city to mobilize the plebs and to suggest a scapegoat. The timing was well-chosen: the senate was meeting on the question of the corn supply. Clodius led the crowd to the senate. There he and his intermediate leaders led the people in scapegoating Cicero and in acts of violence. His gangs served as a claque in shouting slogans.

BENNER's suggestion (98) that the Clodians formed part of the theater public does not comply with the sources.

The participants are likely to have consisted mainly of shopkeepers, since Cicero calls Sergius, one of Clodius' intermediate leaders in the riot, an "agitator of shopkeepers" (*concitator tabernariorum, Dom.* 13). Also Cicero's use of *servi* ("slaves", an insult for freedmen, *Dom.* 6) points in this direction. The spectators in the theater were different from Clodius' following. It should be stressed that the riot took place during the theatrical performances. During the last five days of the *ludi Romani* (September 15-19), chariot races were held. During these very popular races 250.000 Romans gathered in the Circus Maximus. (BALSDON, *Leisure,* 248 and 268.) At the time of the riot only a limited number attended the games, including quite a few people from the countryside (see B-59).

The question of repression is difficult to answer. Cicero says that Clodius and his armed gangs had been driven away before Cicero went to the Capitol (*Dom.* 6-8 and 15). This suggests repression. Cicero, however, mentions it in a propagandistic speech. In his letter to Atticus, he does not mention it and suggests that Clodius was still there to accuse him. What happened was a canalization of the collective behavior. Some people (*boni,* most likely members of the upper class) suggested Pompey as a savior. He was an obvious choice. Pompey was the great organizer who was there to save Rome in case of trouble. The plebs agreed and their attention was diverted from Cicero to Pompey. There was not much Clodius could do now.

The cause of the dearth is uncertain. There was no real famine yet. The price was high and famine was feared (*Dom.* 12). The shortage might have been due to supply problems caused by the *lex Clodia frumentaria* of 58 and the subsequent manumission of slaves on a large scale (RICKMAN). Clodius blamed Pompey for it. In the senate he accused Pompey of having caused the dearth himself, so that he would receive another great command, the care for the corn supply (Plut. *Pomp.* 49.5). Pompey, having an important clientele among the sea traders and the eastern provinces since his conquest of the East and his defeat of the pirates, was certainly capable of creating a grain shortage. In Cicero's account there are some indications of a controversy in the senate over Pompey's command. Many senators, especially all the consulars except Messalla and Afranius (Ap-54), were absent at the meeting during the riot. They feared for their lives. (*Att., Dom.* 8.) During the meeting on the next day, where the details on Pompey's *cura annonae* were filled in, there was a large attendance. Clodius suggested in the senate that the decree on Pompey's command should be annulled, since it had

been passed by an insufficient number of senators (*Dom.* 10). The senate however did not agree. See also GARNSEY.
The food shortage could jeopardize the popularity Clodius had gained by his corn law of the preceding year. Still, he turned the situation to his advantage. He staged a riot at the right moment and suggested a scapegoat to the people in distress, before they could think of him. The riot shows that Clodius still had a large influence among the plebs. Though the riot eventually did not go along his plans, it seems that he escaped the crisis with his popularity intact. For the plebs, in any case, the riot was successful. The élite was forced to take measures to relieve the distress.

## 61. Attack on Cicero's house

DATE: 57-11-3 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Cicero's house
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *armati homines*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae*
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage (houses of M. and Q. Cicero; porticus Catuli); wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: intimidation/support Clodius SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 4.3.2, *Cael.* 78, *Mil.* 87; Dio 39.20.3.
MODERN WORKS: NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 135-136.
DESCRIPTION: At the instigation of Clodius, armed men drove away the workmen who were rebuilding Cicero's house. Catulus' portico was demolished. They threw stones at Q. Cicero's house and set it afire.
COMMENT: Dio mentions that Clodius was stopped by Milo. If so, Cicero would not have failed to mention Milo's involvement. Dio probably confuses this case with other events.
There was probably more to this case than Cicero makes us believe. It was not just an attack on Cicero's property. When Cicero went into exile, Clodius tore down his house and built a temple for the goddess Libertas on the site. The adjacent portico of Catulus was destroyed. Clodius built a new one and had his name inscribed on it. These symbolic acts by Clodius were to show that he had restored liberty and that he was the defender of the interests of the plebs. After Cicero's recall, both his house and Catulus' portico were rebuilt by senatorial decree. It was meant to destroy the monuments of Clodius' popular power. By sabotaging the restoration Clodius unsuccessfully tried to prevent it.

## 62. Attack on Cicero

DATE: 57-11-11 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae*
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, swords)
REPRESSION: by Cicero and escort
CAUSE/GOAL: intimidation SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 4.3.3.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 136.
DESCRIPTION: On the Via Sacra Cicero and his escort were suddenly attacked by Clodius and his *operae*. Cicero withdrew in Tettius Damio's forecourt, from which they could keep the Clodians at a distance.

## 63. Attack on Milo's house

DATE: 57-11-12 DURATION: < 1day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Milo's house
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *homines, notissimi ex omni latrocinio Clodiano* (Cic.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: dead
REPRESSION: by Flaccus and gang
CAUSE/GOAL: intimidation SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 4.3.3, *Sest.* 85, *Mil.* 38; Dio 39.20.3.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 136-137.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius tried to storm and burn Milo's (Ao-2) house in the Cermalus with armed men. Q. Flaccus with a band of strong men prevented it and killed the most notorious adherents of Clodius.
COMMENT: Flaccus is otherwise unknown. He probably was one of the assistant or intermediate leaders of the Ciceronians.
Dio says that Milo prevented Clodius' attack. This remains uncertain, because Cicero would have mentioned Milo's involvement if it had been the case.

## 64. Riot at the senate

DATE: 57-12-? DURATION: < 1day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Forum (at the Curia)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: —
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae*
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: senate threatened
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Q.Fr.* 2.1.3.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 442; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 137-138.
DESCRIPTION: The senate was debating on the time of intended trials and elections. Clodius wanted the elections to be held before the trials. His opponents wanted the reverse order. When Clodius spoke, his *operae* outside the Curia raised an uproar, probably to intimidate Milo's friends. The session of the senate was adjourned.
COMMENT: Clodius was one of the persons who had to stand trial. He wanted the aedilician elections, for which he was a candidate, to pass first. If he was elected, he had the immunity of a magistrate and could not be prosecuted. Clodius was elected aedile and not convicted.

## 65. Trial of Milo

DATE: 56-2-6 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae*, claque
PREC.INCID.: appearance of Pompey
OPP.: corn shortage?
MAG.: aed. Clodius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: threat, wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: by Cicero and gang

CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Milo SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Fam.* 1.5b.1, *Q.Fr.* 2.3.2; Dio 39.18-19; Plut. *Pomp.* 48.7.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 299; LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 138-139 and 153.
DESCRIPTION: Milo (Ao-2) was prosecuted by Clodius for violence. Pompey appeared at the trial as a witness. During his speech he was hindered by clamor from Clodius' gangs (*operae*, Cic.). After he finished Clodius spoke, but he received the same treatment by the Ciceronians (Cic.). Clodius started rhythmic shouts with his gangs. Clodius asked "Who lets the people starve?". Gangs: "Pompey!". C: "Who wants to go to Alexandria?". G: "Pompey!". C: "Who do you want to go to Alexandria?". G: "Crassus!". Next the Clodians spit at the others. A scuffle followed, Clodius was thrown off the rostra and both groups ran away. (Cic.) The trial was adjourned for several days. Milo was later acquitted.
COMMENT: Plutarch's version differs in that he mentions different slogans: "Which general is a pansy? Pompey! Who is a homosexual? Pompey! Who scratches his head with one finger? Pompey!" Plutarch also mentions the interesting feature that Clodius shook his toga as a sign for his gangs to answer him. According to Dio, Clodius used this method of rhythmic slogans more often.
Probably Pompey's *cura annonae* had not been very successful thus far, because Clodius accused him of starving the people and in April Pompey received additional funds because of the dearth (Cic. *Q.Fr.* 2.6.1-2).
After this event, Clodius reinforced his gangs and Pompey mobilized support from the countryside. Pompey had lost the support of the *plebs contionalis* (*contionarius ille populus*). (Cic. *Q.Fr.* 2.3.4.)
Alexandria refers to the Egyption question. Pompey was interested in receiving the lucrative task of restoring king Ptolemy to the throne of Egypt. Ptolemy was willing to pay generously for his reinstatement in power.

## 66. Riot at the Megalesia

DATE: 56-4-8 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: theater
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: (slaves), freedmen
TERMINOLOGY: *servi*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *vici*
MAG.: aed. Clodius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: games for Clodius' following SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Har.Resp.* 22-26.
MODERN WORKS: BENNER, *op.cit.*, 113-114; LENAGHAN, *op.cit.*, 114-117; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 140.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius as aedile had organized the Megalesian games. At a given sign (*signo dato*) by Clodius, a mob of slaves, collected from all the neighborhoods (*vis...ex omnibus vicis collecta servorum*), stormed into the theater. The consul Lentulus, the senate, the *equites*, and all the *boni* stood up in protest and left the theater. The public was forced out of the theater. The games were now performed for slaves only.
COMMENT: For the date: LENAGHAN 117.
Cicero's contention that Clodius only admitted slaves is exaggerated. Some slaves will have been among the crowd, but Cicero used the servile element as an invective. The crowd is likely to have been composed of Clodius' usual urban following: the members of the *collegia* and the neighborhood organizations (*vici* ), i.e. shopkeepers (freedmen) and some slaves. See LENAGHAN 116. Clodius probably had not had the opportunity to issue tickets to the urban plebs. Now he violently provided access to the popular games for the urban plebs.
Perhaps the riot was connected to problems in the corn supply (see B-65 and BENNER).

Piso (Ap-55), who at that moment was governor of Macedon, had sent convicts to Clodius for him to throw to the lions during the games (Cic. *Pis.* 89).

## 67. Demonstration pro-Clodius

DATE: 56-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*
LOCATION: Forum (at the Curia)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius, Pompey, Crassus
assistant = Cato Ap-39
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos, homilos, polloi* (Dio), *universus populus* (Val.Max.)
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: contemporary popular leader Clodius
MAG.: tr.pl. Cato
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: senate threatened
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by cos. Marcellinus and senate
CAUSE/GOAL: support Clodius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 39.27.3-29.3; Val.Max. 6.2.6.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 443; LINTOTT 214.
DESCRIPTION: After the conference of Luca, Pompey and Crassus decided to stand for the consulate of 55. Since their candidacy had been submitted irregularly, the consul Cn. Lentulus Marcellinus objected. Therefore, through C. Cato (Ap-39), they tried to postpone the elections, so that they could run for office according to the laws. The senate protested by a decree to have the senate dress in mourning as in times of great distress. Cato tried to sabotage the voting in the senate by calling in plebeians from outside the senate house, for the senate was not allowed to vote when nonsenators were present. Other tribunes prevented the entrance of the plebs, so the decree was passed. The senate also decreed not to partake in any public events, such as games. Cato opposed this too. The senate went outside to the assembled people. The consul Marcellinus addressed them. He denounced Pompey's large power and was loudly cheered by the people (*universus populus*, Val.Max.). But now Clodius, who after Luca had become reconciled with Pompey, spoke to the people on Pompey's behalf. The senators showed their indignation and Clodius went to the senate house. The senators denied him access and Clodius was surrounded by the *equites*, who threatened to kill him. Clodius called upon the people. They came to his rescue threatening to burn the senate house and to kill Clodius' assailants.
Pompey and Crassus afterwards were elected according to plan.
COMMENT: Valerius Maximus only mentions Marcellinus' speech on Pompey to the people, but it is likely that it belongs to this case. Dio mentions the speech as well.
The people probably came together in a *contio* called by Cato before the senate meeting. The tribunes in support of Marcellinus probably were Antistius (Ao-3) and Racilius (Ao-28). Plancius (Ao-26) is unlikely to have been involved, because of his low profile during his tribunate. The other known tribunes of 56, Gallus (Ap-10), Nonius (Ap-32), Plautius (Ap-37), Procilius (Ap-40), and Rutilius (Ap-44), were all supporters of Cato or Pompey.
The attitude change in the crowd is interesting. First, Cato had the crowd on his side. Then the senators explained their opinion to the people by way of Lentulus' speech. The people now agreed with the senate's standpoint and obviously did not like Pompey's powerful position. But when Clodius, still popular, was attacked, the crowd finally went over to the side of Pompey and Clodius. Of all the popular leaders involved in this case, Clodius clearly had the largest influence with the plebs. It shows how much Pompey needed Clodius to have his plans realized in the city, unless Pompey was prepared to bring country folk and veterans into the city, which was much more troublesome.

## 68. Cato the Younger's return from Cyprus

DATE: 56-?-? (Fall) DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: (triumph)

LOCATION: Rome, on the banks of the Tiber - Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = magistrates, senate
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: booty
MAG.: all magistrates
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Cato SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Plut. *Cat.Min.* 39.1 and 3; Vell.Pat. 2.45.5.
DESCRIPTION: Cato the Younger (Ao-27) had been sent to annex Cyprus. When he returned, all the magistrates, priests, and senators and many of the people went to the Tiber to greet him. Both banks were crowded with people. As Cato entered with his ships, it looked like a triumph. The treasure from Cyprus was carried through the Forum.
COMMENT: For the date: NISBET, *op.cit.*, xxxvii.

## 69. Destruction of the tribunician tablets

DATE: 56-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Capitol
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Cicero
assistant = Milo Ao-2 and tribunes
PARTICIPATION: clients?
TERMINOLOGY: *polloi* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?
MAG.: tr.pl.
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: annulment of Clodius' laws SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Dio 39.21.1; Plut. *Cat.Min.* 40, *Cic.* 34.
DESCRIPTION: Cicero, with Milo (Ao-2) and some tribunes (Dio) plus a large group of men, went to the Capitol and tore down the tablets with the accounts of Clodius' tribunate. This was to show that Clodius' laws, among which the law on Cicero's exile, were illegal. Clodius protested and also Cato the Younger, who was afraid that his acts in Cyprus would be annulled. For Cato had received the Cyprian command through a Clodian law.
COMMENT: It must have happened after Cato's return from Cyprus, for Plutarch places the events after the return in both accounts and has Cato refer to his mission to Cyprus in the debate on Cicero's action.
The tribunes with Cicero probably were Antistius (Ao-3) and Racilius (Ao-28). See B-67. Gallus (Ap-10) might be a possibility too, since he was friendly with Cicero.
Cicero probably made use of the gangs Milo had organized. It is most unlikely that many members of the urban plebs were eager to participate in this event, because in that case they would have acted against a still very popular leader and the corn law he had passed. Cicero, therefore, will have taken clients and personal retainers with him.
Cicero's action was not successful, because Clodius' laws were not annulled.

## 70. Consular elections

DATE: 56-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate elective
LOCATION: Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey, (Crassus)
PARTICIPATION: soldiers, slaves
TERMINOLOGY: *stratiôtai* (Dio, Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: army, *operae* ?
MAG.: (cos.cand. Pompey)

VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) and Cato (Ao-27)
CAUSE/GOAL: election to the consulate SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.17; Dio 39.31; Plut. *Cat.Min.* 41.4-5, *Crass.* 15.3-5, *Pomp.* 51.4 and 52.1-2.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 443; LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 97-90.
DESCRIPTION: On the night before the consular elections, Pompey (and Crassus, Plut. *Crass.*) and his competitor L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) went to the Campus Martius. Their followers started fighting, and one of Domitius' slaves, a torchbearer, was killed. Cato the Younger (Ao-27), who was fighting on Domitius' side, was wounded. Domitius had to run. P. Crassus, son of Crassus the triumvir and legate of Caesar, had brought soldiers from Caesar's army to Rome to vote in the elections (Dio, Plut.). Pompey and Crassus were elected.
COMMENT: Since the elections were postponed, it must have happened towards the end of the year.
Plutarch says that Pompey was afraid of Cato drawing the "healthy part of the people" (*tou dèmou to hugiainon, Pomp.* 52.1) over to his side and therefore resorted to violence. Since it concerned an election in the centuriate assembly which favored the propertied classes, by the healthy part of the people Plutarch probably means the *boni* in the Ciceronian sense.

## 71. Praetorian elections

DATE: 55-2-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate elective
LOCATION: Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
assistant = Vatinius Ap-50
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae* ?
MAG.: cos. Pompey, (Crassus)
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: by Pompey
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Vatinius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 39.32.1-2; Plut. *Cat.Min.* 52.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 99; TAYLOR, *PP*, 81-82.
DESCRIPTION: Pompey and Crassus wanted to have their own candidates, especially Vatinius, elected to the praetorship. Cato the Younger (Ao-27) also was a candidate in opposition to them. At the assembly presided by Pompey the first tribe voted for Cato. Pompey said he had heard thunder, and for this bad omen dissolved the assembly (*obnuntiatio*). Next the voters were bribed and the *optimates* (*beltistoi*, Plut.) ejected from the Campus. Vatinius was elected praetor by force. A part of the people were assembled in a *contio* by a tribune. Cato addressed them and he was escorted home by a large crowd (*plèthos*).
COMMENT: For the date: D.R. SHACKLETON BAILEY (ed.), *Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum, Text and Commentary*, Cambridge 1980, p. 189.
This case shows the reputation Cato had for his staunch defense of legal procedures. See also B-73. Pompey and Crassus could evidently only count on part of the voters and had to resort to violence. Furthermore, at least the city-dwellers would not have forgotten Cato's grain measure of 62.
Dio mentions that Cato's candidature was obstructed, but that the elections themselves went without violence.
The tribune who assembled the *contio* for Cato probably was either Ateius (Ao-5) or Aquillius (Ao-4). See Dio 39.32.3.

## 72. Aedilician elections

DATE: 55-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal elective
LOCATION: Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
assistant = Messius Ap-29?
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: cos. Pompey
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead.
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: election of aediles SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.17; Dio 39.32.2; Plut. *Pomp.* 53.3.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 98-99.
DESCRIPTION: During the aedilician elections there was a fight. People were wounded and killed. Pompey came home with a blood-spattered toga.
COMMENT: It took place shortly after B-71. The elections always were situated on the Campus.
Messius perhaps was involved in this case. He was a Pompeian assistant leader and was aedile in 55.

## 73. Lex Trebonia de provinciis consularibus

DATE: 55-?-? DURATION: 2 days
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: *contio*, then tribal legislative
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey, Crassus, (Caesar)
assistant = Trebonius Ap-49, and tribunes
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos* (Dio) *plèthos, politai, polloi* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *cheira*, armed men
MAG.: tr.pl. Trebonius, cos. Crassus and Pompey
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead; symbolic (statues pelted)
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Cato, Favonius, Ninnius, Ateius, and Aquillius
CAUSE/GOAL: provincial commands SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 39.32.3-36.2; Plut. *Cat.Min.* 43.1-5, *Crass.* 15.5.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 440; LINTOTT 214; NOWAK, *op.cit.*, 99-100.
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Trebonius proposed a law to grant the consuls Pompey and Crassus the governorship of Spain and Syria respectively. Also he proposed to extend Caesar's command in Gaul for five years. Opposition came from Cato the Younger (Ao-27) and Favonius (Ao-38). They were helped by Ninnius (Ao-24) and the tribunes Ateius (Ao-5) and Aquillius (Ao-4) (Dio). Favonius and Cato spoke at a *contio*. Favonius used up his time complaining against his time limit. Cato did the same, speaking on the political situation in general (Dio). Cato deliberately exceeded his time limit (Dio), so that he would be stopped by Trebonius and have another reason to criticize him. Trebonius acted accordingly and had his lictor drag Cato from the Forum. Cato came back and tried to speak again. Trebonius had him put in jail. Trebonius however had to release him for fear of the people. For Cato was accompanied to the prison by a large crowd (*plèthos*, Plut.) who wanted to listen to what he had to say. The opposing tribunes did not get a chance to address the assembly (Dio).
The next day a tribal assembly was convened to vote on the bill. Aquillius had spent the night in the senate house, so that he could join the assembly at dawn. But Trebonius barricaded the building to prevent Aquillius from getting out. The Forum was occupied during the night to keep Cato, Ateius, Favonius, and Ninnius out. Nevertheless they managed to get in and declared an omen (*obnuntiatio*) in order to break up the assembly. The lictors of Trebonius and other tribunes (Dio) and/or armed men (*hopla*, Plut.) drove them out and wounded their followers. A few were killed. The law was

passed. As the assembly was dissolving, Ateius took the wounded Aquillius and showed his wounds to the people. Pompey and Crassus intervened with a bodyguard (*cheira*, Dio) and forced the two tribunes away. They immediately called another meeting and passed the measures regarding Caesar's command. Many came together and pelted the statues of Pompey (Plut.). But Cato intervened and made them stop.
COMMENT: The tribunes who acted in support of Trebonius are not attested. But they are likely to be found among the known assistant leaders of the *populares* in this year: Allienus (Ap-3), Fabius (Ap-15), Mamilius (Ap-25), Peducaeus (Ap-35), and Roscius (Ap-42).
The attack on Pompey's statues should be seen as a symbolic act of the plebs against the injustice which the virtuous Cato had encountered.

## 74. Crassus' departure from Rome

DATE: 55-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly? SPECIFICATION: *contio* ?
LOCATION: Rome (at the city gate)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Ateius Ao-5
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *polloi, ochlos* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: burning stove
MAG.: tr.pl. Ateius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Crassus threatened
REPRESSION: by Pompey and tribunes
CAUSE/GOAL: to prevent Crassus' departure SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: App. 2.18; Dio 39.39.6-7; Plut. *Crass.* 16.3-6; Vell.Pat. 2.46.3.
MODERN WORKS: TAYLOR, *PP*, 85.
DESCRIPTION: Crassus was preparing to leave Rome for his province Syria. It was obvious that he had planned a campaign against the Parthians. This was considered an unjust war. Ateius assembled a group of people to prevent Crassus' departure. The people blocked his passage. Crassus asked Pompey to escort him because of Pompey's popularity. As the crowd saw Pompey, they let Crassus pass. Ateius wanted to imprison Crassus, but was held back by other tribunes. Ateius, then, placed a burning stove at the city gate and cast curses over it.
COMMENT: Ateius used religious symbols to curse Crassus' Parthian campaign and to show the injustice of the war.
The tribunes who held back Ateius might have been Allienus (Ap-3), Fabius (Ap-15), Mamilius (Ap-25), Peducaeus (Ap-35), Roscius (Ap-42), and Trebonius (Ap-49).

## 75. Attack on Cato the Younger

DATE: 54-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *ochlos, plèthos, dèmos*
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Cato's entrance in the Forum
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (stoning, Cato)
REPRESSION: by Cato (Ao-27)
CAUSE/GOAL: annulment of Cato's decree SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Plut. *Cat.Min.* 44.2-4.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 443; LINTOTT 214-215.
DESCRIPTION: Cato (Ao-27), then praetor, had the senate pass a decree against electoral corruption. The multitude who found the corruption very lucrative was opposed to Cato's decree. When Cato went to the tribunal he was abused and stoned. Cato was able to reach the *rostra*, and through a speech calmed the people.

## 76. Cicero in the theater

DATE: 54-7-9 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: theater
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Cicero's entrance
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Cicero SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Att.* 4.15.6, *Q.Fr.* 2.15.2.
DESCRIPTION: Cicero came back to Rome and went to the theater. As he entered, he was loudly applauded.
COMMENT: This happened during the *ludi Apollinares* (July 5-13). These games were possibly organized by M. Fonteius, pr.urb. (*MRR* 221).

## 77. Milo in the theater

DATE: 54-?-? (Summer) DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: theater
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Milo's entrance?
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Milo SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Q.Fr.* 3.1.13.
DESCRIPTION: Milo (Ao-2) received applause in the theater.
COMMENT: Cicero's letter was written in September. Perhaps Milo was applauded during the *ludi Romani* (September 15-19).
These games were not the games Milo organized himself and on which he spent three inheritances (Cic. *Q.Fr.* 3.6.6, written in November 54).

## 78. Julia's funeral

DATE: 54-9-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: funeral procession
LOCATION: Forum - Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: intermediate? = *philoi*
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *populus* (Liv.), *dèmos, plèthos* (Plut.)
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: clients?
PREC.INCID.: Julia's death
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: physical violence?
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37)
CAUSE/GOAL: to honor Caesar and Pompey? SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Dio 39.64; Liv. 106; Plut. *Caes.* 23.4, *Pomp.* 53.4-5.
DESCRIPTION: Julia, Caesar's daughter and Pompey's wife, died. Pompey wanted to bury her on his estate, but the people violently seized the corpse in the Forum and buried her on the Campus Martius. It was organized by friends (*philoi*) of Pompey and Caesar or by people who wanted to do them a favor (Dio). The people did it more out of pity for the young woman than to honor Pompey and Caesar. But Caesar was more honored than Pompey (Plut.). Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) protested against the funeral in vain.
COMMENT: For the date of Julia's death: Cic. *Q.Fr.* 3.1.17.
The Campus Martius served as an honorable burial ground.

## 79. Trial of Gabinius 1

DATE: 54-9-28 DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top/assistant = Domitius Ao-37, Appius Claudius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *concursus magnus, universus populus* (Cic.), *dèmos, polloi* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Gabinius' appearance
MAG.: cos. Domitius, App. Claudius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Gabinius)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Gabinius SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Cic. *Q.Fr.* 3.1.24; Dio 39.60.3-4 and 62.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 322-328.
DESCRIPTION: Gabinius (Ap-18) had to stand trial for his intervention in Egyptian politics. The consuls Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37) and Appius Claudius Pulcher, Clodius' brother, pressed charges against him. Gabinius was unpopular with the people, because of a prohibition in the Sibylline books of an intervention in Egypt. The two consuls made the oracle public, despite Pompey's opposition. Appius Claudius wanted to please the plebs (*dèmagogia*) and hoped to receive bribes from Gabinius if he would cause a riot (*suntarassô* ). (Dio.)
Gabinius entered Rome unconspiciously during the night of the 27th. The next day he had to stand trial. The entire Roman people were in favor of his conviction. He was almost killed by the crowd. Gabinius was nevertheless acquitted for the moment.
COMMENT: Several charges were pressed against Gabinius. The most important of those was the restoration of Ptolemy to the throne of Egypt without permission of the Roman government. For this charge, Gabinius was eventually convicted and forced into exile.
Both consuls, by making the Sibylline oracles public, were responsible for creating an anti-Gabinius mood among the plebs. App. Claudius probably was responsible for the riot.

## 80. Trial of Gabinius 2

DATE: 54-10/11-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top/assisant = Domitius Ao-37, Appius Claudius
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos, plèthos* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: flood
MAG.: cos. Domitius, App. Claudius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: jury threatened
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Pompey
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Gabinius SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Q.Fr.* 3.7.1; Dio 39.61 and 63.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 438.
DESCRIPTION: The Tiber flooded the lower parts of the city. Many houses, shops, and granaries were destroyed and many people died. The plebs considered this a punishment from the gods because of Gabinius' acquittal, for Gabinius had gone to Egypt despite the prohibition in the Sibylline books. The plebs threatened the jurymen. Pompey was unable to change the people's attitude. Gabinius was convicted.
COMMENT: Dio erroneously puts the flood before Gabinius' return and acquittal. The flood however happened in October or November: D.R. SHACKLETON BAILEY (ed.),

*Cicero: Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem et M. Brutum, Text and Commentary*, Cambridge 1980, p. 220.
For the leadership see B-79.

## 81. Consular elections

DATE: 54-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: ?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top/assistant = Domitius Ao-15, Messalla
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae*
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Sulla's slave)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: election of candidates SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.19; Asc. 20C.
MODERN WORKS: MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 128; LINTOTT 214.
DESCRIPTION: The competitors of M. Aemilius Scaurus in the consular elections attacked a slave of Faustus Sulla, son of Sulla the dictator, with an armed gang of 300 men (*armati*, Asc.).
COMMENT: The competitors of Scaurus who led the attack were Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messalla Rufus (MARSHALL).
Appian only mentions violence in general at the consular elections of 54.

## 82. Pomptinus' triumph

DATE: 54-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: public manifestation SPECIFICATION: triumph
LOCATION: (throughout) Rome
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = tribunes of the plebs
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tribunes
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (physical violence)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: disrupt triumph SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Dio 39.65.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 438; LINTOTT 215.
DESCRIPTION: Gaius Pomptinus wanted to celebrate a triumph over the Gauls, but no one was prepared to grant him permission. The praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba granted citizenship to some people, so that they could vote on the triumph. The triumph was granted and some of the tribunes, who had been left out of the assembly, stirred up a riot during the triumph. People were wounded.
COMMENT: Perhaps the persons who received citizenship were Gauls. Pomptinus was Caesar's predecessor in Gaul. One of the tribunes that might have caused the disturbance was Q. Mucius Scaevola (Cic. *Att.* 4.18.4, *Q.Fr.* 3.4.6). Since it is unknown where Pomptinus and Scaevola stood politically, the political value of this case is impossible to establish. The other tribunes of 54 who might have been involved are: Laelius (Ap-21) and Terentius (Ao-32).

## 83. Trial of C. Cato

DATE: 54-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum?
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Pompey
assistant = Cato Ap-39
PARTICIPATION: clients
TERMINOLOGY: *clientes*

MOBILIZATION: ORG.: clientele
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded (Asinius Pollio)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Cato SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Sen. *Contr.* 7.4.7.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 442 and n.164; LINTOTT 215.
DESCRIPTION: C. Cato was prosecuted by Asinius Pollio. During the trial Asinius was attacked by Cato's clients.
COMMENT: Pompey helped his assistant leader Cato during the trial and Cato was acquitted.

## 84. Riot on the Via Sacra

DATE: 53-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Forum (Via Sacra)
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
assistant = Hypsaeus Ap-56
PARTICIPATION: personal attendants
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *manus*
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Milo (Ao-2)
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Hypsaeus SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Asc. 48C.
MODERN WORKS: MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 199; LINTOTT 215.
DESCRIPTION: The gangs of the competing candidates for the consulate of 52, P. Plautius Hypsaeus and Milo (Ao-2), got into a fight on the Via Sacra. Milo's gang unexpectedly lost and many fell.
COMMENT: Asconius says that the headmen, in this case Clodius and Cicero, were usually with the candidates they supported.
The consular elections were cancelled because of the bribery and the violence used. Neither Milo nor Hypsaeus were elected.

## 85. Consular elections

DATE: 53-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: centuriate elective
LOCATION: Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Clodius
PARTICIPATION: ?
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: *operae*
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage (to the *saepta*), wounded (stoning)
REPRESSION: by Milo (Ao-2)
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Hypsaeus SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: Asc. 30C; Cic. *Mil.* 41 and 43.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 215.
DESCRIPTION: At the assembly for the consular elections Clodius tried to force the voting area (*saepta*). He used swords and stones. As Milo appeared, Clodius had to run. (Cic.)
COMMENT: Clodius tried to manipulate the voting for the candidates he supported (Hypsaeus Ap-56 and Metellus Scipio Ao-8). Clodius and Milo probably had an armed gang with them. Cicero mentions that Milo was accused of having blood-stained hands. Asconius gives a general account of the violence around the consular elections.
The elections were cancelled. See also B-84.

## 86. Riot after Clodius' death

DATE: 52-1-18/19 DURATION: 2 days
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political (*contio*)
LOCATION: Palatine hill - Forum - throughout Rome
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Munatius Ap-31, Rufus Ap-38, Sallustius Ap-45
intermediate = Sex. Clodius, *noti homines*
PARTICIPATION: plebs, slaves, shopkeepers
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos, plèthos* (App), *multidudo, servi, infima plebs,vulgus, populus* (Asc.), *homiloi, ochlos* (Dio)
MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: *librarium, fasces*, martyr
PREC.INCID.: Clodius' assassination
MAG.: tr.pl. Munatius, Rufus
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: material damage (Curia, Basilica Porcia, houses)
REPRESSION: unsuccessful by Milo's friends
CAUSE/GOAL: revenge SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.21; Asc. 7, 31-33, 42-43, 46, 49C; Cic. *Mil.* 13, 27, 33, 90; Dio 40.48-49; Liv. 107.
MODERN WORKS: FLAMBARD, *Asconius II*, 112-113; MARSHALL, *Asconius*, 167-168; LINTOTT 215; NICOLET, *Métier*, 464-465.
DESCRIPTION: Clodius and Milo (Ao-2) met coincidentally outside Rome. Milo had a band of gladiators with him and murdered Clodius. In the evening the news reached Rome; the plebs was thrown into great distress. A great crowd of slaves and plebeians (*infimae plebis et servorum maxima multitudo*, Asc.) surrounded the corpse in Clodius' house on the Palatine hill. Fulvia, Clodius' widow, hightened the indignation of the crowd by showing his wounds. The next morning an even larger crowd of the same composition assembled, among whom a number of *noti homines* (Asc.) The tribunes T. Munatius Plancus and Q. Pompeius Rufus went to Clodius' house as well. They persuaded the people to carry the corpse to the Forum. There the tribunes addressed the people in a *contio* (Asc.). Another, less riotous meeting was held by the tribune C. Sallustius Crispus (Asc.) Under the leadership of Sextus Clodius (Asc, Cic.) the crowd carried the body into the senate house and cremated the corpse with the Curia and the adjoining Basilica Porcia. Amidst the tumult Sex. Clodius put up the case with Clodius' bills (*librarium*) as a *palladium* (Cic. 33). Then the crowd (*Clodiana multitudo*) tried to burn the houses of Milo and Lepidus the interrex, but was repelled by arrows. Next, the crowd took the *fasces* and carried them first to the houses of Scipio and Hypsaeus and then to the gardens of Pompey. At that point the people loudly called Pompey consul and dictator. The house of Lepidus was put under siege for several days by the gangs (*factiones*) of Hypsaeus (Ap-56) and Scipio (Ao-8). They wanted to take advantage of Milo's current impopularity by demanding that the postponed consular elections should be held immediately. Lepidus' house was releived by Milo's gang (*manus*).
COMMENT: For the date: Asc. 31C; Cic. *Mil.* 27.
Asconius' version is the most detailed; his report is taken as the leading story.
The senator C. Vibienus was not among the *noti homines* (Asc. 32C): FLAMBARD, 112-113; MARSHALL 167-168. Among the *noti homines* perhaps were C. Clodius and P. Pomponius (Asc. 31C).
The participation of *tabernarii* is not specifically attested. At Milo's trial (B-88), however, it is. Since the shopkeepers were prepared to work for Milo's conviction, since they belonged to Clodius' usual following, and since Asconius uses the same terminology in this case and in B-88 (*Clodiana multitudo*, Asc. 33 and 40-41C), their participation in this case is highly likely.
Appian says that the crowd carried the corpse into the Curia and that the more reckless ones (*propetesteroi*) set the building afire. This detail shows that a small group in the crowd took the most daring action, while the majority formed a body of bystanders.
The popular leader Clodius served as a martyr symbol.

The role of the leadership is interesting. The news of Clodius' death made the people assemble in great numbers. There was a general feeling of distress. It took leadership to turn these feelings into direct action. The tribunes told the people to go to the Forum and organized a *contio*. Sex. Clodius led the crowd in the cremation of the corpse. It must have been the tribunes as well who suggested the plebs to fetch the *fasces* and to bring them to Pompey. The tribunes were assistant leaders of Pompey, and Pompey for some time was hoping to become dictator. For the plebs, Pompey, Rome's big decision-maker and savior in times of distress, was an obvious choice.
One of the bills Clodius had proposed concerned the distribution of the votes of the freedmen over all the tribes (Asc. 52C; *LGRR* 408-409). This explains the participation of freedmen and slaves with the prospect of manumission. Sextus Clodius used the case with Clodius' bills as a symbol, a *palladium*. A *palladium* was a statue of Pallas Athena which served as a talisman to a city. Sextus Clodius wanted to tell the people that they need not fear after Clodius' death, because his bills were still there to serve their interests and to protect them. This was a suggestion of continuity.

## 87. More riots after Clodius' death

DATE: 52-1-27/30? DURATION: > 2 days
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: political
LOCATION: Forum - throughout Rome
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Munatius Ap-31, Rufus Ap-38, Sallustius Ap-45
PARTICIPATION: plebs, slaves, shopkeepers
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos, therapontes* (App.)
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Milo's return
MAG.: tr.pl. Munatius, Rufus, Sallustius
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: dead, material damage (houses)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: prevention of Milo's acquittal SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.22; Asc. 33-34; Cic. *Mil.* 91; Dio 40.49.5-50.1; Liv. 107.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 215; J.S. RUEBEL, The Trial of Milo in 52 B.C.: A Chronological Study, *TAPhA* 109 (1979), pp. 231-249.
DESCRIPTION: After the murder on Clodius, Milo (Ao-2) returned to Rome in secret. He distributed money among the tribes, 1000 asses (400 HS) for each individual. A few days later, the tribune M. Caelius (Ao-10) held a *contio* in the Forum on Milo's behalf. The crowd consisted of slaves and rustics which Milo had bribed and assembled (*therapontôn kai andrôn agroikôn plèthos,* App.). Caelius and Milo told the people that Clodius had ambushed Milo. Caelius wanted to have Milo acquitted by a public trial on the spot (App.) The other tribunes burst into the Forum with the armed and unbribed part of the people, among which there were many slaves (App., Cic.). Milo and Caelius escaped dressed as slaves, but many of their adherents were killed. The riots continued several days. The crowd persecuted the rich, stoned and killed them. Houses were plundered and burnt. (App.)
COMMENT: For the date: RUEBEL 236-237.
There were actually two distinct cases of collective behavior: the actions of the group mobilized by Milo and Caelius and the actions of their opponents.
Appian does not mention the names of the tribunes who led the crowd against Caelius' *contio,* but it must have been Munatius and the others who also incited the plebs against Milo in the previous and subsequent cases.
For the participation of shopkeepers, see B-86 and 88.
There was no actual repression, but the disorders after Clodius' death led directly to the appointment of Pompey as sole consul (*sine collega*) and the passing of the emergency decree (*senatus consultum ultimum*), which granted Pompey powers to restore order with every possible means.

## 88. Milo's trial

DATE: 52-4-4/8 DURATION: > 2 days
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Munatius Ap-31, Rufus Ap-38, Sallustius Ap-45
intermediate = claqueurs?
PARTICIPATION: shopkeepers
TERMINOLOGY: *multitudo, populus* (Asc.)
MOBILIZATION: MAG.: tr.pl. Munatius, closing of the shops
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: Marcellus threatened
REPRESSION: by soldiers
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Milo SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Asc. 37-38, 40-42, 44-45, 50-52C; Cic. *Mil.* 3, 45; Dio 40.54.1-2; Plut. *Cic.* 35.
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 338-343; J.S. RUEBEL, The Trial of Milo in 52 B.C.: A Chronological Study, *TAPhA* 109 (1979), pp. 231-249.
DESCRIPTION: Milo (Ao-2) was prosecuted for the murder of Clodius. Munatius, Pompeius, and Sallustius held daily *contiones* against Milo (Asc., Cic.). At one of the *contiones* they let Pompey appear before the people to express his fear of an attempt against his life by Milo (Asc.).
C. Causinius Schola, a friend of Clodius, testified against Milo at the trial. When he was interrogated by M. Marcellus the public rose a tumult (*Clodiana multitudo,* Asc.). Marcellus feared for his life and took cover. The next day Pompey attended the trial with a bodyguard (*praesidium,* Asc.). The Clodians were intimidated and kept quiet for several days. On the eve of the last day of the trial, the tribune Munatius called on the people in a *contio* to close the shops and to attend the trial in great numbers in order to prevent Milo's acquittal (Asc.). The next day the shops were closed throughout the city and Pompey surrounded the Forum with soldiers (Asc.). During Cicero's defense the crowd shouted at him and Cicero was intimidated. Milo was convicted and went into exile.
COMMENT: For the date: RUEBEL 240-245.
The participation of artisans and shopkeepers is obvious from the fact that the shops (*tabernae*) were closed.

## 89. Scaurus' trial

DATE: 52-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: riot SPECIFICATION: trial
LOCATION: Forum
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *plèthos* (App.)
MOBILIZATION: ?
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded, dead
REPRESSION: by soldiers
CAUSE/GOAL: acquittal of Scaurus SUCCESS: no
SOURCES: App. 2.24; Dio 40.53.3.
DESCRIPTION: Pompey restored order by seeing to it that several people who had been involved in the electoral corruption and violence in 53 and 52 were prosecuted. Pompey's soldiers were present at the trials as a police force. At one of the trials, the one of M. Aemilius Scaurus, the people interceded for Scaurus (App.). Pompey's soldiers intervened and killed several. The people remained quiet and Scaurus was convicted.
COMMENT: Dio's account seems to apply to Milo's trial (B-88), but the riot is more likely to have taken place at this trial or one of the others. Asconius' detailed account of Milo's trial does not mention actual violence by the soldiers.

Dio's account of the repression by the soldiers is interesting. He says that Pompey ordered the soldiers first to drive the people from the Forum with the flat of their swords. When the people refused to leave and kept shouting, the soldiers wounded and killed a few. After that, the crowd kept quiet, also during the subsequent trials. Dio's account, however, might be anachronistic and influenced by observations of his own time (second and third centuries A.D.), when soldiers served permanently as a police force in Rome.

## 90. Hortensius in the theater

DATE: 51-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: theater
LOCATION: Curio's theater
LEADERSHIP: ? TYPE: ?
PARTICIPATION: spectators
TERMINOLOGY: ---
MOBILIZATION: PREC.INCID.: Hortensius' entrance
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: conviction of Messalla SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Fam.* 8.2.1
MODERN WORKS: *LGRR* 438; SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Familiares I*, p. 385.
DESCRIPTION: M. Valerius Messalla Rufus was prosecuted *de ambitu*. He was defended by the orator Q. Hortensius Hortalus. In spite of abundant evidence Messalla was acquitted. The day after the acquittal, Hortensius entered the theater and was immediately hissed. Public opinion forced Messalla to be convicted afterwards.
COMMENT: Messalla was consul in 53. He had possibly received support from Caesar during his campaign in 54 (*RE* Valerius 268, col. 167). Messalla joined Caesar in the civil war (BRUHNS, *Caesar*, 39). Therefore the demonstration in the theater should be seen as anti-*populares*.

## 91. Election of Antony to the augurate

DATE: 50-8-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: assembly SPECIFICATION: tribal elective
LOCATION: Campus Martius
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: top = Caesar
assistant = Curio Ap-46
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *familiares*
MOBILIZATION: ORG.: clientele?
MAG.: tr.pl. Curio
VIOLENCE: yes TYPE: wounded? (physical violence)
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: election of Antony SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: Cic. *Phil.* 2.4.
MODERN WORKS: LINTOTT 215; TAYLOR, *PP*, 93-94.
DESCRIPTION: By means of violence by Curio and his *familiares* Antony (Ap-5) was elected to the augurate.
COMMENT: For the date: SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Familiares I*, 429.
Antony's competitor was Domitius Ahenobarbus (Ao-37).

## 92. Pro-Curio demonstration

DATE: 50-?-? DURATION: < 1 day
TYPE: demonstration SPECIFICATION: gathering
LOCATION: Forum - Curio's house
LEADERSHIP: yes TYPE: assistant = Curio Ap-46
PARTICIPATION: plebs
TERMINOLOGY: *dèmos* (App., Plut.)

MOBILIZATION: SYMBOLS: flowers
MAG.: tr.pl. Curio
VIOLENCE: no
REPRESSION: no
CAUSE/GOAL: to support Curio SUCCESS: yes
SOURCES: App. 2.27; Plut. *Caes.* 30.2, *Pomp.* 58.5-6.
DESCRIPTION: The tribune Curio had gained popularity by proposing bills on the building and repairing of roads (*lex viaria*) and on the food distribution (*lex alimentaria*). He also proposed that Pompey and Caesar should lay down their commands and dismiss their armies simultaneously. The people liked the proposal because they hoped it would prevent civil war. After having put the proposal in the senate, Curio went outside and was welcomed by the people. They escorted him home with applause and scattered flowers and guirlands on him.
COMMENT: On Curio's bills see: Cic. *Fam.* 8.6.5; *LGRR* 472-473; SHACKLETON BAILEY, *Familiares I,* 416-417.

## Appendix C

# The Negative Image of the Demagogue in Fourth-Century Greek Authors

This appendix surveys the negative image of the demagogue as it appears in the Greek authors of the fourth century.

Third column: Checked are the qualities that are ascribed in the passage to the demagogue(s).
F = flattery of the people,
S = causing sedition,
P = aiming at personal power.

Fourth column: Checked is the specific term (if any) with which the demagogue is indicated.
D = *dèmagogos, dèmagogia, dèmagogeo,* etc.,
R = *rhètor,*
P = *prostatès.*

| Author | Locus | F | S | P | D | R | P |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aeschin. | *In Ctes.* 234 | x | | x | | x | |
| Arist. | *Ath.Pol.* 28.4 | x | | | x | | |
| | *Pol.* 4.4.4-6 | x | x | x | x | | |
| | 5.4.1 | | x | | x | | |
| | 5.4.3-5 | x | x | x | x | | |
| | 5.7.19 | | x | | x | | |
| | 5.8.2-3 | x | x | x | x | | |
| | 5.9.6 | x | | | x | | |
| | 6.3.2 | x | x | | x | | |
| Dem. | *Olynth.* 3.24 | x | | | | | |
| | 3.31 | x | | | | | |
| Isoc. | *Ant.* 133 | x | | | | | |
| | *Panath.* 148 | | x | x | x | | |
| | *Pac.* 3-6 | x | | | | x | |
| | 9-10 | x | | | | | |
| | 122-123 | | x | | x | | |
| | 124 | | x | x | | x | |
| | 129-131 | | x | x | x | x | |
| Lys. | *Epicr.* 10 | | | x | x | | |
| Plato | *Grg.* 466A-C | x | x | x | | x | |
| | *Resp.* 565A-566E | x | x | x | | | x |

## Appendix D

# The Negative Image of the Demagogue in the Sources on the Roman Republic from 80-50 B.C.

The table below is a concordance of the negative image of the demagogue as it occurs in the sources of the late Republic. The analysis of the use of the concept of demagogy has some ground in common with what is called content analysis in the social sciences. But the latter is especially about word frequencies. Since we will never know exactly how far the sources that have come down to us are representative of antiquity, and since many sources are lacunose, a statistical analysis of the image of the demagogue does not seem sensible.[1] Therefore, I have not attempted to be exhaustive. The evidence for the late Republic is nevertheless abundant. This appendix is a survey of the most obvious and explicit passages. It shows how the negative image of the demagogue appears in ancient literature. Moreover, it is possible to see what reproaches are made to what person.

The context of the passages, of course, differs widely. But it is just that which proves the carry-over of Greek stereotypes in the different literary types: historical, philosophical, and rhetorical works, and orations. Take the example of the quality "flattery" in three different works: In his Roman History, Dio Cassius says: "Caesar courted the good-will of the multitude."[2] What Dio is referring to is Caesar's support of the Manilian law putting Pompey in charge of the war in the East. It was a measure the plebs supported. The next example is from one of Plutarch's biographies: "Then there remained but one accusation for envious tongues to make, namely, that (Pompey) devoted himself more to the people than to the senate, and had determined to restore the authority of the tribunate (...) and to court the favor of the many; which was true".[3] The final example comes from Cicero's oration In Defence of Sestius: "One man alone held all power with the help of arms and brigandage, not by any force of his own; but (...) he behaved insolently, played the tyrant, made promises to some, kept his hold on many by fear and terror, on still more by hopes and promises."[4] Cicero here describes Clodius' tribunate in 58. The "promises" Clodius made were his institution of free corn distribution and the restoration of the *collegia*.

In these three examples from different literary types, three different persons are accused of courting the favor of the people. In order to know what really happened we have to look at the context. Caesar supported the Manilian law, perhaps to make himself popular or in support of Pompey. Pompey's restoration of the *tribunicia potestas* certainly was a popular act, but he may also have done it because he thought it necessary for the operation of the Roman political system. Clodius' measures furnished him with great popularity, but it is also possible that he had a genuine interest in the

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[1] See on the impracticability of content analysis in ancient texts: C. NICOLET, Lexicographie politique et histoire romaine: problèmes de méthode et directions de recherches, *Atti del Convegno sulla Lessicografia politica et giuridica nel campo delle scienze dell'antichità*, Torino 1980, pp. 19-46, esp. 44-45.

[2] Dio 36.43.3: "Καῖσαρ μὲν τόν τε ὄχλον ἅμα ἐθεράπευσεν."

[3] Plut. *Pomp.* 21.4: "αἰτιᾶσθαι τοῖς βασκαίνουσι περιῆν ὑπόλοιπον, ὅτι τῷ δήμῳ προσνέμει μᾶλλον ἑαυτὸν ἢ τῇ βουλῇ, καὶ τὸ τῆς δημαρχίας ἀξίωμα (...) ἔγνωκεν ἀνιστάναι καὶ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς πολλοῖς, ὅπερ ἦν ἀληθές."

[4] Cic. *Sest.* 34: "unus omnium potestatem armis et latrociniis possidebat non aliqua vi sua, sed (...) insultabat, dominabatur, aliis pollicebatur, terrore ac metu multos, plures etiam spe et promissis tenebat."

needs of the plebs. At a glance, the three persons seem to be the same, but the context makes the difference.[5]

First column: The authors are listed alphabetically. First the Greek authors, next the Latin. Appian and Sallust are treated more extensively in Appendix E.
Third column: Checked are the qualities that are ascribed in the passage to the demagogue(s).
F = flattery of the people,
S = causing sedition,
P = aiming at personal power.
Fourth column: Checked is whether in the text *dèmagogos, dèmagogia, dèmagogeo,* etc. respectivily *popularis, populariter,* etc. are explicitly stated. From the low frequency of these terms, one can conclude that they are not fundamentally important to the image of the demagogue. The three qualities are the most important to the image.
Fifth column: The person(s) who in the passage are described as demagogues in the negative sense (including the year if it refers to certain events).

| Author | Locus | F | S | P | D/P | Person |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dio | 36.43.3 | x | | | | Caesar (66) |
| | 37.8.1 | x | | | | Caesar (65) |
| | 37.22.1 | x | | | | Caesar (63) |
| | 37.26.2-3 | | x | x | | *Tribuni plebis* (63) |
| | 37.30.2 | x | x | | | Catiline (63) |
| | 37.37.3-38.1 | x | | x | | Caesar (63) |
| | 38.1.1-2 | x | | x | | Caesar (59) |
| | 38.6.2-3 | | x | | | Caesar (59) |
| | 40.48.1 | x | x | x | | General (52) |
| Diod. | 40.5.1 | | x | | | Catiline (63) |
| Plut. | *Caes.* 5.2-5 | x | | | x | Caesar (68-66) |
| | 14.1-2 | x | | | | Caesar (59) |
| | 20.2 | x | | | x | Caesar (56) |
| | 28.3-4 | x | x | | | General (53) |
| | *Cat.Min.* 18.1 | x | | | | General |
| | 19.3 | | x | | x | Clodius |
| | 26.1 | x | x | | | Caesar (63) |
| | 31.1 | x | | | x | Pompey (60) |
| | 31.2 | | x | | x | Clodius (60) |
| | 32.1-2 | x | x | | | *Tribuni plebis* (59) |
| | 33.3 | x | | x | | Caesar (59) |
| | 42.4 | x | x | | | Pompey, Crassus (56) |
| | 43.4 | x | x | x | | Pompey, Crassus (56) |
| | 45.4 | | x | x | | Pompey (54) |
| | *Cic.* 12.1 | x | x | | x | General (63) |
| | 25.3 | x | | | x | Crassus |
| | 30.1 | x | x | | | Clodius (58) |
| | *Crass.* 15.4 | | x | | | Pompey, Crassus (56) |
| | *Luc.* 5.3 | x | | x | x | Cethegus (74) |
| | 5.4 | | x | | x | Quinctius (74) |
| | 7.2 | x | | | x | General |
| | 24.3 | | x | | x | General (69) |
| | 34.2 | x | x | | x | Clodius (68) |
| | 35.7 | x | | x | x | Pompey and general (66) |
| | *Pomp.* 21.4 | x | x | | | Pompey (71) |

[5] See also YAVETZ, *HSCP*, 50.

| Author | Locus | F | S | P | D/P | Person |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Plut. | *Pomp.* 25.4 | x | | | | Caesar (67) |
| | 44.3 | x | | | | Pompey (61) |
| | 46.4 | x | | | | Clodius (58) |
| | 48.6 | x | | | | Clodius (56) |
| Cic. | *Acad.* 2.13 | x | x | | x | General |
| | *Amic.* 95 | x | | | x | General |
| | *Off.* 1.85 | x | x | | x | General |
| | 2.78 | x | x | | x | General |
| | *Off.* 2.80 | x | x | x | | General |
| | *Att.* 2.12.1 | | | x | | Clodius (59) |
| | *Att.* 2.17.1 | | x | x | | Pompey (59) |
| | 2.21.1 | x | | x | | General (59) |
| | *Fam.* 1.9.13 | | x | | | General (58) |
| | *Cat.* 1.2-3 | | x | x | | Catiline (63) |
| | *Clu.* 94 | x | x | | x | Junius (74) |
| | 113 | x | x | | x | Quinctius (74) |
| | *Dom.* 110 | | x | x | | Clodius (58) |
| | *Flac.* 54 | | x | | | Maeandrius (59) |
| | *Leg.Agr.* 1.23-24 | x | x | x | x | Rullus et al. (63) |
| | 2.8 | | x | x | x | Rullus et al. (63) |
| | 2.15-16 | x | | x | x | Rullus et al. (63) |
| | 3.5-6 | x | | x | | Rullus (63) |
| | *Mil.* 72 | x | x | x | | Clodius |
| | *Mur.* 74 | x | | x | | Murena (63) |
| | 83 | | x | | | Catiline (63) |
| | *Planc.* 86 | | x | | | Clodius, Caesar, Pompey, Crassus, Gabinius, Piso (58) |
| | *Phil.* 5.49 | x | x | x | x | Caesar |
| | *Rab.Perd.* 11-13 | | | x | x | Labienus (63) |
| | 17 | | | x | | Labienus (63) |
| | *Sest.* 34 | x | x | x | | Clodius (58) |
| | 96 | x | | | x | General |
| | *Vat.* 18 | | x | | | Vatinius (59) |
| | 23 | | x | x | | Vatinius (59) |
| Flor. | 2.1.1 | x | x | x | | *Tribuni plebis* |
| Suet. | *Iul.* 9-10 | x | | x | | Caesar (65) |
| | 29.1 | | x | | | Curio (50) |
| Val.Max. | 3.8.3 | x | x | | | Palicanus (71) |
| Vell.Pat. | 2.47.5 | | x | | | Clodius (52) |
| | 2.48.3 and 5 | | x | | | Curio (50) |

## Appendix E

# The Negative Image of the Demagogue in Appian and Sallust

The table below provides a survey of the negative image of the demagogue in Appian's *Bella Civilia* and Sallust's *Bellum Iugurthinum* and *De conspiratione Catilinae* in the same way as in Appendix D. The use of words has not been listed because Appian and Sallust seldom use the terms *dèmagogos* and *popularis* .

| Author | Locus | F | S | P | Person |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| App. | *BC* 1.2 | | x | x | General |
| | 21-23 | x | x | x | Gaius Gracchus (124-123) |
| | 23-24 | x | | | Livius Drusus (123-122) |
| | 24 | x | | | Gaius Gracchus, Fulvius Flaccus (122) |
| | 27 | | x | | Gaius Gracchus (121) |
| | 28 | | x | x | Glaucia, Saturninus (101) |
| | 30 | | x | | Saturninus (100) |
| | 32 | | x | | Saturninus (100) |
| | 33 | | x | x | General: *tribuni plebis* |
| | 34 | x | x | x | General |
| | 35 | x | | | Livius Drusus (91) |
| | 55 | x | | x | Marius, Sulpicius (88) |
| | 56 | | x | | Sulpicius (88) |
| | 59 | x | | | General |
| | 64-65 | | x | x | Cinna (87) |
| | *BC* 2.1 | x | | x | Caesar (64) |
| | 2 | | | x | Catiline (64) |
| | 4 | x | | | Clodius (63) |
| | 6 | x | | | Caesar (63) |
| | 7 | | x | | Catiline (62) |
| | 10-13 | x | x | x | Caesar (59) |
| | 14 | x | | | Clodius (59) |
| | 14 | | | x | 1st Triumvirate (59) |
| | 17 | | | x | 1st Triumvirate (56) |
| | 19 | x | x | x | General (53) |
| | 19-20 | | | x | Pompey |
| | 21 | | x | | Assistants of Clodius (52) |
| | 22 | x | | | Milo (52) |
| | 24 | x | | | Hypsaeus, Memmius, Sextius (52) |
| | 24-25 | | | x | Pompey |
| | 26 | x | | | Curio (51) |
| | 86 | | | x | Pompey |
| | 120-121 | x | | | Brutus, Cassius (44) |
| | 146 | x | x | | Antony (44) |
| | 149-150 | | | x | Caesar |
| | *BC* 3.2 | | x | | Antony (44) |
| | 21 | x | | | Octavian (44) |
| | 23 | x | | | Tyrranicides (44) |
| | 23 | x | | | Octavian (44) |
| | 51 | | x | | Ciceronians (44) |
| | 86 | | x | | Octavian (43) |
| | 88 | | | x | Octavian (43) |
| | *BC* 4.66 | | x | | Alexander, Mnaseas (43) |
| | *BC* 4.94 | x | x | | Antony (42) |
| | 97 | | | x | Caesar, Antony, Octavian |
| | 5.4 | x | | | General |

| Author | Locus | | F | S | P | Person |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| App. | *BC* | 5.53 | x | | | Antony (41) |
| Sall. | *Cat.* | 5.6 | | | x | Catiline (64) |
| | | 38.1 | x | x | x | General: *tribuni plebis* |
| | | 52.14 | x | x | | Adherents of Catiline (63) |
| | *Iug.* | 4.3 | x | | | General |
| | | 30.3 | | x | | Memmius (111) |
| | | 37.1 | | x | | P. Lucullus, L. Annius (108) |
| | | 73.5 | | x | | *Magistratus seditiosi* (107) |

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# Index

Notes and appendices are not indexed.

# Samenvatting

Introduction:
In de inleiding wordt een overzicht geboden van de sociologische theorieën die hebben bijgedragen tot het opstellen van de vraagstelling voor het onderzoek. Tevens wordt een overzicht geboden van de voornaamste aspecten van de late Romeinse Republiek.

Chapter 1: Leiderschap
Het Romeinse collectief gedrag werd geleid door leiders op drie niveaux. Hoofdleiders (b.v. Caesar, Clodius) behoorden tot de belangrijkste leden van de Romeinse bovenlaag. Hulpleiders (b.v. Gabinius, Labienus) waren jongere politici die het volkstribunaat bekleedden. Tussenleiders (b.v. Sex. Clodius) waren personen met verschillende functies; zij waren leden van de stadsplebs met een hogere status en zij vormden de schakel tussen hoofdleiders en massa. De leiders van verschillende niveaux maakten deel uit van een organisatie die tot doel had de Romeinse stadsbevolking te mobiliseren en in te zetten in het politiek proces. De leiders stonden in een wederzijdse afhankelijkheidsverhouding tot elkaar.

Chapter 2: Participatie
In de verschillende vormen van collectief gedrag kunnen verschillende soorten participanten onderscheiden worden, hetgeen leidde tot verschillende politieke uitingen. De participanten in het politiek meest belangrijke collectief gedrag, d.w.z. het gedrag dat zich uitte in bijeenkomsten, volksvergaderingen en oproeren, waren de handwerkslieden en kleine winkeliers. Zij waren de in sociaal-economisch en daardoor ook in politiek opzicht meest onafhankelijke groep binnen de Romeinse onderlaag. Zij vormden een publieke clientela, in die zin dat zij als collectief een tijdelijke patronageverhouding aangingen met een volksleider die tevens magistraat was. Materiële voordelen voor de plebs en politieke hervormingsvoorstellen droegen bij tot het verwerven van een aanhang onder het volk, maar waren op zichzelf onvoldoende voor het mobiliseren van de publieke clientela.

Chapter 3: Mobilisatie
Communicatie en propaganda (b.v. slogans zoals "libertas" en "commoda") alsmede het imago van de leider waren verantwoordelijk voor het tot stand komen van een stemming die kon leiden tot daadwerkelijke mobilisatie van de participanten. Het imago van de goede leider bestond uit dienstbaarheid aan de res publica d.m.v. militaire en politieke prestaties en een bescheiden machtsvertoon. Tot directe mobilisatie leidden faktoren als organisatie (b.v. collegia), symbolen (b.v. statussymbolen en associatie met vroegere volksleiders), onverwachte

gebeurtenissen (b.v. acute deprivatie), gelegenheden tot handelen (bevorderd of beperkt door tijd en plaats) en de aanwezigheid van leiderschap. Voor een geslaagde mobilisatie was het van belang dat een leider een magistratuur bekleedde, zodat de actie gelegitimeerd werd. De mobilisatiefaktoren bewogen zich over het algemeen binnen het kader van de bestaande Romeinse tradities. Het succes van volksleiders was afhankelijk van hun imago en het doelmatig gebruik van hun politieke organisatie.

Chapter 4: Collectief gedrag
In dit hoofdstuk worden de diverse vormen van collectief gedrag beschreven, wordt ingegaan op gewelddadig gedrag en wordt verklaard waarom sociale controle in de late Republiek tekort schoot.

Chapter 5: Politiek
Collectief gedrag was een belangrijke faktor binnen het Romeinse politiek proces. Het was een doeltreffend middel voor de plebs om haar wensen te realiseren. De doelen bewogen zich binnen het verwachtingspatroon van de traditionele patroon-clientverhoudingen. De strategie van het leiderschap was niet gericht op het tot stand brengen van veranderingen, maar op het realiseren van persoonlijke ambities. De deelnemers aan collectief gedrag waren niet gepolitiseerd en een sociale beweging kwam niet tot stand. Collectief gedrag leidde tot het herstellen van de traditionele verhouding tussen patroon en client, waarbij een volksleider de patroon werd van de publieke clientela.

Chapter 6: Bronnen
Antieke auteurs gebruikten concepten uit de Griekse politieke filosofie om de gebeurtenissen van de late Republiek te beschrijven. Al naar gelang het politieke standpunt van de auteur werden volksleiders beschreven met de kenmerken van de negatieve dan wel de positief/neutrale demagoog. De Latijnse *popularis* wordt daarmee tot de equivalent van de Griekse *dèmagogos*. Het beeld van de massa was negatief bij alle auteurs. Tijdgenoten van de late Republiek percipiëerden hun periode binnen het denkraam van de stadstaat, waardoor bestaande problemen onvoldoende onderkend werden.

Epilogue:
Aan de hand van het succes van de regering van Augustus wordt een terugblik geboden op de relatie tussen volksleiderschap en collectief gedrag tijdens de late Republiek.

# CURRICULUM VITAE

Op 7 januari 1960 ben ik te Sittard geboren. Na aldaar de lagere school en het Gymnasium doorlopen te hebben, ben ik in 1978 aan de Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen geschiedenis gaan studeren. Het doctoraalexamen heb ik in 1983 met goed gevolg afgelegd. Vervolgens ben ik aan een promotie-onderzoek begonnen waarvan u het resultaat zojuist heeft kunnen lezen.